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Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.
Citations: 74 L. Ed. 2d 765; 103 S. Ct. 927; 460 U.S. 1; 1983 U.S. LEXIS 17; 51 U.S.L.W. 4156Docket: 81-1203
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; February 23, 1983; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, located in North Carolina, contracted with Mercury Construction Corporation, an Alabama entity, for construction projects. The contract included a provision for dispute resolution, first through an architect and then by binding arbitration if unresolved. Disputes arose when Mercury submitted claims for increased costs due to delays attributed to the hospital, which the hospital refused to pay. The hospital then sought a declaratory judgment in North Carolina state court to prevent arbitration and assert non-liability, obtaining a temporary injunction against arbitration. Mercury countered with a federal action to compel arbitration under the United States Arbitration Act. The District Court stayed the federal case pending the state court's resolution of arbitrability, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, determining the stay was appealable as a final decision since it effectively dismissed the federal action by preventing further litigation. The Court also found that the District Court abused its discretion by granting the stay, asserting federal courts should only decline jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances. The balancing of relevant factors—like jurisdictional priority and avoidance of piecemeal litigation—favors exercising federal jurisdiction, as established in previous rulings. The exceptional-circumstances standard from Colorado River was upheld and not affected by the ruling in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. No exceptional circumstances justified the District Court's stay order, as neither court assumed jurisdiction over any property, nor was the federal court deemed less convenient than the state court. Factors such as avoiding piecemeal litigation and the sequence of jurisdiction acquisition did not support the stay. The requirement for arbitration under the federal Arbitration Act leads to separate resolutions for disputes with the respondent and architect, but the decision to adjudicate arbitrability in state court does not inherently cause piecemeal resolution. The timing of the state suit's filing—shortly after the petitioner's refusal to arbitrate—did not afford the respondent a reasonable opportunity to file federally first. Priority should consider the progress of both actions rather than merely the filing order; substantial steps toward resolution had been taken in the federal case, while the state suit lacked significant proceedings at the time of the stay order, undermining the Arbitration Act's policy for prompt enforcement of arbitration agreements. Federal law, specifically the Arbitration Act, governs the arbitrability issue in both courts, further opposing the stay. Additionally, the inadequacy of the state suit to protect the respondent's rights, particularly the likelihood of not compelling arbitration, is a critical reason against the stay. The District Court's decision to stay rather than dismiss the federal action does not negate the applicability of the Colorado River exceptional circumstances test. The Court of Appeals affirmed that the contractual dispute was arbitrable under the Arbitration Act based on comprehensive briefs and evidence from both parties. The case involves a contract between petitioner Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and respondent Mercury Construction Corp. for construction work initiated in July 1975. The contract, created by Hospital representatives, established a framework for dispute resolution related to the contract and its breach. Initial disputes regarding contract interpretation or construction performance were to be referred to J.N. Pease Associates, the independent architectural firm overseeing the project. With specified exceptions, any unresolved disputes could be submitted to binding arbitration under the contract's broad arbitration clause, adhering to the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. The arbitration agreement was enforceable under prevailing arbitration law, with arbitrators' awards being final and subject to court judgment. Time limits for arbitration demands were outlined in the contract. Construction began in July 1975, aiming for completion by October 1979, but was substantially finished by February 1979, with final inspections in June. During construction, in October 1977, Mercury, at the Architect's request, agreed to postpone its claims for delay and impact costs until substantial completion, an agreement that the Hospital did not contest but claimed was unauthorized by the Architect. In January 1980, Mercury submitted its delay and impact cost claims, which were discussed with the Architect over several months, leading to a reduction of those claims. The Hospital only learned of Mercury's claims in April 1980 and engaged its legal team in May. Disputes arose regarding whether there were ongoing negotiations or investigations. A detailed presentation of Mercury's claims occurred on August 12, 1980, with further meetings planned. On October 6, Mercury's counsel confirmed a meeting for October 13, but on October 7, the Hospital's counsel informed Mercury that it would not pay the claims and intended to file a declaratory judgment action in North Carolina. The Hospital filed this action on October 8, naming Mercury and the Architect as defendants, asserting that Mercury's claims were baseless and barred by the statute of limitations, and that Mercury had waived its right to arbitration. The complaint asserted multiple delinquencies by the Architect, with the Hospital seeking several declarations: no right to arbitration, a stay of arbitration, no liability to Mercury, and entitlement to indemnity from the Architect if found liable. The complaint was served to Mercury on October 9, the same day Mercury's counsel requested arbitration. On October 15, the Hospital secured an ex parte injunction from state court against Mercury’s arbitration efforts without informing Mercury. Mercury objected, leading to the dissolution of the stay on October 27. Following this, Mercury filed a motion in District Court to compel arbitration under the Arbitration Act, citing diversity jurisdiction. The District Court stayed Mercury's federal suit until the state-court issue of arbitrability was resolved, prompting Mercury to seek appellate review via both notice of appeal and mandamus. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, after initially hearing the case, later decided to review it en banc. The en banc Court established appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291, reversed the District Court’s stay order, and remanded for arbitration. The Court found the stay order final and appealable, rejecting the Hospital's argument against its finality. Citing Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, the Court noted that the stay effectively barred further litigation in federal court, making it tantamount to a dismissal of the suit, as the state court's judgment on arbitrability would be res judicata. If the District Court order is not final for appealability, it remains appealable under the Cohen exception to the finality rule. This exception requires that the order conclusively determine a disputed question, resolve an important issue separate from the merits, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal. The order meets the second and third criteria as it represents a refusal to adjudicate the merits. If not appealed now, it would be unreviewable due to res judicata, as the federal court would have to respect the state court's ruling on arbitrability. The Hospital argues the order does not conclusively determine the disputed question, but this is only technically true, as there is no indication the District Judge intended to reconsider deferring to state court. The choice to stay the case rather than dismiss it is unclear, but the practical effect is the same, rendering the order appealable. The main issue is the appropriateness of the District Court's decision to stay the federal suit in favor of parallel state litigation. The case of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States offers guidance on this matter. Colorado River addressed federal jurisdiction over water rights and the implications of the McCarran Amendment, which allows the U.S. to join state court suits for water rights adjudication. In that case, the District Court dismissed a federal suit in favor of state court proceedings, a decision initially reversed by the Tenth Circuit. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the District Court's dismissal based on the abstention doctrine. The analysis of the abstention doctrine reveals that abstention from federal jurisdiction is an exception rather than the norm, applicable only in exceptional circumstances where state court intervention serves a significant interest. The three categories of abstention were deemed inapplicable to the case being analyzed. The District Court's dismissal was upheld on different grounds, emphasizing wise judicial administration and resource conservation rather than state-federal comity or constitutional avoidance. Federal courts maintain an obligation to exercise jurisdiction, even with concurrent state proceedings, and dismissals based on concurrent state litigation are limited compared to those under abstention principles. Factors influencing dismissal include the jurisdiction order, federal forum convenience, and the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation. No single factor is determinative; rather, a careful judgment must weigh the obligation to exercise jurisdiction against factors favoring dismissal. The case of Colorado River exemplifies this balance, where avoiding piecemeal adjudication in water rights was pivotal, reflecting Congress's intent for comprehensive treatment in experienced forums. The argument that the exceptional-circumstances test was undermined by a later decision was dismissed, indicating the ongoing validity of the original test. The Hospital references Justice Rehnquist's opinion in the case, suggesting it modifies the Colorado River doctrine, though the majority of the Court reaffirmed the Colorado River test in Calvert. Justice Rehnquist's opinion received only four votes and was opposed by a dissenting opinion from four Justices, who asserted that the Calvert District Court's stay violated Colorado River. Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the dissent on the application of Colorado River's exceptional-circumstances test and voted for remand to allow the District Court to apply Colorado River factors. On remand, the Court of Appeals recognized that the dissenting Justices and Justice Blackmun constituted a majority requiring the application of the Colorado River test. The distinction between Calvert and this case lies in the standard for issuing a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. §1651, which Justice Rehnquist emphasized is meant to ensure that inferior courts act within their lawful authority. He found that the movant in Calvert did not meet the burden for the writ, although he suggested a proper appeal might have succeeded. In this case, the Court of Appeals confirmed it had appellate jurisdiction and determined that the District Court's stay was impermissible under Colorado River. The Hospital argues that Calvert necessitates reversal because greater deference to the District Court's discretion was warranted. However, the discretion of the District Court must be exercised within the standards set by the Court, specifically the Colorado River exceptional-circumstances test. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the District Court abused its discretion in granting the stay, as the Colorado River factors indicated a lack of exceptional circumstances justifying the stay. The Hospital acknowledged that the first two Colorado River factors were absent, with neither court assuming jurisdiction over any property, nor was there a claim of inconvenience regarding the federal forum compared to the state forum. The remaining factors, including avoidance of piecemeal litigation and the order of jurisdiction acquisition, do not support the stay and instead argue against it. The Hospital also highlighted two separate disputes it faces, one with Mercury regarding delay costs and another with the Architect concerning indemnity for potential liability to Mercury. An arbitration dispute involving the Architect cannot occur without the Architect's consent due to the absence of an arbitration agreement between the Hospital and the Architect. If Mercury secures an arbitration order, the Hospital must address related disputes in separate forums, a situation arising from federal law that mandates piecemeal resolution when an arbitration agreement is present. Under the Arbitration Act, even if other parties are involved in the underlying dispute, an arbitration agreement must be enforced. If the dispute between Mercury and the Hospital is deemed arbitrable, the Hospital will deal with one dispute in arbitration and the other in state court. Conversely, if not arbitrable, both disputes will be handled in state court. The determination of arbitrability does not hinge on whether it is resolved in federal or state court, meaning the choice of court does not lead to fragmented resolutions. The Hospital's argument for a stay based on the timing of the state-court suit's filing is flawed, as it overlooks that Mercury’s cause of action for an arbitration order was contingent on the Hospital's prior refusal to arbitrate. The Hospital's refusal occurred just before filing its state suit, limiting Mercury's ability to file its petition first. Additionally, the Hospital obtained a state ex parte injunction to prevent Mercury from pursuing arbitration. The priority of filings should be assessed pragmatically, considering the progress in both actions rather than solely the filing dates. In this case, the state suit had minimal proceedings, while the federal suit was advancing toward resolving the arbitrability issue. The District Court's decision to stay the federal suit was erroneous, conflicting with Congress's intent in the Arbitration Act to expedite arbitration. The Act allows for both a stay of litigation and an affirmative order to engage in arbitration, emphasizing the need for a quick and limited inquiry into factual issues. The state court's potential for prompt relief to Mercury under the Arbitration Act would still be hindered by the District Court's stay, undermining the Act's aim for quick enforcement of arbitration agreements. In addition to the four factors from Colorado River, a critical factor from Calvert is that federal law dictates the merits of the case. While the relevance of state versus federal law was unclear in Colorado River, Calvert emphasized that the case involved federal law issues. The core issue in Mercury's federal suit was the arbitrability of the dispute with the Hospital, governed by federal law under the Arbitration Act. Section 2 of the Act asserts that written arbitration agreements in maritime or commerce transactions are valid and enforceable, promoting a federal policy favoring arbitration over conflicting state laws. The principles established in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood, Conklin Mfg. Corp. support the view that arbitrability questions should favor arbitration, regardless of the nature of the dispute. Although the importance of the source-of-law factor is less pronounced here than in Calvert, the presence of federal law issues should weigh heavily against ceding jurisdiction to state courts. Additionally, there are concerns that state court proceedings may inadequately protect Mercury's rights, underscoring the need to maintain federal jurisdiction in this context. An order to compel arbitration under the Act raises uncertainties, particularly regarding whether Mercury could secure such an order from state court compelling the Hospital to arbitrate. In circumstances where the opposing party is responsible for payment or performance, simply staying litigation does not suffice, as it allows that party to avoid both litigation and arbitration. A stay could lead Mercury to unnecessarily return to federal court for a compelling order, undermining the efficiency intended by the Arbitration Act. The Hospital's argument that the Colorado River test does not apply because the District Court stayed, rather than dismissed, the federal litigation is rejected. The distinction is deemed irrelevant, as both a dismissal and a stay signify a refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction. A stay implies the federal court's belief that the state court can adequately resolve the issues. If there is significant doubt about the state court's adequacy, granting a stay or dismissal would be an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, whether a case is stayed or dismissed, Mercury retains the option to return to federal court if the state forum proves inadequate, indicating no substantial difference between the two actions in this context. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's stay and ruled that the contractual dispute between Mercury and the Hospital is subject to arbitration under the Arbitration Act and the parties' arbitration agreement. It instructed the District Court to enter an order to arbitrate, despite the Hospital not contesting the arbitrability decision but raising procedural objections. The Hospital's primary concern was that the appeal only formally addressed the stay order, typically limiting the Court of Appeals to issues decided in the District Court. However, the Court of Appeals justified its broader decision by referencing the special interests involved and the lack of prejudice to either party. It noted the Arbitration Act's emphasis on summary and expedited procedures for enforcing arbitration clauses, stating that there were no factual disputes necessitating a jury trial. Thus, the Court acted within its authority to facilitate prompt arbitration. Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor, dissented, arguing that the Court's decision undermined established procedural rules and mischaracterized the District Court's order as final. He contended that the District Court's stay was interlocutory and subject to review under specific statutes. He asserted that the stay did not resolve the case on its merits and highlighted that the District Court's order was tentative, allowing for adjustments depending on the state court's actions regarding the arbitration agreement. If the state court found no agreement to arbitrate, the District Court would be bound by that decision, illustrating the potential for res judicata or collateral estoppel in the absence of a stay. A federal district court's decision to take a recess, order additional briefing, or delay a ruling does not create a final judgment, even if a state court may later determine an issue in the case. Section 1291 of the Judicial Code prohibits federal courts of appeals from interfering with district courts' management of ongoing cases unless specific criteria for a writ of mandamus are met or a district court certifies an interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(b). This statutory framework aims to prevent piecemeal appeals and maintain effective judicial administration by allowing district courts to control their proceedings without disruption. The potential for unjust outcomes from erroneous district court decisions is outweighed by the systemic risks posed by encouraging interlocutory appeals, which could lead to delays and increased litigation costs. The court's recent rulings emphasize the importance of finality, reaffirming the principle that district judges should manage their cases comprehensively. The creation of exceptions to Section 1291 could lead to uncertainty and abuse of the appeals process, undermining respect for district courts. The court accepted the argument that the order in question effectively excluded the party from court but determined this did not warrant an exception to the statute governing appeals. Allowing appeals from non-final orders based on case-specific facts would disrupt the relationship between trial and appellate courts, undermining the final-judgment rule. The court found no compelling justification for the appellate court's involvement in the trial process. Citing Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, the court noted that while that case allowed for an appeal because the plaintiff was effectively out of court, it was not applicable here because the current party was less "effectively out of court" and there was no pending state litigation to address the issues. Furthermore, the decision in Coopers clarified that the collateral-order doctrine did not apply to class decertification orders, reinforcing that an order does not become final simply due to the plaintiff's inability to pursue the claim if the order stands. The court criticized the creation of an unwarranted exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 regarding appeals, noting that the previously established criteria for collateral orders in Cohen had not been satisfied in this instance. The District Court's order did not definitively resolve the disputed issue regarding arbitration, contrary to the Court's claims, which are viewed as speculative regarding the District Judge's mindset. The precedent in Cohen demonstrates that a decision is conclusive when no change in circumstances could alter its basis. In the current case, various potential developments could influence the District Court's assessment of whether the state court would fairly adjudicate the arbitration agreement issue. The significance of the issue—whether the arbitration agreement should be resolved in state or federal court—should not be overstated, especially since there is no indication that the state court would misinterpret the facts. Thus, the appellant's desired resolution does not inherently elevate the issue's importance beyond typical interlocutory orders affecting procedural positions. The opinion concludes that the District Court's order was not appealable, emphasizing the statutory commitment of interlocutory orders to the District Courts' discretion. The Court expresses concern over the Court of Appeals affirming a decision that the District Court did not address, noting that appellate jurisdiction is distinct from original jurisdiction and that the Court of Appeals cannot act as a trial court. The reliance on 28 U.S.C. 2106 does not extend to granting appellate courts the authority to take on trial court functions, and the Arbitration Act preserves the right to a jury trial for the Hospital. The Court of Appeals appears to have improperly decided a motion for summary judgment not presented to it, which is typically resolved by district judges. Although the Court of Appeals reviewed memoranda from the District Court, the specific issue was not argued there, and no party sought the appellate court's resolution on this matter. The district judges are presumed to act promptly on disputes after reversals, and it is inappropriate for appellate judges to override district court decisions without following established procedures. The judgment of the lower court should be vacated, and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. If the appellate court finds the stay order erroneous, the judgment regarding arbitrability should be reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The contract stipulates that the Architect has final authority on artistic matters, excludes arbitration for claims waived by final payment acceptance, and sets specific timelines for arbitration demands. The completion date of the project was extended to October 1979. Mercury's attempt to remove the Hospital's state-court action was remanded by the District Court due to a lack of complete diversity, a matter not under current review. The Hospital's argument that Mercury's filing in the Court of Appeals should be treated under stricter mandamus standards is deemed frivolous. Mercury filed a notice of appeal in the District Court, adhering to Federal Rule App. Proc. 3(a). A court of appeals generally does not engage in extraordinary review via mandamus per 28 U.S.C. 1651 when a contemporaneous appeal can suffice. The discussion references several cases, including Hines v. D'Artois and Pullman Co. v. Railroad Commission, illustrating that the appealability of a District Court order is not predicated on the denial of injunctive relief. Section 1292(a)(1) pertains only to interlocutory orders and cannot support a claim of finality for the orders in question. The dissent’s argument to differentiate the case from Idlewild based on the status of state-court actions lacks merit, as both appellate courts did not imply any limitations on the plaintiff's access to state courts. The phrase "effectively out of court" relates specifically to federal jurisdiction. The dissent's position would create inconsistent standards for appealability of Pullman abstention orders across states, particularly favoring Texas. The excerpt also highlights that the distinction between stays and dismissals in the context of appealability lacks substantive foundation and references numerous cases that affirm the general rule that a stay is not considered a final decision for appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291. The reasoning is confined to situations where a stay is intended to mandate that a federal case be litigated in state court, aligning with doctrines such as Colorado River abstention. This clarifies the dissent's argument regarding Idlewild's status in light of Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, which dismissed the "death knell" doctrine of appealability. The death knell doctrine suggested that certain interlocutory decisions could effectively terminate a lawsuit due to the plaintiff's disincentive to pursue individual claims. However, unlike death knell cases, where the plaintiff retains the right to proceed, stays based on abstention or Colorado River grounds do not offer similar appeal rights dependent on specific case facts. Determining when a district court has relinquished jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit is expected to be straightforward. The dissent's comparison of the stay to routine docket management is misplaced; a stay order is deemed final only if it explicitly aims to cede jurisdiction to a state court. The document also notes that an order does not become final merely because it may allow a state court to adjudicate a common issue first. The finality of a stay order is reaffirmed when it serves solely to transfer jurisdiction. Additionally, the "completely separate from the merits" requirement is emphasized to prevent piecemeal reviews of pre-final judgment steps, which are not applicable here since the case refuses to advance altogether. The excerpt distinguishes between inherently tentative orders, such as class decertification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1), and other orders that are intended to be conclusive. The overarching principle is that while many interlocutory orders can be modified before final judgment, not all are considered inherently tentative. The order discussed in this case was intended as a final determination. Coopers & Lybrand's reasoning applies only to pretrial orders that may reasonably be expected to be revised during standard litigation, as established in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States. Neither party has claimed that the abstention doctrine categories apply in this case. Following the Colorado River decision, the District Court and Court of Appeals in Calvert maintained a stay based on a newly identified ground: the federal suit was deemed a "defensive tactical maneuver" with a fabricated federal claim, justifying a stay to prevent misuse of federal courts. The courts also observed that the basis for the plaintiff's claim of exclusive federal jurisdiction had dissipated. The Court of Appeals further concluded that the Hospital's state suit was a reactive measure in response to Mercury's anticipated claims. The appellate reasoning in both the current case and Calvert suggests that the vexatious nature of litigation may affect whether to defer to parallel state litigation under Colorado River. However, even if the Hospital acted in good faith, the absence of exceptional circumstances negates the need for the District Court's stay. Additionally, the Calvert Court of Appeals found it lacked jurisdiction for an ordinary appeal due to the exclusive federal jurisdiction over part of the federal litigation, highlighting a contrast with the McCarran Amendment's intent to avoid piecemeal litigation. In the context of arbitration law, the excerpt highlights the discretion of district courts (or state trial courts under state procedural rules) to stay litigation among non-arbitrating parties while arbitration is pending. The decision to stay is aimed at managing court dockets effectively. The excerpt references several cases that clarify that state court injunctions should not prevent a party from filing or prosecuting a federal lawsuit. It emphasizes that Mercury was not required to risk contempt sanctions to expedite arbitration proceedings. Mercury’s application for an order was treated as a motion under Section 6 of the Arbitration Act, which allows for procedural motions regarding arbitration. Mercury provided affidavits, legal briefs, and documentary evidence, while the Hospital countered with its own extensive submissions and sought oral argument and a jury trial. If the District Court had denied the stay, it could have quickly resolved the arbitrability issue. Sections 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act dictate that if a lawsuit involves a dispute covered by an arbitration agreement, the court must stay the action upon request if the applicant is not in default in arbitration proceedings. Section 4 mandates that a district court must order arbitration unless there is a dispute over the agreement's existence or compliance, in which case the court must conduct a summary trial on that point. The policy of the Arbitration Act supports a liberal interpretation of arbitration agreements, indicating that some issues related to arbitrability may themselves be subject to arbitration, thereby expediting the process. The excerpt also notes the dissenting opinions in Colorado River, which addressed federal and state law issues regarding litigation rights, but the majority opinion concluded that those points were not controlling due to federal law supporting litigation in state courts. "Maritime transaction" and "commerce" are defined within Section 1 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1. The document references various cases illustrating the application of these definitions, such as Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc. and Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc. The Arbitration Act is characterized as an anomaly in federal-court jurisdiction because it establishes federal substantive law regarding arbitration agreements but does not create independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 4 permits an order compelling arbitration only if jurisdiction over the underlying dispute exists, requiring either diversity of citizenship or another basis for federal jurisdiction. Section 3 limits federal courts by preventing them from staying suits unless there is an existing suit. Although enforcement largely falls to state courts, the Act represents a federal policy that federal courts should uphold when applicable. The stay provision in Section 3 applies to both state and federal courts, ensuring that arbitration agreements are enforced regardless of the court in which a dispute arises. The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized this requirement, affirming the necessity of enforcing arbitration agreements consistently across courts. Section 4 mandates that state courts issue orders to arbitrate where conditions are met, despite historical doubts about a state court's willingness to issue a stay. The prevailing legal precedent in North Carolina previously held that contracts like the one between Mercury and the Hospital were not governed by the Arbitration Act, based on the interpretation that construction projects do not qualify as "commerce" under the Act. This was established in cases such as Burke County Public Schools Board of Education v. Shaver Partnership and Bryant-Durham Electric Co. v. Durham County Hospital Corp. However, the North Carolina Supreme Court later overturned these decisions. The excerpt also mentions that the reservation pertains only to cases under Colorado River, referencing American Trial Lawyers Assn. v. New Jersey Supreme Court regarding the preference for a stay rather than dismissal in Pullman abstention. Furthermore, it raises doubts about whether the Court of Appeals would have expedited arbitration compared to the District Court, suggesting that if the Court of Appeals deemed the dispute arbitrable, state courts likely could have resolved the matter within the 11 months it was pending there.