Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 22, 1983; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
The New Jersey Legislature's 1980 congressional reapportionment plan, which created 14 districts with an average population of 526,059, was challenged for its validity due to population deviations among districts. The largest district had 527,472 residents, while the smallest had 523,798, resulting in a deviation of 0.6984% from the average. A District Court ruled the plan violated Art. I, § 2 of the Constitution, as the population differences, although minor, were not the product of a good-faith effort to achieve equality.
The Supreme Court held that the "equal representation" standard mandates congressional districts be apportioned for near population equality, placing the burden on challengers to prove that population differences could have been minimized through good-faith efforts. If proven, the state must then justify significant variances as necessary for legitimate goals.
The Court determined that a mere small maximum deviation does not equate to a good-faith effort, and fixed numerical standards cannot excuse population variances without context. It found no legal basis to treat deviations below the anticipated census undercount as equivalent to zero. The census, despite its imperfections, is the only reliable measure for assessing population levels and forming equality efforts.
The Court concluded that the population differences in New Jersey's plan could have been mitigated through good-faith efforts, such as transferring entire political subdivisions to achieve greater equality. Therefore, the District Court's finding that the plaintiffs demonstrated the plan did not align with the principle of population equality was affirmed. The state also failed to prove that the deviations were necessary for a consistent legislative policy, as specific justifications for the deviations were lacking.
The court addressed whether New Jersey's congressional district apportionment plan complied with Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, focusing on the necessity of population equality among districts. The primary justification for the plan was to maintain the voting strength of racial minorities; however, the appellants did not demonstrate that the population disparities were essential for this purpose. A three-judge District Court found the 1982 reapportionment plan unconstitutional, citing precedents from Kirkpatrick v. Preisler and White v. Weiser, because the population deviations, although minor, did not stem from a genuine effort to achieve equality. Following the 1980 census, New Jersey's representation decreased from 15 to 14 seats, prompting the legislature to create a new plan. The Feldman Plan, passed by the 200th Legislature and signed into law, established 14 districts with an average population of 526,059, but variations existed, with the largest district having a population 3,674 higher than the smallest. Alternative plans, such as the Reock Plan, proposed smaller population deviations. Soon after the Feldman Plan's enactment, various stakeholders, including incumbent Republican Congress members, sought a declaration that the plan violated constitutional standards and requested an injunction against its implementation for upcoming elections.
A three-judge district court was assembled under 28 U.S.C. 2284(a) and held a hearing on February 26, 1982, where parties submitted depositions, affidavits, and moved for summary judgment, waiving the right to introduce further evidence if denied. The court subsequently declared the Feldman Plan unconstitutional, denying the summary judgment motions and concluding that the population variances in the plan were not "unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality," as referenced in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler. The court rejected the appellants' claim that a deviation less than the census's statistical imprecision equated to mathematical equality, also noting appellants did not justify the variances based on the Legislature's goals of preserving minority voting strength or anticipating population shifts. The District Court enjoined the appellants from conducting elections under the Feldman Plan, but this order was stayed pending appeal. The document elaborates on the standard of "equal representation for equal numbers of people" as established in Article I.2, emphasizing that while absolute equality may be unattainable, states must make a good-faith effort towards it. Courts must assess whether population differences could have been minimized through such efforts, placing the burden of proof on those challenging the apportionment. If plaintiffs can demonstrate a lack of good faith in achieving equality, the state must justify any significant population variances. The appellants assert that the Feldman Plan reflects a good-faith attempt at equality since its maximum deviation is smaller than the expected census undercount.
Kirkpatrick's principles reject arguments supporting a flexible 'as nearly as practicable' approach to population equality in legislative apportionment. Fixed numerical standards, which might allow for population variances, are viewed as undermining the Constitution’s ideal of equal representation. Accepting any significant deviation, such as the appellants' suggested 0.7% maximum deviation, raises questions about how to address slightly larger deviations, leading to arbitrariness in apportionment. While recognizing inherent limitations in census data, the document asserts that only equality aligns with the aspirations of Article I, Section 2. The rigorous adherence to absolute population equality is primarily required for congressional districts, reflecting a balance between national legislative needs and state interests. Historical application of this standard has not led to unjust outcomes, and advancements in technology have simplified achieving population equality in districting. Abandoning this constitutional interpretation could weaken judicial authority and potentially invite challenges to established legal standards, thus reaffirming that no de minimis population variations are acceptable without justification.
Appellants propose a de minimis line based on the statistical imprecision of the census, arguing that deviations from ideal district sizes, when less than the census's known imprecision, are effectively negligible. This approach faces two key issues: it emphasizes a systematically underreported population figure, which is uncertain and irrelevant to the case, and it incorrectly assumes that minor deviations equate to equality despite statistical imprecision. Appellants rely on Dr. James Trussell's affidavit, which outlines that the 1980 census undercount is likely over one percent and varies by demographics but does not provide a precise undercount level for New Jersey. The affidavit’s conclusions do not substantiate appellants’ argument, as they fail to define how the undercount affects population deviations among districts. For the one percent undercount to justify a corresponding one percent deviation, the undercount in smaller districts would need to be disproportionately larger, a scenario unlikely to be true without supporting evidence. Moreover, Trussell's findings do not clarify the variability of undercounts across different municipalities or how these factors affect district populations, undermining appellants' claims.
Dr. Trussell acknowledges that the distribution of undercounts in New Jersey is unknown, indicating that any relationship between the census undercount and the districts created by the Feldman Plan is coincidental. The census may systematically undercount populations variably across regions; however, this does not invalidate the population differences between congressional districts as determined by uncorrected census data. Despite the potential inaccuracies, census data remains the most reliable indicator of relative population levels, establishing that a district with a higher census count is more likely to be larger than one with a lower count. This level of certainty is adequate for decision-making.
The census is deemed the 'best population data available,' essential for good-faith attempts to achieve population equality. Claims that population deviations arise from census flaws require precise support, which is lacking in this case. The population deviations in the Feldman Plan reflect genuine differences among districts that could have been minimized with a sincere effort towards equality, making it inappropriate to consider the Feldman Plan equivalent to a population-equal plan.
The District Court noted that alternative plans presented in the 200th Legislature had smaller maximum deviations than the Feldman Plan. While appellants argue that these plans differed politically and therefore were not comparable, it is recognized that apportionment is inherently political. However, population differences must be justified, placing the burden on the State in such cases. The District Court did not need to base its findings solely on the existence of alternative plans. Instead, it could have achieved greater numerical equality by reallocating entire political subdivisions between adjacent districts, thus reducing population deviations in the Feldman Plan without significant difficulty. The District Court correctly determined that the Feldman Plan did not come close to achieving population equality as required.
The discussion establishes that the Feldman Plan's unconstitutionality is not automatically inferred from its failure to achieve population equality. Instead, the responsibility shifts to the State to demonstrate that any population deviations serve a legitimate state interest. While small differences in congressional district populations can be permissible if aligned with constitutional standards, the State must justify these deviations with specific, rather than general, assertions. Acceptable justifications may include maintaining compact districts, respecting municipal boundaries, and preserving the integrity of prior districts, provided these criteria are applied consistently and nondiscriminately.
The extent of allowable deviations is flexible, contingent upon factors such as the size of the deviations, the significance of the State's interests, the overall reflection of those interests, and the availability of less deviant alternatives. Previous cases, including Kirkpatrick, acknowledged that variations in voter eligibility or population shifts could justify deviations, but the Court rejected such justifications when they were inadequately documented or inconsistently applied.
The District Court correctly determined that the appellants failed to substantiate the population deviations in the Feldman Plan, primarily arguing only the need to preserve the voting strength of racial minorities. Affidavits presented by mayors and a mayoral candidate highlighted the importance of black voter majorities in specific districts but did not sufficiently justify the deviations according to the required legal standards.
The District Court determined that the appellants failed to establish a causal relationship between the preservation of minority voting strength in the Tenth District and population variances in other districts. Specifically, the court found no connection between the voting strength goal and the population deviations in the Fourth and Sixth Districts, noting that the Fourth District's large population diluted the votes of all its residents, including racial minorities. The court applied the two-part test from Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, concluding that New Jersey's 1982 congressional district apportionment was not functionally equal and did not represent a good-faith effort to achieve population equality. The court’s findings were upheld, affirming the judgment. Additionally, Justice Stevens concurred, addressing allegations of political gerrymandering, characterizing it as a form of vote dilution prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. He noted that under Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, while it mandates the apportionment of representatives, it does not restrict how states define their congressional districts. This interpretation aligns with the precedent set in Wesberry v. Sanders and reinforces the constitutional basis for the court's decision.
Classification of registered voters by criteria such as initials, age, residence duration, or political affiliation is permissible under Article I, Section 2, even if these classes have unequal voter numbers. Historically, this section acknowledged inequalities, such as the three-fifths compromise regarding representation of enslaved individuals. The Civil War Amendments reformed this framework by abolishing slavery and establishing voting rights, effectively nullifying Article I, Section 2's unequal representation mandates. Despite this, Article I, Section 2 does not guarantee equal representation; that assurance is derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as emphasized by Justices Clark and Black in their respective opinions.
The Supreme Court has not consistently invoked the Equal Protection Clause in reviewing state congressional district laws post-Wesberry v. Sanders, although it forms the foundation for the 'one person, one vote' principle applicable to both congressional and state legislative districts. The Equal Protection Clause mandates that state electoral rules must serve the community's interests impartially; any rule benefiting a specific segment at the expense of another violates this principle. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Court struck down a boundary change that effectively disenfranchised black voters, highlighting that discriminatory treatment based on race violates both the Fifteenth Amendment and principles of equal protection.
The Court has treated the case of Gomillion as if it were decided on equal protection grounds, as seen in Whitcomb v. Chavis. Gomillion involved the complete exclusion of a racially identified group from a geographical area. Following this, the Court has indicated that the dilution of voting strength among both racial and political groups may be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. This principle was highlighted in Fortson v. Dorsey, concerning apportionment schemes that could diminish the voting power of such groups. Similar references appear in Gaffney v. Cummings and White v. Regester.
Justice Douglas, in his separate opinion in Williams v. Rhodes, emphasized that the Equal Protection Clause safeguards voting rights for various groups, not just racial ones. The Court's decision in Abate v. Mundt noted the absence of bias favoring specific political interests in apportionment. Justice White acknowledged that any plan discriminating against a racial or political group would violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause must treat all citizens equally, without favoring certain groups over others, as established in Zobel v. Williams. Thus, protections against vote dilution extend beyond racial groups to include other identifiable voter groups. The political strength of a group is tied to the number of voters who act collectively, rather than solely their shared ethnic, racial, or religious backgrounds.
Additionally, there is a critique of the focus on achieving perfect population equality in evaluating apportionment plans, advocating that gerrymanders should not escape scrutiny even if they approach this ideal.
The proposal to relax the population equality standard established in Wesberry and subsequent cases is criticized for lacking merit and potentially resulting in shifting forms of unfairness. The argument emphasizes that additional criteria should supplement the population equality standard to ensure effective evaluation of equal protection challenges to districting plans. Key considerations should include the significant adverse impact on identifiable political groups, objective indicators of irregularity, and the state's ability to demonstrate that the plan serves neutral, legitimate community interests.
Historically, the Court refrained from judging the constitutionality of legislative apportionment plans, even with significant population disparities, until Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims established the "one person, one vote" principle. This principle is deemed "judicially manageable" due to the reliability of census data. However, it has limitations, as it does not adequately address the significance of minor numerical differences in population counts and fails to guarantee equal representation for groups.
While numerical equality protects individual voters, it does so only indirectly for groups. The text underscores that a smaller numerical disparity does not necessarily equate to a fairer districting plan, noting that absolute equality can coexist with extreme gerrymandering, which can undermine the popular will on critical issues.
Developments in computer technology have exacerbated gerrymandering, complicating efforts to ensure fair electoral districting. While numerical standards for evaluating district plans provide a neutral criterion, they are inadequate as they do not consider other significant factors affecting political fairness and group participation. The Court has occasionally recognized discriminatory treatment of voter groups, particularly through the lens of intentionality, where a majority's deliberate actions to hinder minority representation may render an electoral plan unconstitutional. However, relying solely on intent is insufficient, as legislators inherently incorporate political motivations into redistricting. A substantial adverse impact on a political group, alongside significant deviation from neutral criteria, should shift the burden of justification to the state. Plaintiffs face challenges in proving their claims, needing to demonstrate membership in a politically salient group, show adverse effects on their voting strength, and establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Evidence of voting rights dilution can be derived from the "one person, one vote" principle or through the examination of district shapes, among other methods.
Dramatically irregular district shapes may indicate potential gerrymandering and warrant further explanation, deviating significantly from mathematical standards of compactness can suggest illegitimate motives. Compactness facilitates political organization, campaigning, and representation, and is mandated by various state laws, though these requirements are often not rigorously defined. Scholars have proposed precise methods to measure compactness, similar to population counts, with drastic deviations serving as red flags for potential issues. Additionally, extensive deviations from established political boundaries may indicate gerrymandering, as seen in Reynolds v. Sims, where disregard for natural or historical boundaries invites partisan manipulation. Stable political subdivisions foster community interests and administrative convenience in legislative districts. While the significance of deviations varies, they can be quantified and compared across plans. Procedural standards also offer insight; if a plan's formulation excludes diverse viewpoints or employs partisan criteria without justification, it raises concerns about its validity. Conversely, plans developed through neutral processes with transparency should be presumed valid.
A voting scheme may be constitutionally valid even if it worsens the position of a specific group or has irregular geographic features, provided the State demonstrates that the overall plan serves acceptable, neutral objectives. Justifications accepted by the Court for population disparities apply similarly to issues of shape, compactness, political boundaries, and decision-making processes. To counter a prima facie case of invalidity, the State must present legitimate considerations tied to rational state policies and must show specific reasons for deviations rather than relying on general claims. The court’s analysis considers the size of deviations, the importance of state interests, consistency with those interests, and alternative plans that could better achieve population equality.
If a State fails to demonstrate adequate neutral criteria supporting its plan, a court may conclude that the scheme is irrational or intended to diminish the political power of the affected group. While federal courts do not need to invalidate all plans influenced by partisan maneuvering, they are empowered to provide constitutional remedies in severe cases.
The referenced case does not require departing from established court reasoning in prior cases, and the identified shortcomings in the New Jersey plan concerning shape, compactness, and boundaries reinforce the conclusion that it violates the Equal Protection Clause. The district configurations are described as "uncouth" and "bizarre," reminiscent of recognized gerrymanders. Specific examples include districts that disregard geographical compactness and county boundaries, such as the "Swan," which spans multiple counties, and the "Fishhook," which traverses parts of various communities, indicating significant partisan manipulation in redistricting.
A map related to New Jersey's congressional reapportionment raises questions about the process behind its adoption, which was led by the Democratic party in control of the State Legislature and Governor's office. The plan was enacted just before a Republican Governor took office, and legislators did not clarify the criteria for selecting this plan over others. Several discarded plans, including one by expert Dr. Ernest Reock, Jr., offered districts that were more equal in population, compact, and aligned with subdivision boundaries, but these were rejected due to partisan motives, as noted by the District Court. A letter from the Democratic Speaker acknowledged the importance of leveraging Democratic control for redistricting. The decision-making process was found to favor increasing Democratic representation while diminishing Republican seats. Although no definitive conclusion was reached regarding the plan's constitutionality as a partisan gerrymander, the lack of legitimate justifications for the population deviations undermined the plan's validity. The potential for further distortions in future plans raises concerns about the effectiveness of judicial oversight in ensuring fair representation, aligning with past judicial standards aimed at ensuring citizen participation. Justice White, joined by other justices, dissents in this case.
The New Jersey Legislature enacted a districting plan on January 19, 1982, reducing congressional districts from 15 to 14 in response to the 1980 census. The newly created districts exhibit an average population deviation of 0.1384% and a maximum deviation of 0.6984%, equating to a difference of 3,674 individuals among over half a million residents. A divided District Court invalidated the plan, ruling that the population variances were not unavoidable despite a good faith effort to achieve equality. The Court's decision marks a precedent of invalidating a districting plan with deviations under 1.66%. A dissenting opinion argues against the Court's demand for perfect equality, suggesting that the cases cited (Kirkpatrick v. Preisler and White v. Weiser) do not necessitate the outcome and calling for a reevaluation of these precedents. The dissent expresses skepticism that the Court's ruling promotes fair representation, emphasizing that achieving an absolute equal voting weight is impractical, especially in light of historical malapportionment, such as the significant disparities in population sizes among congressional districts prior to Wesberry v. Sanders. The dissent highlights the Court's prior acknowledgment of the impracticality of achieving precise mathematical equality in districting.
Mathematical precision is not a feasible constitutional requirement for redistricting. Following the Wesberry decision, states worked to minimize disparities between congressional districts. However, the Court later struck down redistricting plans with small percentage deviations (5.97% and 13.1%) in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler and Wells v. Rockefeller, asserting that the "as nearly as practicable" standard necessitates a good faith effort toward achieving numerical equality. The Court rejected the idea of a fixed population variance that could be considered de minimis. This ruling was applied in White v. Weiser, which invalidated a Texas redistricting scheme with a 4.13% variance.
The Court noted that while Kirkpatrick's deviations were small, they were still significantly larger than those at issue in the current case. It highlighted the absence of a fixed point for determining acceptable variance and noted that the Missouri plan approved post-Kirkpatrick had a deviation of 0.629%, which was deemed unconstitutional in this context. The decision is not seen as predetermined by Kirkpatrick or Weiser. Justice Brennan, in a stay order, questioned whether Kirkpatrick mandates strict mathematical precision or allows for legislative discretion in choosing among plans with minimal variances. The variances in the New Jersey plan are considered statistically insignificant, especially given that the Census Bureau acknowledges inaccuracies in census data, estimating a 2.3% inexactitude for the 1970 census, which surpasses the New Jersey plan's maximum variance of 0.6984%. Thus, the court should not assume that minor differences in redistricting plans reflect actual population variances.
Dr. James Trussel, an expert accepted by the Court, asserts that the undercount in New Jersey's census is unevenly distributed across municipalities, which makes it impossible to create truly equal congressional districts based solely on census data. He opines that districts with a population difference of less than one percent should be regarded as equal, arguing that striving for numerical equality beyond this threshold is illusory. Although the deviation of 0.6984% in this case is not statistically insignificant, it is minimal compared to other variations arising from the inherent fluctuations in district populations and participation rates. The census represents a snapshot in time, and demographic changes occur continuously, often rendering the data outdated. Additionally, factors such as the youth of a significant portion of the population, registration failures, and foreign nationals further complicate accurate representation.
Trussel emphasizes that accepting the imperfections of census data does not undermine the commitment to fair representation. He concurs with Judge Gibbons' dissenting opinion, which argues against prohibiting minor population variances that do not materially affect representation. He expresses concern that the Court's stance on avoiding any de minimis population variations may lead to excessive litigation over congressional redistricting plans across the country. Many states have adopted plans with greater deviations than New Jersey's, which could provoke constitutional challenges under the Court’s rationale.
Furthermore, the Court's requirements compel state legislatures to justify their choices rigorously, as any variance is deemed "significant," placing a heavy burden on states to demonstrate that differences in populations were necessary for legitimate purposes. This rigorous standard could complicate future redistricting efforts.
When the state does not meet its burden, courts typically resort to alternative districting plans, often leading to disputes that persist until just before elections. To minimize litigation, legislatures or bipartisan commissions might feel pressured to adopt plans with the least population deviation, but this approach may undermine fair representation. The rigid focus on numerical precision could lead to absurd outcomes, such as splitting households between districts, which diminishes the integrity of the "one man, one vote" principle. The Court has not provided compelling reasons for its decision or demonstrated that it aligns with the goals of fair representation, as established in previous rulings. It declines to uphold any definitive numerical standard that would limit federal court intervention, claiming that the principle of population equality has generally not caused harm. However, the application of this principle has become excessively stringent, and there is skepticism about the Court's assertion of success in this area. Ultimately, the document argues for the recognition of legislative judgment in apportionment matters, suggesting that state legislatures are better equipped to balance traditional policies within constitutional parameters.
A decade of experience with the Kirkpatrick decision indicates that strict adherence to absolute population equality in districting allows for significant partisan gerrymandering. The ability of legislators to create district plans that maintain population equality while disregarding political and geographical boundaries poses a threat to fair representation. While neither absolute nor substantial equality can effectively prevent gerrymandering, the former provides a rationale for legislators to manipulate district lines in favor of political advantage. Justice Harlan's dissent in Wells v. Rockefeller highlighted concerns that districts could be compacted to diminish the representation of particular political or racial groups, which has proven accurate, as evidenced by current practices favoring the dominant political party.
Moreover, the Kirkpatrick framework leads to increased judicial intervention in legislative matters, as courts often become involved in reapportionment—a primarily political process. This judicial involvement can result in federal courts making political decisions that diverge from the original legislative intent. The insistence on strict numerical equality has prompted many political losers to challenge districting outcomes in court, resulting in an estimated 25% to 35% of congressional district lines being drawn by courts. The extension of Kirkpatrick's standards to allow minimal deviations from equality exposes redistricting plans to further legal challenges. Lastly, the reliance on stare decisis to uphold Kirkpatrick, despite the Court's willingness to overturn other aspects of its rulings, raises questions about the consistency of legal principles applied in these cases.
The Court in Kirkpatrick firmly rejected the justification of slight variances in congressional district sizes to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions, emphasizing that such variances are not legally acceptable. It further dismissed the notion that compactness of districts could justify population variances, stating that aesthetic preferences in district shapes cannot legitimize deviations. Justice Fortas noted that the Court systematically refuted every potential justification for variances.
However, subsequent Court opinions, without acknowledging the Kirkpatrick precedent, suggest that various legislative policies—such as compactness, respect for municipal boundaries, and preservation of existing districts—may warrant some degree of variance. Justice Stevens indicated that greater weight should be given to state interests over strict population equality. The majority appears inclined to apply this new standard with deference to state concerns, allowing for a de minimis range of population deviation akin to that allowed in legislative reapportionment cases.
The insistence on strict equality discourages legislatures from considering legitimate factors in their plans, as any minor deviations must be specifically justified to avoid invalidation and judicial intervention. Additionally, maintaining precise mathematical equality could facilitate gerrymandering. The Court has recognized, in past cases, that small deviations typically do not constitute constitutional violations and has upheld plans that accommodate political subdivisions and ensure fairness.
The principles established in Gaffney v. Cummings regarding legislative apportionment apply equally to congressional redistricting. The goal of fair representation does not necessitate the elimination of minor population variations, as significant disparities can undermine representation, but strict mathematical equality is not the only factor. The emphasis on raw population counts can obscure other critical considerations for effective representation. Congressional districts differ from state legislative districts in that states create more districts, which requires greater allowances for geographical and political boundaries. Additionally, due to the larger size of congressional districts, any percentage variation corresponds to a greater number of people, suggesting that judicial scrutiny should be less stringent in congressional cases unless extraordinary circumstances arise. A deviation of up to 5% is deemed reasonable for challenges, with greater deviations permissible if linked to significant state interests, such as maintaining compact districts and respecting political subdivisions. The New Jersey plan in question has a minimal deviation and, despite other potential issues, does not violate constitutional requirements. However, should evidence of invidious discrimination against specific groups arise, the situation would warrant different scrutiny. Lastly, the court suggests that small population variances may be justified by consistent legislative policies, advocating for a remand of the case for further consideration rather than upholding the lower court's decision.
The New Jersey legislature's challenges in creating congressional districts with equal populations were influenced by its decision to avoid dividing municipalities. Despite limited evidence in the record, the State should have the opportunity to defend its population deviation plan beyond the singular justification of preserving racial minority voting strength. The dissenting opinions emphasize that strict adherence to mathematical equality in legislative reapportionment is impractical and overlooks important factors such as political and geographic boundaries. The reliance on Kirkpatrick v. Preisler leads to an invalidation of New Jersey's redistricting plan based solely on population deviations, which the dissenters argue are not significant. Moreover, the insistence on numerical equality risks enabling partisan gerrymandering, suggesting that the Constitution allows for reasonable variations from exact population equality to accommodate legitimate state interests.
A districting plan with an average population deviation of 0.1384 and a maximum deviation of 0.6984 complies with constitutional requirements for equal population apportionment among districts. However, concerns regarding gerrymandering—the intentional distortion of district boundaries for political gain—are raised. It is noted that gerrymandering poses a greater threat to representative equality than mere deviations from census figures. Injuries from such practices may have constitutional implications, particularly when electoral rules favor one group and disadvantage another, violating the equal protection guarantee.
Gerrymandered districts often disregard political and natural boundaries, undermining the goal of fair representation. The legitimacy of a legislator’s representation and voters' ability to make informed decisions are compromised when districts are artificially constructed. While irregular district shapes may occur due to geographic and demographic factors, and political considerations are inherent in democratic processes, courts should remain open to constitutional challenges against partisan gerrymandering that results in discrimination.
A reapportionment plan is not invalid simply because an alternative could be less partisan. However, any plan that aims to significantly disenfranchise identifiable voter groups violates the constitutional mandate for fair representation. Unconstitutional discrimination may be suggested by district boundaries that lack a clear relationship to legitimate state purposes.
Justice Stevens emphasizes that irregularly shaped electoral districts may indicate potential gerrymandering, necessitating a legitimate explanation from the state for their configuration. Significant deviations from compactness and established political boundaries are critical indicators of such manipulations. In this context, the New Jersey Legislature’s districting appears heavily influenced by partisan interests rather than rational criteria, as the districts created lack compactness and do not respect natural or historical boundaries, leading to confusion among voters and representatives alike.
Judge Gibbons critiques the apportionment plan, noting it produces districts that are not only non-compact but also disconnected in terms of community interests, evidenced by disparate media and transportation systems within the same districts. He argues that the partisan nature of the redistricting is apparent, as it was designed to disadvantage certain incumbents. Gibbons' dissent highlights strong concerns about the constitutionality of the New Jersey Legislature's redistricting as a gerrymander.
Despite these findings, the issue was not addressed by the District Court, and the matter of population equality is set aside, with dissenting opinions referencing relevant census data that influenced the redistricting process. The latest population figures, which were not available to the Legislature at the time of the redistricting, are deemed irrelevant for consideration in this context.
Apportionment among states within the Union is based on their respective populations. In New Jersey, Speaker Alan Karcher indicated a maximum one percent deviation for legislative plans, yet there was no significant effort to improve upon this threshold. Justice White's five percent deviation solution is criticized as arbitrary, lacking a direct correlation to actual voter populations and failing to address population equality issues. If states pursue alternatives to total population for districting, they must do so in a consistent and systematic manner, avoiding arbitrary adjustments. The New Jersey Legislature's difficulties in achieving equal populations stem from a decision to avoid splitting municipalities, which, while a legitimate goal, does not justify population inequality without a robust rationale. Justice White contends that strict population equality rules might inadvertently facilitate gerrymandering; however, the requirement for states to justify population deviations could mitigate this risk. The principle of population equality does not prevent states from enacting measures against gerrymandering, provided they make a genuine effort toward population equality.
Justice WHITE argues that the absence of a de minimis rule leads to increased litigation and federal court interference in state matters. He suggests that such a rule would have rendered this case less appealing for litigation. Historical patterns indicate that federal court involvement typically arises not from new apportionment plans failing to meet established criteria but from partisan conflicts that hinder state legislatures from updating plans following significant census findings of malapportionment. Examples cited include several cases from the 1970s and 1980s where federal courts intervened in state apportionment.
The document also discusses the implications of population undercount in census data, particularly how it affects congressional district populations. An illustrative scenario shows that even with a one percent statewide undercount, the actual population deviation between districts can vary significantly based on the distribution of uncounted individuals. Additionally, it highlights that the undercount of the black population is notably higher than that of the white population, complicating accurate district representation. Adjustments to the existing Feldman Plan are recommended to minimize population variance across districts, demonstrating the need for careful consideration of demographic factors in apportionment plans.
Montville and Boonton Town are being added to the Eighth District from the Fifth District, while River Edge and Oradell are being transferred to the Ninth District from the Fifth District. The transfer of Roosevelt from the Fourth to the Seventh District notably aligns the town more closely with the mean and addresses its geographical isolation. Similarly, River Edge, Oradell, Norwood, and Montville are largely surrounded by the proposed new districts, indicating a need for redistricting adjustments. The document suggests that further refinements could be made using computer analysis and census data but does not prejudge the validity of a plan incorporating these changes. It acknowledges that small deviations from population equality are permissible if justified by consistent state policies, as supported by various court cases. Courts have upheld plans with minor deviations in favor of those reflecting consistent state policies, even when they do not present the lowest population deviation. The critical question posed is whether the state has justified any variances based on a coherent policy. Furthermore, it was noted that the drafters of the Feldman Plan aimed to maintain the integrity of existing districts and municipal boundaries.
Speaker Karcher's affidavit indicates legislative concerns regarding the Ninth District's complete inclusion within Bergen County. However, these justifications were not presented to the District Court or this Court in a substantive manner, leading to them being excluded from the appellants' argument about whether preserving minority voting strength can justify small deviations from population equality in congressional reapportionment. Several alternative plans considered by the Legislature maintained lower population deviations and proposed an all-Bergen County Ninth District. The excerpt references the historical apportionment of Representatives, noting that the U.S. Constitution originally included provisions for counting a portion of the slave population, which resulted in disproportionate representation for slave states. It argues against interpreting a "one person, one vote" requirement into Article I, Section 2, claiming such an interpretation is both historically and textually flawed. Additionally, it highlights that discriminatory legislation, which effectively dilutes the voting power of certain citizens, contravenes the equal protection clause, as illustrated by the implications of the 1901 State Apportionment Act.
The "one person, one vote" rule, rooted in the Equal Protection Clause, safeguards against various forms of voter discrimination, particularly in cases where district boundaries diminish the weight of votes in populous areas while enhancing the political power of rural voters. This rule not only protects individual voters but also identifies and mitigates discrimination against specific voter groups. Gerrymandering is highlighted as a tactic that capitalizes on cohesive voting patterns among certain groups, raising concerns that without clearer guidelines to limit it, the principle of equal representation could devolve into a mere facade for discriminatory practices. Technological advancements now allow for the generation and analysis of multiple redistricting plans, contrasting sharply with the limited options available during the 1970s reapportionment. The text emphasizes that identifiable voter groups, defined by factors such as political affiliation and race, may face challenges in proving vote dilution due to existing alternative strategies.
Vote dilution can occur in two primary scenarios: when a group’s population is fragmented across multiple districts or when it is overly concentrated in a single district beyond the threshold needed for electing a preferred candidate. Legal precedents, such as Mobile v. Bolden, highlight these situations. In Voting Rights Act litigation, federal courts have gained insights into the challenges of measuring the dilution of racial voting strength, which may also apply to political party claims, although proving harm for political parties may be more complex due to various baseline measures of party strength, like voter registration and historical election performance.
The text critiques conventional metrics for evaluating gerrymandering, arguing against defining it solely by district shapes while acknowledging that compactness and contiguity can be legitimate criteria. An odd district shape, combined with racial demographics, can shift the burden of justification to the state. While compactness standards might not eliminate gerrymandering entirely, they could limit the discretion of those drawing district boundaries. Importantly, even if districts are compact, it is still possible for a group's voting strength to be diluted.
Modern transportation and communication advancements weaken the validity of geographical justifications for population-based representation deviations. Arguments favoring these deviations for effective representation in sparsely populated areas are largely unpersuasive today. However, the creation of districts with irregular shapes and boundaries raises distinct concerns. Additionally, several state laws and constitutions explicitly mandate that districts be compact and contiguous, emphasizing the importance of these principles in districting.
Various mathematical measures of compactness for legislative districts are discussed, highlighting different methodologies for assessing geographic and sociopolitical compactness. One approach involves calculating the relationship between the district's area and the area of its smallest circumscribing circle, sensitive to elongation. Another method examines the ratio of the district's perimeter to the circumference of the smallest circumscribing circle to assess boundary indentation. Additional techniques include evaluating the distances from the district's center of gravity to each point within the district, the degree of boundary indentation in nonconvex districts, and the aggregate length of district boundaries. The document also notes that oddly-shaped political subdivisions may compromise geographic compactness, referencing specific state statutes that acknowledge the impact of county boundary lines and population density on compactness. Furthermore, it distinguishes between geographic and sociopolitical compactness, suggesting that in some cases, districts aligned with transport corridors may be more efficient for representatives, advocating for a measure based on travel time rather than strict geometric compactness.
In Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, the Supreme Court acknowledged that strict adherence to subdivision boundaries does not prevent gerrymandering and criticized a state's justification of population disparities based on such adherence. The discussion specifically focuses on partisan gerrymandering within relatively equal population districts. The author expresses disagreement with the notion that respecting subdivision boundaries inhibits gerrymandering, citing concerns about dividing smaller subdivisions among multiple districts, particularly when they also encompass parts of other subdivisions.
Instances of gerrymandering are highlighted, particularly the 1961 New York congressional redistricting, which was criticized for its lack of opposition participation and public transparency. The state may defend against claims of gerrymandering by arguing that a group's voting strength is not diluted overall, even if it has been reduced in specific districts. The author emphasizes the need for the state to demonstrate that its justification for districting is consistent with its interests, rather than merely focusing on population deviation sizes.
It is noted that even neutral plans may adversely affect some political groups, and some degree of vote dilution is inevitable due to residential patterns. Therefore, prima facie standards should be stringent enough to avoid excessive litigation over every apportionment plan's adverse impact on political groups. The text references previous cases to support these points, underscoring the complexity of establishing fair representation in districting efforts.
Allegations assert that Act 140 represents an extreme case of gerrymandering rather than a standard geographic redistricting measure. A hypothetical scenario illustrates how intentional manipulation of district boundaries could allow a minority party to gain disproportionate legislative control, highlighting the potential for significant electoral imbalance. New Jersey's recent congressional map has been characterized as a "four-star gerrymander" due to its irregular district shapes, with specific districts designed to consolidate Republican votes in a manner detrimental to Democratic interests. The redistricting process is seen as a strategic opportunity for Republicans to close a narrow margin in Congress, especially as demographic shifts occur. Circuit Judge Gibbons expressed concern over the map's lack of compactness and community representation, indicating a clear intention to disadvantage a political group. The dissenting opinion criticized the districts for their disjointed nature and the overtly partisan tone of communications regarding the redistricting.
Partisanship has led to the manipulation of congressional district boundaries, resulting in the placement of Congressmen Smith and Courter in districts where they face incumbents. Data from 1962 indicated significant variances in district populations, with 35 out of 42 states having disparities exceeding 100,000. The Court has acknowledged the importance of these "enormous variations" in early legislative apportionment cases. District courts have upheld plans with population deviations, such as a 0.78% deviation being accepted over a 0.13% alternative. The National Academy of Sciences estimated a 2.5% national undercount in the 1970 census, with the 1980 census possibly undercounting by over 2 million, potentially reaching 5 million.
The Court acknowledged Dr. Trussel's data as possibly correct but dismissed it as guesswork due to the inability to precisely quantify statistical imprecision and variances across districts. The issue of whether a plan with the smallest maximum deviation improves or worsens population equality among districts remains uncertain. The Census Bureau's methodology for district population counts also complicates the assessment of equality, as geographic boundaries can influence data aggregation. Absolute numerical equality in census data does not equate to equal district populations. The Court’s comments on statistical certainty regarding district sizes were seen as overly simplistic, emphasizing that the critical factor is the extent of size differences between districts under different plans.
Variable undercounting and discrepancies between census units and district lines can lead to significant differences in maximum population deviations among congressional districts. Focusing on minute variations becomes impractical when there is uncertainty about their impact on actual population differences. For instance, in New Jersey, population growth in the 1970s resulted in some districts increasing by as much as 26%, while others saw declines of up to 8.7%. The absolute equality of populations across districts is unattainable due to factors such as birth and mortality rates, societal transience, and census inaccuracies.
In 1978, the adult population varied notably among New Jersey's congressional districts, with District 10 having 282,000 individuals aged 18 and over compared to 429,000 in District 2. Nationally, about 71% of the voting-age population registers to vote, and discrepancies in voter turnout further distort the weight of votes across districts. For example, the number of votes cast in the 1982 New Jersey congressional races varied significantly between districts, with District 10 receiving 92,852 votes and District 9 receiving 186,879.
States exhibit various maximum population deviations, with Indiana at 2.96% and Alabama at 2.45%, among others. The Court's position requires justification for any population difference between districts, placing a heavy burden on state legislatures. Even adopting a plan with minimal deviation does not guarantee avoidance of constitutional challenges. The Court criticized New Jersey's legislature for not selecting a plan with the smallest deviation, indicating that federal judges may require plans to be better than any proposed alternatives. Additionally, while mathematical proof can often demonstrate population deviations, political gerrymandering is less amenable to such quantification.
The excerpt critiques the application of the "one-man, one-vote" principle in the context of partisan gerrymandering. It argues that this principle, aimed at ensuring equal population representation in congressional districts, is being misused by state legislators across the political spectrum to justify partisan redistricting. This practice often disregards important considerations such as community boundaries and shared interests among constituents, leading to district maps that cross city, county, and township lines to achieve population equality. The focus on strict population equality has inadvertently facilitated gerrymandering, as legislatures are incentivized to draw irregular district boundaries.
The text highlights a shift in redistricting norms, with a decline in emphasis on compactness and local boundaries, resulting in increased partisan gerrymandering claims. The example of New York post-Wells v. Rockefeller illustrates how Republican control led to a new congressional districting plan that, while adhering to population deviation standards, fragmented urban areas to dilute Democratic concentrations. The commentary suggests that the Supreme Court's decisions have not only lacked effective checks against gerrymandering but have also made the practice easier, as shown by the significant changes to district boundaries without significant population deviation. The excerpt concludes with an ironic note on the plaintiff who originally challenged the districting, indicating a desire to revert to the previous arrangement.
Certain state interests relevant to legislative reapportionment do not apply to congressional districting. While preserving the integrity of political subdivisions may justify minor population variances in state legislative districts, it cannot justify malapportioned congressional districts. Congressional cases are governed by Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, whereas legislative cases are based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is no constitutional basis for the differing treatments of these two types of redistricting. Early cases indicated that equal population in districts is paramount, and the decision in Kirkpatrick rejected the legitimacy of considering nonpopulation factors in congressional redistricting. Following the overruling of Kirkpatrick, the justification for disparate approaches to congressional and legislative reapportionment is eliminated. Experience has shown that allowing minor population variances in legislative apportionment does not undermine the goal of equal population. Various legislative policies may justify some variance in district populations, including compactness, respect for municipal boundaries, and preserving prior district cores. The recent congressional redistricting in Illinois serves as an example of this new legal standard, which emphasizes the importance of state interests and the consistency of their application over the size of population deviations.
After the Illinois Legislature failed to implement a reapportionment plan, a three-judge District Court selected one of four plans with varying maximum population deviations, ultimately choosing the plan with the smallest deviation that favored Democratic voting strength. This decision, affirmed by the Supreme Court, highlighted the effectiveness of a sophisticated computer program that ensured nearly equal population across districts, with the most populous district having only 171 more residents than the least populous. The court showed no concern over the division of cities and counties in the new district lines.
Similar cases, such as Carstens v. Lamm and O'Sullivan v. Brier, illustrated a trend where state legislators produce increasingly partisan redistricting plans, knowing they are vulnerable to legal challenges. Federal district courts have shifted roles from merely reviewing state plans for constitutionality to actively selecting among options. The importance of keeping entire cities within single voting districts was noted as it enhances voter identity and awareness of representatives, potentially leading to more informed voting. Examples from New Jersey further demonstrated the fragmentation of counties in various redistricting plans, with significant divisions leading to complexities in voter representation.
