Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; January 13, 2009; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Natasha Nichols, acting as tutrix for her children and on behalf of Chadrick Jones, filed a tort action against Horseshoe Casino after Mr. Jones, an employee with a history of asthma, died from an acute asthma attack while at work. Ms. Nichols alleged that Mr. Jones' supervisor denied his request to seek treatment, which she claimed constituted an intentional act leading to Mr. Jones' death and allowed for recovery outside of workers' compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Horseshoe Casino, finding no evidence of an intentional act. Ms. Nichols appealed the decision.
Mr. Jones had been in the emergency room for an asthma attack on his first day of work, August 18, 2005, but returned to work the following day with a doctor's release and his breathing machine. During his shift, he experienced breathing difficulties, and despite being advised to rest in the break room, he was subsequently found unresponsive later that night. Emergency personnel arrived promptly, but Mr. Jones later died from respiratory arrest. Testimonies indicated that the supervisor observed Mr. Jones without apparent distress at times and did not witness a refusal of treatment. The court upheld the trial court's ruling, affirming that there was insufficient evidence of an intentional act by the supervisor.
Mr. Smith testified that a former employee, Mr. Lee, claimed Mr. Robinson had prevented Mr. Jones from leaving, although Mr. Robinson denied this allegation. Smith indicated that company policy required written reports from those involved in the incident, specifically Ms. Whitehurst, Mr. Nolan, and Mr. Robinson, but no reports were produced by Horseshoe from Smith, Lee, or Robinson. Horseshoe moved for summary judgment, arguing insufficient evidence of intentional misconduct and that Ms. Nichols' only remedy was through workers' compensation. The trial court granted this motion.
On appeal, Ms. Nichols raised two errors:
1. The repeated denial of an employee with a known asthma condition during an asthma attack created a substantially certain risk of injury or death.
2. The failure of Horseshoe to produce relevant investigative reports justified a continuance for additional discovery before the summary judgment dismissal.
In addressing the second assignment, it was noted that Ms. Nichols claimed Horseshoe did not provide essential investigative reports, warranting a continuance. Horseshoe maintained it had provided all reports in its possession and lacked any incident reports from the individuals involved. The court found no error in denying the continuance since Nichols had deposed all relevant parties and Horseshoe complied with document requests.
Regarding the first assignment, appellate courts review summary judgments de novo. Summary judgment is granted if evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The opposing party must present evidence that could meet their burden of proof; without such evidence, summary judgment is appropriate. The court concluded that Nichols failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, thus affirming the trial court’s decision.
Under La. R.S. 23:1032(A), workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for employees injured during employment, with La. R.S. 23:1032(B) providing an exception for injuries resulting from an employer's intentional acts. Intent is defined as either a conscious desire for the result or knowledge that the result is substantially certain to occur. The Louisiana Supreme Court has set a high standard for what constitutes "substantially certain," clarifying that mere belief that someone may get hurt does not meet this threshold and falls under negligence rather than intentional wrongdoing. The terms 'inevitable,' 'virtually sure,' and 'incapable of failing' are used to interpret this standard, and mere knowledge of a risk does not equate to intent.
In this case, Ms. Nichols argues that the actions of Horseshoe's supervisor, Mr. Robinson, amount to an intentional act outside the workers' compensation framework. She claims Mr. Robinson was aware that Mr. Jones' lack of medical treatment for asthma could lead to serious injury or death and that Horseshoe's policies support employees seeking medical help. Ms. Nichols asserts that Mr. Robinson observed Mr. Jones' worsening condition, denied his requests for treatment, and threatened him with job loss if he sought help. Testimony from Mr. Smith, who heard rumors of Mr. Robinson denying treatment requests, supports her claims. Ms. Nichols contends that Mr. Robinson's failure to send Mr. Jones to available EMTs, despite his knowledge of the situation, indicates intent to harm.
Ms. Nichols' deposition indicates she does not believe Mr. Robinson intentionally harmed Mr. Jones and lacks evidence of any intentional acts. Nichols acknowledges that while employees might not have intended harm, something may have occurred that was beyond their control. She confirms there were no intentions to harm Mr. Jones, nor did anyone inform her of any such intentions. Horseshoe asserts that Mr. Robinson demonstrated concern for Mr. Jones by checking on him regularly and denies that Mr. Jones requested to leave work or seek medical treatment. The review of evidence shows no indication that Mr. Robinson denied any such requests or threatened Mr. Jones regarding medical assistance. Nichols' claims are primarily based on rumors from other employees. The evidence does not support any intentional acts or substantial certainty that Mr. Robinson's actions could lead to Mr. Jones' injury or death. Although more assistance might have been warranted, there is no evidence of intentional wrongdoing by Horseshoe employees that would allow recovery beyond workers' compensation for Mr. Jones' death. The trial court's summary judgment in favor of Horseshoe Casino is affirmed, and costs of appeal are assigned to Natasha Nichols, representing A.N. and C.N., and on behalf of Chadrick Jones. Additionally, there is a dispute regarding whether Mr. Jones attempted to call in sick, with Nichols claiming he was told he would lose his job if he did not report, while Horseshoe counters that Mr. Robinson was not present to receive any such call.
