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DeBiasi v. Snaith
Citations: 732 So. 2d 14; 1999 WL 235782Docket: 98-2193
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; April 21, 1999; Florida; State Appellate Court
In the legal malpractice case of Victor DeBiassi v. Phillip H. Snaith, the District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed a trial court's summary judgment in favor of attorney Snaith, who had represented DeBiassi in an appeal concerning a mechanics' lien foreclosure. The court found that the trial court had improperly applied the doctrine of judgmental immunity, which Snaith claimed protected him from liability due to the ambiguity of appellate rules. DeBiassi alleged that Snaith's untimely motion for certification, filed after a prior motion for rehearing was denied, deprived him of a chance to overturn the appellate judgment. The trial court had ruled that the language of Rule 9.330, which allows for post-decisional motions, was ambiguous enough for a reasonable attorney to interpret it as permitting the late filing. However, the appellate court determined that the historical context and the specific wording of Rule 9.330 indicated a clear requirement for a single filing per decision, ultimately supporting DeBiassi's claim against Snaith for legal malpractice. Rule 9.330(a) allows for motions for rehearing, clarification, or certification to be filed within 15 days of an order, defined as the order to which the motion is directed. This practice has been consistently followed by the court, and the 1988 amendment aimed to simplify the process by allowing certification motions without prior rehearing motions. The court's prior summary denial of a motion for certification as untimely suggests that the issue of serial filings was not seen as legally unsettled at that time. However, the literal interpretation of Rule 9.330(b) alongside Rule 9.330(a) introduces some ambiguity, particularly for appellate counsel who might misinterpret the timelines regarding certification motions following rehearing denials. Despite this ambiguity, it does not reach the threshold of being a 'fairly debatable' legal issue sufficient to invoke judgmental immunity for an attorney's actions. The precedent set in Crosby v. Jones indicates that an attorney must demonstrate good faith and diligent inquiry to claim such immunity. Unlike Crosby, there was no existing case law or guidance supporting the actions taken by Snaith, necessitating proof of his good faith and inquiry diligence. For timely filing, motions for certification must adhere to the same 15-day rule as motions for rehearing or clarification, regardless of concurrent filings. The First District has allowed second motions for rehearing based on new opinions that alter the original ruling, a principle that could analogously apply to motions for certification. The case at hand leads to the conclusion that motions for certification may also address new opinions that significantly change prior ones. The cross-appeal is dismissed, the summary judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings.