Lorain Journal Co. Et Al. v. Milkovich

Citations: 449 U.S. 966; 101 S. Ct. 380; 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2189; 49 U.S.L.W. 3329; 66 L. Ed. 2d 232; 1980 U.S. LEXIS 3846Docket: 80-100

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; November 3, 1980; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The Supreme Court of the United States denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case of Lorain Journal Company, The News-Herald, and J. Theodore Diadiun v. Michael Milkovich. The case, which involved issues of media liability in libel actions, originated from a column written by sportswriter Ted Diadiun criticizing Milkovich, a wrestling coach deemed a public figure. The column accused Milkovich of lying about a brawl during a wrestling match that led to penalties from the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA). After Milkovich's team faced disciplinary actions, he testified in a related lawsuit but was not a party to it. Diadiun's column falsely alleged that Milkovich had misrepresented facts at a hearing, leading Milkovich to file a libel suit.

The trial court acknowledged Milkovich's public figure status under the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan standard but denied the petitioners' motion for summary judgment. The case proceeded to jury trial. Justice Brennan dissented, highlighting concerns about the limits of trial courts in dismissals and judgments favoring media defendants in libel cases. Justice Stewart also indicated a desire to deny the petition due to the absence of a final judgment. Additionally, two motions for amici curiae briefs were granted from Beacon Journal Publishing Company and the Ohio Newspapers Association.

After the trial concluded, petitioners sought a directed verdict, claiming Milkovich did not provide enough evidence to demonstrate that Diadiun's article was published with actual malice as defined by the New York Times standard. The court agreed, stating that the evidence, viewed favorably for Milkovich, did not meet the clear and convincing proof requirement of actual malice. Milkovich appealed, and the State Court of Appeals reversed this decision, asserting that Diadiun's column contradicted a previous court finding, which was sufficient evidence of actual malice to deny the directed verdict. Petitioners then appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which dismissed the case, stating it did not raise substantial constitutional questions and denied a rehearing.

The Ohio appellate court's ruling established that a newspaper could lose the right to a directed verdict if it published statements conflicting with court decisions, even without evidence of knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. This ruling was seen as contrary to First Amendment protections, which allow newspapers to express their views of facts without being constrained by court determinations. The dissent argues that the appellate decision undermines robust public discourse about judicial processes and that the previous court ruling did not address the specifics of the events in question. The dissent concludes that the appellate court's decision violates First Amendment principles and would chill press freedom in Ohio, advocating for certiorari to review the constitutional implications of this case.

The ruling addresses the implications of directed verdicts on summary judgments and judgments notwithstanding the verdict, specifically regarding the sufficiency of evidence for a jury to find actual malice based on the "clear and convincing evidence" standard. The court found that the wrestling team was denied the opportunity to cross-examine and call its own witnesses. No factual findings were made regarding the underlying events, and the designation of Milkovich as a public figure remains unchallenged. The court affirmed that a judicial determination of truth, made during the trial, should be respected until overturned on appeal. Consequently, any media publication contradicting this judicial finding may be deemed to show reckless disregard for the truth, potentially constituting actionable libel against a public figure. The determination of whether this constitutes reckless disregard is considered a factual question for the court. Although the appellate court remanded for retrial, the decision is viewed as final for purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1257. A ruling favoring the petitioners would conclude the litigation, while failing to address the issue leaves Ohio's press in legal uncertainty regarding the constitutionality of its reporting practices. Moreover, common law dictates that factual findings from one case cannot be used as evidence in another.