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Skrandel v. State

Citations: 830 So. 2d 109; 2002 WL 1059868Docket: 4D01-860

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; November 12, 2002; Florida; State Appellate Court

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John J. Skrandel was convicted of aggravated assault with a firearm after an incident at Osborne Park in Palm Beach County on March 21, 1999, involving a heated argument over a batting cage with Michael Adams. During the argument, Skrandel retrieved a gun from his equipment bag and aimed it at Adams, leading to his conviction. The State argued that Skrandel overreacted, while Adams testified that Skrandel threatened him and his son. Testimony indicated that Adams and Randy Huseby intervened to defuse the situation, with Huseby removing a bat from Skrandel’s reach. Skrandel claimed self-defense, pointing out the physical disparity between himself and Huseby, who was significantly larger. Following his conviction, Skrandel filed a pro se motion for a new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to call key witnesses, including Dr. Panzarella, his son, and himself, to support his self-defense claim. The court affirmed the denial of his motion for a new trial.

Dr. Panzarella testified at the evidentiary hearing regarding an incident involving Skrandel, stating he had spoken to Skrandel about switching cages without issue, that Skrandel screamed when Huseby threw a bat but believed there was no danger to Skrandel's child, and that Huseby and Adams approached Skrandel before he pulled out a gun. Skrandel's attorney, Gordon Richstone, acknowledged that Panzarella's testimony could benefit Skrandel but chose not to call him as a witness at trial to avoid introducing potentially damaging statements, including Panzarella's description of Adams and Skrandel as "two maniacs" and confirming that Skrandel pointed a gun at Adams.

Skrandel's son and ex-wife also testified. The son indicated the bat was close enough to hit him, but Richstone decided against calling him due to his young age and unreliable memory. The State undermined the child's testimony by referencing his deposition where he claimed to have his eyes closed during the incident. The ex-wife testified that the son stated someone was trying to harm Skrandel, but the State countered this with deposition evidence suggesting the child only made comments after being calmed down.

Skrandel testified that during a confrontation with Adams, Huseby picked up and threw his son's bat, prompting him to yell for his son to move. He claimed the bat nearly hit his son and that he felt cornered when Adams approached, leading him to pull out his gun. To succeed in his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Skrandel needed to show that his attorney's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced his defense. The trial judge denied the motion for a new trial, determining that the decisions made by Richstone fell within the bounds of competent legal assistance and that Skrandel did not demonstrate the necessary prejudice.

Skrandel appeals on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically the failure to call Dr. Panzarella as a witness. The review standard for counsel's performance is de novo, examining both deficiency and any resulting prejudice. Skrandel's defense was based on his fear for himself and his son during an altercation. To prove prejudice under Strickland, he must show that, had Panzarella been called, there was a reasonable probability of a different trial outcome. While Panzarella could have testified that Skrandel drew his gun after both Adams and Huseby approached him, Skrandel's own testimony at the evidentiary hearing indicates that he acted out of fear of Adams alone, as Huseby had exited the batting cage before the incident. This inconsistency undermines the argument for calling Panzarella, as it contradicts both eyewitness accounts and Skrandel’s own narrative. Consequently, the court found no deficiency in counsel's strategy and affirmed the judgment and sentence. The motion for rehearing was also denied, with additional issues discussed in the court's response.

John Skrandel, convicted of aggravated assault with a firearm, sought a new trial, claiming ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, Gordon Richstone. Skrandel argued Richstone failed to call key witnesses, including Dr. Carl Panzarella, to support his self-defense claim. The trial court dismissed this claim, leading Skrandel to appeal, focusing on the absence of Panzarella's testimony, which he contended would have supported his assertion that he acted out of fear for himself and his son. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, noting Panzarella's testimony at the new trial hearing contradicted Skrandel's claim that his son was in danger, as Panzarella stated the son was never at risk. 

The court also examined whether Panzarella’s testimony would have bolstered Skrandel's self-defense argument. Although Panzarella suggested both Adams and Huseby approached Skrandel before he drew his gun, this conflicted with Skrandel's own testimony that only Adams posed a threat. The court concluded that Panzarella's testimony would not have altered the trial outcome, satisfying the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, but finding no deficiency in Richstone's performance as counsel. The defense did not present a unified theory of self-defense that included both men approaching Skrandel at the same time, rendering the decision not to call Panzarella reasonable. Skrandel's motion for rehearing challenged the appellate court's reasoning, arguing it was inappropriate to create justifications for counsel's decisions and that Richstone's failure to call Panzarella or Skrandel was unreasonable. The court acknowledged the discrepancy between the testimonies but reiterated that the standard for assessing counsel's performance is objective, not subjective.

A reasonably competent lawyer's expected actions are central to evaluating counsel's performance, with a strong presumption that such performance was reasonable and based on sound professional judgment. Courts should not deem counsel incompetent for their strategies unless they fall outside the bounds of what a reasonable lawyer might do. If the record is ambiguous regarding counsel's actions, it is presumed that reasonable professional judgment was exercised. The assessment of counsel's performance is objective, requiring a petitioner to demonstrate that no competent lawyer would have taken the same actions. A court need not analyze the lawyer's mental processes to uphold their strategy. In the case discussed, Skrandel's attorney was not found to have performed deficiently by failing to call Dr. Panzarella as a witness, given inconsistencies in testimonies. Skrandel referenced a ruling from the Seventh Circuit, which criticized a defense counsel for not presenting witnesses in a self-defense case. However, the court believes this interpretation would conflict with the objective standard of reasonableness. Ultimately, it was determined that any competent attorney could reasonably choose not to call Panzarella under the circumstances, especially since Skrandel conceded that his potential testimony could have justified the decision not to call Panzarella.

Skrandel contends that his defense counsel's advice not to testify at trial rendered it unreasonable for the counsel to also not call Dr. Panzarella as a witness. However, this argument was not presented to the trial court. Instead, Skrandel claimed his lawyer was ineffective for not calling Panzarella, along with his ex-wife, son, and himself as witnesses. Given the evidence, it is improbable that Panzarella's testimony, which would have contradicted Skrandel's assertion that only Adams confronted him, would have changed the trial's outcome. Therefore, the conviction is upheld. Notably, the original opinion mistakenly stated that Skrandel had a jury trial, while it was actually a bench trial. The trial judge acknowledged the inconsistency between Skrandel's testimony and that of Panzarella but Skrandel maintained his argument of ineffective counsel without any revision.