Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 22, 1981; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
In the case of Robert Edwards v. State of Arizona (No. 79-5269), the Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of Edwards' confession obtained after he invoked his right to counsel during custodial interrogation. Edwards was arrested on January 19, 1976, informed of his Miranda rights, and initially cooperated with police questioning. However, he subsequently expressed a desire for an attorney, leading to the cessation of interrogation.
On January 20, police approached Edwards again, provided him with his Miranda rights once more, and obtained a confession after he indicated a willingness to talk. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the confession, deeming it voluntary, and he was convicted. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld this, ruling that Edwards validly waived his right to counsel.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision, ruling that the use of Edwards' confession violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court clarified that once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, any subsequent waiver must be both knowing and intelligent. The state courts erred by focusing solely on the voluntariness of the confession rather than on whether Edwards comprehended and knowingly relinquished his right to counsel. The Court emphasized that a valid waiver cannot be inferred merely from a suspect responding to police-initiated questioning after having invoked the right to counsel. Since the interrogation on January 20 was instigated by the police and Edwards had not initiated further communication, his confession was deemed inadmissible. The case was reversed, highlighting the critical nature of protecting the right to counsel during custodial interrogations.
An interrogating officer informed Edwards that he could not negotiate a deal and provided him with a county attorney's phone number. After making a call and hanging up, Edwards requested an attorney before proceeding, leading to the cessation of questioning and his transfer to county jail. The next morning, detectives sought to interrogate him, but Edwards expressed a desire not to speak. Despite this, he was compelled to meet with them. The detectives identified themselves and informed him of his Miranda rights. Edwards initially wanted to hear a taped statement from an alleged accomplice before speaking. After listening to the tape, he agreed to make a statement, provided it was not recorded. He subsequently implicated himself in the crime.
Prior to trial, Edwards moved to suppress his confession, claiming a violation of his Miranda rights after he had invoked his right to counsel. Initially, the trial court granted this motion but later reversed its decision based on a higher court ruling, asserting his confession was voluntary. Edwards was tried twice, and his confession was admitted in both trials. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that Edwards had invoked his rights to remain silent and counsel during the first interrogation but found he had waived those rights when he voluntarily spoke to detectives the next day.
The appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling on the voluntary waiver and confession. However, the use of Edwards' confession against him at trial was deemed a violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as established in Miranda v. Arizona, which requires that custodial interrogation only occurs after a suspect is advised of their rights. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the Arizona Supreme Court's judgment, agreeing with Edwards that he did not validly waive his right to counsel after having asserted it the previous day.
The Arizona Supreme Court incorrectly applied the standard for determining waiver of the right to counsel, which necessitates not only a voluntary act but also a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of that right. This standard varies depending on the individual circumstances of each case, including the accused's background and behavior. In the proceedings, the trial court found the confession to be voluntary without addressing whether the accused, Edwards, had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged that confessions are generally considered involuntary until proven otherwise by the State and that the voluntariness should be evaluated based on the totality of circumstances, but it failed to specifically address the requirement for a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. The Supreme Court cited Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, which relates to waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, but clarified that it does not govern the waiver of the right to counsel, which demands a higher standard of protection. Ultimately, neither the trial court nor the Arizona Supreme Court adequately considered whether Edwards understood and knowingly relinquished his right to counsel, leading to a misunderstanding of the valid waiver requirement.
An accused individual may waive their Miranda rights and respond to police interrogation, but if they invoke their right to counsel, further interrogation cannot occur unless the accused initiates communication. Once the right to counsel is asserted, interrogation must stop until a lawyer is present. The court reaffirmed that the assertion of the right to counsel requires immediate cessation of questioning, as established in previous cases, including Miranda and Michigan v. Mosley. The ruling emphasizes that reinterrogating an accused after they have clearly requested counsel violates Miranda protections. In the case of Edwards, although he could have later initiated conversation, the police returned to him for questioning without making counsel available, contrary to his expressed wishes to remain silent. The Arizona Supreme Court correctly recognized his invocation of rights, and thus, any statements made during the interrogation initiated by police without counsel present are inadmissible.
Edwards was subjected to custodial interrogation on January 20, as established by Rhode Island v. Innis, without having access to counsel. Although he stated a willingness to talk after being informed of his Miranda rights, this did not constitute a valid waiver of his right to counsel, rendering his subsequent incriminating statement inadmissible at trial. The Arizona Supreme Court's conclusion that Edwards had waived his right was found to be flawed, leading to the reversal of its judgment. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment but argued against the necessity of a special rule for waiving rights during custodial interrogation, asserting that the inquiry should focus on whether the waiver was voluntary, in line with established standards. Justice Powell, concurring in the result, expressed uncertainty about the meaning of the Court's opinion but acknowledged the importance of assessing waivers based on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.
One accused of a crime can waive constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, provided they fully understand the rights and voluntarily intend to relinquish them. The Court's recent opinion asserts that if an accused has expressed a desire for counsel, they cannot be interrogated by police until counsel is available unless they initiate further communication. This raises concerns about establishing a new requirement regarding who initiates conversations between the accused and police, which the author disagrees with, suggesting it complicates established waiver doctrine.
The opinion identifies two critical questions for assessing waiver in the context of interrogation: whether there was actual interrogation and whether the police initiated it. In the specific case of Edwards, he was subjected to interrogation against his will, indicating a violation of his right to counsel. The author contrasts this with permissible police interactions, such as routine conversations or inquiries about a suspect’s willingness to speak without an attorney, emphasizing that the Constitution does not prevent police from checking if a suspect has changed their mind about requesting counsel.
Ultimately, after appropriate warnings and invoking the right to counsel, the key inquiry is whether the suspect wishes to speak to police without counsel, determined by the circumstances rather than who initiated the conversation. The primary concern remains whether there was a voluntary and informed waiver of the right to counsel prior to any interrogation.
Agreement with the Court's opinion is expressed, contingent upon its restatement of established principles, with concern raised over an excessive focus on the element of "initiation." Justice WHITE's dissent in *Miranda v. Arizona* is cited, emphasizing that the Court imposed a prophylactic rule not explicitly required by the Constitution. It is noted that *Miranda* acknowledged the possibility of waiving counsel's assistance, which should be assessed under the general Zerbst standard. The opinion references facts primarily from the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in *State v. Travis*, highlighting that detectives met with the defendant Edwards without his request, thereby ignoring his prior request for counsel. The court found Edwards' request for an attorney to negotiate was sufficiently clear, interpreting it as a request for counsel and to remain silent until counsel was present.
The discussion touches on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments concerning the right to counsel, referencing the *Massiah v. United States* ruling that this right attaches once adversarial proceedings have begun. The State initially acknowledged this right attached upon formal charges but later argued, relying on *Kirby v. Illinois* and *Moore v. Illinois*, that it does not attach until an indictment or formal complaint is filed. Arizona law requires prosecution to begin through an information or indictment, and a felony complaint must involve a preliminary examination unless waived. The State contends that the right to counsel does not arise until after the required legal processes are completed.
Upon arrest, the accused must be brought before a magistrate for a hearing where the magistrate confirms the accused's name and address, informs them of the charges, and explains their rights, including the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. A preliminary hearing must occur within 10 days of custody unless waived, aimed at determining probable cause for the trial. The State references the case of Moore v. Illinois, indicating that criminal proceedings commence upon the filing of a complaint, with adversary proceedings initiated at the preliminary hearing. The excerpt also notes that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment does not arise until further proceedings occur after the filing of a complaint, as clarified in United States v. Duvall.
In cases like Brewer v. Williams and Massiah v. United States, the Court ruled that a valid waiver of counsel cannot be assumed from the accused's responses without the presence of their attorney. Conversely, in McLeod v. Ohio, the Court reversed a decision allowing police to elicit information after indictment without appointed counsel. The text discusses how an accused may validly waive their right to counsel, emphasizing that if the accused initiates dialogue with law enforcement, the circumstances must be assessed to ensure any waiver of rights was knowing and intelligent. Various appellate court decisions support that an accused can change their mind regarding counsel, allowing them to speak with police without an attorney present if the waiver is made voluntarily.
In the Fifth Circuit, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, cannot occur if the accused has clearly invoked this right, unless the accused initiates further contact with law enforcement. Waivers may be valid if the request for counsel is ambiguous. The validity of a waiver in circumstances where the accused has faced only one interrogation is not addressed. Justice White's remarks in Michigan v. Mosley highlight that a suspect may wish to provide information that could lead to immediate release or reduced charges, even after invoking rights. Although Mosley involved a suspect's right to remain silent, it parallels the current situation due to the invocation of the right to counsel. A complete prohibition on voluntary statements could hinder legitimate police investigations and prevent suspects from making informed decisions about their interests. Any shift from the standard waiver requirement must be clearly justified, as current case law demonstrates effective protection of constitutional rights under the established framework.
