Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; December 9, 2008; Louisiana; State Appellate Court
Gene Lejeune appeals a judgment from the Court of Appeal of Louisiana that granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the Friendship Hunting Club (the Club) and denied his exceptions and request for a preliminary injunction against Neal Onebane. The case revolves around the ownership of hunting leases in Vermilion Parish and whether the Club was an unincorporated association, as the trial court determined, or merely a name used by Lejeune for his personal hunting lease and camp.
The original members of the Club included Lejeune, Andrew Onebane, Neal Onebane, Jake Onebane, and David Savoy, who allegedly formed the Club to share hunting and fishing expenses. Lejeune contended that the other members were merely his guests with no ownership rights. The trial court found in favor of the Club as an unincorporated association, leading to the affirmation of the judgment.
The facts indicate that Lejeune worked as a hunting guide for over twenty years before entering a four-year lease with Amoco Production Company in 1996, on behalf of the Club. Lejeune signed the lease documents as representing the Club, which also required insurance that was acquired in the Club's name. Following Amoco's donation of the property to the State of Louisiana in 2002, the Club made lease payments directly to the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.
Neal Onebane, involved with the Club, contacted the Department regarding late lease payments and made payments for insurance and other expenses, while also communicating with Lejeune about these transactions. In July 2007, Lejeune informed Onebane of his eviction from the Club. The appellate court upheld the trial court's findings, affirming the ruling that the Club constituted an unincorporated association.
Neal Onebane and other Club members sought legal counsel after receiving correspondence from Mr. Lejeune. On August 2, 2007, they warned Mr. Lejeune that he could not unilaterally claim possession of Club property. Subsequently, Mr. Lejeune was expelled from the Club via a vote by Neal, Andrew, and Jake Onebane, with notification sent on September 3, 2007. In response, Mr. Lejeune locked the Club’s entrance and posted a sign prohibiting entry. On October 22, 2007, the Club, represented by Neal Onebane, filed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunctions against Mr. Lejeune, which the trial court granted, preventing Mr. Lejeune from interfering with the Club's property until a hearing on November 5, 2007. Mr. Lejeune filed exceptions and counterclaims, which included challenges to the Club's standing and procedural capacity. The trial court issued a reciprocal TRO against Neal Onebane, allowing Mr. Lejeune to pursue certain objections. During the proceedings, the court indicated it would rule on the exceptions, ultimately denying Mr. Lejeune's claims and recognizing the Club as a collectively formed entity maintaining the lease. On November 7, 2007, the court granted the Club's preliminary injunction against Mr. Lejeune, prohibiting him from interfering with or accessing the Club's leased properties. Mr. Lejeune's request for a preliminary injunction against Neal was denied, and the prior TRO in his favor was vacated. Mr. Lejeune has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in limiting his ability to present evidence related to his exceptions.
The trial court erred by issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO) based on allegations not included in the plaintiff's petition for the TRO, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction. Additionally, the court's issuance of the injunction deprived Mr. Lejeune of his personal lease rights to the property and the judgment signed was inconsistent with the oral reasons provided. The appellate court cannot overturn a trial court's factual findings unless there is manifest error or they are clearly wrong, as established in Rosell v. ESCO. The trial court's credibility assessments and inferences are given substantial deference, and findings deemed reasonable in context cannot be reversed even if the appellate court would have weighed the evidence differently.
Regarding Assignment of Error Number One, Mr. Lejeune claimed the trial court improperly ruled on his exceptions of no right of action and lack of procedural capacity before he completed presenting evidence. The Club argued that Mr. Lejeune was given adequate time to present his case, and the trial court exercised its discretion appropriately under Louisiana law. The appellate review concluded that sufficient evidence was available for the trial court's decision, and Mr. Lejeune's due process rights were upheld by allowing him to proffer additional evidence.
In Assignment of Error Number Two, Mr. Lejeune challenged the issuance of the TRO, but the law stipulates that there is no appeal from such orders, rendering this claim meritless. In Assignment of Error Number Three, he contended that granting the injunction violated his lease rights and that the court ignored verified allegations in the Club's petitions. The Club countered that it successfully proved its ownership of the lease and that Mr. Lejeune interfered with its possession of the property. Mr. Lejeune argued that the injunction should have been restricted to the verified claims in the Club’s petition, which stated the Club was formed in 1998 or 1999 when the hunting lease was acquired.
Documents submitted in response to a subpoena revealed that the original lease for the property was established in 1996, contradicting the Club's claims about its timeline. Mr. Lejeune contends that the trial court overlooked the Club's verified allegations but fails to provide legal authority to support this assertion. According to La. Code Civ. P. art. 3609, the court is permitted to consider both verified pleadings and evidence from both parties when deciding on applications for preliminary injunctions. The trial court's actions were consistent with this provision, and Mr. Lejeune's argument lacks merit.
Both parties referenced the case of Ermert v. Hartford Insurance Co. to support their positions. In Ermert, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that a group of hunters did not form an unincorporated association because they lacked the intent to create a separate legal entity. The court emphasized that the parties must at least view their group as a distinct entity. Specific facts, such as individual ownership of the campsite and the lack of formal organization, supported this conclusion.
In contrast, the Club argues that its circumstances differ significantly from those in Ermert, primarily because all leases were executed in the name of the "Friendship Hunting Club," with Mr. Lejeune signing on behalf of the Club. This indicates a recognized entity distinct from its individual members, despite Mr. Lejeune's role in locating the lease.
The Club obtained insurance under its name, with expenses largely covered by its members, often excluding Mr. Lejeune, who admitted he could not afford lease payments or maintenance costs until 2007. The Club operated as an unincorporated association prior to acquiring the first lease, making it the lease owner instead of Mr. Lejeune. He acknowledged securing the leased property with a lock and posted no trespassing signs. The Club successfully demonstrated its entitlement to a preliminary injunction.
Mr. Lejeune's claim of non-joinder of parties was deemed abandoned due to lack of brief support. The trial court correctly ruled the Club as a separate juridical entity with the capacity to sue, dismissing Mr. Lejeune's exceptions of no right of action and lack of procedural capacity. The appellate review emphasized the trial court's credibility assessments and the weight of documentary evidence, which favored the Club, leading to the conclusion that the trial court's decisions were not manifestly erroneous.
Regarding Mr. Lejeune's fourth assignment, he argued that the written judgment incorrectly reflected the trial court's oral rulings about compensation for his absence during hunting season. Despite his objections, the court signed the judgment as prepared by the Club, which was found consistent with the issues considered. The appellate court upheld that the written judgment prevails over oral reasons. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment in its entirety, assessing all appeal costs to Mr. Lejeune.
