Jackson v. JEFFERSON PARISH CLERK OF COURT

Citations: 981 So. 2d 156; 2008 WL 1735490Docket: 07-CA-963

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; April 15, 2008; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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Arevel Jackson appealed the dismissal of his suit against the Jefferson Parish Clerk of Court, Jon A. Gegenheimer, his insurer, National Union Fire Insurance Company, and employee Rose Phillips. Jackson, previously convicted of felonies and released on parole, faced revocation of his parole due to an erroneous minute entry filed by Phillips, which incorrectly stated he had pled guilty to a new charge. This error led to his incarceration for four years without cause. After his release, he filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, which was denied, prompting him to sue in May 2006. The defendants raised exceptions of prescription and judicial immunity, which were upheld by the trial judge. Jackson contended that he only discovered the error leading to his damages after hiring an attorney post-release, invoking the doctrine of contra non valentem to argue that he could not have discovered his cause of action while incarcerated. Under Louisiana law, delictual actions are subject to a one-year liberative prescription, starting from the date the injury is sustained. The court ultimately affirmed the trial court's decision.

Prescriptive statutes are interpreted in a way that favors the obligation being enforced and against the assertion of prescription. The burden of proof lies with the party claiming prescription, except when the grounds for prescription are clear in the pleadings; in such cases, the plaintiff must prove suspension, interruption, or renunciation. When a peremptory exception of prescription is raised before trial, evidence can be presented to support or contest objections, and findings of fact by the trial court are reviewed under the manifest error standard. Without evidence, the court decides on the facts alleged in the petition, accepting all allegations as true.

The doctrine of contra non valentem states that prescription does not apply if a plaintiff is unaware of the facts supporting their cause of action and can suspend the prescriptive period under certain conditions: (1) legal causes preventing action; (2) conditions linked to contracts hindering action; (3) actions by the defendant preventing the plaintiff from pursuing their claim; and (4) situations where the cause of action is unknown or unknowable to the plaintiff. This doctrine is strictly construed and does not apply if the plaintiff's ignorance is due to their own negligence or willfulness.

In the specific case referenced, the plaintiff's parole was revoked in 2001 due to a conviction, but he knew the case was still pending and had not investigated further despite being informed of an error. In 2004, while incarcerated, he filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence but did not pursue it further after it was denied. The trial judge concluded that being in prison does not excuse the plaintiff from filing suit within the prescribed time limits, supported by precedent cases which similarly ruled against the application of the contra non valentem doctrine in such circumstances.

The court rejected the application of the doctrine of contra non valentem in a case involving an injured prisoner who claimed intimidation by the Sheriff prevented her from filing suit. In Corsey v. State, the court tolled prescription because the prisoner was incapacitated and unaware of his legal remedies due to severe injuries. However, in the present civil case, the court found that the plaintiff's action was prescribed at the time of filing, as no legal barriers existed to prevent the plaintiff from acting, nor did the defendants impede the plaintiff's access to his cause of action. The court noted that the plaintiff was aware of his cause of action when wrongfully returned to prison, as demonstrated by his 2004 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The trial judge's ruling to grant the peremptory exception of prescription was upheld.

Regarding judicial immunity, La. R.S. 13:760 provides that court clerks acting under a judge's order are not liable for damages. The plaintiff argued that a mistake by the minute clerk did not conform to a written order, thereby negating immunity. However, precedent from Johnson v. Foti established that clerks performing judicial functions have absolute immunity. This principle was confirmed in subsequent cases involving judicial staff and administrative boards. Consequently, the court found that the Clerk of Court and Ms. Phillips enjoyed absolute immunity in this case. Even if the action had not prescribed, the plaintiff failed to allege a viable cause of action against the defendants, leading to the affirmation of the trial judge's decision.

In dissent, Judge Edwards expressed concern over the outcome, highlighting that the plaintiff was illegally imprisoned due to a significant error by the trial court and remained incarcerated without legal justification until May 2005, despite filing a motion to correct the erroneous sentence. Judge Edwards argued that the defendants' successful exceptions of prescription and judicial immunity did not serve justice in this situation.

Imprisonment without resources or legal representation hindered the plaintiff's ability to act, leading to the application of the doctrine of contra non valentem, which suspends the prescription period in exceptional circumstances. The author emphasizes that this doctrine is rarely invoked but is warranted in this case. The defense of judicial immunity, as outlined in LSA-R.S. 13:760, does not apply here because the criminal clerk's actions were not in line with any written order or judgment from the trial judge. Unlike the precedent set in Johnson v. Foti, where judicial immunity was granted due to adherence to a trial judge's order, this case lacks any formal plea, trial, or conviction, negating the possibility of immunity. Consequently, the author advocates for reversing the trial court's judgment that granted the exceptions and remanding the case for further proceedings, with dissent from Judge Edwards.