Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; August 27, 1999; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Larry Wayne Whitehead was convicted of three counts of capital murder related to the death of Ernest Andrew Whitten. The murder was classified as capital for three reasons: it occurred during a first-degree burglary, Whitten had testified before a grand jury that indicted Whitehead for first-degree theft, and Whitten had been subpoenaed to testify at Whitehead's trial on that theft charge. The jury unanimously recommended a death sentence, which the trial court imposed. Whitehead raised 22 issues on appeal, many of which were not previously objected to in the trial court. Despite this, his death sentence allowed for a review of these issues under Alabama's Rule 45A, which permits the Court of Criminal Appeals to recognize plain errors that may have adversely affected substantial rights, regardless of whether they were raised at trial. The court emphasized that this plain error exception should be applied sparingly to avoid miscarriages of justice. Evidence at trial indicated that Whitehead had engaged in a fraudulent scheme at his workplace, Hudson Foods, by having co-defendants punch his time card to falsely indicate he had worked a full day. This scheme led to allegations of theft, prompting an investigation by Detective Andrew Whitten, who later testified at a parole revocation hearing for Whitehead, although his parole was ultimately not revoked.
In September 1994, Whitehead was indicted for first-degree theft. Whitten, who investigated the theft, testified before the grand jury and was subpoenaed for Whitehead's trial set for January 30, 1995. Whitten was shot on January 24, 1995, and died the following day. Codefendant Stephen Brookshire testified that Whitehead asked him to drive that night, stating he needed to "get rid of his witness." Brookshire confirmed he was aware of the theft charges against Whitehead. On the evening of January 24, after leaving Brookshire’s mobile home, they drove to Whitten's neighborhood. Brookshire testified he heard a gunshot after Hyde exited the car, and Hyde returned, apologizing to Whitehead about Whitten not being dead. Hyde claimed his gun jammed after one shot, to which Whitehead replied, "we'll get him later."
Witnesses stated that Whitehead discussed filing a civil lawsuit against Hudson Foods, indicating that Whitten's removal would aid his acquittal. Whitehead's girlfriend, Wanda Self, recalled him saying "the deed was done" shortly after the murder. Testimony revealed Whitehead threatened to "shoot up the courtroom" with Whitten present. Additionally, a neighbor noted a man inquiring about Whitten's address days before the murder. Self and her daughter confirmed they were with Whitehead while he searched for Whitten’s home. On January 25, Whitehead asked Randall Ogle to dispose of a .380 caliber pistol, which matched the murder weapon, but police never recovered it. Witnesses saw Hyde in specific attire on the night of the murder and later observed him discarding these items into a river. Whitehead did not testify at his trial, but his prior testimony from Hyde's trial indicated he alone killed Whitten.
Whitehead and his companions believed they were visiting a drug dealer's house on the night of the shooting. After the State concluded its case, the defense did not call any witnesses. Whitehead claims several pretrial rulings by the trial court were erroneous, particularly regarding the denial of funds for expert assistance, which he argues violated Ake v. Oklahoma principles. In a pretrial motion, his original attorney, Clyde Baker, asserted that Whitehead suffered from serious mental disorders and mental retardation, claiming expert psychological assistance was necessary for his defense. However, no evidence supporting these claims was presented to the court, and Baker did not clarify how a psychologist would assist Whitehead's defense. During a motion hearing, the court emphasized the need for a clear justification for expert assistance, noting that Whitehead's counsel primarily sought funds for examining physical evidence rather than for psychological evaluation. Subsequently, Baker withdrew from the case, and new counsel, Hoyt Baugh, did not file any requests for psychological expert funds nor pursued Baker's earlier motion. The Alabama Supreme Court has established that the principles from Ake are applicable to nonpsychiatric experts, provided the indigent defendant demonstrates a need for such assistance to ensure a fair defense.
A defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that an expert's assistance will aid in their defense and that denying such aid would lead to a fundamentally unfair trial. In previous Alabama cases, the adequacy of a defendant's need for the requested expert has been pivotal. Whitehead failed to provide any evidence to the trial court indicating that an expert psychologist was essential for his defense or that he was unfairly denied the opportunity to present his defense due to a lack of funds for the expert. Consequently, there was no error in denying his request for expert funding.
Whitehead also contended that his right to a fair trial and an impartial jury was violated when the trial court denied his request for individual, sequestered voir dire of jurors regarding pretrial publicity exposure. The court questioned the 60-member jury venire in panels and allowed individual questioning afterward, which has been deemed sufficient under Alabama law to ensure juror impartiality. There is no requirement for individual voir dire in Alabama, even in capital cases, and such decisions are left to the trial court's discretion. Whitehead did not show evidence of prejudice from the panel questioning method nor that pretrial publicity was so pervasive that it compromised juror impartiality. The trial court’s method of conducting voir dire was upheld as sufficient, and the denial of Whitehead's motion was not deemed an abuse of discretion.
Whitehead contends that the trial court made an error by allowing the jury to separate without his consent, arguing that Rule 19.3(a)(1) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure takes precedence over Alabama Code § 12-16-9, which gives the trial court discretion in this matter. He cites recent Alabama Supreme Court cases, Ex parte Stewart and Ex parte Smith, which rejected similar claims, leading to the conclusion that Whitehead's argument lacks merit.
Additionally, Whitehead asserts that the trial court wrongfully denied his motion for a change of venue, claiming excessive pretrial publicity compromised his right to a fair trial in Marshall County. He references media coverage of Whitten's murder and related proceedings involving his codefendants. Whitehead highlights a prior change of venue granted to his attorney, Shannon Mitchell, and compares it to the denial of a change of venue for codefendant Matthew Hyde, whose conviction followed a trial in the same county.
During the hearing on the motion, the prosecutor noted that many jurors had limited knowledge of the case, suggesting that media coverage alone was insufficient grounds for a change of venue. The court agreed to assess jurors' familiarity with the case before making a determination, and there was no objection from Whitehead's counsel regarding the circulation figures of local newspapers mentioned during the proceedings.
Whitehead's counsel agreed to defer the ruling on a change of venue until after jury voir dire to assess the impact of pretrial publicity on potential jurors. The State noted that Whitehead did not renew his motion during or after voir dire. The standard for reviewing a trial court's ruling on a change of venue relies on whether there was an abuse of discretion, as the trial judge is best positioned to evaluate potential juror bias from pretrial publicity. A successful appeal requires proof of "gross abuse of discretion." A change of venue is mandated under two conditions: (1) when prejudicial pretrial publicity has saturated the community, likely affecting jurors, creating an "inherently suspect" trial environment, or (2) when a direct link exists between the publicity and demonstrated actual prejudice among jurors. The burden of proof lies with the appellant to show either pervasive community saturation or actual prejudice, with mere widespread publicity insufficient for a venue change unless it contains sensational or disparaging content affecting the ability to conduct a fair trial.
To establish prejudice due to adverse publicity, a defendant must demonstrate through voir dire examination that prospective jurors were biased. Extensive publicity surrounding Whitehead's case does not automatically warrant a change of venue; it must be shown that such publicity was inherently prejudicial. The standard of "presumptive prejudice" applies only in extreme cases, and the burden on Whitehead to prove that pretrial publicity denied him a fair trial is substantial. Prejudicial publicity must significantly exceed mere reporting of charges or trial processes. The court found that the publicity did not so thoroughly saturate the community as to render the trial proceedings a mere formality. Whitehead's claim was limited to asserting that jurors had heard about the case, which is insufficient to rebut the presumption of juror impartiality. Jurors may have preconceived notions but can still render a fair verdict if they can set aside those opinions. The voir dire process thoroughly examined jurors’ knowledge of the case, and there was no evidence that any juror held a fixed opinion that would impair their impartiality. Consequently, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Whitehead's motion for a change of venue.
E. Whitehead claims that the trial court improperly allowed Detective Tommy Cole, a key State witness and chief of detectives, to remain in the courtroom despite a granted motion to sequester witnesses, which violated Rule 9.3(a) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although Whitehead did not object during the trial to Cole's presence, his claim is reviewed under the plain-error rule. Rule 9.3(a) gives the trial court discretion to exclude witnesses, and Alabama case law generally supports allowing police officers who will testify to remain in the courtroom without it being deemed an abuse of discretion. Whitehead has not provided any substantive argument demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in this instance.
Additionally, Whitehead contends that the trial court erred by allowing the victim's family to remain in the courtroom, arguing that their presence prejudiced him by giving them undue influence in the proceedings. While he did object to their presence, he did not object to the victim's representative at the prosecution's table. Despite acknowledging that the law permits the victim's family to be present, Whitehead fails to explain how their presence specifically prejudiced his case beyond a vague assertion. Consequently, no error is found regarding either claim.
The trial court has the discretion to exclude witnesses from the courtroom, as established in Weaver. Under the Alabama Crime Victims' Court Attendance Act, victims or their representatives have the right to be present during the trial alongside the prosecutor, applicable in both capital and noncapital cases, as confirmed in Burgess and Henderson. A victim's family should not be excluded without a valid reason, which Whitehead failed to provide regarding the Whitten family. Therefore, the trial court's decision to allow the Whitten family to remain was not an abuse of discretion.
Whitehead also argues that the prosecution improperly used peremptory strikes to remove female jurors, violating Batson and J.E.B. standards. However, Whitehead did not object during the trial, so the claim is reviewed under the plain-error rule. The only evidence presented is that the prosecutor used 17 of 20 peremptory challenges against females. The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Trawick stated that the burden of proof for a prima facie case of discrimination lies with the party making the challenge. Factors to establish gender discrimination in jury selection include: the homogeneity of the jurors, patterns of strikes against a gender, the prosecutor's past conduct, and the nature of questions posed during voir dire. Trawick's objection was based solely on race, and no evidence was provided to demonstrate discriminatory intent against female jurors.
Trawick did not provide evidence of a prosecutor's discriminatory history regarding peremptory challenges against any gender, merely noting the removal of women from the venire. The mere number of women struck is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, as outlined in relevant case law. Whitehead similarly relied on the statistic that 17 of 20 struck veniremembers were female but failed to demonstrate discriminatory intent. The presence of 9 females on the jury further undermines his claim. Whitehead argued that the trial court should have considered factors from Ex parte Branch to find discrimination, but he did not raise this issue at trial, limiting the court's ability to assess it. His appeal offers no substantial evidence beyond the statistics, which do not suffice for a prima facie case of discrimination. Additionally, Whitehead claimed reversible error due to the trial court's restriction on questioning jurors about automatic death sentence imposition for a capital murder conviction. However, this claim lacks merit, as established in Bracewell v. State, which holds that jurors with fixed capital punishment opinions must be excused if their views obstruct fair jury service. The voir dire process aims to identify and exclude biased veniremen.
Denying the defense's request to ascertain whether a juror would categorically refuse to recommend mercy upon a guilty verdict for capital murder constitutes an error. The case law, including 47 Am. Jur.2d Jury. 290 and 48 A.L.R.2d 560, supports this position. Despite the defense's claims, Whitehead was granted the opportunity to question jurors about their stance on automatic death penalty recommendations for a capital murder conviction. During voir dire, Whitehead's counsel engaged the first panel of jurors, asking if any would automatically impose the death penalty following a guilty verdict for capital murder, to which a juror affirmed that a conviction would lead them to recommend death. The court, however, intervened, suggesting that the jurors lacked sufficient legal understanding to answer such a question. Whitehead's counsel objected, emphasizing the importance of knowing if jurors would automatically impose the death penalty based solely on a conviction for capital murder, particularly in light of the responses received.
The Court overruled an objection related to questioning prospective jurors about their views on the death penalty. Initially, the trial court allowed Whitehead's counsel to ask this question to three panels of jurors but later offered to allow questioning of the first panel, which counsel declined. This indicates that Whitehead was not denied the opportunity to inquire if jurors would automatically recommend the death penalty upon a conviction for capital murder. The Court noted that any potential error regarding this issue was invited by Whitehead himself, thereby waiving the right to claim it as an error on appeal unless it constituted plain error. The invited error rule applies consistently in both capital and noncapital cases, and any failure to question jurors does not meet the threshold for plain error. Additionally, Whitehead's counsel attempted to clarify the basis for a capital murder charge related to the victim being a police officer, but this line of questioning was objected to and sustained by the Court, reinforcing that the charge was not applicable in this context.
Whitehead's counsel questioned whether any punishment other than death could be recommended, asserting that there was no burglary and that the victim's role as a police officer was irrelevant to the case, as Whitehead was not charged with murdering an on-duty officer. The trial court sustained the prosecution's objections, affirming that Whitehead was tried for the capital offenses of murdering a witness and murder during a burglary, not for killing a police officer on duty. Consequently, the victim's status as a police officer was deemed irrelevant for imposing the death penalty, and defense counsel's questions about jurors' views on capital punishment for such a murder were misleading.
The trial court's discretion in limiting voir dire is upheld absent an abuse of discretion, and questions posed must be pertinent and reasonable to the case. Whitehead's inquiries related to a crime he was not charged with were ruled unreasonable.
Additionally, Whitehead argued that the trial court erred by not removing three jurors for cause who he believed were biased against him, which forced him to use peremptory challenges. Because these arguments were not raised in the trial court, they were reviewed under the plain-error doctrine. Proper grounds for removing a juror for cause require absolute bias, and jurors must be removed if they express bias or prejudice, unless they can impartially apply the law and evidence.
A juror is not automatically disqualified from service based on prior knowledge or opinions about the case, as established in Kinder v. State. Disqualification requires that a juror's opinion is so entrenched that it would bias their verdict. In the case of prospective juror J.S., Whitehead argued for removal due to J.S.'s familiarity with the victim and the victim's family. However, Whitehead did not raise this specific concern during the trial, instead challenging J.S. on grounds of reluctance and candor. This claim was reviewed on appeal under the plain-error rule. J.S. acknowledged his acquaintance with the victim and his family but, according to precedent, such personal knowledge does not automatically disqualify a juror. The court emphasized that jurors can serve if they demonstrate the ability to set aside personal biases and follow the law as instructed by the trial judge. The assessment of a juror's ability to remain impartial is based on their responses and demeanor during voir dire, which lies within the discretion of the trial judge.
A juror's admission of having opinions but asserting the ability to be fair and impartial does not constitute grounds for a challenge for cause, as established in Howard v. State. A juror who is open about their views may strive harder to be fair. In this case, juror J.S. expressed he could render an impartial verdict despite his relationship with the victim, affirming the presumption of innocence and indicating that he would feel the same about any death penalty case, demonstrating no absolute bias or fixed opinion. The trial court found no error in not removing J.S. from the jury. Additionally, the court rejected Whitehead's challenge regarding J.S.'s candor during voir dire, noting that he answered all questions openly.
Whitehead also argued that juror C.M. should have been removed for cause due to familial ties with the victim. However, since Whitehead did not raise this challenge during the trial, it is reviewed under the plain-error rule, which requires showing that an error affected his substantial rights. C.M. acknowledged her distant relation to the victim but did not express bias.
The juror indicated uncertainty about having met the victim or his family during her 31-year marriage but asserted her capability to deliver a fair and impartial verdict, unaffected by her husband's relationship with the victim. She emphasized that her decision-making would strictly rely on the court's evidence. Jurisprudence supports that a juror can set aside personal biases to render a verdict based solely on evidence, as noted in cases such as Smith v. State and others. The trial court's decision not to remove juror C.M. was deemed appropriate.
Additionally, the appeal by Whitehead regarding the potential bias of juror M.P., related to Assistant District Attorney Tim Jolley, was analyzed under the plain error standard since no formal challenge for cause was made. M.P. confirmed her familial connection during voir dire but did not express bias. Whitehead failed to demonstrate M.P.'s bias, and the voir dire lacked inquiries into her ability to remain impartial. The trial court had offered Whitehead's counsel the opportunity to challenge M.P. for cause, which was declined, leading to the conclusion that any alleged error regarding her inclusion was invited error. Consequently, Whitehead could not later claim this as a trial error, affirming the principle that a party cannot benefit from their own actions that led to the alleged error.
Whitehead did not need to use a peremptory challenge to remove juror M.P., as the State exercised a strike against him, leaving Whitehead with one additional challenge. This circumstance rendered any potential error harmless, as established in Ex parte Jones. The trial court's decision not to remove M.P. for cause was not considered plain error. Whitehead argues that several prospective jurors (R.A., K.A., F.H., M.P., N.S., L.R.) should have been removed for cause due to their expressed willingness to impose the death penalty automatically if convicted of capital murder. He claims this failure violated his right to a fair trial and affected his use of peremptory challenges. However, these claims must be assessed under the plain-error doctrine since no challenges for cause were made during the trial. Jurors cannot be excluded solely for opposing the death penalty unless their beliefs would significantly impair their duties. Conversely, potential jurors who would automatically impose the death penalty in all capital cases must be excused. The standard for exclusion is whether a juror can follow court instructions and uphold their oath despite their views on capital punishment, as clarified in relevant case law. Importantly, juror bias need not be established with absolute certainty.
Whitehead argues that six prospective jurors expressed a predisposition to impose the death penalty if he were convicted of capital murder. However, he fails to provide substantive support for his claims beyond references to the record. A review of the voir dire reveals that none of the six jurors demonstrated opinions on capital punishment that would significantly hinder their ability to serve impartially.
Specifically, Whitehead's counsel questioned juror R.A. about whether he could ever recommend life imprisonment instead of the death penalty in a scenario involving the murder of a police officer. R.A. responded that he could not envision such a scenario, indicating a strong inclination towards the death penalty. Following this exchange, the trial court clarified to the jurors that the murder of a police officer is not an aggravating circumstance and that they could only recommend the death penalty if they found one or more aggravating circumstances outweighing mitigating factors.
The court emphasized that if jurors found no aggravating circumstances, their only option would be to recommend life without parole. Whitehead's counsel reiterated the purpose of his questioning was to identify jurors who might automatically favor the death penalty purely based on a conviction of capital murder, but R.A. indicated uncertainty about making such a judgment without knowing the case details.
R.A. expressed a conditional belief in the death penalty, stating he would not automatically recommend it for a single murder, particularly if it was the defendant's first offense. He indicated that he believes the death penalty is warranted only in cases involving multiple murders or certain aggravated circumstances. During questioning by both the prosecutor and Whitehead's counsel, R.A. clarified that he would need to consider all the facts before making a recommendation for the death penalty, thus showing he did not have a fixed opinion that it should be imposed in every capital murder case.
The court emphasized that R.A.'s responses should be viewed collectively rather than in isolation, concluding that his answers did not suggest he would automatically impose the death penalty if Whitehead were convicted of capital murder. Consequently, the trial court's decision to retain R.A. on the jury was not deemed erroneous. Additionally, since the State used a peremptory strike against R.A., any potential error was considered harmless.
K.A. also indicated she would not automatically recommend the death penalty, even if the defendant was convicted of capital murder for killing a police officer. She acknowledged the complexity of the situation and clarified that capital murder involves multiple crimes occurring together.
A capital murder charge against Whitehead hinges on whether he is found guilty of certain counts outlined by the judge, which include considerations like the victim being a police officer or a witness under subpoena. Juror K.A. expressed that she would consider capital murder justified if the defendant intentionally killed someone during a robbery, particularly targeting a witness. K.A. affirmed her willingness to follow the court's instructions despite her personal views on capital punishment, indicating that she would adhere to the judge's directives during sentencing. The trial court determined that K.A. could fulfill her juror duties, and thus, there was no error in not removing her from the jury pool. Furthermore, the state exercised a peremptory strike against K.A., so Whitehead did not need to use one of his challenges. Whitehead also argued that juror F.H. should have been removed for stating she would impose the death penalty automatically for capital murder. However, her response indicated that she would consider the evidence before making a decision, which did not necessitate her removal. Overall, the court found no basis for error in these juror decisions, and any potential issues were deemed harmless.
F.H. expressed that she would adhere to the trial court's instructions regarding the death penalty and indicated she could consider alternatives in appropriate cases. During voir dire, she confirmed her ability to vote for a sentence other than death if warranted, which led to the conclusion that her removal from the jury pool was not necessary. The court found no merit in Whitehead's argument for her removal and deemed any potential error harmless, as the State had used a peremptory strike against her.
Whitehead also challenged juror M.P., who initially appeared uncertain about automatically imposing the death penalty but had previously stated that she personally could not vote for it. Her responses signified a lack of a fixed opinion on the death penalty, thus the trial court's decision not to remove her was not erroneous. M.P. was also removed by the State's peremptory strike, contributing to the harmless error assessment.
Additionally, juror N.S. stated that he would not recommend death in every case of capital murder, indicating a similar flexibility in his views. Whitehead's counsel was given the opportunity to challenge M.P. for cause due to her familial connection to the prosecutor but chose not to. Consequently, Whitehead was not entitled to relief based on these claims.
The Judge clarified that a juror, N.S., did not imply she would automatically recommend the death penalty for a capital murder conviction, countering Whitehead's claims. The court found no error in this regard. Whitehead also argued that juror L.R. should have been dismissed for cause, alleging she would impose the death penalty automatically. However, L.R. indicated she would consider the trial court's instructions on aggravating and mitigating circumstances and mentioned that without aggravating circumstances, she would recommend life imprisonment. Thus, the trial court did not err in retaining L.R., and any potential error was deemed harmless since the State used a peremptory strike against her.
Additionally, Whitehead claimed a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights due to underrepresentation of black individuals on his grand and petit juries, asserting that this constituted systematic exclusion. The claim, not raised in the trial court, was reviewed under the plain-error rule. To establish a fair cross-section violation, a defendant must demonstrate three criteria: that the excluded group is distinctive, that their representation is unfair compared to their community numbers, and that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion. While the State conceded that blacks are a "distinctive" group, it argued that Whitehead failed to meet the other two criteria, specifically noting that he only claimed there were no black individuals on his jury venire without further evidence.
The representation of Black individuals on the grand jury list and the jury venire in Marshall County is claimed by Whitehead to be unfair compared to the community's demographics. However, he fails to provide evidence regarding the racial percentages in the county versus those on his venire and incorrectly asserts that no Black individuals were present on his venire, despite records indicating three Black members. The law emphasizes that the jury venire, not the final jury selected, must reflect the community's demographics. Whitehead does not substantiate his argument that the underrepresentation stems from systematic exclusion within the jury selection process, merely stating there was an "improper method" without specifying what that method was. The record shows that the venire was selected through a random method from a list of licensed drivers, which is an accepted practice. To prove a violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must show that the selection process inherently leads to underrepresentation and that this pattern is common in other venires, neither of which Whitehead accomplished.
Additionally, Whitehead argues that his convictions for capital murder violated his double jeopardy rights, as he was convicted of two counts related to the murders of witnesses. However, he did not raise this issue during the trial, so it is evaluated under the plain error standard. Previous rulings clarify that double jeopardy protections prevent multiple prosecutions or punishments for the same offense, which Whitehead's claim touches upon but does not successfully substantiate.
The Double Jeopardy Clause restricts sentencing courts from imposing punishments greater than those intended by the legislature. In this case, the appellant was not subject to double jeopardy since he was neither acquitted nor convicted a second time for the same offense. The appellant's death penalty sentence is singular, as he can only be executed once. Even if double jeopardy were violated due to two convictions for murdering a single witness, any resulting error would be deemed harmless. The remaining convictions for the murder of another witness and for murder during a burglary could independently support a death sentence.
The appellant also contended that the existence of two capital murder convictions compromised his right to a fair trial and reliable sentencing, arguing it complicated the jury's assessment of aggravating circumstances. However, this argument was not raised during the trial and was reviewed under the plain-error rule. The court found it unmeritorious, noting that the jury received proper instructions on aggravating circumstances and the weighing process. The murder of a witness was not considered an aggravating circumstance, and jurors are assumed to follow the trial court's instructions. The trial court acknowledged in its sentencing order that the murder of a witness does not qualify as an aggravating factor.
The trial court determined that it had only considered statutory aggravating circumstances in its sentencing decision, finding no plain error related to this issue. Whitehead argued that the court erred by admitting several pre-trial statements he made, including one to a police officer, a statement to his parole officer, and his testimony from a co-defendant's trial. However, he provided only record citations and conclusory assertions without substantive argument or factual support. Whitehead did not object during the trial to the introduction of the statement to his parole officer or to his testimony from the co-defendant's trial, which, while not barring appellate review, undermines his claims of prejudice. Regarding the statement made to Officer Maze, Whitehead claimed he was not adequately advised of his rights prior to giving the statement. Since his suppression motion did not raise these grounds, the claim could only be evaluated for plain error. The court emphasized that confessions are presumed involuntary unless proven voluntary by the State, which must show that Miranda rights were communicated and the confession was given voluntarily. The trial court's finding of voluntariness only needs to be supported by a preponderance of evidence, and its decision will not be overturned unless it is contrary to the weight of the evidence. The totality of circumstances surrounding Whitehead's confession indicated it was voluntary, as Officer Maze testified he confirmed Whitehead's desire to speak and provided the necessary Miranda warnings, which Whitehead acknowledged by initialing and signing a waiver.
Officer Maze testified that he did not make any promises or threats to Whitehead regarding his confession. Whitehead appeared to understand his rights and was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol when he confessed to the shooting of Whitten, asserting that his co-defendants, James Matthew Hyde and Steven Brookshire, were not involved. The trial court found that Whitehead's confession was made knowingly and voluntarily, with proper advisement of his Miranda rights and a voluntary waiver. Whitehead initiated contact with Officer Maze, demonstrating a desire to confess. The court concluded that the determination of voluntariness was supported by the evidence.
Whitehead also claimed that the trial court erred by admitting a statement he allegedly made to his parole officer. However, no evidence of such a statement was found; instead, the record contained a statement made to Whitten, which Whitehead’s counsel did not object to during trial. This statement included Whitehead denying theft charges but admitting to clocking in and out of work without actually working. The court found no error in admitting this statement.
Lastly, Whitehead argued that the admission of a tape recording and transcript of his testimony from James Matthew Hyde's trial constituted reversible error. In that prior testimony, Whitehead admitted to shooting Whitten and threatening his co-defendants to prevent them from reporting the shooting. Whitehead claimed that his testimony was not voluntary and that he had not been advised of his Miranda rights. However, he did not object to this testimony's admission at his own trial, so his appeal is reviewed under the plain-error rule. It is established that a defendant's prior testimony is admissible in subsequent trials unless it was given without the right to counsel or was compelled to rebut evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights. The court found no violation of Whitehead's rights regarding the admission of his prior testimony.
Whitehead voluntarily waived his constitutional right to remain silent and testified at his co-defendant's trial, with his counsel's guidance and the trial court's protection. He was not coerced to testify nor denied counsel, despite being advised against testifying, which he chose to disregard. The court found no error in admitting Whitehead's prior testimony and rejected his claim of inadequate Miranda rights advisement, as his testimony did not occur during a custodial interrogation. Additionally, Whitehead objected to the State's elicitation of testimony regarding his post-arrest silence, citing a violation of Doyle v. Ohio. The specific exchange involved Detective Cole confirming Whitehead's arrest and his choice not to speak without an attorney. Whitehead did not object at trial to Cole's comment, so the court reviewed this claim under the plain-error rule. The court referenced relevant case law, clarifying that the use of a defendant's post-arrest silence for impeachment is barred by the Due Process Clause.
A single comment may constitute a Doyle violation, but the Supreme Court's ruling in Greer clarifies that a single mention does not inherently infringe on a defendant's rights unless the government explicitly attempts to use that comment for impeachment, as seen in Doyle and Greer. The Seventh Circuit's decision in Lindgren illustrates that when a prosecutor does not highlight a defendant's silence, a Doyle violation is not present. In Lindgren, the defendant merely indicated a desire to say no more, which did not constitute a violation. Similarly, in Mathenia, an officer's statement about the defendant's lack of a comment at arrest was permissible, as it served a preliminary purpose related to evidence admission. In Rowan, an officer’s mention of a defendant’s reluctance to speak was also acceptable, as it did not suggest the defendant was withholding information to avoid self-incrimination. In the case at hand, Officer Wilkinson's comment was not emphasized or revisited during the trial, indicating it was part of a narrative and not an improper remark on post-arrest silence under Doyle. Likewise, Cole’s mention of a defendant's silence was not improper, as it was not emphasized and related to the investigation's circumstances, leading to no plain error found regarding this issue.
Furthermore, Whitehead argues that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of alleged prior bad acts, including threats against an accomplice, possession of a rifle and ammunition, parole violations, and an alleged church robbery. However, Whitehead fails to substantiate these claims beyond citing the record and asserting irrelevance and prejudice. Additionally, he did not raise timely objections to the introduction of this evidence, limiting the review of these claims to the plain-error rule under Rule 45A of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Whitehead argues that the trial court improperly allowed Christina Phelphs to testify about a threat he made against his codefendant Hyde, specifically that he would kill Hyde if he testified against him at a parole revocation hearing. As Whitehead did not object to this testimony during the trial, the claim is reviewed only for plain error under Rule 45A, Ala. R.App. P. Whitehead cites the record without further argument. Phelphs's testimony emerged in a context where the prosecutor asked about conversations related to Hyde's testimony, and she recalled Whitehead's threat, which she claimed was made in front of Hyde's brother.
The court found the threat testimony relevant and not highly prejudicial, as it aligned with the State's theory that Whitehead killed Whitten to prevent him from testifying against him in a theft case, which would have led to a life sentence as a habitual offender. Multiple witnesses had indicated that Whitehead intended to kill Whitten for this reason. Although Whitehead's threat toward Hyde pertained to the parole hearing rather than directly to the theft trial, the court deemed it relevant to demonstrate his motive for the murder, suggesting a consistent pattern of threatening witnesses to thwart testimony against him. Evidence of motive, while not a formal element of the prosecution's case, is admissible, and the jury should consider even minimal evidence indicating motive. Additionally, the State presented evidence of other threats Whitehead made against Hyde, reinforcing the relevance of the testimony.
At Hyde's trial, Whitehead testified for the defense, claiming responsibility for Whitten's murder to protect Hyde from facing the death penalty. He admitted to threatening Hyde to prevent him from testifying against him. Whitehead's prior testimony was later introduced at his own trial, which was deemed admissible. Even if some testimony was potentially inadmissible, it could be considered harmless if supported by lawful evidence of the same nature. The court found no error regarding the admissibility of threats Whitehead made against Hyde during both the murder case and a parole revocation hearing.
Whitehead also argued that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence of his possession of a rifle and ammunition at the time of his arrest. Deputy Dola Dyson testified about this, but similar evidence had already been provided by Whitehead's sister-in-law, Angelina. Whitehead did not object to either testimony, which the court reviewed under the plain-error rule. The court concluded that the evidence was relevant, as it demonstrated Whitehead's flight from arrest and potential consciousness of guilt, thereby supporting the State's case.
Evidence of flight is admissible in court, regardless of its strength, inconclusiveness, or the time elapsed since the crime. This includes instances where the accused may have committed other crimes. Additionally, evidence of resistance to arrest is also admissible. In the case of Whitehead, evidence showing he was carrying a rifle and ammunition was relevant to the circumstances of his arrest, indicating an attempt to flee and evade capture. While such evidence may not alone warrant a conviction, it can infer a consciousness of guilt when connected to other incriminating facts. The jury has the authority to determine the weight of this evidence.
Whitehead challenged the admissibility of testimony from Dola Dyson regarding his arrest for a parole violation, claiming it prejudicially introduced his criminal history. However, this argument was raised for the first time on appeal, and thus reviewed only for plain error. The jury had already been made aware of Whitehead's parole status prior to Dyson's testimony, as the defense itself introduced this information during the trial. Whitehead's defense strategy aimed to disprove motive by discussing his parole revocation hearing, where he admitted to theft, suggesting he had no reason to murder Whitten to prevent testimony against him. A defendant cannot claim error resulting from their own actions.
In Barber v. State, 151 Ala. 56, 43 So. 808 (1907), the court addressed the principle that an accused individual cannot manipulate the judicial process through their own actions or choices. The excerpt references several precedents which highlight that mere silence in the face of error does not constitute a proper defense. Specifically, it was determined that testimony indicating Whitehead was on parole for a prior conviction was already presented to the jury, making additional testimony about his arrest for a parole violation cumulative and thus harmless. Evidence that might be inadmissible can be deemed harmless if similar lawful testimony has already been provided.
Further, Whitehead challenged the introduction of evidence related to an alleged robbery of a church. This included testimony from Jason Windsor about conversations with Whitehead regarding the murder of Andy Whitten. Windsor recounted discussions about employment, legal representation, and Whitehead's expressed intentions to retaliate if he did not win his case, including threats against courtroom personnel. Windsor's testimony illustrated Whitehead's mindset and intentions, emphasizing the potential implications of his statements regarding courtroom violence and manipulation related to his legal outcomes.
A conversation occurred in which one individual expressed that his lawyer suggested that if certain people went missing, he would not face a case against him, implying a recommendation to commit murder. The individual questioned the reasoning behind such an action, suggesting it would be foolish if he believed he could win his case. During this conversation, Matt Hyde approached and interrupted, prompting them to be quiet. Hyde then spoke about past burglaries, including a robbery at a church, claiming he took the blame for it due to his youth.
Whitehead's counsel objected to the narrative form of the officer's testimony regarding Hyde's statement. The court sustained the objection but noted that the objection was not timely, as it should have been made immediately when the narrative began. Whitehead later moved for a mistrial, arguing that the officer's statement about the church robbery could prejudice the jury. However, the court overruled the motion for mistrial, stating that the objection was not properly preserved for review, as the grounds for the objection were not clearly stated until later. The court found no plain error in the officer's testimony.
A statement made during the trial regarding a church robbery was deemed incidental and nonresponsive to the prosecutor's question, and it was not objected to at the time. The prosecutor did not take advantage of this isolated comment, and the defendant, Whitehead, specifically requested no curative instruction be given. Typically, indirect references to other crimes are not considered severely prejudicial if a curative instruction is provided, but in this case, the defendant's request not to address it led to any potential error being classified as invited. After reviewing the case, the court determined that the statement did not significantly undermine the fairness or integrity of the proceedings, thus ruling out plain error.
Whitehead also alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the trial but failed to object to any of the claimed instances, which affects the evaluation of these claims. The court noted that the lack of objections suggests the defense did not view the comments as particularly harmful. In assessing whether the prosecutor's conduct constituted plain error, the court emphasized the need to consider the context of the trial rather than the comments in isolation. The standard for evaluating prosecutorial arguments is whether they infected the trial with unfairness, thereby denying due process. The trial court has broad discretion in determining the appropriateness of such arguments, and this discretion is a key factor in the court's analysis.
Reversal of the trial court's decision will occur only upon a demonstrated abuse of discretion. Whitehead argues that during the closing argument in the guilt phase, the prosecutor improperly conveyed personal opinions about the evidence, citing phrases like "I do not believe" and "I think." However, referencing prior case law, it is established that while a prosecutor should not express personal opinions on a defendant’s guilt, reversible error is not found when the prosecutor discusses reasonable inferences from the evidence. The court reviewed the cited comments within the context of the entire argument and concluded that the prosecutor was not expressing personal opinion but rather providing impressions based on the evidence. Even if the comments were viewed as personal opinions, they would not rise to reversible error.
Additionally, Whitehead contends that the prosecutor improperly introduced testimony regarding the circumstances of his arrest, claiming it was prejudicial and irrelevant. However, this issue was not raised in the trial court and is therefore subject to plain error review. Evidence indicated that Whitehead, aware of being a suspect in a murder investigation, went to a relative's house shortly after the incident. Overall, the court found no plain error in either claim.
Whitehead's sister-in-law testified that after sheriff's deputies left, he took a rifle and went into the woods for several hours before returning briefly to the house. Around 3:30 a.m. on January 27, police arrived at the residence searching for him; upon being informed he was in the woods, the police began their search. Whitehead eventually emerged with his rifle pointed down and surrendered, though prior to surrendering, he threatened to kill himself with the rifle. He was arrested and taken into custody. The court found that evidence surrounding his arrest was admissible, as it indicated his consciousness of guilt, a principle supported by case law stating that flight from prosecution can be used as evidence of guilt. The prosecutor had the discretion to present evidence of Whitehead's actions both before and after the alleged crime as relevant to his state of mind. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct were rejected, as no individual instances were deemed improper, thus negating any argument for cumulative prejudicial effects on the trial.
Whitehead argues that the trial court made errors by not providing certain jury instructions regarding voluntary intoxication and manslaughter as a lesser included offense of capital murder. He did not object to these omissions during the trial, so his claims are assessed under the plain-error rule. According to Alabama law, a defendant is entitled to jury instructions on lesser included offenses if supported by reasonable evidence, regardless of the source of that evidence. However, a court may refuse such instructions if there is no evidence to justify the lesser charge. Voluntary intoxication can be relevant to negate specific intent in a murder charge, which may reduce it to manslaughter, but mere evidence of alcohol consumption does not suffice to establish intoxication. In this case, although Whitehead had been drinking, there was no evidence demonstrating that his mental or physical capacities were impaired at the time of the offense, thus failing to warrant the requested instructions.
No evidence supported an instruction on intoxication for the jury, as there was no indication that the appellant, Whitehead, or his co-defendants, Hyde and Brookshire, were intoxicated during the murder of Whitten. Testimony indicated that while Whitehead and his co-defendants regularly used drugs, they were not intoxicated at the time of the crime. Whitehead himself stated he remembered the events clearly and did not feel impaired. Brookshire corroborated that they were not "wired or zonked." Claims of extreme intoxication or that drugs caused the murder were unsupported by evidence. Whitehead's argument for an instruction on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter failed because habitual drug use does not equate to intoxication during the crime. Furthermore, evidence presented showed that Whitten’s murder was premeditated, with Whitehead planning the act days in advance and actively seeking Whitten out.
Whitehead's argument that intoxication rendered him unable to form intent to murder Whitten is deemed unreasonable, and no plain error is found. He also claims that the trial court failed to instruct the jury adequately on determining an "entry" into Whitten's house regarding the capital offense of murder during a burglary. However, the court's instructions were consistent with the Alabama Proposed Pattern Jury Instructions, and adherence to these patterns strongly counters claims of plain error. The court affirms that all elements of the capital offense were correctly charged. Furthermore, Whitehead contends that the reasonable doubt instructions were improper, suggesting they allowed for conviction based on insufficient proof. He references Cage v. Louisiana but fails to provide specific arguments related to his case. The trial court's definition of reasonable doubt emphasized that it must be based on reason and logic, not mere speculation, and clarified the standards required for conviction and acquittal. Overall, the trial court's instructions were deemed appropriate and aligned with established legal standards.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction. The Supreme Court in *In re Winship* emphasized this standard. In *Cage v. Louisiana*, the Court identified that a jury charge defining "reasonable doubt" with ambiguous terms could mislead jurors into applying a lower standard of proof. The determination of whether jury instructions are constitutionally sound hinges on whether there is a reasonable likelihood that jurors interpreted them in a way that undermined the reasonable doubt standard. The reviewing court assesses reasonable doubt instructions in the context of the overall jury charge. As long as the definition of "reasonable doubt" accurately reflects the concept, a charge will not warrant reversal. In this case, the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction did not contain the problematic language identified in *Cage* and was deemed clear. Consequently, the instruction was found not to violate constitutional principles.
Additionally, Whitehead argued that the trial court improperly labeled his decision not to testify as a "failure," suggesting it prejudiced the jury against him. However, the court disagreed, indicating that the jury was appropriately instructed regarding this matter.
The defendant's choice not to testify in the case cannot be used by the jury to draw any inferences, either favorable or detrimental. The trial court's instructions were appropriate and clarified that no conclusions should be made regarding the defendant’s silence. Additionally, the defendant, Whitehead, argued that the trial court failed to instruct the jury correctly regarding the equal weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, suggesting this misstatement created a presumption of death. However, precedent from Ex parte Trawick indicates that similar claims were rejected, and the trial court's instructions aligned with Alabama law. Specifically, the court instructed the jury that life imprisonment without parole was required if mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating ones, and the jury could only recommend death if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones. The instructions were consistent with Alabama Pattern Jury Instructions and did not mislead the jury, thereby confirming there was no plain error in the instructions given.
If aggravating and mitigating circumstances are balanced or if mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating ones, the jury must vote for life imprisonment without parole, as established in Stewart, 730 So.2d at 1230. The court found no plain error regarding this issue. Whitehead argues that his case does not support a capital murder conviction during a burglary based on three points:
1. The State failed to prove an "entry" into Whitten's dwelling, as required for burglary under Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-40 (a)(4) and § 13A-7-5. Whitehead claims that shooting through a partially open door does not constitute entry, and the relevant Alabama laws do not recognize a bullet's flight from outside as an entry.
2. The Double Jeopardy Clause prevents conviction for both burglary and murder based on the same act.
3. Elevating the crime from murder to capital murder using the same act violates the Eighth Amendment.
Since these claims were not presented at trial, they were reviewed under the plain-error rule (Rule 45A, Ala. R.App. P.). The court addressed each argument, noting that previous cases, such as Hyde v. State and Pack v. State, have consistently ruled against similar claims regarding "entry." The court explained that an entry can occur through the introduction of part of the body or a tool, depending on the purpose. A bullet fired merely to break a lock does not constitute entry, while a bullet fired with the intent to harm would. In Whitehead's case, evidence showed that his co-defendant entered an enclosed porch and shot Whitten through a partially opened door, resulting in Whitten's death, which supports the burglary and capital murder charges.
The entry of a bullet into Whitten's house qualifies as an "entry" under the burglary statute, as established in prior cases including Hyde. In Hyde, it was affirmed that an object entering a building can fulfill the entry requirement for burglary. Historically, both breaking and entry were essential elements of burglary, but the Alabama Criminal Code has since removed the breaking requirement. An entry is defined as any penetration of the building's interior by the defendant or an instrument intended for a felony. Relevant case law indicates that if an instrument is only used for gaining entrance and not for committing a felony, it does not constitute an entry. In this case, Hyde fired a bullet into the house with the intention of committing murder, thus satisfying the entry criteria. His actions, combined with the fact that he unlawfully entered the property armed with a deadly weapon, provided sufficient evidence for his burglary/murder conviction.
Whitehead's argument regarding double jeopardy is dismissed, as he was not convicted of burglary but of capital murder occurring during a burglary, which constitutes a single offense. Furthermore, Whitehead's claim that using the murder to elevate the charge to capital murder violates the requirement for capital murder statutes to narrowly define eligibility for the death penalty was previously rejected in Hyde, and it is similarly dismissed here.
Whitten's murder was classified as capital murder because it occurred during a burglary and because Whitten was a witness, as per Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(4). The State demonstrated sufficient evidence of burglary, justifying Whitehead's conviction for capital murder. Whitehead argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that it must find he knew Whitten was a witness at the time of the murder, referencing Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-40(a)(14). However, Whitehead did not object to the instruction during the trial, leading to a review under the plain-error rule, where his lack of objection complicates demonstrating prejudice. The trial court provided the jury with specific instructions regarding the charges, which included the intentional murder of Whitten, who was a grand jury witness. The instructions outlined the elements necessary for conviction, which required the jury to find that Whitten was deceased, that Whitehead caused his death by shooting, and that Whitehead intended to kill him, emphasizing that the intent must be specific and real.
The document outlines the legal standards and jury instructions related to the intentional murder of a witness. It emphasizes that if the defendant used a deadly weapon with the intent to kill, this fact may be considered in deliberations. The specific case involves the testimony of Andrew Whitten in a grand jury proceeding. A person can be charged with the murder of a witness if they intentionally kill someone who has been subpoenaed to testify in a criminal trial, and the murder is connected to the victim's role as a witness.
For a conviction, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Whitten was subpoenaed. Whitehead contends that the trial court's instructions were insufficient because they did not align with the Alabama Proposed Pattern Jury Instructions, specifically regarding the requirement that Whitehead knew Whitten was a witness at the time of the murder. However, the court holds that while adherence to these instructions is important, it does not automatically constitute grounds for reversal. The trial court's instructions were determined to adequately convey the necessary legal elements, emphasizing that the jury must conclude that Whitten's murder was related to his role as a witness, implying that Whitehead was aware of this fact. The court asserts that the jury could not reasonably find that the murder was related to Whitten's witness status without also concluding that Whitehead knew of that status. Consequently, the trial court's guidance was sufficient and did not mislead the jury regarding the necessary findings for conviction.
Whitehead argues on appeal that he was prejudiced by the trial court's instructions, claiming the evidence regarding his awareness of Whitten as a witness was conflicting. He contends that the trial court's instructions allowed the jury to convict him without determining his knowledge of Whitten's status. However, the court finds no basis for this claim, noting that the evidence presented does not show conflict regarding Whitehead’s awareness. Whitehead's trial counsel's closing argument, which suggested disbelief in Whitehead's potential for a successful civil lawsuit against Hudson Foods, does not constitute evidence and is deemed irrelevant to the actual belief Whitehead held.
Witnesses testified that Whitehead believed he could win a lawsuit against Hudson Foods if Whitten was eliminated. Additionally, Whitehead had a strong motive to kill Whitten to prevent him from testifying in the theft trial, where a conviction could result in a life sentence due to his habitual offender status. Whitehead himself acknowledged the severe consequences of a conviction, expressing a willingness to resort to violence to avoid imprisonment.
Whitehead's confession regarding the theft, made during a parole revocation hearing, does not indicate a lack of awareness about Whitten's status, as the possibility of winning a lawsuit does not negate his motive. The court reiterates that evidence of motive extends beyond the lawsuit, particularly highlighting the threat of life imprisonment as a significant factor. Lastly, Whitehead references his co-defendant Brookshire's testimony to support his argument, but Brookshire's lack of knowledge about the lawsuit prior to the murder does not create a conflict in evidence regarding Whitehead's awareness.
Whitehead asserts that testimony supports his claim of uncertainty regarding his knowledge of Whitten being a witness. However, Brookshire's testimony contradicts this, indicating that Whitehead explicitly mentioned needing to "get rid of his witness" on the morning of the murder. Whitehead also posits a defense theory linking the murder to his drug use; however, there is no evidence connecting Whitten's murder to drugs. Testimony regarding drug use was deemed irrelevant to Whitehead's awareness of Whitten's status as a witness. It was established that Whitehead knew Whitten was involved in the investigation of a theft case against him and was aware of his impending trial. The trial court's jury instructions adequately explained the law concerning the murder of a witness, and there is no indication that the jury was confused. Even if there were instructional errors, they were not prejudicial, as the facts established Whitehead's knowledge of Whitten's status, and the omitted instruction pertained to unsupported facts. The case is differentiated from prior decisions where knowledge was disputed, as Whitehead's defense did not challenge his awareness of Whitten's witness status.
Whitehead's claim of lack of knowledge was unsupported by trial evidence, and the trial court's overall instructions mitigated any failure to explicitly instruct the jury on his awareness of Whitten’s witness status, rendering any error harmless. Whitehead argued that the trial court erred by not providing a lesser included instruction for intentional murder, citing conflicting evidence regarding entry into Whitten's house and his knowledge of her status as a witness. However, Whitehead did not adequately preserve this objection for appeal, as he only made a general objection without specifying grounds, failing to meet the requirements of Rule 21.3, Ala. R.Crim. P. As a result, the court reviewed the issue for plain error and found none. The legal precedents cited include Beck v. Alabama, which prohibits imposing a death sentence without considering lesser included offenses when supported by evidence, and Hopper v. Evans, which clarified that a lesser included offense instruction is required only when warranted by the evidence. The Alabama standard mandates that such an instruction should be given if there exists any reasonable theory from the evidence supporting the lesser charge. The court concluded that Whitehead had no right to the lesser included offense instruction based on the presented evidence.
A court may refuse to instruct a jury on a lesser included offense if there is no evidence supporting such an offense or if the instruction would confuse the jury. An accused has the right to instructions that are not misleading and align with the evidence, even if that evidence is weak or doubtful. According to Alabama law, a jury cannot be charged with an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a conviction on that offense. In the case of Whitehead, the evidence clearly indicated that his accomplice unlawfully entered a residence and caused a bullet to enter, resulting in the victim's death. This established that there was no rational basis for a charge of intentional murder for the murder-burglary count, and instructing the jury on that offense would likely confuse them. Furthermore, regarding the charges for murdering a witness, the evidence showed Whitehead was aware of the victim's status as a witness. Multiple witnesses testified that Whitehead expressed intentions to kill the victim to obstruct an investigation and facilitate a civil lawsuit. The evidence demonstrated that the victim was involved in the investigation against Whitehead, and he was murdered just days before a scheduled trial related to theft charges. Consequently, there was no error in the trial court's failure to provide jury instructions on the lesser included offense of intentional murder.
Whitehead was aware that Whitten was a witness at the time of the murder, establishing that he could not be found guilty solely of intentional murder instead of capital murder. The trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on this distinction was deemed correct and not a plain error. Whitehead also contested the admission of victim-impact testimony during the sentencing phase, specifically from Whitten's father and brother, but failed to object during the trial. Thus, his claim was reviewed under the plain-error rule, where the absence of an objection significantly undermined his case for prejudice.
Prior to the sentencing phase, Whitehead's counsel indicated his desire to waive the jury's sentencing, which the State did not specifically oppose but requested jury participation, a request that the court granted without objection from Whitehead. The prosecutor’s opening statement preceded the defense's waiver of opening and closing statements. The State's witness testimonies included Whitehead's parole officer and Mike Whitten, who emotionally urged the jury to recommend the death penalty. Edsel Whitten, the victim's father, similarly requested a death sentence as a means of vindication.
Before closing arguments, the court confirmed with Whitehead that he understood his rights to present mitigating evidence and that he had chosen not to call any witnesses, including family members, in his defense, despite having discussed this option with his attorney multiple times.
Larry Whitehead, during a court proceeding, confirmed that he understood the process and had chosen not to present any witnesses or evidence in his defense. His counsel affirmed that Whitehead was satisfied with their representation. The court established that Whitehead was voluntarily waiving his right to any defense during sentencing.
On appeal, Whitehead argued that testimony from the victim's family suggesting that death was the appropriate sentence was improper under Alabama and federal law and influenced the jury's recommendation and the trial court's decision. The State conceded that while the testimony was improperly admitted, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court case Payne v. Tennessee, the court noted that while evidence about the victim's impact is admissible, opinions from family members regarding the appropriate sentence are not. The testimony from family members Mike Whitten and Edsel Whitten was deemed inadmissible but the court held that the error did not warrant reversing the conviction, as it was harmless under the applicable legal standards. The harmless error rule applies even in capital cases, allowing the court to affirm the sentence despite the error.
In Musgrove v. State, the court addressed the standards for determining if a constitutional error is harmless. Under the Chapman standard, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not impact the verdict or sentence. According to Ala. R.App. P. 45, the state must show that the error did not or probably did not injuriously affect the appellant's substantial rights. The harmless error rule aims to prevent the overturning of convictions for minor issues unlikely to alter trial outcomes. The court concluded that the error in question did not contribute to the sentence or harm the appellant's substantial rights.
The ruling referenced the necessity for a reviewing court to be confident that any constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as established in precedent cases. Additionally, plain error is defined as a clear error that could compromise the judicial process's fairness or integrity. The Supreme Court acknowledged that many errors can be harmless and do not automatically render a trial unfair, including the improper admission of evidence during sentencing.
In this case, the defendant, Whitehead, chose not to present any mitigating evidence during trial. The State argued five statutory aggravating circumstances, two of which were conclusively established: the murder occurred during a burglary, and Whitehead was under a sentence of imprisonment at the time of the murder. Testimony confirmed that he was on parole for a prior felony conviction involving escape. The State also asserted that the murder was committed for financial gain and to obstruct governmental functions, which were adequately supported by trial evidence and jury findings.
The trial court properly instructed the jury on how to assess aggravating and mitigating circumstances for sentencing. Although Whitehead presented no mitigating evidence, jurors were allowed to consider any mitigating factors from the guilt phase. The court provided a list of statutory mitigating circumstances and clarified that mitigating factors could include aspects of Whitehead's character, record, or circumstances of the offense that warranted a life sentence over the death penalty. Jurors were directed to base their recommendations solely on the evidence and legal instructions, free from emotional bias. The jury unanimously recommended a death sentence for Whitehead.
Subsequently, the trial court held a sentencing hearing where Whitehead again failed to present mitigating evidence. The court identified four aggravating factors: the murder occurred during a burglary, while Whitehead was imprisoned, for financial gain, and to impede governmental functions. Although Whitehead did not argue for mitigating circumstances, the court attempted to identify any but found none. The court noted that certain factors, such as the murder of a witness and a police officer, were not to be considered aggravating. It was presumed that the court disregarded any improper considerations during sentencing. While the admission of victim-impact testimony was deemed improper, it was ruled harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of aggravating circumstances and the absence of any mitigating factors. The State's burden to prove at least one aggravating circumstance remained intact.
Improper testimony from Whitten's family did not affect the jury's recommendation of death for Whitehead, as the jury likely recognized this testimony as a natural reaction to the victim's death. The court referenced the case Wimberly v. State, where the admission of victim-impact evidence was deemed harmful due to multiple improper comments by a family member that influenced the jury's decision. In contrast, Whitten's family only expressed their opinion on the appropriate punishment without making prejudicial remarks about Whitehead's constitutional rights. Unlike Wimberly, where the defendant's age was a mitigating factor, Whitehead's case presented sufficient aggravating circumstances to support the verdict. The court concluded that any improperly admitted victim-impact evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not constitute plain error. Additionally, Whitehead's claim of "double-counting" the burglary charge was raised for the first time on appeal and was reviewed under the plain-error rule, with the court finding no merit to this argument.
The use of underlying crime elements as aggravating circumstances in sentencing, known as 'double-counting' or 'overlap,' is constitutionally acceptable. Relevant Alabama statutes (Section 13A-5-50 and Section 13A-5-45(e)) allow for certain aggravating circumstances to be established during capital murder sentencing, even when they are included in the definition of the capital offense. Whitehead argues Alabama's capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional for not defining the weight given to jury recommendations and for failing to specify the aggravating circumstances found. However, these claims were not raised at trial, warranting a plain error review. The U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v. Alabama upheld that the Eighth Amendment does not require a state to define the weight of jury recommendations, allowing judges to impose capital sentences based on their discretion while considering jury advice. Alabama's statute sufficiently channels judicial discretion to prevent arbitrary outcomes, and since Whitehead's claims have been previously addressed and rejected, no plain error is found.
Whitehead's second claim has been rejected based on the Alabama Supreme Court's ruling in Ex parte Trawick, which determined that there is no requirement for a jury to specify the aggravating circumstances it finds. The jury was adequately instructed on aggravating and mitigating factors, leading to no error in their failure to specify aggravating circumstances. Additionally, Whitehead contends he was entitled to two attorneys experienced in criminal law under Alabama Code § 13A-5-54, but this statute only guarantees one attorney with at least five years of experience. Whitehead did not contest the qualifications of his appointed attorney and therefore received the counsel to which he was entitled. Furthermore, he challenges the constitutionality of Alabama Code § 15-12-21(d), which caps court-appointed attorneys' fees at $1,000 for out-of-court work in capital cases, arguing it violates several constitutional principles. However, these claims were not raised at trial, and prior cases have consistently rejected similar arguments, thus they are subject to plain error review.
Whitehead challenges the constitutionality of Alabama's use of the electric chair for executions, claiming it involves "faulty equipment, unqualified personnel, and inadequate procedures," leading to excessive burning and mutilation of condemned prisoners. These arguments were not raised at trial, so the court's review is limited to plain error under Rule 45A, Ala. R.App. P. Established case law indicates that electrocution does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Previous cases, including Lindsey v. Smith and Sullivan v. Dugger, support this conclusion. Whitehead's assertions regarding the electric chair's antiquity and associated harms have been addressed in earlier rulings, which found them to be without merit.
Additionally, Whitehead argues that the cumulative effect of alleged trial errors infringed upon his due process rights and fair trial rights. However, after reviewing each claim, the court finds no single error that warrants reversal, nor does the cumulative effect present a greater issue. Consequently, Whitehead's claims are dismissed as lacking merit, and the court finds no plain error in these matters.
The review of Whitehead's capital murder convictions and death sentence revealed no plain errors during the trial's guilt and sentencing phases. Under Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-53, the court assessed the appropriateness of the death sentence by examining: (1) any errors that negatively impacted the defendant's rights during sentencing, (2) whether the trial court's findings on aggravating and mitigating circumstances were evidence-supported, and (3) the overall appropriateness of the death penalty. The court also considered factors outlined in § 13A-5-53(b), such as ensuring the death sentence was not influenced by arbitrary factors, conducting an independent assessment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and evaluating whether the sentence was excessive or disproportionate compared to similar cases.
Following Whitehead's conviction, a separate sentencing hearing was held, where the jury, after evaluating evidence of aggravating and mitigating factors and receiving proper legal instructions, unanimously recommended death by electrocution. The trial court then conducted another hearing, received a presentence investigation report, and made specific findings on the presence of statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder occurred while Whitehead was imprisoned, (2) it was committed during a burglary, (3) it was for pecuniary gain, and (4) it was aimed at disrupting governmental functions. The trial court found no statutory or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, noting that Whitehead presented no evidence or arguments for such circumstances.
The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances in Whitehead's case outweighed any mitigating factors, leading to a death sentence. This determination was based on the trial court's consideration of the presented evidence, counsel arguments, the presentence report, and the jury's advisory verdict. Whitehead was convicted of murder during a burglary and the murder of a witness, both classified as capital offenses under Alabama law. The trial court identified four statutory aggravating circumstances with no mitigating circumstances offered by Whitehead to counterbalance them. The court's findings were substantiated by evidence, and an independent review confirmed that the sentence was not influenced by improper factors. The death penalty was deemed appropriate and consistent with penalties in similar cases. Whitehead’s convictions and death sentence were affirmed by the reviewing judges. Additionally, the record included testimony from the victim's brother, and the initial charge of murdering a police officer was dropped prior to trial.
