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Union Carbide Corp. v. Kavanaugh
Citations: 879 So. 2d 42; 2004 WL 1393537Docket: 4D03-2956
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; June 23, 2004; Florida; State Appellate Court
Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) appealed a final judgment awarding Dennis and Ingeborg Kavanaugh $1,153,000 for damages resulting from asbestos exposure linked to UCC's negligence. The Kavanaughs alleged Dennis was exposed to asbestos while sanding joint compound containing asbestos, primarily from Georgia-Pacific, which UCC supplied. The case involved multiple defendants, and after a mistrial, a jury found UCC 100% liable for Dennis's injuries. UCC contended that the trial court erred in not granting a directed verdict on the Kavanaughs' failure to warn claim, arguing it had fulfilled its duty to warn by notifying Georgia-Pacific of asbestos hazards and had no obligation to warn end users. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, emphasizing that a directed verdict should only be granted when no reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party, thus supporting the jury's role in weighing evidence and drawing reasonable inferences. UCC, as a bulk asbestos supplier, had a duty to warn about the dangers of its product under Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This section establishes liability for suppliers if they place a dangerous product on the market, knowing its risks, and fail to adequately warn users who may not recognize the danger. UCC argues it fulfilled its duty by warning Georgia-Pacific, the manufacturer. However, this duty can only be discharged if the manufacturer is deemed a "learned intermediary," responsible for conveying warnings to consumers. Warnings provided solely to the manufacturer may not suffice if there is reason to believe the manufacturer will not relay these warnings effectively, especially if the manufacturer is careless. Factors influencing the assessment of whether UCC adequately warned Georgia-Pacific include the product's dangerous nature, the manner of its use, the intensity of the warnings, the burden of providing warnings, and the likelihood of effective communication to end users. Ultimately, the adequacy of UCC's warnings and its continuing duty to Kavanaugh is a matter for the jury to decide. The evidence indicated that UCC provided incomplete warnings about known hazards to Georgia-Pacific, failing to disclose the full extent of the risks. UCC argued that Shell Oil Co. v. Harrison dictated a directed verdict in its favor. In Shell Oil, the defendant was found not liable because it had informed Kerr-McGee about the dangers of Nemagon, which Kerr-McGee then communicated to its employees and customers. The court determined that the manufacturer and distributor fulfilled their duty to warn, as they had taken necessary precautions. However, in contrast, UCC did not adequately warn Georgia-Pacific or communicate the risks to the ultimate users. Thus, UCC’s obligation to warn extended beyond Georgia-Pacific, and the trial court rightfully denied the directed verdict motion, affirming that UCC had not met its duty to warn. The ruling was upheld by the judges.