Smith v. Maryland

Citations: 61 L. Ed. 2d 220; 99 S. Ct. 2577; 442 U.S. 735; 1979 U.S. LEXIS 134Docket: 78-5374

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 20, 1979; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

Lead Opinion SummaryLead Opinion OriginalCombined Opinion OriginalDissent AnalysisDissent OriginalDissent AnalysisDissent Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The case examines whether the installation and use of a pen register constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment. Following a robbery on March 5, 1976, in Baltimore, Patricia McDonough identified the perpetrator and a vehicle associated with the crime. After receiving threatening calls from the alleged robber, police installed a pen register at the request of the telephone company without a warrant, which revealed a call from the petitioner, Michael Lee Smith's, home to McDonough's phone. This led to a search warrant for Smith's residence, where incriminating evidence was found, including a phone book with McDonough's information. Smith was convicted of robbery and sought to suppress evidence from the pen register installation due to the lack of a warrant. The trial court denied his motion, concluding that the warrantless installation did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, ruling that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed, thus no "search" occurred, and no warrant was necessary. Dissenting judges argued that individuals do have a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding dialed numbers and that the absence of a warrant should exclude such evidence. Certiorari was granted to resolve conflicting views on the Fourth Amendment's applicability to pen registers. The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, affirming the need for scrutiny in such cases.

Determining whether government-initiated electronic surveillance constitutes a "search" under the Fourth Amendment follows the precedent set in Katz v. United States. In Katz, the Supreme Court held that interception of a telephone conversation via an electronic listening device constituted a search because it violated the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not just places. This decision established a framework for assessing privacy expectations based on two questions: whether the individual exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy and whether that expectation is recognized as reasonable by society.

In the present case, the challenged state activity involves the installation and use of a pen register, which records the numbers dialed from a phone without capturing any content of the communications. Since the pen register was installed on telephone company property, the petitioner cannot claim a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area. Instead, the petitioner argues that the pen register infringed upon his legitimate expectation of privacy regarding the dialed numbers. However, the court finds this claim unpersuasive, noting that most individuals do not have an actual expectation of privacy concerning the numbers they dial, as they understand that this information is conveyed to the telephone company and is routinely recorded for billing and operational purposes. Thus, the claim that the installation and use of a pen register constituted a search is rejected.

Pen registers are utilized to monitor phone usage for various legitimate business purposes, such as detecting business calls from home, malfunctioning dials, or overbilling. Telephone users are generally aware that they provide numerical information to the phone company, which has the capability and practice of recording this data. This understanding leads to the conclusion that users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the numbers they dial.

The petitioner contends that his personal usage of the telephone in his home created a specific expectation of privacy. However, the location of the call is deemed irrelevant; while he may have aimed to keep his conversation private, he could not ensure the privacy of the dialed number. Even if the petitioner believed his dialing numbers would remain private, such an expectation is not recognized as reasonable by society. The Supreme Court has established that individuals do not possess a legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily shared with third parties. For instance, in prior rulings, it was determined that a bank depositor cannot expect privacy for financial information given to a bank, as they assume the risk of disclosure.

The same reasoning applies to the petitioner, who voluntarily transmitted numerical information to the telephone company, thereby assuming the risk that this information could be disclosed to law enforcement. The technological advancements in automatic switching equipment do not alter this analysis; the equipment functions similarly to earlier operators in handling calls. The petitioner’s argument that automated systems record fewer numbers than human operators does not create a different constitutional outcome, as the decision of what to record is ultimately at the discretion of the phone company and does not impact the petitioner’s lack of reasonable expectation of privacy.

Petitioner provided information to the telephone company regarding recording capabilities, thereby assuming the risk of disclosure to law enforcement. The court found that Fourth Amendment protection should not vary based on how the telephone company defined local calling zones or its billing practices. Consequently, petitioner likely had no actual expectation of privacy regarding the dialed phone numbers, and even if such an expectation existed, it was not considered “legitimate.” Thus, the installation and use of a pen register did not constitute a “search” requiring a warrant. The Maryland Court of Appeals' judgment is affirmed. A pen register records dialed numbers without capturing the content of calls and operates at a phone company's facility. The phone company acted as an agent of the police in this case, qualifying the action as “state action” under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court acknowledged that subjective expectations of privacy could be influenced by external factors, which may render them irrelevant in determining Fourth Amendment protections.