Life Care Centers v. Sawgrass Care Center

Citations: 683 So. 2d 609; 1996 WL 669949Docket: 96-811

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; November 20, 1996; Florida; State Appellate Court

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Life Care Centers of America, Inc. appealed a final order from the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) that denied its application for a certificate of need to build a nursing home in northern Duval County, while approving a competing application from Sawgrass Care Center, Inc. Life Care argued that the AHCA's order failed to comply with section 120.59(2) of the Florida Statutes (1995) because it did not individually rule on each proposed finding of fact. The court concluded that the recent revisions to the Administrative Procedure Act did not necessitate reversal based on this argument and dismissed Life Care's claim that the AHCA's decision lacked competent and substantial evidence. The court affirmed the AHCA's order. The excerpt also references a prior case, Island Harbor Beach Club, Ltd. v. Department of Natural Resources, which highlighted the need for explicit agency rulings on proposed findings of fact, indicating a historical context for interpreting section 120.59(2). The court noted that previous administrative orders often contained vague rulings, complicating appellate review, and emphasized the importance of numbered paragraphs in legal documents for clarity and ease of reference, as supported by Florida's rules of civil procedure.

Hearing officers are encouraged to address each proposed finding of fact submitted by parties explicitly by referencing specific paragraph numbers in their final orders. This approach enhances clarity for reviewing courts and ensures compliance with the intent of section 120.59(2). The excerpt emphasizes that merely ruling on proposed findings in a vague, broad manner, as was done in a specific case, is inadequate. Agencies historically addressed proposed findings by adopting detailed recommended orders. The failure to adequately specify rulings on proposed findings in the current case necessitated a burdensome comparison of documents to discern which findings were accepted or rejected, violating the mandated requirements of section 120.59(2). Amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act in 1996 repealed the obligation to rule on each proposed finding, but the requirement for a concise statement of underlying facts remains. The legislative changes raise questions about their applicability to the current case and whether they negate the need for a reversal and remand.

The reviser's bill lacks explicit guidance on retroactivity in administrative adjudication, in contrast to the former Administrative Procedure Act of 1974, which included section 120.72 addressing such issues. Judicial interpretations of section 120.72 created inconsistencies that hindered effective transitions. The 1996 amendment does not provide similar statutory provisions for retroactivity. Generally, substantive statutes do not operate retrospectively unless clear legislative intent exists, while procedural or remedial statutes are applied retrospectively and to all pending cases. Substantive statutes create new obligations or impair existing rights, whereas procedural statutes deal with enforcement methods. The repeal of the second sentence in former section 120.59(2) may have implications for judicial review, but it aims to simplify administrative adjudication processes and mitigate the risk of litigants overwhelming the system with excessive findings. Despite this repeal, litigants retain the right to propose findings and file exceptions to recommended orders, ensuring adequate judicial review remains intact for quasijudicial actions. The amendment modifies procedural methods without infringing on substantive rights.

In *Stuckey's of Eastman, Ga. v. Department of Transp.*, the court reinforced that enforcement of procedural guarantees under former section 120.59(2) is a judicial responsibility, specifically under review procedures outlined in section 120.68. The court referenced *McIntyre v. Tucker*, where a procedural error by the Franklin County School Board led to reversal due to a failure to address proposed findings of fact. Similarly, in *Ehrenzeller v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services*, failure to make required findings was deemed a significant procedural error. However, the court determined that not all noncompliance with section 120.59(2) necessitates reversal, as established in prior rulings, including *Wong v. Career Service Commission* and *Parekh v. Career Service Commission*, where the failure to rule on proposed findings did not always compromise the fairness or correctness of proceedings. The court concluded that the omissions in question did not impair the fairness or correctness of the agency's action, affirming the decision without remand. Additionally, proposed findings of fact were largely considered, adopted, or dismissed based on their evidentiary support. Changes to terminology in the statute were noted, as well as the reclassification of hearing officers to administrative law judges as of October 1, 1996.

The appendix to the recommended order regarding Life Care's proposed findings of fact identifies the acceptance status of various findings. Findings 1-20 are partially accepted in findings 4-17; findings 21-34 are partially accepted in finding 18; findings 35-42 are partially accepted in finding 19; finding 43 is partially accepted in finding 20; findings 44-46 are rejected as unnecessary; findings 47-58 are partially accepted in finding 21; findings 59-69 are partially accepted in finding 22; findings 70-71 are rejected as unnecessary; findings 72-74 are partially accepted in finding 23; findings 75-85 are partially accepted in finding 24; findings 86-90 are partially accepted in finding 25; and finding 91 is rejected as unnecessary. When findings are partially accepted, the remainder is rejected due to being unnecessary for resolution, irrelevant, lacking credible evidence, subordinate, or constituting a conclusion of law.

Subsection two of section 120.72, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1974), states that administrative proceedings begun before January 1, 1975, shall continue under the 1973 Florida Statutes, except those not yet at the hearing stage may proceed under the new act with all parties' consent. In Lewis v. Judges of the First District Court of Appeal, 322 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1975), the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether the First District had jurisdiction to review revocation orders by the comptroller, concluding that prior law, as governed by section 120.72, precluded review until a final order was issued, despite the 1974 Administrative Procedure Act's provisions for judicial review of intermediate agency actions. This position was later re-evaluated in City of Plant City v. Mayo, 337 So.2d 966 (Fla. 1976), where the court did not consider a subsequent legislative amendment that clarified its original stance. In 1978, the Legislature enacted another amendment declaring the transitional period over.