Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 23, 1983; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act allows either House of Congress to invalidate the Attorney General's decision to suspend the deportation of a specific alien. Jagdish Rai Chadha, an alien who overstayed his nonimmigrant student visa, was ordered deported after the House vetoed the suspension granted by an Immigration Judge. Chadha challenged the constitutionality of Section 244(c)(2), but the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied the authority to rule on its constitutionality. Subsequently, Chadha sought a review in the Court of Appeals, which found Section 244(c)(2) unconstitutional due to a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
The Supreme Court confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the INS's appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1252, as the INS was an aggrieved party in an action where an Act of Congress was deemed unconstitutional. The Court also determined that Section 244(c)(2) is severable from the rest of Section 244, meaning the validity of the remaining provisions would not be affected by the invalidation of the veto clause. The legislative history and the operational viability of the remaining provisions supported the conclusion that Section 244 could function effectively without the one-house veto.
Chadha has standing to challenge the constitutionality of 244 (c)(2) as he has shown a concrete injury and a significant likelihood that judicial relief will address this injury. The availability of other statutory relief does not bar him from this constitutional challenge, particularly since such alternatives are uncertain. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under 106 (a) of the Act, which mandates that it is the exclusive means for reviewing final deportation orders against aliens, encompassing all matters contingent on the order's validity, including the challenged veto affecting Chadha's deportation.
A case or controversy exists, marked by adverseness from the House's intervention and adequate Article III adverseness beforehand, despite the INS's agreement with Chadha. The INS's position does not negate the necessity for congressional defense of the statute's constitutionality when an agency aligns with the plaintiff's position.
The case does not raise a nonjusticiable political question simply because it involves Congress's authority under the Naturalization and Necessary and Proper Clauses; constitutional issues with political implications do not exempt courts from resolving them.
The congressional veto provision in 244 (c)(2) is deemed unconstitutional. Article I, Section 1, mandates that all legislative powers reside in a bicameral Congress, and Section 7 outlines the legislative process requiring approval from both Houses and the President. The House's action under 244 (c)(2) was legislative in nature and thus required adherence to these procedural norms, as it effectively overruled the Attorney General's decision regarding Chadha's deportation. The one-House veto cannot be construed as a mere amendment to existing standards or a repeal of the deportation provision concerning Chadha.
The one-House veto reflects a legislative function, as Congress must adhere to its delegation of authority to the Attorney General unless that delegation is altered or revoked through legislation. The procedural framework established by the Framers for any unilateral action by either House of Congress is explicitly defined in the Constitution, underscoring the veto's legislative nature. The excerpt affirms the constitutionality challenge regarding the provision in 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which allows one House to invalidate an Executive Branch decision concerning a deportable alien. The case involves Chadha, an Indian national born in Kenya, who entered the U.S. on a student visa that expired in 1972. Following a deportation order, Chadha applied for suspension of deportation under 244(a)(1) of the Act, demonstrating continuous residence for over seven years, good moral character, and potential extreme hardship if deported. An immigration judge suspended his deportation based on these findings, and the decision was reported to Congress as mandated by 244(c)(1).
Suspension of an alien's deportation requires a detailed report to Congress, including the reasons for such suspension, submitted monthly while Congress is in session. Under 8 U.S.C. 1254 (c)(2), Congress can veto the Attorney General's recommendation to suspend an alien's deportation. If either the House or Senate passes a resolution against the suspension during the relevant congressional session, the Attorney General must proceed with deportation or allow voluntary departure. If no resolution is passed, deportation proceedings are canceled.
Chadha's deportation was suspended for 18 months under an immigration judge's order, but Congress did not act on its veto authority until the 94th Congress, which concluded on December 19, 1975. Had Congress not acted, Chadha would have adjusted to permanent resident status. On December 12, 1975, a resolution opposing permanent residency for Chadha and five others was introduced and quickly moved through the House without adequate notice or debate, based on a committee's assessment of hardship. The resolution was passed without a recorded vote, thus not treated as a standard legislative act, and the immigration judge reopened deportation proceedings following the House's veto.
Chadha challenged the constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. 1254 (c)(2), but the immigration judge determined he lacked authority to rule on that issue. Consequently, Chadha was ordered deported on November 8, 1976, in compliance with the House's resolution.
Chadha appealed a deportation order to the Board of Immigration Appeals, arguing that the one-House veto provision of 244 (c)(2) is unconstitutional. The Board dismissed his appeal, stating it lacked authority to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional. Subsequently, Chadha petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) supported his position. The Court of Appeals invited Congress to submit amicus briefs due to the case's significance. After reviewing the case, the Court ruled that the House lacked constitutional authority to order Chadha's deportation, directing the Attorney General to halt any deportation efforts based on the House's resolution. The Court concluded that 244 (c)(2) violated the separation of powers doctrine.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for related cases and noted preliminary jurisdictional challenges regarding the INS's appeal. Congress contended that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1252, which permits appeals when an Act of Congress is held unconstitutional. The Court clarified that the appellate process was valid as the INS was a party in a civil action that declared the one-House veto unconstitutional. Despite Congress's argument that the INS was not aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' decision because it received the outcome it sought, the Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing that the INS was compelled by the House to act on the deportation order and had presented its constitutional concerns in the appellate proceedings.
The INS did not change its decision to comply with a House directive for Chadha's deportation, but the Court of Appeals halted the deportation proceedings and ordered the Attorney General to cease related actions. The court found the INS was an "aggrieved party" under appellate jurisdiction, allowing it to appeal the decision that prohibited action it would normally take. The excerpt addresses Congress's argument that the one-House veto provision in section 244(c)(2) cannot be severed from the entire section, claiming if the veto is unconstitutional, the Attorney General loses authority to suspend Chadha's deportation, thus Chadha lacks standing to challenge it. However, the court references a precedent affirming severability unless it's clear the legislature would not have enacted the valid provisions independently. The Immigration and Nationality Act explicitly states that if any part of the Act is invalidated, the rest remains unaffected. This indicates Congress intended the one-House veto provision to be severable, supported by the legislative history reflecting a shift from case-by-case deportation handling to a more structured process. The presumption of severability stands, despite potential congressional reluctance to delegate final authority on deportation cancellations.
The Immigration Act of 1924 mandated the deportation of unlawfully present aliens by the Secretary of Labor, allowing legal status changes only through private bills passed by both Houses of Congress and presented to the President. However, Congress found this process unmanageable, as demonstrated in a 1937 debate where Representative Dies noted the inefficiency of handling "meritorious" cases through special bills. Although Dies' bill to allow the Secretary to grant permanent residence passed the House, it failed in the Senate.
In 1940, the Alien Registration Act allowed the Attorney General to suspend deportations, but Congress required concurrent resolutions from both Houses to disapprove such suspensions. This process was amended in 1948 to expand eligibility for suspension but also imposed the same concurrent resolution requirement, which became burdensome. The House Judiciary Committee later reported that these requirements interfered with legislative work.
In response, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 introduced a provision allowing one House of Congress to veto the Attorney General's suspension of deportation. This legislative history reflects Congress' desire to simplify the process, indicating that the burden of private immigration bills was significant. Despite these considerations, the presumption of severability is upheld; even if the veto provision in 244 (c)(2) were unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of 244 would still function effectively as law.
The administrative process established by Congress allows the Attorney General to suspend an alien's deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 244(a), with ongoing Congressional oversight through reporting requirements. Deportation proceedings will cease once the designated time under § 244(c)(2) expires, indicating that § 244 remains functional regardless of the one-House veto. Chadha has standing to challenge the deportation order resulting from this veto, as he has shown an injury and a likelihood that judicial relief will address it. The constitutionality of the veto provision could lead to the cancellation of Chadha's deportation order.
There is a contention that the court should avoid ruling on the constitutional issue because Chadha may have other statutory relief options due to his marriage to a U.S. citizen and potential eligibility under the Refugee Act of 1980. However, these alternative avenues are speculative and uncertain, and Chadha's right to challenge the constitutionality of the deportation process cannot be restricted merely based on hypothetical relief.
Furthermore, there are arguments regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), which is claimed to be limited to final orders of deportation made during administrative proceedings under § 242(b). The one-House veto is argued to occur outside these proceedings, which could affect jurisdiction. The precedent in Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS supports the view that jurisdiction under § 106(a) pertains only to determinations made during § 242(b) proceedings, including motions to reopen those proceedings.
One court has interpreted Cheng Fan Kwok as limiting appeals similar to Chadha's, specifically referencing Dastmalchi v. INS, which concluded that the term "final orders" encompasses all matters contingent on the validity of the final order, not just those decided at the hearing. In Chadha's case, his deportation is contingent upon the validity of a veto action by the House of Representatives, making the deportation order itself a direct target of his appeal. Although the Attorney General believed the House’s action was invalid, he allowed the legal process to proceed. The prior case, Cheng Fan Kwok, did not prevent Chadha's appeal because he directly challenges the deportation order rather than seeking relief that is consistent with it.
Further, there was a genuine controversy, as the involvement of Congress in the case established clear adverseness despite the INS and Chadha's agreement on the constitutionality of the one-House veto. The INS's status as aggrieved remains valid for appeal purposes, even with its agreement with Chadha. The Court of Appeals recognized that a ruling in favor of Chadha would prevent his deportation, while upholding the statute would lead to his deportation. Prudential concerns regarding the absence of a party defending the statute were mitigated by Congress's participation, affirming its role as the appropriate defender of the statute's validity when an agency does not contest it.
The case involves a challenge to Congress' authority under the Naturalization Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause of the U.S. Constitution. It is argued that Congress possesses unreviewable authority over alien regulation, but the issue at hand is whether Congress's chosen method of exercising that authority is constitutionally permissible. The precedent set in Buckley v. Valeo establishes that Congress has broad legislative power, provided it does not violate other constitutional restrictions.
A review of factors indicating a nonjusticiable political question, as outlined in Baker v. Carr, reveals that jurisdiction over this case does not violate the political question doctrine. These factors include: constitutional commitments to political branches, lack of judicial standards for resolution, and the need for initial policy determinations by nonjudicial entities. Congress claims Chadha's challenge undermines legislative authority, but if this were true, it would render nearly all constitutional challenges to statutes as political questions.
Chadha contends that a single House of Congress cannot constitutionally veto the Attorney General's decision regarding his residency. The political question doctrine does not permit Congress or the Executive to determine a statute's constitutionality; that responsibility lies with the courts. The standards outlined in Article I provide the necessary judicial frameworks for addressing the issues in this case, negating the need for nonjudicial policy determinations or concerns of disrespect toward other branches of government.
Section 244(c)(2) is deemed unconstitutional, and this Court is responsible for resolving the matter, ensuring no conflicting rulings arise. While the controversy may have political elements, the presence of constitutional issues prevents invoking the political question doctrine. Courts must adjudicate claims challenging the constitutional authority of government branches, regardless of political implications, as established in Marbury v. Madison. The Court has previously ruled that a bill must be legitimately passed by Congress to be considered law, highlighting the necessity of adhering to constitutional provisions regarding law enactment. The Court affirms its duty to address the validity of actions taken by one House of Congress under Section 244(c)(2), beginning with the presumption that the statute is valid. The Court emphasizes that it does not review the wisdom of laws, only their constitutionality, and efficiency alone cannot render an unconstitutional law valid. All parties involved have been properly examined for standing, and the significant issues have been thoroughly briefed and argued.
Convenience and efficiency are not the main objectives of democratic governance, as evidenced by the rising frequency of Congressional veto provisions in statutes that delegate authority to executive and independent agencies. Since the first veto provision was enacted in 1932, there have been 295 such procedures in 196 statutes, with a significant increase occurring from 1970 to 1975, where 163 provisions were included in 89 laws. Justice White argues for the utility of the one-House veto as a political invention, a point that is acknowledged but its long-term political wisdom remains debatable. Policy arguments in favor of political inventions must align with constitutional mandates, which clearly delineate the powers of Congress and the Executive in the legislative process. Key constitutional provisions specify that all legislative powers are vested in Congress, that legislation must be presented to the President before becoming law, and that any order requiring Congressional concurrence must also be presented to the President. These provisions are essential to the constitutional principle of separation of powers, a foundational concept for the Framers of the Constitution.
The text emphasizes the significance of the Presentment Clauses and the bicameral requirement in the context of the separation of powers as outlined in the U.S. Constitution. It highlights the intention of the Framers during the Constitutional Convention to ensure that all legislation must be presented to the President and subject to a veto, which was seen as vital to prevent circumvention of legislative processes. James Madison's concerns about potential evasion of these requirements led to the inclusion of specific provisions to safeguard against mislabeling legislation. The Framers believed that the President's veto serves not only as a check on Congress but also protects against hasty or ill-considered laws that could arise from factionalism or majority impulses. The text references "The Federalist No. 73" by Alexander Hamilton, which discusses the necessity of a presidential power to defend against legislative overreach. It also notes that the Presentment Clauses ensure a national perspective in the legislative process, positioning the President as a representative of the populace alongside Congress members. The interconnectedness of the bicameral requirement and the presidential veto is underscored as a critical component of the legislative framework established by the Constitution.
The Framers of the Constitution established that no law could take effect without approval from a prescribed majority in both legislative Houses, underscoring their belief that legislation requires careful deliberation by elected officials. James Wilson expressed concerns about potential legislative despotism, arguing that without restraints, liberty and stability would be jeopardized, necessitating a division of legislative power into independent branches. Hamilton echoed this sentiment, warning that a unicameral legislature would consolidate sovereignty and foster tyranny, contrary to the Constitution's objectives. The Framers recognized the fallibility of human nature, noting that unchecked legislative bodies are prone to impulsiveness, hindering thorough consideration of societal implications. They advocated for a divided legislature to mitigate the predominance of legislative authority and protect liberty. Additionally, concerns from smaller states about being overshadowed by larger states highlighted the need for a bicameral system, as established in the Great Compromise, which balanced representation and addressed fears of both large and small state interests. The bicameral requirement and Presentment Clauses were thus deemed essential for constitutional integrity.
The President's involvement in the legislative process is aimed at safeguarding the Executive Branch from Congress and protecting citizens from unwise laws. The bicameral structure of Congress ensures thorough deliberation through separate discussions in both Houses. The President's veto power can be overridden by a two-thirds majority in both Houses, preventing unilateral decisions. Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the Constitution establish a detailed legislative procedure reflecting the Framers' intent for the Federal government to operate within distinct powers: legislative, executive, and judicial. The document emphasizes the necessity of maintaining the boundaries of each Branch's authority, warning against the natural tendency to overreach. While the powers of the three Branches are functionally distinct, they are not entirely isolated, and actions taken by each Branch are presumed to be within its constitutional authority.
The analysis focuses on whether the action taken by one House under Section 244(c)(2) aligns with the procedural requirements of Article I, which applies only to genuine legislative actions. It distinguishes between the forms of actions and their legislative character, noting that the legislative nature of a one-House veto can be established by examining its purpose and effects. In this case, the House's action aimed to enforce a uniform rule of naturalization, effectively altering the legal status of individuals, including the Attorney General and the affected alien, Chadha. The one-House veto functioned to mandate Chadha's deportation, which would not have occurred without the House's intervention, highlighting the legislative implications of the action taken.
An individual or both Houses of Congress cannot compel the Attorney General to deport an alien if the Attorney General has already determined that the alien should remain in the U.S. Without the provision in § 244(c)(2), any deportation would necessitate new legislation. Furthermore, a veto by one House under this section cannot be interpreted as an amendment or repeal of standards in § 244(a)(1) or of § 244 itself, as adjustments to statutes must comply with Article I of the Constitution. The legislative character of the one-House veto highlights Congress's prior decision to delegate authority to the Attorney General regarding the status of deportable aliens, a decision which must be respected until formally changed by Congress.
The Constitution explicitly allows one House to act independently only in four narrowly defined instances: initiating impeachments, conducting impeachment trials, approving presidential appointments, and ratifying treaties. These exceptions do not apply to the action challenged in this case. The veto under § 244(c)(2) does not fit within these constitutional limits and thus is an unauthorized exercise of legislative power. The bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses, along with the President's veto power, serve as essential checks on legislative authority, ensuring that the separation of powers is maintained and that no branch of government can overstep its defined role.
Action by one House of Congress must follow the Constitution's prescribed legislative procedures, which require majority passage by both Houses and presentment to the President. The veto provision in § 244(c)(2) is seen as a convenient shortcut, allowing Congress to share authority over aliens with the Executive. However, historical records from the Constitutional Convention indicate that the Framers prioritized a deliberate legislative process over efficiency. They aimed to define and limit federal powers, ensuring that legislation be methodical and thoughtful, despite potential inefficiencies. The Court determined that the legislative veto provision is severable from the Act and unconstitutional, affirming the Court of Appeals' judgment. Justice Powell, while concurring, cautioned against broad implications of this ruling, noting that the legislative veto has been fundamental to Congress in managing power delegation to administrative agencies. He suggested that the Court's decision could be based on narrower grounds, highlighting concerns about congressional overreach into judicial functions. The Framers were wary of the concentration of powers, fearing it could lead to tyranny, as articulated in Federalist No. 47.
Colonial experiences under British rule highlighted the dangers of unchecked executive power, often associated with hereditary monarchy. In response, the states during the Confederation shifted authority from executives to elected legislatures. However, this led to new issues, as legislatures often abused their power, resulting in property confiscation, paper money schemes, and the suspension of debt collection practices. Judicial powers were frequently usurped by state legislatures, leading to concerns about the "tyranny of shifting majorities," as articulated by Jefferson. Reports from the Council of the Censors noted violations of constitutional rights and the encroachment of legislative authority into judicial matters.
To counter these abuses, the Framers established a separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. This framework aimed to prevent unilateral legislative actions that could unjustly deprive individuals of rights, as underscored by the Bill of Attainder Clause, designed to keep legislative functions distinct from judicial ones. The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as a broad safeguard against legislative overreach.
The Constitution does not delineate rigid boundaries between the branches but encourages a balance of power with both separateness and interdependence. The Court has emphasized the need for flexible boundaries based on practical governance rather than strict definitions, ensuring that power is diffused to protect liberty while allowing for effective governmental coordination.
One branch of government may violate the separation of powers doctrine by either interfering with another branch's constitutionally assigned functions or by assuming functions that are more appropriately assigned to another branch. This particular case illustrates the latter scenario. Jagdish Rai Chadha, a Kenyan citizen, requested a suspension of his deportation after his student visa expired, which was granted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and reported to Congress. Congress, however, reviewed the cases of Chadha and 339 others and determined that six individuals, including Chadha, should not be allowed to remain in the U.S. A resolution was submitted to the House stating that it did not approve the granting of permanent residence to these individuals, despite lacking prior distribution or recorded voting. The House's action was adjudicatory, as it made a specific determination regarding the individuals' compliance with statutory criteria, a function traditionally reserved for the judicial branch. Even if the House's action was merely a review of the INS's findings, it still encroached upon a function typically reserved for the courts, indicating an improper assumption of judicial authority by Congress.
Congress has overstepped its constitutional authority by assuming functions reserved for other branches, particularly in the case of Chadha's deportation, where Congress can act without internal constraints that protect individual rights, unlike the judiciary or administrative agencies. The lack of procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and impartial hearings, exposes individuals to potential arbitrary decisions by Congress. Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that while legislatures should create general rules, the application of those rules is the responsibility of other governmental branches. The dissenting opinion highlights the court's invalidation of the legislative veto in the Immigration and Nationality Act as a significant ruling, potentially affecting around 200 similar statutes that rely on legislative vetoes. This mechanism is crucial for Congress to maintain oversight over executive and independent agencies, addressing the dilemma between insufficiently specific laws and the risk of unaccountable policymaking. The legislative veto has been embedded in numerous statutes across various governmental functions, including budgets, foreign affairs, and trade regulation.
The legislative veto emerged as a response to the challenges of reorganizing the federal government during the Great Depression, initially proposed by President Hoover in 1929, who suggested that Congress delegate authority to the Executive with a mechanism for legislative review. This led to the Reorganization Acts, allowing Congress to authorize reorganization subject to legislative oversight. Although the 1933 reorganization authority did not include a legislative veto, it reappeared during the Roosevelt Administration, with Congress using it extensively, disapproving 23 out of 115 reorganization plans submitted by Presidents.
The legislative veto was further utilized during World War II to grant the President greater authority in national security and foreign affairs while maintaining Congressional oversight. Over thirty statutes were enacted during this period that conferred power to the Executive with legislative veto provisions. Post-war, Presidents continued to accept legislative vetoes as constitutional, despite criticizing Congressional committee reviews of Executive actions.
Throughout the 1970s, the legislative veto played a crucial role in addressing constitutional disputes between the President and Congress regarding impoundment, war, and national emergency powers. The War Powers Resolution allowed Congress to terminate military engagement through concurrent resolution, while the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act established a framework for handling impoundments, allowing temporary deferrals unless disapproved by one House. The War Powers Resolution was enacted despite President Nixon's veto, whereas the Impoundment Control Act received his approval. Subsequent legislation, such as the National Emergencies Act, continued to address similar issues.
Legislation addressing unchecked Executive emergency powers, foreign arms sales, and nuclear technology exports includes the following acts: the Emergency Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1622, 1976), the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(b), 1976), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (42 U.S.C. 2160 et seq., 1978). The legislative veto emerged as a solution to balance broad legislative delegations during the 1970s energy crisis and to prevent confrontations between the Executive and Legislative branches over fragmented educational grant programs. This mechanism also preserved Congressional authority over the Federal Trade Commission's role in regulating commerce. The legislative veto is characterized as an essential political tool that facilitates resolution of constitutional and policy disputes, ensures accountability of regulatory agencies, and maintains Congressional control over lawmaking. Historical use of the legislative veto has not been aimed at Congress aggrandizement but rather as a protective measure to uphold its lawmaking authority under Article I of the Constitution. Despite Presidential objections to specific legislative vetoes, there has been a general acceptance of legislative review in exchange for broader delegations of authority. The Court’s recent decision to invalidate all forms of legislative vetoes is seen as regrettable, especially as it undermines a vital check on Executive power and strikes down a mechanism that has proven necessary for Congressional oversight. The critique emphasizes the irresponsibility of invalidating an entire class of statutes based on a singular, atypical case.
Justice Brandeis emphasized the Court's careful approach when evaluating the validity of congressional acts, noting that it avoids creating overly broad constitutional rules beyond the specific facts at hand. Today's ruling on the legislative veto, however, lacks this limitation and implies a clear unconstitutionality that is not universally accepted. The constitutionality of the legislative veto remains contentious, with significant disagreement among scholars, courts, and government branches. The argument is made that if the veto were as evidently unconstitutional as suggested, Congress would not have incorporated it into numerous laws over five decades. The Constitution's silence on the legislative veto indicates that its authorization or prohibition is not clearly defined, thus requiring analysis of its compatibility with Article I and the principles of Separation of Powers. The evolution and complexity of governance since the Constitution's framing necessitate the use of mechanisms like the legislative veto for Congress to maintain its legislative role. The framers intended for the Constitution to be adaptable to the changing needs of governance while upholding democratic principles. Justice Jackson's concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case articulated that governing under the Constitution cannot strictly adhere to judicial interpretations based on isolated provisions, suggesting a need for a practical approach to the legislative veto's constitutional questions.
Neither Article I of the Constitution nor the separation of powers doctrine is violated by the method allowing elected representatives to maintain their governance role. The Court asserts that disapproval of a deportation suspension by one House of Congress constitutes an exercise of legislative power that bypasses the constitutional lawmaking requirements of bicameral approval and presentation to the President. While acknowledging the Court's accurate interpretation of these constitutional provisions, the author agrees that both Houses must approve a bill for it to become law, and that any concurrent resolution exercising original lawmaking authority should be struck down. The author emphasizes the importance of the President's veto power as a check on legislative overreach, echoing sentiments from the Framers regarding the need for both bicameralism and the Presidential veto. However, the author argues that the constitutional issue remains unresolved, noting that a legislative veto does not equate to the ability to create new law without bicameral approval or presidential consideration. The author points out that such a veto must be authorized by statute and can only negate proposals from executive departments or independent agencies. The Court acknowledges that not all actions by either House are subject to bicameralism and presentation requirements and that only bills and their equivalents fall under these requirements. Article I, Section 7 mandates that all bills passed by both Houses must be presented to the President for approval or disapproval, with specific provisions for resolutions or orders requiring Presidential concurrence, reinforcing the necessity of these constitutional processes.
The Clause in question lacks specificity regarding the actions requiring the concurrence of both houses of Congress, but historical proceedings from the Philadelphia Convention indicate its purpose was to ensure adherence to the presentation requirement for new legislation. James Madison highlighted that limiting the President's veto to bills could allow circumvention by labeling proposed laws as "resolutions" instead of "bills." Although an initial proposal to include "or resolve" was rejected, it was later adopted, indicating a limited role for the Clause without broad constraints on Congressional authority. The Framers' primary concern was to restrict methods for enacting legislation, aware of past legislative evasion in Pennsylvania. The Convention did not intend for Article I's requirements to restrict Congressional power, which was perceived as expansive under the Necessary and Proper Clause, allowing Congress to enact laws necessary to execute its powers. The Court's recognition of the modern administrative state highlights that legislative authority is often delegated to executive agencies and private entities, a trend that has evolved despite traditional three-branch government theories. Supreme Court decisions affirm that Article I does not mandate all legislative-type actions to be enacted strictly through formal lawmaking processes. Delegations of legislative power are permissible provided Congress establishes an intelligible principle for agencies to follow, though practical limits on delegation have largely diminished over time.
The Court identified only two cases, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, as instances of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. In other cases, the "intelligible principle" standard allowed agencies to exert significant control over economic matters using terms like "just and reasonable," "public interest," and "unfair methods of competition." Congressional delegation enables independent agencies and executive departments to exercise legislative power without new legislation, leading to a substantial increase in agency rulemaking compared to traditional congressional lawmaking. The Administrative Procedure Act defines "rules" as agency statements that implement or interpret laws, granting these regulations the force of law, binding courts and federal officials, and potentially pre-empting state law.
Congress's ability to delegate lawmaking power raises questions about whether it can also reserve checks on that power for itself. Agencies can enact regulations without bicameral approval or presidential signature, provided the initial statutory authorizations comply with Article I. Delegations of legislative authority are not strictly limited to executive or independent agencies, as seen in cases like Currin v. Wallace and United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, where the Court upheld laws allowing private individuals to veto certain government actions. This suggests Congress may allow veto powers to independent agencies or private individuals but is restricted from reserving such powers for itself.
The Court's opinion contrasts the Attorney General's action of suspending deportation under § 244 with legislative authority, arguing that the Attorney General operates under Article II enforcement powers rather than legislative powers, a view inconsistent with Mahler v. Eby, which recognized deportation authority as a legislative delegation. The Court assumes that judicial review can ensure compliance with Congressional intent, but acknowledges no precedent exists for federal court review of such Attorney General decisions, as affected parties lack the right or motivation to appeal. The Court further asserts that the bicameral process is unnecessary for checking executive actions under § 244, since those actions are bound by the statute's limits. However, it contends that a resolution of disapproval for the Attorney General’s actions does not require bicameral approval, as it merely checks the exercise of the authority granted by the statute. The discussion recognizes that administrative actions can resemble lawmaking and refers to such agency activities as "quasi-legislative." Consequently, the Court's analysis implies that while the Executive Branch and independent agencies can create rules with legal effects, Congress cannot veto these rules, thereby undermining the framers' intent to confer legislative power solely to Congress.
The effective operation of a complex modern government necessitates delegating extensive authority, which may be legislative or quasi-legislative. Article I, the foundation of the non-delegation doctrine, should not prohibit Congress from imposing a legislative veto on such delegations. The Court overlooks that resolutions of disapproval require agreement from the House, Senate, and President, effectively altering the status quo only through this consensus. Legislative powers reserved for Congress should be maintained if their exercise aligns with the distribution of power outlined in Article I.
Historically, Congress did not legislate on alien deportation until 1917, and the Immigration Act of 1924 expanded mandatory deportation categories, removing prior time limits for initiating deportation proceedings. This led to increased hardship for many individuals, including those who entered the U.S. during more lenient times. Over the years, deportation enforcement became stricter, often ignoring individual circumstances. While Congress occasionally provided relief through private bills, significant deportations peaked in 1933, prompting the Secretary of Labor to suspend deportations due to hardship. Proposed legislation to allow some deportable aliens to remain faced opposition for granting excessive discretionary authority and failed.
Subsequent proposals aimed to grant residence to long-term deportable aliens were criticized for undermining congressional control and similarly did not pass. Efforts to address deportation issues continued, with a notable House bill requiring congressional approval for individual deportations, which was amended in the Senate to condition deportation on congressional disapproval of the Secretary's recommendations. The resulting compromise allowed the Attorney General to suspend deportations for eligible aliens.
Deportation can be canceled and permanent residence granted if Congress does not adopt a concurrent resolution of disapproval, as established by the Alien Registration Act of 1940. The Executive Branch, led by President Roosevelt, significantly influenced this legislation. In 1947, the Department of Justice sought authority for the Attorney General to cancel deportations without congressional oversight, aiming to streamline the process. However, Congress objected, insisting on affirmative congressional action prior to cancellation, which resulted in an amendment requiring such approval. This legislative requirement was later deemed impractical, leading to changes in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The Act maintained the necessity of congressional approval for deportation cancellation while allowing the Attorney General to exercise discretion in suspending deportation for certain aliens. Eligibility for this relief includes continuous physical presence in the U.S. for at least seven years, proof of good moral character, and demonstration of "extreme hardship" upon deportation. Judicial review of denial of relief is permitted, with the process involving both a legal determination of statutory conditions and a discretionary decision by the Attorney General.
Under section 244(c)(1), the Attorney General is required to report all suspensions of deportation, detailing the facts and reasons, to Congress. Congress can block a suspension by passing a resolution of disapproval within the same or next session. If Congress does not act, the alien's status is adjusted to that of a lawful resident alien under section 244(c)(2). Historical context indicates that this provision does not change the balance of authority between Congress and the Executive; any permanent change in an alien's deportable status requires agreement from the Attorney General, the House, and the Senate.
The requirements of Article I ensure that any departure from the legal status quo must involve the President and both Houses, or a two-thirds majority in the event of a presidential veto. The Attorney General's recommendation for suspension represents the President's approval, while inaction by Congress signifies their approval. If any of the three parties disagree, the alien retains their previous status, similar to a failed private bill. The Executive and Congress maintain equal authority in determining legal status changes, and nothing changes without consensus among all three entities. This interpretation aligns with the principles of bicameralism and presentation, which the Executive previously supported regarding the constitutionality of the Reorganization Act and congressional review procedures. Potential objections to this analysis are briefly acknowledged but not elaborated upon.
Chadha's nondeportation status before legislative disapproval is clarified, emphasizing that the veto by Congress changes the status quo, contrary to assertions made. The statutory language in Section 244 reveals that Congress has not delegated final authority to the Attorney General regarding the deportation status of aliens; rather, Congress maintains ultimate control over changes to this status. The Attorney General's power to suspend deportation and adjust status is strictly limited to the provisions outlined in the section. A suspension order does not equate to cancellation of deportation or adjustment to permanent resident status; it merely defers deportation and requires Congressional approval to mature into a cancellation and adjustment. The actions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, acting for the Attorney General, lack effect without Congressional ratification, meaning the executive's action is only a recommendation until such ratification occurs.
The document also addresses the constitutional implications of legislative vetoes, noting that a one-House veto may be more constitutionally sound than a two-House veto. If the Attorney General's action is considered a legislative proposal, disapproval by one House suffices to prevent passage, aligning with the bicameral approval requirement. The two-House veto raises additional constitutional questions since neither House can exercise more power individually than is granted to Congress as a whole.
Finally, the potential objection that Congress cannot express approval through inaction is examined. The Court of Appeals noted that inaction could imply various attitudes, but this critique targets the legislative veto's wisdom rather than its constitutionality. The Constitution does not ensure that legislators will scrutinize legislation effectively; accountability lies with the electorate. The argument is made that a private bill does not undergo significantly greater scrutiny than a disapproval resolution under Section 244(c)(2), and the legislative veto is no more vulnerable to this critique than the judicial practice of recognizing Congressional inaction regarding executive actions.
The Court emphasized Congress's inaction on proposed bills to challenge the IRS's interpretation of tax-exempt status under 501(c)(3), suggesting that this inaction may imply congressional approval of the IRS's stance. Similarly, Congress's failure to veto a suspension of deportation by the Attorney General could be seen as tacit approval. The Court of Appeals previously ruled that a specific provision violated the separation of powers principle, which aims to prevent the concentration of power in one branch of government. Historical context shows that while separation of powers is crucial, it must also allow for practical governance, avoiding total isolation of government branches, as a completely hermetic separation would hinder effective self-governance. The Court has typically invalidated actions only when they violate explicit constitutional provisions, citing examples where congressional actions compromised presidential appointment powers or judicial authority. The essence of a functional government requires a balance that allows for delegation of authority to executive and independent agencies for addressing complex policy issues, in line with past rulings that set forth criteria for evaluating potential disruptions to the balance of power between branches.
The excerpt addresses the constitutionality of Section 244 (c)(2) regarding the legislative veto power in relation to the Executive Branch's authority, particularly concerning the suspension of deportation for aliens. It establishes that the Executive Branch lacks a constitutional function to suspend deportation, emphasizing Congress's extensive legislative power over immigration matters. The excerpt references key legal cases, asserting that the President's role is confined to executing laws established by Congress, without extending beyond the authority granted by Congress.
Section 244 is characterized as providing a qualified suspension authority to the President, which aligns with constitutional limits. The legislative veto is viewed as an exercise of legislative authority that does not infringe upon the Executive or Judicial Branches' prerogatives. The Attorney General's suspension of deportation is likened to a legislative proposal, with Congress retaining the right to disapprove rather than ratify.
The excerpt contrasts Section 244 with private bills, indicating that it enhances rather than diminishes Executive authority and does not undermine the Executive's decisions' "weight and dignity." Furthermore, it clarifies that congressional review does not replace judicial review of the Attorney General's decisions, which are subject to limited judicial scrutiny. The excerpt concludes that Congress retains its judgment in the statutory process, and there is no constitutional requirement for judicial review concerning the suspension of deportation decisions.
Congress possesses the authority to expel individuals, akin to its power to exclude specific classes of aliens, which can be executed through executive officers or with judicial assistance to verify facts related to an alien's eligibility to remain in the country, as established in several Supreme Court cases. While some legislative vetoes may conflict with separation of powers principles, the legislative veto discussed serves as a crucial check on the growing power of executive agencies, rather than an overreach by Congress. The dissenting opinion expresses concern over the Court's ruling, which it perceives as fundamentally altering the Constitution's interpretation, undermining Congress's ability to enact laws, and complicating the democratic process by shifting policy-making away from elected representatives. An appendix lists fifty-six statutes that provide for congressional review, categorized into areas such as foreign affairs, national security, and budget, highlighting specific laws that allow for legislative vetoes or oversight.
Civilian personnel assignments to Sinai, foreign assistance contingent on human rights standards, and presidential offers to sell defense equipment may be disapproved by concurrent resolution, as outlined in various legislative acts from 1975 to 1978. Key statutes include the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976, and the National Emergencies Act, all allowing congressional disapproval of specific presidential actions. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 permits congressional disapproval of cooperative agreements related to nuclear materials and technology. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 enables disapproval of budget deferrals by either House. Trade laws, such as the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and the Trade Act of 1974, grant Congress the authority to disapprove presidential trade recommendations and actions. The Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974 and energy-related legislation further emphasize congressional oversight over presidential decisions regarding exports and oil export continuations.
Proposed rules or orders by the President regarding the allocation or acquisition of essential materials can be rejected by either House of Congress. For energy actions related to fuel economy and pricing, Congressional disapproval is also required. The President's extension of production periods for naval petroleum reserves, as well as proposed sanctions associated with federal assistance and energy conservation standards for new buildings, may face disapproval from either House.
International agreements and expenditures for foreign spent nuclear fuel storage by the Secretary of Energy necessitate a concurrent resolution for approval if not legislatively consented, and plans exceeding $50 million for demonstration facilities require approval from both Houses. The Secretary of Energy's establishment of an oil and gas lease bidding system and the export of oil and gas can be disapproved by either House or through a concurrent resolution, respectively.
Presidential reimposition of natural gas price controls can be rejected through concurrent resolution, while the Congress retains the ability to reimpose those controls as well. Amendments by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that involve cost passthroughs for natural gas are subject to disapproval by either House.
Proposals by the President for domestic crude oil production and any prohibitions by the Secretary of Commerce on agricultural exports must receive concurrent resolutions for approval. Loan guarantees by the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Commerce which exceed specified thresholds, as well as the President's proposals for loans or guarantees above set amounts, may be disapproved by either House. Additionally, contracts for the purchase of more than 75,000 barrels per day of crude oil, including those aimed at addressing energy shortages through synthetic fuels development, are subject to Congressional disapproval.
Procedures are established for either House of Congress to disapprove various proposals and actions related to the Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC) and other regulatory matters. Key points include:
1. The SFC can request additional time for its comprehensive strategy, which can be disapproved by either House through resolution.
2. Proposals for amendments to the SFC's comprehensive strategy by its Board of Directors may be disapproved via concurrent resolution or by the failure of both Houses to pass an approval resolution.
3. Both Houses can approve proposed actions of the SFC by concurrent resolution or reject them.
4. Proposed loans and guarantees by SFC require approval but can be disapproved by either House.
5. Any acquisition by SFC of a synthetic fuels project receiving financial assistance can be disapproved by either House.
6. Contract renegotiations by SFC that exceed initial cost estimates by 175% are subject to disapproval by either House.
7. Proposed financial assistance for synthetic fuel projects in the Western Hemisphere outside the U.S. may also be disapproved by either House.
8. The President’s request to suspend provisions regarding reserve buildup and crude oil sale/disposal requires approval from both Houses.
9. Various acts outline that Department of Education regulations, Federal Election Commission rules, Supreme Court proposed amendments, and other rules from different federal agencies may all be disapproved by either House or require concurrent resolution for disapproval.
These procedures ensure legislative oversight over significant actions and proposals related to SFC and broader regulatory frameworks.
Proposed premium schedules by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) necessitate approval via concurrent resolution, with the option for Congress to disapprove revised schedules for voluntary supplemental coverage also through concurrent resolution. Various legislative acts outline that regulations and rules from different governmental departments, including the Environmental Protection Agency, Secretary of the Interior, and Secretary of Commerce, may be disapproved by concurrent resolution from either House of Congress. Specifically, the Secretary of Education's Pell Grant family contribution schedule, Secretary of Transportation's safety programs and freight agreements, and Consumer Product Safety Commission regulations are subject to disapproval by either House resolution. Additionally, the Federal Civil Defense Act and the National Aeronautics and Space Act provisions regarding interstate compacts and function transfers to NASA can also be disapproved. The President's alternative pay plan and the distribution plan for Indian Claims Commission judgment funds are similarly disapprovable by resolution from either House.
The Secretary of the Interior's plan to assume the assets of the Menominee Indian Corporation can be rejected by either House of Congress through a resolution. Various legislative acts outline specific congressional controls, including the need for concurrent resolutions or resolutions from either House to disapprove actions such as District of Columbia Charter amendments, interest rate changes by the Federal Reserve, recommendations for military educational assistance, land sales, unemployment compensation rates, the continuation of the Senior Executive Service, and the designation of marine sanctuaries. A dissenting opinion from Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, discusses the implications of severability clauses in legislation. It asserts that while such clauses suggest that a valid portion of a statute should remain enforceable if part is invalidated, the ultimate determination relies on legislative intent rather than the presence of a severability clause. Rehnquist concludes that he believes Congress did not intend for a specific one-House veto provision to be severable, emphasizing that Section 244 (c)(2) is dependent on the entirety of the provision for the Attorney General's authority to suspend deportations.
The Court asserts that exceptions within a statute cannot be severed without undermining the legislature's intent, as severance would extend the statute's application beyond what Congress intended. Citing Spraigue v. Thompson, the Court emphasizes that removing exceptions alters the statute's purpose. It also references Davis v. Wallace, highlighting that an unconstitutional provision does not expand the scope of other provisions. The Court argues against the severance of § 244 (c)(2), noting that Congress did not intend for the Executive Branch to have unilateral authority over deportation suspensions, as evidenced by Congress's repeated rejections of requests for complete discretion. The legislative history shows Congress sought to maintain control, whether through concurrent resolutions or one-House vetoes, and has not provided any indication of a willingness to allow unfettered executive power in this area.
The Court has indicated a confusion between Congress's intent to allow suspensions of deportation and its ability to implement that intent. The author argues that section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is not severable from the rest of the statute and proposes reversing the Court of Appeals' judgment. Congress has delegated enforcement responsibilities of the Act to the Attorney General, who operates through the Immigration and Naturalization Service within the Department of Justice.
The term "veto" refers to the President's constitutional power, but Congressional actions similar to those permitted under section 244(c)(2) are often termed a "veto," specifically a "one-House veto" regarding the Attorney General's decisions on deportation cases. It remains unclear if the House, particularly Subcommittee Chairman Eilberg, fully grasped the implications of House Resolution 926 in relation to the Attorney General's decision to suspend deportation for an individual named Chadha. A year prior, Eilberg had introduced a resolution disapproving another suspension of deportation for six aliens, during which he confirmed that such resolutions do not contradict the Attorney General's actions.
Eilberg's statements suggest that the House resolution aimed to confirm the Attorney General's determination of deportability, but the author contends this was misleading. The true purpose of the resolution was to overrule the Attorney General's decision, not to affirm it.
Nine Members of the House of Representatives have filed an amicus curiae brief opposing the positions taken by the Senate and House, advocating for the affirmation of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Senate and House were authorized to intervene in this case through resolutions S.Res. 40 and H.R.Res. 49, 97th Congress, and their motions to intervene were granted by the Court of Appeals, making them proper parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). Additionally, the appeal must present a justiciable case or controversy as per Article III, which exists in this instance due to the involvement of both Houses of Congress as opposing parties. The excerpt indicates a focus on severability issues, referencing prior case law such as Buckley v. Valeo and United States v. Jackson. It notes that without a one-House veto, Congress would retain the power to enact deportation laws under Article I unless constrained by other constitutional principles. Historical context is provided regarding a past bill that aimed to deport a specific individual, which the Attorney General criticized as a departure from precedent. The brief also compares the challenged statute to a "report and wait" provision from Sibbach v. Wilson, emphasizing that while Congress had the right to review rules, it did not possess unilateral veto power. The status of Chadha, depending on the interpretation of the law, may be adjusted retroactively to that of a permanent resident as of December 19, 1975, potentially affecting his citizenship waiting period under 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).
Judicial review under § 106(a) does not encompass the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) due to the inability to challenge this issue during administrative deportation proceedings under § 242(b), as established in Dastmalchi v. INS. In Dastmalchi, Iranian aliens challenged a reporting regulation during the hostage crisis but could still be deported regardless of that regulation. In contrast, Chadha's deportation hinged on § 244(c)(2). The precedent in Bob Jones University v. United States illustrates that government agreement with a party on the merits does not negate jurisdiction if the law is enforced against that party. Additionally, the claim that § 244(c)(2) is immune from constitutional review due to its Congressional passage is refuted by Marbury v. Madison, which asserts that executive assent does not shield legislation from judicial scrutiny. Historical instances show that multiple presidents have questioned the constitutionality of Congressional vetoes, with Attorney General opinions highlighting concerns over provisions they deemed unconstitutional, further illustrating the tension between legislative enactments and constitutional principles.
Key points of discussion include whether the presidential veto should be absolute or qualified, and if qualified, the necessary approval from each legislative house for a bill to become law. There is also debate about whether the veto power should be solely with the president or shared with another government department. The importance of the Great Compromise is highlighted, as it is protected from alteration without consent from the affected states, as stated in Article V of the Constitution.
Concerns are raised that affirming a ruling from the Court of Appeals could allow the Attorney General to engage in "lawmaking" without going through the full bicameral legislative process. While some administrative actions may have a quasi-legislative nature, such as rulemaking, the President's role is clarified as not being a lawmaker but rather an executor of laws. The Attorney General's actions, when performed under delegated authority, do not constitute legislative power, and the bicameral process does not apply to administrative activities that operate within the confines of existing statutes.
The constitutionality of the Attorney General's execution of authority centers on delegation doctrine, with courts able to assess compliance with Congressional intent. The Attorney General operates under Article II powers while administering the Immigration and Nationality Act. Executive actions that may mimic legislative functions do not require Congressional approval, as the Constitution does not mandate such a process. Instead, these actions are subject to checks based on the enabling legislation, with judicial review available if authority is exceeded and Congress retaining the power to modify or revoke such authority.
A one-House veto is fundamentally legislative in nature and requires checks under Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the Constitution. Congress’ ability to delegate powers to administrative agencies does not justify a Congressional veto over the administration of laws. Although the excerpt does not evaluate whether such a veto would breach constitutional provisions, it emphasizes that there is no constitutional allowance for Congress to repeal or amend laws through non-legislative means. The Framers expressed a preference for establishing limits on the duration of laws rather than facilitating their repeal. Congress retains significant oversight and control over administrative agencies through various mechanisms, including setting duration limits and imposing reporting requirements. While there are exceptions to the Presentment Clauses, such as in the context of constitutional amendments and certain internal Congressional actions, these exceptions do not permit Congress to act in legally binding ways outside the legislative framework, reaffirming the Framers' intent for strict legislative procedures. Additional safeguards, such as the requirement for a two-thirds Senate majority for treaty consent and impeachment convictions, further illustrate the precautionary measures intended by the Framers. The holding in Hollingsworth v. Virginia confirms that a resolution for a constitutional amendment bypasses the Presidential approval requirement but necessitates a two-thirds majority from both Houses.
Three-fourths of the states are required to ratify any constitutional amendment. Justice Powell contends that the one-House veto is a judicial act and thus unconstitutional, as it exceeds Congress's constitutional authority. Although the one-House veto appears to review Executive actions, such as the resolution vetoing Chadha's deportation suspension, it lacks a perfect analogy to judicial action. Federal courts are restricted by Article III to addressing justiciable cases and controversies, which were absent in the Attorney General's decision regarding Chadha. Courts do not have the authority to review deportation suspensions but can assess whether the Attorney General applied statutory standards correctly. Justice Powell's characterization of the one-House veto as adjudicatory is unsupported, and it is determined that the veto serves a legislative purpose, adhering to the procedures outlined in Article I. The one-House veto does not alter the bicameralism and presentation requirements for future legislation affecting aliens. Justice White's argument that the Attorney General's action is akin to a legislative proposal, with Congressional approval inferred from a lack of veto, is countered by the Court of Appeals, which suggests that the one-House disapproval does not equate to a lack of affirmative action by Congress.
Justice White's position implies that any legislative actions circumventing the constitutional requirements of Article I would effectively amend the Constitution itself. The legislative processes outlined in Article I were intentionally crafted to ensure participation from both Houses of Congress and the President in lawmaking. Although legislation does not always require prior debate, there must be opportunities for deliberation and discussion, as established in United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz. Allowing Congress to bypass these constitutional mandates by adopting Executive proposals through silence contradicts Article I's intentions.
Justice White's dissent highlights the legislative veto's presence in various statutes, raising questions about its compliance with the Presentment Clauses depending on the context of its use. There is hesitance to declare all legislative vetoes unconstitutional based on the current case's unique circumstances. The historical context is reinforced by Thomas Jefferson's concerns regarding judicial independence and its implications on individual rights, especially illustrated during the Aaron Burr trial, which underscores the need for a neutral judiciary free from political influence.
The House and Senate argue that the legislative veto does not inhibit executive functions; however, this does not address the risk of Congress exercising unchecked judicial power, which could undermine individual liberties. The Framers established the separation of powers to prevent such arbitrary governance. Additionally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service administers the Immigration and Naturalization Act under the Attorney General's authority, which delineates specific procedures for deportation and provides for judicial review of these decisions, emphasizing the importance of structured legal processes.
The statute for the legislative veto restricts Congress's timeframe to veto the Service's decision to suspend deportation, as outlined in 8 U.S.C. 1254 (c)(2). In this instance, Congress had Chadha's report for about a year and a half but acted only three days before the deadline, necessitating a departure from standard resolution procedures and increasing the risk of arbitrary decisions. The Court viewed Congress's action as legislative since each branch typically operates within its designated authority. However, the distinction between legislative and adjudicative actions is nuanced, and determining whether a branch has overstepped its powers requires examining the potential dangers highlighted by the Framers of the Constitution.
The Court argued that the one-house veto was not judicial because the Immigration and Naturalization Service's decision was not subject to judicial review. Nonetheless, this reasoning overlooks the fact that the House effectively acted as an appellate body by overturning the Service's ruling without providing Chadha with legal representation or a hearing. The impact on Chadha's rights would be comparable to a scenario where Congress found someone guilty after an acquittal. While Congress can grant relief under its spending power or admit individuals through special acts, it cannot unilaterally determine that an individual has no legal right to remain in the U.S. This would diverge from established American practices, as noted by Attorney General Robert Jackson. The text also acknowledges that independent regulatory agencies often exercise powers that have judicial characteristics.
The function of the agencies is rooted in public law and adheres to procedural safeguards, including judicial review, as outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.). Justice Powell notes that the respect for Congress as a coordinate branch of government dictates that the ruling should be narrowly tailored to the case at hand. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that the complexities of agency rulemaking do not hinder the ability to establish specific criteria in the governing statute, which is relevant to the separation of powers and the validity of the unicameral device. Historical references highlight Congress's attempts to assert control over executive actions through legislative vetoes, with various administrations defending their constitutionality. Legislative veto provisions have been proposed and supported by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and discussions around their legitimacy have evolved, particularly concerning committee versus full congressional vetoes. Several specific legislative acts and proposed bills with veto provisions are mentioned, reflecting ongoing debates about the balance of power between legislative and executive branches.
A tariff recommended by the Tariff Commission can be enacted through a concurrent resolution. The Impoundment Control Act has facilitated legislative review of budget deferrals, with 65 out of hundreds proposed by Presidents disapproved without Executive protest. Broad statutory delegations regarding energy management and petroleum reserves include veto provisions, such as in the Naval Petroleum Reserves Production Act and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) possesses extensive authority to regulate commercial activities, prompting Congress to introduce a two-House legislative veto as a check on this broad delegation; however, the constitutionality of this veto is currently under review in court cases involving the FTC. While Congress could draft more specific statutes, practical political dynamics hinder this approach, as exemplified by the complexities in immigration regulation where the inability to comprehensively define deportable categories led to the cancellation of proposed regulations aimed at ensuring uniform adjudication.
Oversight hearings and congressional investigations serve specific purposes but cannot replace the actual exercise of authority by Congress. While the "laying" procedure from Sibbach v. Wilson is appropriate for certain legislative measures, it has limitations due to Congress needing to pass new laws to control administrative actions, which diminishes its ability to monitor authority effectively. Corrective legislation enacted after agency regulations or executive actions can lead to significant negative consequences, such as economic damage from retroactive price control changes or strained international relations from rescinded arms sales.
The Court may consider whether certain forms of legislative veto align with Article I requirements. One potential approach is to interpret a resolution of disapproval as a guide for understanding delegated lawmaking authority—indicating legislative intent that could prevent enforcement of agency rules contrary to that intent. This interpretation acknowledges the historical practice of recognizing legislative reactions to administrative actions. However, reliance on congressional silence as consent is complicated by concerns about misinterpreting the original Congress's intent and the difficulties in ascertaining a subsequent Congress's views. The passage highlights several cases that illustrate the complexity of interpreting congressional action and intent in relation to administrative rulemaking.
The original statute permits subsequent legislative review, which grants Congress the authority to clarify the law's meaning. The inclusion of a disapproval resolution provides a clear indication of Congressional intent, contrasting with the ambiguity that may arise from other Congressional actions, such as the failure to pass an amendment, which could be interpreted in various ways. The legislative veto serves as a definitive sign that a specific agency or Executive decision is opposed. However, the lack of a veto resolution should not be interpreted as support for that decision. Various legal commentaries have been produced both in favor of and against the legislative veto, reflecting on its implications for separation of powers and Congressional oversight.
The excerpt references several legal cases and constitutional provisions regarding legislative vetoes. It notes the Supreme Court's decision in 1978 that upheld the legislative veto provision in the Federal Salary Act but simultaneously declared the legislative veto in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 unconstitutional. The text emphasizes the distinction between legislative vetoes that require approval from one or both Houses of Congress and those exercised by congressional committees. It also discusses the interpretation of a savings clause in the Immigration Act, arguing that it pertains to severability of major parts of the Act rather than individual provisions. The historical context highlights Congress's long-standing desire to maintain oversight on individual suspension cases, indicating that any judicial alteration of this oversight undermines legislative intent. Additionally, it mentions the Pennsylvania Constitution's requirements for public bills, which were often circumvented through "resolves" for urgent legislation, suggesting a historical precedent for legislative evasion that influenced the discussions at the federal Constitutional Convention.
Madison, who initiated the motion for the Presentation Clause, was informed by the Council of Censors report and recognized the Pennsylvania experience. The Council of Censors report has been acknowledged as relevant in constitutional interpretation, as seen in Powell v. McCormack. Although the legislative veto emerged in the twentieth century, early Congressional practices illustrate that Article I was not intended to impose strict limitations. The First Congress exercised broad investigatory powers without formal legislation. Notably, the Northwest Territories Ordinance of 1787, initially drafted under the Articles of Confederation, allowed for the adoption of laws subject to Congressional disapproval, a provision that persisted after the Constitution's enactment. Although Congress occasionally disapproved of territorial actions, instances exist where one House disapproved laws while the other did not, with no evidence suggesting that such disapproval resolutions required Presidential presentation or were constitutionally questionable. The First Congress's actions, comprised largely of the framers of Article I, did not consider the Constitution to preclude a precursor to the modern legislative veto, indicating a more flexible interpretation of Congressional powers during that period.
The Court emphasizes the importance of contemporaneous legislative interpretation of the Constitution, asserting that such interpretations by the founders have long been accepted as authoritative. It distinguishes between substantive regulations, which are legally binding and issued by agencies under statutory authority, and agency interpretations of statutes, which may not carry the same weight. Judicial deference to agency interpretations reflects a delegation of lawmaking authority to those agencies.
The excerpt further discusses the principle of separation of powers, asserting that legislative power should reside with Congress, executive power with the President, and judicial power with the Courts. A system that allows delegation of legislative power to the President while restricting Congressional oversight undermines this principle. The legislative veto mechanism is framed as a necessary check on Executive authority.
Additionally, the Court critiques the argument that a resolution of disapproval should be treated as new legislation. It clarifies that the Attorney General's role in deportation cases is limited to suspension of orders, not cancellation or adjustment of immigration status, which require Congressional action. The constitutionality of the legislative veto process under Section 244(c)(2) is questioned, with the assertion that it does not amend or repeal existing laws, which is supported by the Framers' intent for any unilateral Congressional action to be narrowly defined.
The document argues against the notion that all congressional actions with a legislative character require formal law passage, stating that established exceptions—such as impeachment, appointment reviews, and treaty ratification—do not pertain to legislative powers. The Constitution’s grant of impeachment authority does not limit Congress's ability to create legislative vetoes over subjects within its lawmaking jurisdiction. Attorney General Bell, in an opinion regarding the constitutionality of the legislative review provisions in the reorganization statute, asserted that the procedures outlined in Article I are not exclusive to legislative enactments. He concluded that if a statute does not alter the constitutional balance of power between the legislative and executive branches, it is constitutional. The reorganization statute's structure, which allows presidential discretion not to submit a plan and grants Congress the power to reject it, meets constitutional standards. Although the Attorney General focused on that statute, the same reasoning applies to other statutes. A positive vote requirement would ensure compliance with bicameralism. Concerns that Congress did not consider the foundational principles of legislative vetoes during enactment are countered by historical precedents from the Reorganization Acts. Madison's writings on the separation of powers emphasize that while distinct branches should not wholly control one another, some interaction is permissible, supported by Montesquieu’s view that the legislature should evaluate the execution of its laws.
