Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.; And Eastman Kodak Co. v. Berkey Photo, Inc.

Docket: 79-427; 79-499

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; February 19, 1980; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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The Supreme Court denied petitions for writs of certiorari in the case of Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Company, with Justice Rehnquist dissenting, joined by Justice Powell. Rehnquist criticized the Court of Appeals' complex and lengthy opinion, which included significant legal interpretations of the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals ruled that Kodak was not required to disclose information about its camera and film systems to competitors but violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by leveraging its market power in films and cameras to gain an unfair advantage in the photofinishing market. Additionally, the court found that Kodak violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by including a nondisclosure clause in a joint development project, despite its substantial investment. Rehnquist expressed skepticism about the antitrust implications of requiring competitors to disclose product plans prior to marketing, referencing prior case law that allows for growth through superior products and business strategies. He argued that the Court of Appeals misapplied legal standards by interpreting monopoly power as inherently violative of the Sherman Act when combined with intent to exercise that power, contrasting it with the precedent set in United States v. Grinnell. The opinion also noted the complexity of the case, underscored by Kodak's demand for a jury trial despite the extensive evidence involved.

The trial spanned from July 1977 to March 1978, with Kodak asserting its constitutional right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The complexity of the case raises concerns about potential misinterpretations of the Sherman Act, suggesting that excessive refinement has complicated its application over time. The excerpt questions whether the Sherman Act necessitates "predisclosure" among competitors before launching new products, arguing that skepticism should originate from this Court rather than from lower courts' interpretations. 

The Court of Appeals' ruling allowing evidence of a defendant's conduct before the statute of limitations is also challenged, indicating inconsistencies with prior case law. The document acknowledges Kodak's alleged antitrust violations stem from its competitive edge and innovative products. The author proposes granting certiorari to address three key questions: 1) Whether Kodak's introduction of the 110 camera and Kodacolor II film system constitutes monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act; 2) Whether Kodak improperly leveraged its film monopoly to gain an advantage in related markets; and 3) Whether Kodak's agreements with General Electric and Sylvania contravene Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Additionally, it questions whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling in Kodak's favor on claims related to film and color print paper and instead remanding for further determination regarding conduct prior to the lawsuit's initiation.