Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 30, 1980; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Under the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, the U.S. guaranteed the Sioux Nation undisturbed use of the Great Sioux Reservation, including the Black Hills, requiring that any cession be signed by three-fourths of the adult male Sioux. In 1876, a controversial "agreement" signed by only 10% of the Sioux led to their relinquishment of rights to the Black Hills in exchange for subsistence rations. The 1877 Act, enacted by Congress, implemented this agreement, effectively abrogating the treaty.
The Sioux viewed this action as a treaty breach and could not litigate until 1920, when a special jurisdictional Act allowed them to sue for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Claims dismissed their claim in 1942, asserting it was not authorized to question the adequacy of the compensation. In 1946, the Sioux resubmitted their claim to the Indian Claims Commission, which determined that the 1877 Act constituted a taking, entitling the Sioux to just compensation.
On appeal, the Court of Claims recognized the government's dishonorable dealings and awarded the Sioux $17.5 million, excluding interest, but ruled that the claim was barred by res judicata due to the earlier dismissal. The court noted that interest could only be awarded if the taking were unconstitutional. In 1978, Congress passed the 1978 Act, allowing a de novo review of the merits regarding the 1877 Act's taking status. The Court of Claims reaffirmed the Commission's finding that the 1877 Act was a taking, applying a test of good faith regarding compensation. The court characterized the 1877 Act as an exercise of eminent domain and awarded the Sioux interest on $17.1 million, the fair market value of the Black Hills as of 1877, dating from that year.
Congress' 1978 Act waived the res judicata effect of a previous judicial ruling that rejected a legal claim by the Sioux against the United States, without violating the separation of powers doctrine. The Act did not disturb the finality of judicial decrees or improperly endow the Court of Claims with jurisdiction over the merits of the Black Hills claim by dictating a decision-making rule. Congress, exercising its constitutional power to manage national debts, may recognize moral obligations by waiving defenses to claims against it. Upon returning to the Court of Claims, the Sioux sought enforcement of a newly recognized legal right, and Congress did not dictate the outcome of this new review.
The Court of Claims determined that the 1877 Act constituted a taking of tribal property, originally set aside for the Sioux under the Fort Laramie Treaty, thereby imposing a duty on the Government to provide just compensation, including interest. The presumption of congressional good faith regarding dealings with Native Americans was found inapplicable, as the appropriateness of congressional measures protecting tribal interests is a factual issue requiring comprehensive evidence evaluation. While courts should not second-guess legislative judgments, they must conduct thorough reviews of historical records when assessing Congress' actions related to tribal lands. The case centers on the Sioux Nation's longstanding claim that the U.S. unlawfully violated the Fort Laramie Treaty, which guaranteed the Black Hills for their exclusive use following military conflicts in the late 1860s.
The Fort Laramie Treaty established the Great Sioux Reservation, delineating its boundaries and prohibiting unauthorized settlement. The U.S. committed to supporting Sioux tribes in cultivating selected lands and providing essential materials and subsistence for four years. In exchange, the Sioux relinquished rights under an earlier treaty to occupy lands outside the reservation while reserving hunting rights in specific areas as long as buffalo were present. The Sioux also agreed to withdraw opposition to railroad construction, military posts, and settlement efforts outside their reservation.
Article XII mandated that any treaty ceding parts of the reservation required the consent of at least three-fourths of adult male Sioux. Following the treaty, a period of peace ensued, which was disrupted by rumors of gold in the Black Hills, part of the reservation. In 1874, an Army expedition led by Lieutenant Colonel Custer confirmed the presence of gold, leading to widespread interest in settling the area. The discovery was reported nationally, increasing pressure to disregard the treaty. Consequently, the U.S. Army faced the challenge of enforcing the treaty against encroaching prospectors, at times resorting to military force to uphold Sioux rights.
Sheridan expressed support for settling the Black Hills, contingent on Congress extinguishing the treaty rights of the Sioux. His instructions were publicized, but subsequently, the Executive Branch decided to abandon its treaty obligations to protect Sioux territory. In a letter dated November 9, 1875, Sheridan informed General Terry that President Grant, along with the Secretaries of the Interior and War, concluded that the military should no longer resist miner occupation of the Black Hills, believing such resistance fueled demand and complications. The orders were to be quietly enforced, and the decision was to remain confidential.
As the Army ceased its enforcement role, settler influx into the Black Hills grew. The government aimed to secure miners’ rights to extract gold. In spring 1875, a commission led by William B. Allison was tasked to negotiate with the Sioux, who demanded at least $70 million for the land. The commission offered $400,000 annually or $6 million for complete relinquishment, but negotiations failed.
During winter 1875-1876, many Sioux were hunting in their reserved territory. On December 6, 1875, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs ordered Indian agents to notify these hunters to return by January 31, 1876, or be deemed "hostiles," a directive impractical due to harsh winter conditions. By February 1, the Secretary of the Interior transferred jurisdiction over alleged hostile Sioux to the War Department, leading to military actions culminating in Sitting Bull's victory over Custer on June 25. Those who surrendered were returned to reservations, stripped of weapons and horses, and reliant on government rations.
Congress grew dissatisfied with the Sioux's lack of self-sufficiency, especially after their entitlement to subsistence rations expired in 1872. Despite this, over $1 million was appropriated yearly for their food. By August 1876, Congress mandated that no further appropriations for subsistence would occur unless the Sioux ceded the Black Hills, relinquished hunting grounds, and reached an agreement for self-sufficiency. Consequently, a new commission led by George Manypenny was appointed to negotiate the cession of the Black Hills, emphasizing to the Sioux that the U.S. no longer had obligations to provide rations.
The treaty prepared by the commissioners required the Sioux to give up rights to the Black Hills and lands west of the 103rd meridian, along with hunting rights in unceded territories, in exchange for subsistence rations. The commissioners bypassed the Fort Laramie Treaty requirement that three-fourths of adult males must agree to land cessions, presenting the treaty only to Sioux chiefs, resulting in only 10% of adult males signing. Congress later enacted the 1876 agreement into law with the Act of Feb. 28, 1877, which abrogated the Fort Laramie Treaty and legitimized settlers' claims to the Black Hills. The Sioux viewed this as a breach of trust, leading to the formation of the Black Hills Treaty Association to seek reparations, with claims suggesting the government owes about $9 million. Prior to 1946, no general mechanism existed for tribes to litigate treaty claims. However, the Sioux successfully lobbied for a special jurisdictional act in 1920, allowing them to file a claim for compensation for the Black Hills, which was dismissed in 1942, with the court stating that the claim was a moral one, not protected under the Just Compensation Clause. In 1946, the Indian Claims Commission Act was passed to address tribal grievances. The Sioux resubmitted their claim in 1950, but the Commission initially ruled against them. After the Sioux argued that previous counsel had inadequately represented them, the Court of Claims ordered the Commission to reconsider the case with additional evidence.
On November 19, 1958, the Commission reopened the case regarding the Sioux claim, specifically reconsidering the merits related to the 1877 Act, which the Sioux contended constituted a taking of the Black Hills without just compensation. Following an amended petition from the Sioux, a protracted procedural conflict ensued between the Sioux and the Government. In October 1968, the Commission posed three critical questions for determination: the land and rights acquired by the U.S. from the Sioux under the 1877 Act, the consideration provided for those acquisitions, and the existence of any payment if no consideration was given.
In 1974, the Commission, by a 4-to-1 vote, ruled that the earlier 1942 Court of Claims decision did not bar the Sioux's Fifth Amendment claim based on res judicata, as that decision lacked jurisdiction and did not address the merits of the claim. The Commission found that Congress had failed to offer full value for the ceded Black Hills lands and that the only obligation assumed by the Government was to provide subsistence rations, which were limited and not indicative of the land's value. The Commission concluded that Congress had exercised its eminent domain power in enacting the 1877 Act and thus owed just compensation to the Sioux.
The Government appealed this ruling, arguing that the Sioux's claim should be barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, or that the 1877 Act did not constitute a taking requiring compensation. The Court of Claims, without addressing the merits, ruled that the Sioux claim was barred by the res judicata effect of the 1942 decision. The court noted that the key issue was whether the Sioux would be entitled to interest on any award, contingent on whether the acquisition was deemed an unconstitutional taking. Ultimately, the court affirmed the Commission's finding of unfair dealings, awarding the Sioux at least $17.5 million for the lands surrendered and gold taken prior to the 1877 Act.
The court criticized President Grant for violating the government's treaty obligation regarding the Black Hills and noted the coercive tactics used against the starving Sioux to secure their agreement to sell the land. The court described the situation as one of the most shameful in U.S. history. Despite acknowledging the dishonorable dealings, it determined that the Sioux's claim had been previously adjudicated in 1942 and was now barred by res judicata. The court also stated that interest could not be awarded under the Indian Claims Commission Act. Although Congress could amend this, the court lacked the authority to do so. The Sioux's petition for certiorari was denied. Subsequently, the case returned to the Indian Claims Commission, which valued the rights-of-way obtained by the government at $3,484, concluding no offset payments had been made to the Sioux. The government sought a final award of $17.5 million, but the Commission delayed judgment due to pending legislation.
On March 13, 1978, Congress enacted a statute allowing the Court of Claims to review the merits of the Black Hills takings claim anew, without res judicata defenses. Following this, the Court of Claims, led by Chief Judge Friedman, confirmed that the 1877 Act constituted a taking of the Black Hills and rights-of-way. The court applied a test to determine if Congress had made a good faith effort to compensate the Sioux for their land, ultimately classifying the Act as an exercise of eminent domain. It dismissed contrary findings from the Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock case as irrelevant for just compensation claims. The court ruled that the Sioux were entitled to an interest award at 5% per annum on a principal sum of $17.1 million dating back to 1877. The government’s request for a writ of certiorari was granted to address significant constitutional issues arising from this case, marking the third time such petitions had been submitted due to the legislative amendment allowing the review of the Sioux's claims.
The amendment approved on March 13, 1978, allows claimants to apply within thirty days for the Court of Claims to review the merits of the Indian Claims Commission's February 15, 1974, determination regarding the taking of the Black Hills under the 1877 Act, without considering res judicata or collateral estoppel. The Court of Claims is instructed to evaluate any additional evidence, including oral testimony, and to make an independent determination on the Fifth Amendment taking issue.
However, two constitutional objections based on the separation of powers doctrine arise concerning this amendment. The first objection posits that Congress has undermined the finality of prior judicial decisions by effectively converting the Court of Claims' earlier judgments into mere advisory opinions. The second objection argues that Congress has overstepped its authority by granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction to decide the merits of the claim while also dictating a rule that limits the court's adjudicatory role, specifically by excluding the applicability of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
These constitutional concerns were not raised by the Government before the Court of Claims, and during oral arguments, U.S. counsel asserted that the amendment was within Congress' legislative powers. The House of Representatives debated these issues and concluded that Congress' waiver of a "technical legal defense" to allow reconsideration of the Black Hills claim fell within its legislative authority.
The excerpt addresses the role of Congress and the courts in handling claims against the United States, specifically examining the implications of a 1919 Special Act of Congress regarding the Cherokee Nation's claims for interest. The Supreme Court case, Cherokee Nation v. United States, is highlighted, where the Court had previously ruled on the Cherokee's entitlement to interest on certain claims. Following the initial judgment that awarded 5% simple interest on four claims, the Cherokee Nation sought additional compensation in the form of compound interest, prompting Congress to reconfer jurisdiction to reassess their claims.
The Court concluded that Congress had the authority to waive the res judicata effect of prior judgments, allowing for further examination of the interest claims. This establishes that Congress can effectively direct the Court of Claims to revisit previously decided issues, reinforcing its power under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to address and settle debts of the United States. The precedent established by Cherokee Nation is pivotal in affirming Congress's broad constitutional powers in this context and addresses separation-of-powers concerns raised regarding legislative authority over judicial determinations.
The Court clarified that "debts" encompass not only legally enforceable claims but also those based on moral or honorary obligations that may not be recoverable in a court of law. Congress possesses the authority to recognize and settle such moral debts, which may include waiving legal defenses against claims. This principle was illustrated in the case of Cherokee Nation, which, while not explicitly linking Congress's power to waive res judicata to its authority to pay debts, relied on precedents like Nock v. United States. In Nock, the Court of Claims addressed whether Congress overstepped judicial authority by instructing the court to adjudicate a damages claim despite a prior ruling favoring the government. The court determined that Congress did not interfere with judicial processes, as it effectively acted as a defendant agreeing to waive its prior legal objections. This established that Congressional waiver of res judicata does not violate separation-of-powers principles. These concepts were reaffirmed in Pope v. United States, where Congress allowed the Court of Claims to adjudicate certain claims against the government, directing the court to follow specific legal guidelines and methodologies for judgment.
The Court of Claims found that a specific Act unconstitutionally interfered with judicial independence, distinguishing it from the Cherokee Nation case where Congress merely provided for a new trial without dictating court outcomes. However, the higher Court reversed this judgment, asserting that the Act did not negate the prior denial of damages to Pope but instead created a new obligation for the Government to compensate him for beneficial work performed, which Congress believed had not been adequately reimbursed. The Court ruled that Congress's action was within its constitutional authority to address the Nation's debts, emphasizing that the power to create new obligations extends beyond legally binding debts to include moral or honorary claims. Furthermore, the Court clarified that the Special Act did not encroach on judicial functions, as it required the Court of Claims to adjudicate Pope's claims using a specific liability formula while still allowing for the normal judicial process to take place. The earlier factual findings of the Court of Claims were not rendered conclusive by the Act, and the Court noted that even if Congress stipulated facts, the ultimate judgment remained a judicial function. The Court also refrained from addressing how the principles from the Klein case might apply if Congress attempted to overturn a judgment of the Court of Claims in favor of the Government.
The separation-of-powers issue in this case has been addressed in Cherokee Nation and aligns with the principles from United States v. Klein. In Klein, the administrator of V. F. Wilson's estate sued the U.S. for proceeds from the sale of property sold by government agents during the Civil War, based on the Abandoned and Captured Property Act, which allowed claims from noncombatants who had not supported the rebellion. President Lincoln's proclamation provided amnesty to certain individuals, restoring their property rights upon taking a prescribed oath. The Court of Claims ruled that Wilson’s oath absolved his rebellion involvement, entitling Klein to the sale proceeds. This decision mirrored the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Padelford, affirming that a presidential pardon removed any legal offense consequences. However, Congress subsequently enacted a proviso in an appropriations bill that disallowed presidential pardons as evidence of loyalty in claims, dismissed appeals based on such pardons, and treated acceptance of a pardon as proof of rebellion support. The Supreme Court later deemed this proviso unconstitutional, interpreting it as an attempt to negate the judicial recognition of pardons' effects, despite Congress's authority to regulate appellate jurisdiction.
The proviso in question was deemed unconstitutional for two main reasons. First, it imposed a specific rule of decision on a pending case, effectively requiring the courts to rule in favor of the government. This requirement for the court to dismiss an appeal if the judgment favored the claimants, due to a pardon granted to the intestate, raised concerns about legislative overreach into judicial decision-making. The court questioned whether Congress could mandate a rule that would compel the judiciary to deny its jurisdiction based solely on the potential outcome being unfavorable to the government.
Second, the proviso was criticized for undermining the effect of a presidential pardon, thereby encroaching on the Executive's constitutional powers. The court emphasized that it would not function as a tool for Congress to alter the implications of a presidential pardon.
The document also distinguishes this case from the precedent set in Klein, where Congress had attempted to dictate the outcome in its favor. In contrast, the current amendment merely waived the defense of res judicata to allow the Sioux to seek a judicial resolution of their claim on its merits, without Congress attempting to influence the court's ultimate decision. The amendment did not challenge the finality of previous judgments nor interfere with the Court of Claims' role, instead facilitating a new review based on established facts and legal principles.
Congress did not review or interfere with the finality of the Court of Claims' decisions regarding the merits of claims, specifically allowing the court to reaffirm its 1942 ruling that the Black Hills claim was not cognizable under the Fifth Amendment. This amendment is notably different from the "consent judgment" in Pope, which was deemed constitutional as a valid exercise of Congress' authority to settle debts. Furthermore, it is distinguishable from the provisions of appellate jurisdiction that were ruled unconstitutional in Klein. The Court of Claims, referencing the "good faith effort" test from a prior case, concluded that the 1877 Act constituted a taking of the Black Hills, warranting just compensation for the Sioux under the Fifth Amendment. The Fort Berthold test reconciles two conflicting legal principles: one that accepts Congress' paramount power over Indian property, and another that mandates just compensation for tribal land appropriations. The test illustrates that Congress cannot simultaneously act as a trustee for Indian interests while also exercising eminent domain over their property; it must adopt one role at a time.
A guideline is necessary for courts to determine Congress's capacity in legislative actions concerning Indigenous lands. The guideline states that if Congress attempts in good faith to compensate Indigenous peoples for land value, converting it from land to money, this does not constitute a taking; it is simply a change in asset form, akin to a trustee's duties. In the case at hand, the Court of Claims found that Congress, in enacting the 1877 Act, did not make a good-faith effort to provide the Sioux with equivalent value for the Black Hills. The central question is whether the Court of Claims applied the correct legal standard. The Government argues that the Court erred by concluding the 1877 Act constituted a taking because Congress did not affirmatively demonstrate that the consideration offered was equivalent to the ceded property rights. It contends that Congress should be presumed to act within its authority to manage tribal assets if the legislation appears aimed at promoting tribal welfare, citing the precedent set in *Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock*. In that case, the Court ruled that Congress could enact laws contrary to treaties with Indigenous tribes, emphasizing that Congress possesses the power to abrogate treaty provisions when justified by governmental policy and consistent with good faith toward Indigenous peoples. The Court in *Lone Wolf* did not address claims of fraud regarding the land cession agreement due to the lack of required signatures from adult males in the tribe.
Legislative authority holds exclusive jurisdiction over matters related to tribal property, and its decisions are final against judicial review. In the case of Lone Wolf, the Court addressed whether the Act of June 6, 1900, potentially constituted a taking of Indian property without just compensation. The Act was enacted during a time of active tribal relations among the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches, and it aimed to address the allocation of tribal property while providing compensation for surplus lands. The Court referenced Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, affirming that Congress has full administrative authority over Indian tribal property, which was exercised in this instance as a mere reallocation rather than a confiscation.
The Court presumed Congress acted in good faith and exercising its best judgment, asserting that any grievances stemming from Congress's actions should be addressed to the legislative body rather than through the courts. The legislation was deemed constitutional. The government argued that the presumption of Congress acting within its powers applies if the legislation is perceived to benefit the tribe. However, the Lone Wolf case is distinguished from other situations, particularly noting that in Lone Wolf, Congress provided what it considered adequate compensation for treaty lands. In contrast, the 1877 Act lacked such negotiation and adequate compensation, suggesting a significant difference in the nature of legislative actions and intentions. The Lone Wolf Act included provisions for land allotments and financial compensation, reinforcing the Court's conclusion of a legitimate legislative intent.
The historical context surrounding the 1877 Act and its implications does not support the notion that the Act simply altered the investment form of Indian tribal property. The Court's rationale in *Lone Wolf* was significantly based on the premise that Congress has comprehensive authority over tribal relations, which has traditionally been viewed as a political matter beyond judicial oversight. This perspective has been largely discredited, particularly following *Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks*. Furthermore, *Lone Wolf* implies that when congressional actions harm Indian rights, redress should be sought from Congress, not the courts. However, in this case, the Sioux have sought remedy from Congress, which has subsequently directed the courts to address the issue. This situation diminishes the relevance of the *Lone Wolf* principles, especially since Congress has waived sovereign immunity and instructed the courts to evaluate the taking claim. Courts must recognize that while tribal lands are under Congress's jurisdiction, this authority is not without limits and must adhere to constitutional constraints. The Court of Claims noted that determining whether a congressional measure appropriately protects tribal interests is inherently factual and must be assessed based on the evidence provided.
A reviewing court is not to retrospectively evaluate legislative judgments regarding measures benefiting tribal interests but must conduct a thorough and objective examination of the historical record to determine if congressional actions align with its powers to manage tribal lands for the welfare of Indigenous peoples. Courts must not rely solely on a presumption of congressional good faith in this inquiry. The Court of Claims employed an appropriate legal standard, emphasizing the need to assess whether Congress made a genuine effort to provide fair value for lands acquired from Native Americans. This assessment involves analyzing legislative acts, congressional committee reports, and other relevant documents.
The concepts of "good faith effort" and "transmutation of property" are interconnected, reflecting the principle that a trustee can modify trust assets as long as there is a fair attempt to provide equivalent value. If the government fails to offer fair consideration for Indian lands, it effectively takes property rather than transmuting it. A critical element of this inquiry is evaluating the adequacy of compensation offered for the lands.
The Court of Claims found that the only potential consideration provided to the Sioux was the promise of rations until self-sufficiency, a finding supported by historical evidence and uncontested by the government. Furthermore, the court determined that neither the Manypenny Commission nor Congress acknowledged that the rations constituted a fair equivalent for the value of the Black Hills and other property rights surrendered by the Sioux, a finding also unchallenged by the government.
The Court found that the Government's conditions on the Sioux's entitlement to rations indicated that its commitment to provide these rations was not an acknowledgment of their equivalent value to the land surrendered, but rather a means to pressure the Sioux into compliance with congressional demands. This conclusion aligns with historical precedent, specifically in Choctaw Nation v. United States, where the Court determined that the treaty facilitating the Choctaw's removal was executed under significant pressure, without fair compensation for the land ceded, which was valued over ten million acres. The Court emphasized that the payments made to induce the Choctaw's removal were not intended as payment for the land but rather to support U.S. policy objectives. The analysis of these historical cases supports the notion that Congress's actions regarding the Sioux's removal from their land and the extinguishment of their hunting rights were similarly coercive and unjust.
The Court of Claims dismissed the Government's argument that its expenditure of over $43 million on Sioux rations over 75 years demonstrated that the 1877 Act was an act of guardianship in the Sioux's best interest. The court emphasized that the relevant inquiry is Congress's intent and understanding of its obligations at the time of the land acquisition, rather than the eventual costs incurred. It found no evidence that Congress anticipated the prolonged period for the Sioux to achieve self-sufficiency or the extent of expenditures necessary for their sustenance. The findings reinforced the conclusion that the 1877 Act involved an implied obligation for just compensation to the Sioux for the appropriation of the Black Hills. The court referenced established legal precedents affirming that Indian lands are subject to government authority, provided just compensation is given, and that the government's vague commitment to provide rations did not satisfy this standard. Additionally, it noted that the obligation to provide rations was meant to assist the Sioux in transitioning from a nomadic lifestyle to an agrarian one, and that the 1877 Act not only removed the Black Hills but also ceded hunting rights over a larger area. This indicates that Congress's provision of rations was a trade-off for the loss of the Sioux's traditional way of life, rather than compensation for the land taken. Overall, the court concluded that the 1877 Act did not merely represent a change in the management of tribal property.
The 1877 Act resulted in the taking of tribal property designated for the Sioux under the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, creating an obligation for the Government to compensate the Sioux Nation justly, including interest. The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed. Justice White concurs with the decision, agreeing that Congress's direction to the Court of Claims to consider the case without the defense of res judicata is constitutional, and he supports the Court's decision. Justice Rehnquist dissents, arguing that the Sioux Tribe's prior petition for certiorari in 1942, which challenged the Court of Claims' ruling that the 1877 Act was not an unconstitutional taking but rather an exchange for rations and grazing lands, should not allow Congress to reopen the judgment. He contends that reopening the case lacks constitutional support, and the initial interpretation by the Court of Claims in 1942 was more accurate. He emphasizes that the Court of Claims had fully considered the Sioux's claim, recognizing that Congress aimed to improve the Sioux's situation, despite unsuccessful attempts to prevent white settlers from entering the Black Hills.
The court determined that the Government sought to negotiate the sale of the Black Hills with the Sioux Indians during 1875 and 1876, but after negotiations failed, Congress created terms for acquisition deemed beneficial for both parties. Under the 1877 agreement, Congress provided over $43 million in rations and 900,000 acres of grazing land to the Sioux. The court concluded that Congress acted under a policy it believed was in the best interest of the Sioux, requiring them to surrender land and hunting rights in exchange for compensation that the Government was not legally obligated to provide.
In subsequent litigation beginning in 1950, the Sioux claimed that the appropriation of the Black Hills was unconstitutional, but the Government raised the defense of res judicata, arguing that previous rulings barred reexamination of the issue. The Court of Claims held that the original decision confirmed Congress's authority to take lands without consent, replacing them with what Congress considered adequate compensation. The court found no grounds for overturning the res judicata principle based on later disagreements with earlier decisions.
Later, Congress enacted a statute allowing the Sioux to relitigate their claim in the Court of Claims. This court reviewed the case based on the existing record and determined that Congress did not act in the Sioux's best interest, concluding that the appropriation of the Black Hills was arbitrary and lacked just compensation, contrasting with the earlier ruling from 1942.
Congress has intervened in the judicial process by reviewing and setting aside the Court of Claims' judgment regarding the Black Hills, which the court interpreted as an overreach of legislative power into judicial authority. The Constitution's Article III reserves judicial power for federal courts, prohibiting Congress from altering judicial decisions or ordering new trials. Historical cases, including Hayburn's Case and United States v. Klein, establish that Congress cannot control judicial power or require new trials of resolved issues. The Supreme Court's rulings affirm that judgments from the Court of Claims are conclusive unless a new trial is granted by that court. Moreover, the Supreme Court is the sole arbiter of its judgments, and Congress lacks the authority to subject these decisions to re-evaluation by other entities. The excerpt argues that Congress has exceeded its constitutional limits by effectively ordering a new trial in this case, which raises questions about whether its actions constitute legislative or judicial power. While Congress can regulate judicial jurisdiction and create new legal rights post-judgment, it cannot revise final judicial determinations.
Congress lacks the authority to review and overturn a final judgment from an Article III court, as it would involve exercising judicial power rather than legislative power, even when acting to pay the Nation's debts. The Court suggests that Congress's actions could be interpreted as a regulation of jurisdiction or a creation of new obligations, but these interpretations fail to acknowledge that Congress cannot order a rehearing of a case already decided. While Congress can regulate judicial functions, it cannot engage in actions that amount to a review or reversal of a final judgment. By attempting to order a new trial, Congress overstepped its boundaries, as this action implies a dissatisfaction with the original ruling and suggests that Congress must have evaluated the merits of the case. The finality of judgments is undermined when Congress seeks to reopen cases, indicating a review of prior proceedings, which is beyond its permissible legislative powers.
Congress has chosen to disregard the judgments of the Court of Claims, which were previously conclusive on litigated issues. This action cannot be justified as a regulation of federal court jurisdiction, as it aims to reopen a final judgment in an ongoing case. Additionally, Congress's action does not merely reflect a litigant's ability to alter a judgment's effects by voluntarily assuming greater obligations. While Congress has the right to expand its responsibilities post-judgment, it has not amended the law or provided for a broader recovery for specific claims, such as the Sioux's interest on the value of the Black Hills. Furthermore, Congress's directive for the Court of Claims to rehear the case exceeds the scope of a simple waiver of defenses, indicating that Congress is exercising legislative authority rather than acting as a litigant. Although res judicata can be waived, courts can dismiss cases if they recognize that the issues have been previously decided, regardless of whether the defense was raised.
Res judicata serves to prevent both unnecessary judicial waste and the burden of multiple defenses on a defendant. Courts adopt this principle to enhance the efficient administration of justice, ensuring that once an issue is conclusively decided, it should not be relitigated without substantial justification. The Court of Claims has expressed reluctance to reconsider previously decided issues unless justified, emphasizing that res judicata and collateral estoppel are judicial, not statutory, defenses aimed at conserving court resources. Even if a defendant consents to relitigation, the judiciary maintains a vested interest in preventing resource misallocation. In a specific case, the Court of Claims acknowledged that a rehearing was mandated by Congress, rather than a simple waiver of res judicata. The ruling in Cherokee Nation is distinguished as it involved a new argument not previously adjudicated, unlike the current case, where the issue has remained unchanged since a 1942 decision. The current court's interpretation of events from 1877 does not alter the original factual findings from 1942, and there has been no change in law; only historical interpretation has evolved. The decision reflects a reexamination of the same factual question rather than a legitimate new consideration.
The legal document asserts that no new evidence has emerged and highlights that Congress has taken actions surpassing those of a private litigant, effectively altering a prior final judgment of an Article III court by ordering a new trial. The court's decision is criticized for misinterpreting the facts as presented in a 1942 case, where the majority's assertion that the rations were not consideration for the Black Hills is deemed untenable. The author contends that the Court's judgment reflects a biased view shaped by contemporary historical interpretation, rather than a balanced assessment of past events. It acknowledges that both the government and the Indigenous peoples engaged in morally questionable actions during the settlement of the West. Furthermore, it emphasizes that historical narratives are varied and subjective, pointing out that significant conflicts between Native Americans and settlers were rooted in a long history, rather than being solely attributable to a manipulative government. The document cites a respected historian, Ray Billington, who underscores the complexity of these confrontations, illustrating the deep historical context of Indian resistance against encroachment from the 17th century through the late 19th century, culminating in significant losses for Native Americans.
Cultural differences between Plains Indians and Eastern tribes contributed to inevitable conflicts characterized by brutal warfare. The Plains Indians, skilled in warfare after acquiring rifles, were formidable adversaries compared to the Eastern tribes, which had gradually succumbed to white settlers. Inter-tribal communication relied on a developed sign language, with bands or villages consisting of a few hundred people, often seen moving across the plains with their possessions. Their lifestyle was transient, focused on immediate survival, leading to acts of theft and violence without remorse.
The historical narrative acknowledges the tragic and brutal aspects of the 300-year expansion from the original 13 Colonies to a nation encompassing over three million square miles and 50 states, suggesting that both settlers and Native Americans should be viewed without harsh judgment.
The Sioux territory recognized by the Treaty of September 17, 1851, included present-day South Dakota and parts of Nebraska, Wyoming, North Dakota, and Montana. The Powder River War and Red Cloud's role as a Sioux leader are documented in historical accounts. The treaty established boundaries for a reservation covering much of western South Dakota and outlined provisions for education, agriculture, and annual supplies for the Sioux, including clothing and rations. It stipulated that those who farmed would receive a higher stipend than those who hunted. Some commentators viewed the Fort Laramie Treaty as a significant victory for Red Cloud and the Sioux.
In 1904, a unique instance in U.S. history was noted where the government waged war, subsequently negotiated a peace that conceded all demands of the enemy without receiving anything in return. The speculation about gold in the Black Hills began as early as the 1830s, with historical accounts compiled in 1974 by the Center for Western Studies, which documented newspaper reports from Custer's expedition. The Sioux perceived Custer's expedition as a breach of the Fort Laramie Treaty, referring to his route as "that thieves' road." General William Tecumseh Sherman likened the military's challenge of preventing prospectors from entering the Black Hills to the biblical story of forbidden fruit. Custer acknowledged the military's duty to protect reservation lands but advocated for the rapid extinguishment of Indian title for military reasons. The Army's commitment to its treaty obligations was inconsistent, leading to descriptions of government efforts to remove settlers as weak. Reports from the Allison Commission highlighted the unsuccessful negotiations regarding the Sioux. Nearly seven years post-Fort Laramie Treaty, the Sioux remained economically dependent, having received significant government support without achieving self-sufficiency. The treaty aimed to transition nomadic tribes into agricultural lifestyles.
The excerpt details the historical context of Indian-White relations, particularly focusing on the Sioux Reservation. Professor Hagan noted that the original intent was to support the Sioux in transitioning from hunting to farming. However, restrictions on hunting due to conflicts with whites led to a rapid dependence on insufficient government rations, which were of poor quality. Congress viewed these rations as temporary gratuities, often underfunding them, leading to starvation conditions on many reservations post-Civil War. The excerpt also references the forced nature of treaty negotiations, where defeated Indigenous leaders had no choice but to accept unfavorable terms, resulting in significant territorial losses without adequate compensation. The only perceived benefit of the treaties was the government's obligation to provide subsistence rations, which were limited and poorly managed.
Indigenous tribes recognized the inevitability of losing the Black Hills, leading them to accept government offers, including continued rations and annual clothing annuities guaranteed by the 1868 treaty. This arrangement promised them a subsistence lifestyle free from the burdens of civilization. The 1877 Act "ratified and confirmed" agreements made by the Manypenny Commission with the Sioux tribes, modifying the Great Sioux Reservation's boundaries by adding approximately 900,000 acres while removing over 7 million acres, including the Black Hills. The tribes relinquished hunting rights in unceded lands and allowed for three wagon roads through the reservation. In return, the government reaffirmed its commitment to provide annuities and assistance for the tribes' "civilization," including education and agricultural training. Rations of food, contingent on school attendance and farm labor, were to be provided until the tribes could support themselves. The government also pledged to help the Sioux find markets for their crops and employment on the reservation. Subsequent congressional actions further reduced the reservation's land, as noted in the Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip case. Additionally, the Commission assessed the Black Hills' fair market value at $17.1 million as of February 28, 1877, and acknowledged the United States' liability for gold extracted by trespassers prior to that date, valued at $450,000. The government would receive credits for past payments made to the tribes under the 1877 Act against the fair market value of the land and gold taken. Further calculations were required to determine the total credits and the value of rights-of-way acquired through the 1877 Act. Chairman Kuykendall partially dissented, claiming the Sioux's taking claim was barred by a prior 1942 Court of Claims decision.
Interest on claims against the United States is not typically awarded unless explicitly provided by statute, as established in United States v. Tillamooks. The only exception to this rule occurs when a claimant is entitled to just compensation for property taken under the Fifth Amendment. In United States v. Klamath Indians, the Court affirmed that the government must provide just compensation, reflecting the property's value at the time of taking plus an amount to ensure complete equivalence at that time. Following the Indian Claims Commission's judgment, Congress amended 25 U.S.C. § 70a to state that government expenditures for food and rations do not count as payments on claims, meaning the government could not offset any judgment awarded to the Sioux for subsistence appropriations dating after the 1877 Act.
Judge Davis dissented on the issue of res judicata, arguing the Sioux had not fully presented their claim in 1942. While the court upheld the Indian Claims Commission's finding that the acquisition of the Black Hills and related rights-of-way constituted takings, it reversed the Commission's view that gold mining prior to 1877 was a taking, thus excluding the gold's value from the principal for interest calculations owed to the Sioux.
Judge Nichols concurred in the outcome but disagreed with distinguishing the precedent set by Lone Wolf, believing that Congress had not adequately recognized the compensation provided under the 1877 Act as sufficient for the Black Hills. Dissenting opinions by Judges Bennett and Kunzig suggested that Congress had the constitutional authority to dispose of tribal property without regard to good faith or adequate compensation, asserting that once Congress acknowledged tribal rights and compensated them, the matter should be considered resolved.
Government counsel indicated that Congress has the authority to allow further litigation of a lawsuit. Representative Gudger of North Carolina expressed concerns that the amendment interfered unconstitutionally with the Judiciary's powers. He dissented from the Committee Report, arguing that once the Federal Judiciary, including the Supreme Court, has reviewed a matter without finding error, Congress should not enact legislation that reverses judicial decisions, particularly relating to res judicata or collateral estoppel. Gudger supported a special appropriation for the Sioux Nation to address a moral obligation regarding the Black Hills claim but opposed the amendment, viewing it as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. He asserted that the amendment would effectively reverse a Court of Claims decision upheld by the Supreme Court, thus placing Congress in a judicial review role contrary to its legislative responsibilities. Gudger criticized the bill for targeting one specific case rather than applying uniformly to all similar cases, which he believed constituted adjudication rather than legislation. In contrast, Representative Roncalio argued that the bill does not determine any constitutional violations or entitlement to interest but allows the court to review the facts and law. He noted that Congress has previously waived res judicata defenses in private claims, including in cases involving Indian claims.
The legal text addresses the authorization of the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court to evaluate claims made by the Delaware Tribe on a de novo basis, disregarding any prior decisions or settlements related to those claims. This was highlighted during Senate Subcommittee hearings regarding the amendment and referenced in notable cases like Choctaw Nation v. United States and Delaware Tribe v. United States. Representative Pressler clarified that the intent of the proposed amendment was to facilitate a review by waiving the defense of res judicata, thereby allowing for the merits of the claims to be considered without technical barriers. The prevailing congressional view, as articulated by Representative Meeds, emphasized that the amendment's purpose was not to resolve the case merits but to eliminate technical defenses that could prevent the Sioux tribal claim from being heard. Furthermore, it was noted that similar legislative actions have historically waived defenses to enable claims to be addressed on their merits in court. The excerpt also references a specific case, Nock, where Congress limited the judgment amount in a manner deemed valid under its authority to condition waivers of sovereign immunity, reinforcing the legislative power to manage the adjudication process of claims against the government.
A list of cases illustrates Congress' authority to waive the defense of res judicata in claims against the United States, including United States v. Grant, Lamborn Co. v. United States, Menominee Tribe v. United States, Richardson v. United States, Delaware Tribe v. United States, and Garrett v. United States. The Court of Claims recognized Congress' ability to waive defenses to facilitate justice in cases previously rejected on legal grounds, allowing jurisdiction to reconsider such claims. Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of congressional actions that reinstated dismissed claims under the World War Veterans' Act, confirming that Congress can permit claimants to have their cases heard again without constitutional prohibition. The analysis also considers whether earlier rulings may have stemmed from a belief that the Court of Claims did not fully operate as an Article III court, a notion ultimately dismissed by later cases, including Pope and Glidden Co. v. Zdanok. The latter emphasized that while Congress may influence the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction, this does not undermine its judicial nature or functions.
The Court of Claims has historically been granted jurisdiction through special acts to award recovery for breaches that would typically amount to moral obligations for individuals. Congress has waived res judicata and defenses based on the statute of limitations, enabling claims to be converted from moral to legal obligations enforceable in court. Significant precedents, including Cherokee Nation v. United States and Pope v. United States, affirm that Congress can authorize the Court of Claims to adjudicate claims otherwise barred by law. The Court of Claims has been recognized as an Article III court since 1953, with its jurisdiction encompassing controversies involving the United States.
The current case differs from typical "taking" cases, which assess when the government should compensate for economic injuries caused by public actions. Here, it is undisputed that the Sioux were deprived of property rights to the Black Hills. The central question is whether Congress's actions constituted a "taking" that necessitated just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, or if Congress was exercising its authority to manage tribal property as a guardian of Indian welfare, which would exempt it from the Just Compensation Clause. The Sioux do not dispute Congress's power to take the Black Hills per the Fort Laramie Treaty but argue that such action must comply with the Fifth Amendment's requirements.
Private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation, as stipulated by the Constitution. The Government does not extend the implications of the Lone Wolf decision, which traditionally views the management and disposal of tribal lands as a political question, but acknowledges a recent relaxation of this strict rule allowing for review under the Fifth Amendment's rational-basis test. The Government cites Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks and Morton v. Mancari to support this test in distinguishing between Congress's confiscation of Indian property and its management of tribal lands.
However, these cases are not directly applicable to the question of whether Congress’s actions regarding tribal property constituted eminent domain or guardianship. The Sioux concede the constitutional validity of Congress's unilateral abrogation of the Fort Laramie Treaty, seeking only a determination that the appropriation of the Black Hills implied a duty by the U.S. to provide just compensation. The Government's rational-basis test is deemed unsuitable for assessing the historical context of the 1877 Act's enactment.
It has been established that the taking of "unrecognized" or "aboriginal" Indian title does not warrant compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Compensation is required only when Congress has explicitly designated land for permanent Indian ownership through treaties or agreements. The Court of Claims did not solely determine that a taking occurred based on Congress's failure to equate the value of compensation for the Black Hills with the land surrendered. Instead, it acknowledged that, in some cases, evidence could counter a congressional assertion of good faith in forced land surrenders. Additionally, adequate compensation for treaty-protected lands might negate the necessity for formal acknowledgment of value. The Court of Claims’ standard, which diverged from the original Fort Berthold test, was justified in its context.
The Court of Claims maintains that the evaluation of just compensation for the taking of private property is fundamentally a judicial matter, not a legislative one. The 1877 Act aimed to assist the Sioux by providing vague aid and educational resources, which the Court deemed inadequate as meaningful compensation. Additionally, while the Act extended the reservation by adding 900,000 acres of grazing land, the Government did not assert this land as significant consideration for the cession of the Black Hills. The extension was not mentioned in the section outlining compensation for the Sioux's property rights, indicating Congressional intent that it should not be viewed as valid compensation. Furthermore, the Government's argument regarding the overall good-faith effort of Congress to promote Sioux welfare fails to address the valuation of property rights taken by the 1877 Act. The dissent raises concerns about potential historical revisionism in the factual findings of the Indian Claims Commission and the Court of Claims but does not specify which parts are problematic. The Court emphasizes that factual findings should only be overturned if they are clearly erroneous, regardless of dissenting views on historical interpretation.
The factual findings of the Indian Claims Commission and the Court of Claims have not been challenged by any party, including the Government. The dissenting opinion fails to cite any credible historical perspective on the cession of the Black Hills that aligns with its view, relying instead on the 1942 Court of Claims decision, which is not currently being reviewed. The 1942 holding, which assumed good faith by Congress regarding its 1877 actions, is criticized for its erroneous interpretation of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lone Wolf. Additionally, Congress’ 1974 amendment to the Indian Claims Commission Act explicitly states that certain expenditures do not count as payments on claims, aiming to expedite the resolution of the Black Hills case. The Senate Committee highlighted that the U.S. actions against the Sioux, including disarming them and denying traditional hunting grounds, constituted significant wrongs that should not be mitigated by the rations provided afterwards. Overall, the Government’s actions led to the deprivation of both livelihood and land for the Sioux, indicating a failure to adequately address the injustices faced by them.
