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Jones Food Co., Inc. v. Shipman
Citations: 981 So. 2d 355; 2006 WL 3718254Docket: 1051322
Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; September 21, 2007; Alabama; State Supreme Court
Jones Food Company, Inc. appealed a trial court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law in a premises-liability case involving Clarence and Kathy Shipman. The Supreme Court of Alabama, on December 15, 2006, ultimately reversed this decision. The case originated from a March 11, 1998, service request by Jones Food for HVAC maintenance at its Huddle House restaurant in Gadsden, which it leased since September 1995. The restaurant, previously an Omelette Shoppe, underwent renovations that included modifications to the roof and installation of new electrical and duct systems, but the roofline and facade design remained unchanged. During the service call, Clarence Shipman and his assistant Thomas McKinney employed a 20-foot portable extension ladder to access the HVAC system, incorrectly positioning it at a 45° angle rather than the recommended 75° angle. This improper positioning was due to the inward slope of the facade, which would have required them to jump approximately four feet from the ladder to the facade edge if the ladder had been correctly angled. The ladder's base was placed on a dry, sloped surface, contributing to the unsafe conditions. The ladder used by Shipman was unsecured at both ends and lacked safety features to prevent movement during use. No instructions were provided by Jones Food regarding the ladder's use or positioning against the building. McKinney assisted Shipman by holding the ladder as he climbed, but when McKinney adjusted his position, the ladder's footings gave way, causing Shipman to fall and sustain severe injuries. In February 2000, Shipman filed a lawsuit against Jones Food for damages related to medical expenses, lost wages, and personal injuries, including permanent disability. His spouse, Kathy Shipman, also sought damages for loss of consortium. The Shipmans claimed that Jones Food was negligent for failing to warn Shipman of roof dangers and for not maintaining safe access to the roof. Jones Food raised defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. During the trial in January 2006, evidence was presented showing a similar incident involving Thomas Cornelius, a HVAC repairman who had fallen from a ladder at the same location in 1996 without having reported the ladder's instability to Jones Food. Additionally, a customer, Calvin McCoy, informed Shipman about Cornelius's fall before the accident. The jury was also presented with building codes in effect at the time, emphasizing public safety in construction and maintenance practices. Section 405.3 of the gas code and Section 304.6.3 of the mechanical code mandate that appliances located on roofs must be accessible, allowing for portable access only if the roof is under 20 feet above grade. Brian Harbison, a building official for Gadsden, confirmed that both codes were adopted before Shipman's accident, but the restaurant's structure predated the adoption. However, renovations conducted by a contractor in October 1995 obligated compliance with these codes. The contractor's work was permitted for general repairs to convert the establishment to a Huddle House, and Harbison inspected only the main level, without examining the roof. He was unaware of any roof work beyond signage installation and did not direct Jones Food or the property owner to amend the roof system or cite them for code violations. Expert testimony from David Carlysle indicated that accessing the roof with a portable ladder at an improper angle was unsafe and highlighted that after 1995 renovations, the roof was not compliant with accessibility requirements. Carlysle asserted that Jones Food violated both codes by failing to ensure that roof appliances, including the HVAC system, were accessible. He outlined several feasible solutions to bring the roof up to code, emphasizing that a permanently affixed ladder would have been the most cost-effective option, noting that such a ladder was installed at another Huddle House location operated by Jones Food. Shipman placed his ladder at a 45° angle to the facade before an accident occurred. He did not perceive any risks associated with this method of ascent nor did he notice any dangers on the roof. Tony Jones, a representative from Jones Food, testified that he had previously accessed the roof using a similar ladder setup on multiple occasions, sometimes securing it and sometimes not. He did not consider it unreasonably dangerous to use an unsecured ladder at the same slope. Expert witness John Verhalen noted that an unsecured ladder could kick out under weight but also stated it was reasonably safe for Shipman and McKinney to use the ladder if McKinney could maintain it against the facade. The jury awarded Mr. Shipman $270,000 for personal injury and Mrs. Shipman $30,000 for loss of consortium, which was later reduced by $25,000 due to a settlement with the property owner. Jones Food's post-trial motions were denied, leading to an appeal. The court reviews motions for judgment as a matter of law (JML) de novo, assessing whether substantial evidence exists for a jury to consider. To establish negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a duty to a foreseeable plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate causation, and (4) damages. The determination of duty is a legal question, while breach and causation are typically for the jury. Under Alabama law, invitees are owed a duty of ordinary care to maintain safe premises. In *Winn-Dixie v. Godwin*, 349 So.2d 37 (Ala. 1977), it is established that a premises owner is not an insurer of an invitee's safety and that negligence cannot be presumed solely from an invitee's injury. The common law dictates that an invitor must ensure that premises are free from dangers or provide adequate warnings of known dangers. However, the invitor is not liable for injuries stemming from defects or dangers that the contractor or invitee knows or should know. Liability arises primarily when the invitor possesses superior knowledge of a hidden danger that the invitee is unaware of. The invitee assumes the risk of obvious dangers and the invitor has no obligation to mitigate such known hazards. In this case, Jones Food argues that Shipman, as an independent contractor, recognized the hazard associated with the ladder configuration he chose, which contributed to his injury. The Shipmans dispute the characterization of the danger as open and obvious, arguing that this necessitates jury consideration of proximate causation, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk. A critical legal question is whether Jones Food owed a duty to Shipman, hinging on whether the hazard was indeed open and obvious. If it is determined to be so, Jones Food's duty to warn or eliminate the hazard is negated, which would prevent further examination of negligence claims. An objective standard is applied to determine the open and obvious nature of hazards in premises liability cases. The excerpt addresses the legal standards for premises liability, particularly concerning an invitor's duty regarding open and obvious hazards. It clarifies that the critical issue is whether the danger should have been observable rather than if the invitee was aware of it at the time of the incident. For a defendant to succeed in summary judgment based on a lack of duty to address such hazards, it is unnecessary to prove that the invitee consciously recognized the danger during the mishap. The court emphasizes that an invitor is not liable for open and obvious dangers if the invitee should have recognized these risks through reasonable care. The case of Quillen v. Quillen illustrates this principle, where the court ruled that a defendant did not owe a duty to an invitee who was injured after using a ladder that slid out from under him. The court determined the ladder's positioning was an open and obvious risk, which the invitee should have acknowledged. Consequently, since there was no superior knowledge of the hazard by the invitor, liability was not established. In the present case involving Jones Food and Shipman, the court concludes that the risk associated with a ladder leaning at a 45° angle was open and obvious, and thus, Jones Food did not have superior knowledge of the risk over Shipman. Therefore, Jones Food owed no legal duty to Shipman, and the trial court should not have allowed the negligence claim to proceed to the jury. Additionally, the Shipmans assert that Jones Food breached a nondelegable duty to comply with gas and mechanical codes, which required that rooftop appliances be accessible for repairs. They argue that Jones Food's obligations under the lease to adhere to applicable laws constitute a breach due to alleged noncompliance with city ordinances. The Shipmans have filed a negligence claim, asserting that Jones Food owed a duty to them despite not being parties to the lease agreement with the property owner. They reference two Alabama cases, Fuller v. Tractor Equipment Co. and Gardner v. Vinson Guard Service, to argue for Jones Food's nondelegable duty. However, these cases do not pertain to the responsibilities owed to an invitee regarding hazardous premises conditions. The court declines to recognize that any alleged lease violations established a nondelegable duty, emphasizing established premises liability standards. While the court acknowledges that a premises owner could have a special duty under the negligence per se doctrine for statutory violations, this doctrine was neither pleaded nor argued in the trial court, making it unavailable for affirming the judgment. Consequently, the judgment against Jones Food is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. In a related context, Jones Food had retained Clarence Shipman to service its HVAC system, during which Shipman and his assistant utilized a 20-foot portable extension ladder. They positioned the ladder incorrectly at a 45-degree angle instead of the recommended 75 degrees, leading to unsafe conditions. The ladder was not secured at the top, and there were no recommendations from Jones Food regarding the ladder's use. No representative from Jones Food instructed Shipman on how to position his ladder or access the HVAC system. Shipman held the ladder while McKinney climbed onto the roof. As McKinney helped Shipman climb over the facade, the ladder slipped, causing Shipman to fall and sustain injuries, including a permanent disability to his right leg. Shipman and his wife, Kathy, sued Jones Food for negligence, claiming the company failed to warn Shipman of the roof's dangers and did not maintain it safely. Jones Food defended itself by arguing contributory negligence and assumption of risk. A customer, Calvin McCoy, informed Shipman of a prior incident involving another contractor's fall and noted that the ladder was improperly secured. Despite recognizing the facade's slope, Shipman did not consider the climbing method risky. Tony Jones, the owner of Jones Food, testified that he had previously used a similar ladder setup without considering it dangerous. An expert witness for Jones Food stated that an unsecured ladder could slip at a 45-degree angle. The jury ruled in favor of the Shipmans, and after Jones Food's posttrial motions were denied, the company appealed. The Chief Justice dissented, asserting that the determination of whether a danger is open and obvious is typically a jury issue and cited case law supporting this viewpoint. However, existing precedent indicates that certain hazards can be classified as open and obvious as a matter of law. In Lilya v. Greater Gulf State Fair and Ex parte Neese, the courts established that certain hazards, such as riding a mechanical bull and an upside-down doormat left in the rain, are open-and-obvious as a matter of law. In Quillen v. Quillen, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that an aluminum ladder leaning against a metal gutter constituted an open and obvious hazard. The plaintiff, a television antenna installer, fell when the ladder shifted, but the court found that the danger was apparent, and the defendant could not be held liable since there was no defect in the ladder and its positioning was obvious to both parties. The dissenting opinion suggested distinguishing Quillen based on testimony that one individual believed the ladder's position was not dangerous; however, the majority maintained that observable facts should determine the open-and-obvious nature of hazards, not personal beliefs about danger. The court emphasized that an invitor's liability is based on superior knowledge of danger, which was not present as both the plaintiff and the invitor had similar awareness of the risk. The plaintiffs in both Quillen and the current case failed to exercise reasonable care regarding the known hazards, and both were skilled tradesmen without any evidence that the defendant had superior knowledge or owed any special duty. The court determined that the open-and-obvious nature of the hazard negated any duty owed by the invitors to the invitees, referencing a prior ruling that Jones Food had no common-law duty to Shipman due to the visible risk. Consequently, the judgment against Jones Food Company was appropriately reversed. The dissenting Chief Justice Cobb argued against this decision, noting that the prior opinion was issued before his tenure and criticized the majority for failing to adequately consider testimony from Jones, the owner of Jones Food Company. During the trial, Jones acknowledged a duty to inform Shipman about a previous fall involving another repairman at the same restaurant, indicating that if the company was aware of the prior incident, they had a responsibility to disclose that information to Shipman prior to his work. Cobb would have supported granting the rehearing and affirming the original judgment. Mr. Jones acknowledged that his company, Jones Food, made a deliberate choice to allow Mr. Shipman to access the roof, despite knowledge of Mr. Cornelius's prior fall, which some employees were aware of before Shipman's incident. Jones, who had accessed the roof multiple times using an unsecured ladder, did not perceive the ladder's positioning as unreasonably dangerous. The legal standard for determining negligence states that if reasonable individuals might reach different conclusions based on the evidence, the matter is for the jury. The trial court must view evidence in favor of the party opposing a directed verdict motion, and if any reasonable inference is adverse to the moving party, the motion should be denied. Questions regarding whether a danger is open and obvious and a plaintiff's recognition of danger are typically factual issues for the jury. Additionally, there is a strong presumption of correctness regarding a jury's verdict, particularly when a trial court has denied a motion for a new trial. The court previously ruled that placing a ladder against a metal gutter posed an open-and-obvious danger, referencing the case of Quillen. However, the current judge finds Quillen's relevance lacking due to distinct factual differences. Testimony from Jones indicated that he did not view climbing the ladder, which was aligned with the building's slope and unsecured, as unreasonably dangerous, unlike the absence of such evidence in Quillen. The judge emphasizes that the determination of whether a danger is open and obvious is typically a factual issue for the jury. The jury’s verdict for Shipman suggests that reasonable individuals could disagree on the ladder's danger. The judge dissents from the majority's decision to overrule the rehearing request. Additional notes clarify that the Shipmans sued multiple parties, with some claims dismissed or settled. It is also noted that applicable codes permitted portable access to roofs under certain conditions, but expert testimony indicated the ladder's placement was unsafe. The jury was not instructed on potential wantonness or punitive damages, and various testimonies confirmed that Jones Food's roof renovations necessitated compliance with building codes, which were reportedly violated. Carlysle testified that a ladder was unsafe for accessing the roof due to the facade's slope, despite codes allowing portable access for roofs under 20 feet. Jones Food countered by presenting evidence of a valid building permit obtained in 1995 for renovations, a subsequent inspection by the City of Gadsden that resulted in a certificate of occupancy, and the absence of any code violations cited against them regarding the roof system. The Shipmans conceded that their claims against Jones Food were not based on a contractual relationship. The Fuller case established that a defendant has a non-delegable duty to a plaintiff/employee of a contractor regarding safety defects in equipment, while the Gardner case confirmed that a contracted security service has a duty to inform employees of potential dangers, but neither case centered on premises liability related to hazards attributable to the property owner. Not all statutory violations equate to negligence per se; a violation must cause injury to an individual the law intended to protect to establish liability. A plaintiff must also demonstrate how a statutory violation translates into a recognized legal duty. The opinion from December 15, 2006, was rendered by a court division excluding the current author, and there was dissent regarding the rehearing application, which was subsequently reviewed by the entire Court.