Local 926, International Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones

Citations: 75 L. Ed. 2d 368; 103 S. Ct. 1453; 460 U.S. 669; 1983 U.S. LEXIS 139; 51 U.S.L.W. 4343; 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3272Docket: 81-1574

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; April 4, 1983; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

Combined Opinion SummaryCombined Opinion Original

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Respondent Robert C. Jones filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) against Local 926, International Union of Operating Engineers, alleging his discharge from a supervisory position was procured by the Union due to his non-membership. The Union's conduct was said to violate the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), specifically § 8(b)(1)(A) and § 8(b)(1)(B), which address coercive actions against employees and employers regarding collective bargaining and grievance processes. The NLRB's Regional Director declined to issue a complaint, citing insufficient evidence of the Union's coercive actions. Jones subsequently pursued a state court action claiming the Union interfered with his employment contract, but the trial court dismissed the case, stating it was preempted by the NLRA. The Georgia Court of Appeals later reversed this dismissal. The Supreme Court ultimately held that Jones's state-court action was preempted by the NLRA. It established that if state regulation addresses conduct that is arguably covered by the NLRA, state law is typically preempted. Although the Union's actions could be seen as violating the NLRA, the determination of whether Jones qualified as a “supervisor” under the NLRA fell under the jurisdiction of the NLRB, not state courts. The Regional Director’s conclusion about jurisdiction did not prevent preemption since the merits of the complaint were still considered. Thus, federal interests were not adequately addressed to allow for a state cause of action.

The pre-emption doctrine enforces federal law supremacy in relevant areas, safeguarding the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) exclusive jurisdiction over applicable matters. A state cause of action cannot circumvent pre-emption by claiming insufficient similarity to an unfair labor practice charge under § 8(b)(1)(B) or by asserting potential greater damages in state court. The case involves Robert C. Jones, a supervisor who alleged that the union, Local 926, influenced his wrongful termination from Georgia Power Company due to his non-union status. After filing a charge with the NLRB, which was dismissed for lack of evidence, Jones pursued a state court action against both the union and the company for contract interference. He claimed that the union maliciously coerced the company into breaching his employment contract, seeking $80,000 in damages. The court ultimately reversed the lower decision, dismissing the appeal and granting certiorari.

Count 2 of the complaint alleged that the Company breached its employment contract. The Georgia trial court dismissed the case, determining that the common-law tort action was preempted due to the subject matter falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. The court noted insufficient state interest in protecting citizens against the alleged conduct compared to the substantial risk of interfering with the Board's jurisdiction. However, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal against the Union, citing relevant precedents that showed a strong state interest in safeguarding citizens' contractual rights. The Court of Appeals deemed the tort claim unrelated to federal labor law concerns, asserting that the Union's actions did not fall under the NLRA's Sections 7 or 8, distinguishing it from prior case law. The Georgia Supreme Court denied review, and the petitioner appealed. The appellate court recognized that the appeal was not mandatory but treated it as a petition for writ of certiorari, granting it. Concluding that the Georgia Court of Appeals erred, the court reversed the decision. The preemption issue revolves around whether state causes of action coexist with the regulatory framework established by the NLRA governing labor-management relations. The court follows a two-step analysis: it first assesses if the conduct is protected or prohibited under the NLRA, recognizing that if it is, then state laws are generally preempted. Conversely, if the conduct is peripheral to the Act or deeply connected to local interests without clear congressional intent to preempt, state regulation may be upheld.

Regulation's permissibility due to local interests requires careful consideration of potential harm to federal regulatory frameworks and the significance of state causes of action for citizen protection. The discussion references prior cases, particularly Iron Workers v. Perko, where the Supreme Court ruled that a common-law tort action was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). In Perko, a union member, after violating a union rule, was discharged following union actions that could be interpreted as interfering with employee rights, raising issues under various sections of the NLRA. The Court determined that the member’s discharge could coerce other employees, thereby violating their protected rights under the Act. Unlike Perko, the individual in the current case, Jones, solely held a supervisory role and is argued to be similarly preempted by the Act due to the potential for state action to punish protected conduct related to supervisory selections. The Union contends that this preemption is valid, paralleling the reasoning in Perko, where the Board might conclude that discharging a supervisor for union rule non-compliance could infringe upon non-supervisory employees' rights. Additionally, the Board's past decisions reflect similar considerations, particularly in the construction industry, where job roles may frequently change between supervisory and non-supervisory positions.

The Board determined that the Union violated § 8(b)(1)(A) and owed backpay to the charging party for two reasons: employees reliant on Union job referrals were intimidated by the Union's actions, infringing on their rights, and discrimination against an individual seeking a supervisory role would extend to intimidation when they returned to a non-supervisory position. This "fluctuating status" approach was deemed relevant to the case of Jones, who worked in the construction industry and held a low-level supervisory position, making it plausible he would occasionally be in a non-supervisory role. The Union’s conduct also raised potential violations under § 8(b)(1)(B), which prohibits unions from coercing employers regarding their choice of bargaining representatives. Unlike in the Perko case, where there was ambiguity about Perko's supervisory status, Jones’ role as an equipment superintendent clearly positioned him as someone who could handle grievances under the collective bargaining agreement, thus allowing him to invoke § 8(b)(1)(B).

The Georgia Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that the Act did not preempt Jones' state court action. Their interpretation of a letter from the Regional Director suggested a lack of Board jurisdiction, which was incorrect as the letter addressed the merits rather than jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' belief that the Regional Director's dismissal of the complaint for insufficient evidence cleared the path for a state cause of action was flawed. This position failed to recognize that supervisors may have viable causes of action and that Jones did not exhaust his administrative remedies by not appealing to the General Counsel. The Garmon preemption doctrine affirms federal labor law's substantive preemption in relevant areas and maintains the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction over matters within the Act's scope.

Jones failed to meet the primary jurisdiction requirements, and even if he had, he did not recognize that Congress has designated one administrative agency to have nationwide jurisdiction for resolving issues under the Act. Matters that fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board should be resolved by it rather than a state court, aligning with Congress's intent for uniform enforcement of national labor policy. 

Jones contended that his state cause of action was not preempted by federal law because the elements of the state claim and the unfair labor practice charge are not sufficiently similar. He cited a precedent indicating that the critical inquiry for preemption is whether the state court's controversy is identical to what could have been presented to the Labor Board. Jones argued that a § 8 (b)(1)(B) unfair labor practice claim requires proof of coercion in selecting a bargaining representative, while his state claim required merely that the Union influenced the employer's choice of a supervisor, which he distinguished as non-coercive.

The court rejected this argument, noting that Jones's state complaint explicitly alleged coercion by the Union, thus acknowledging preemption regarding coercive actions. Furthermore, allowing state actions for non-coercive interference would compel state courts to determine the coerciveness of Union conduct, an issue better resolved by the Board. Even if Georgia law allowed for non-coercive claims, the fundamental element of the Union's causation in the employer's discharge remains central to both the state and federal claims. The Regional Director had already concluded that the Union was not at fault, which contrasted with the circumstances in the cited case of Sears, where the actions were unrelated to labor law issues. In this instance, allowing the state action would interfere with the Board's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices.

Causation in Jones' case would have been a central issue if it had been presented to the Board, similar to other cases under § 8(b)(1)(B). Despite the Regional Director's findings, Jones attempted to relitigate this issue in state court, posing a significant risk of interfering with the Board's jurisdiction. The argument that Jones' damages claim against the Union was merely peripheral to federal labor policy is rejected, as past decisions in Perko and Plumbers Union v. Borden established a stronger federal interest. The court also dismissed the notion that Georgia's law could override federal labor law in this instance. The Union's position highlighted that while employers cannot be coerced regarding collective bargaining agents, employees can influence low-level supervisory choices noncoercively. However, courts have generally found that strikes concerning supervisory personnel are not protected. In contrast, actions like writing letters of opposition or voicing complaints have been deemed protected. The court concluded that had Jones' complaint been brought before the Board, it likely would have been dismissed as the Union's actions were considered protected activity. Jones' argument for pursuing state court to seek punitive damages and attorney's fees instead of backpay was also rejected, referencing San Diego Union v. Garmon. The judgment was reversed, with Justice Rehnquist dissenting, arguing that the National Labor Relations Act does not preempt state law claims. Jones' lawsuit in Georgia alleged that the Union had maliciously coerced Georgia Power into breaching his employment contract and claimed a conspiracy between the Union and the Company to interfere with his contractual relations.

The trial court dismissed Jones' complaint, citing preemption by tort doctrines. However, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed this decision, reinstating the complaint. The Court acknowledged that if the Union's conduct was "arguably prohibited" by the Act, then the preemption analysis standard from Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Carpenters applies, which assesses whether the state court controversy is identical to the federal labor law claim. The Court argued that Jones' claims of noncoercive interference with contractual relations and the federal labor law claims were identical and misinterpreted the "identical controversies" standard. It claimed that allowing state lawsuits for noncoercive interference would require state courts to initially determine whether the Union's conduct was coercive or non-coercive, suggesting that such issues should be resolved by the Labor Board. 

The Court's reasoning was criticized for misunderstanding prior decisions, specifically that state courts are competent to determine whether a claim is preempted unless it is identical to a claim that could have been presented to the Labor Board. The Court referred to the Farmer case, stating that state courts can distinguish between preempted and non-preempted claims. Furthermore, the Court argued that a crucial element of a noncoercive interference claim is proving that the Union caused the discharge, which is also a requirement under § 8 (b)(1)(B) of federal law, suggesting that the claims are fundamentally the same. This perspective was seen as a significant redefinition of the Sears standard, as two claims are not necessarily identical simply because they share a common element.

Sears fails to provide a clear definition of "identical" in the context of legal claims. The standard is exemplified through references to two cases: Farmer v. Carpenters, which illustrates "non-identical" controversies, and Garner v. Teamsters, exemplifying "identical" ones. In Farmer, Richard Hill faced discrimination and harassment in job referrals from a union's hiring hall, leading to a state court suit alleging both discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court determined that despite overlapping factual elements with federal claims, Hill's state claim was not preempted because it required a different focus on the defendant's conduct rather than on union actions. 

In contrast, the Sears case involved federal and state claims with several common factual questions, such as the occurrence of picketing and property owner consent. These issues were critical for both unfair labor practice and state trespass claims, indicating that differing factual determinations alone do not necessitate preemption. The Court concluded that the relationship between state and federal controversies requires a deeper analysis than merely identifying shared facts. It ultimately determined that the claims were not identical, thus Jones' claims are not preempted. The purpose of § 8(b)(1)(A) is emphasized as protecting employees' rights to engage in or refrain from concerted actions, with the Board asserting that discharging supervisors unlawfully interferes with these rights when they testify against employers or refuse to engage in unfair labor practices.

Discharge of supervisors for engaging in union or concerted activities is not unlawful, as only employees possess rights protected by the Act. A supervisor, such as Jones, seeking a claim under § 8(b)(1)(A) must demonstrate that their contractual relations were interfered with in a manner that also affected the rights guaranteed under § 7 to actual employees. This involves complex factual and legal determinations, which diverge from the straightforward inquiry of whether Jones can show the Union caused his job loss. Consequently, Jones' state law claims are not preempted by § 8(b)(1)(A).

For a claim under § 8(b)(1)(B), a supervisor must prove coercion of their employer regarding the selection of bargaining representatives, focusing on congressional intent to protect employers from union influence in this area. In contrast, a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations does not hinge on whether the plaintiff acts as a bargaining representative or the relevance of employer harm related to employee contractual relationships. The state court's examination will involve simpler factual matters than those addressed by the Board, leading to the conclusion that Jones' state claims are not preempted by federal labor law.

The definition of a supervisor includes individuals who have the authority to make significant employment decisions and are excluded from the employee definition under 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Only employees are granted rights under § 7, which encompasses self-organization, collective bargaining, and related activities. Sections 8(a) and 8(b) identify specific unfair labor practices by employers and unions, pertinent to this case.

An unfair labor practice occurs when a labor organization or its agents engage in coercive actions against employees regarding their rights under section [7] of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or manipulate an employer's choice of representatives for collective bargaining. It is also an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to influence an employer to discriminate against an employee, violating section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, which prohibits discrimination in employment to affect labor organization membership.

In the case of Robert C. Jones against the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 926, an investigation found insufficient evidence to support claims that the Union caused his discharge or coerced the Employer in their representative selection for collective bargaining. The investigation revealed that the Employer's restructuring led to Jones’s removal, and while the Union was involved in discussions about these changes, it did not engage in unlawful conduct regarding his supervisory status. Consequently, the Regional Director decided not to issue a complaint.

Jones was informed of his right to appeal this decision by August 1, 1978, but he expressed little interest in pursuing the appeal. The court later affirmed the dismissal of the case against the Employer, though the merits of that decision were not under review. The petitioners had originally claimed that they were entitled to a mandatory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1257(2) regarding the Georgia Right to Work law. However, they later acknowledged that the Georgia Court of Appeals only ruled that the common-law tort action was not preempted by national labor laws, which did not involve a statutory challenge. Thus, the case did not qualify for appellate jurisdiction under 1257(2). The NLRA has precedence over state laws concerning conduct that is neither protected nor prohibited, which Congress intended to remain unregulated.

The case Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton addresses aspects of preemption doctrine in labor law, specifically regarding the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) stance on union influence over supervisor selection. The NLRB emphasizes that the holding in Local 725 remains valid despite subsequent decisions, asserting that coercing a supervisor's choice violates the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) even without proving the supervisor's bargaining authority. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals disagrees with the NLRB on this issue, while the Third Circuit has not fully dismissed the Board's perspective. The excerpt also references precedents like Linn v. Plant Guard Workers and Farmer v. Carpenters, which clarify that some state law claims may proceed even if they involve conduct considered unfair under the NLRA, particularly when they address issues of emotional distress or reputational harm. Additionally, it critiques the rigid application of the preemption standard established in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, suggesting that recent rulings reflect a more nuanced approach to labor law preemption and individual rights. The excerpt concludes that the current subject matter arguably falls within the NLRB's jurisdiction for addressing unfair labor practices, indicating a shift from previous interpretations of potential preemption.

Jones concedes that his state cause of action is preempted regarding claims of coercive influence on his employer. His complaint alleges that a Union agent intimidated Georgia Power into breaching its contract with him, focusing on coerced discharge and breach of contract, which is preempted. This preemption applies only to the coercive conduct aspect of his complaint, while noncoercive conduct remains distinct. The argument presented is deemed unpersuasive, as it assumes Jones implicitly concedes that his coercive interference claim is identical to matters the Board would resolve under sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (B). There is no evidence of such a concession in the respondent's brief. 

Jones' claims for both coercive and noncoercive interference are sufficiently distinguishable from the unfair labor practice charges to avoid preemption. A state law claim for intentional interference with contractual relations is significant to local interests, similar to claims in prior cases like Farmer and Sears. The state has a vested interest in protecting citizens' rights to employment and contractual integrity, as seen in Georgia case law. In contrast, the Garner case involved indistinguishable state and federal claims, with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act mirroring the NLRA. 

The policies underlying section 8(b)(1)(A) and state torts against intentional interference differ fundamentally. The former protects employees' rights to organize and engage in collective bargaining, while the latter focuses on safeguarding contractual relationships. In Jones' case, the differences between state and federal claims would be even more pronounced concerning noncoercive interference, with the Board addressing coercion and state courts concentrating on causation. The question of the case's disposition is not addressed, particularly regarding whether dismissal for lack of a final judgment is appropriate.