Jenks v. State

Citation: 507 So. 2d 877Docket: CA-6352

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; May 12, 1987; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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In the case of Jacqueline Jenks v. State of Louisiana, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana reviewed a wrongful death action concerning the foster child, Henry Jenks, who suffered fatal injuries while in the care of foster parents, Houston and JoAnn Darden. Following the child's hospitalization and subsequent death from a severe head injury in December 1982, his natural mother, Jacqueline Jenks, initiated legal action against multiple parties, including the foster parents and their homeowner's insurer, State Farm Insurance Company.

Jenks alleged a pattern of intentional abuse by the Dardens, negligence for failing to report each other's actions, and negligence by the State in placing Henry with them. Before the trial, Jenks settled her claims against the State and its insurer for $46,000 but retained her claims against State Farm. The jury awarded her $100,000, which State Farm appealed, asserting several arguments including the trial court's erroneous denial of its exceptions of no right of action, the plaintiff's failure to prove her case, and that the jury did not properly apply certain policy exclusions regarding "intentional acts" and "resident insured."

The court found merit in State Farm's argument regarding the excessive nature of the jury's award. It emphasized that insurance policy provisions must be interpreted as written, without alteration by the courts, and that any exclusions from coverage must be clear and unmistakable. The ruling highlighted the importance of adhering to the explicit terms of insurance contracts.

Ambiguities in insurance policies are construed in favor of the insured and liberal interpretations favor coverage. Homeowner's insurance frequently excludes coverage for individuals residing on the premises. In Louisiana, exclusion of bodily injury to an insured does not violate public policy. A policy’s definition of "insured" includes residents of the household and persons under 21 in their care. A crucial question arises regarding whether a child, referred to as Henry, qualifies as a resident of the Darden household, as he must be under 21, in their care, and residing there.

The term "resident" lacks a single definition and is interpreted based on context, focusing on facts and circumstances. It generally refers to someone who dwells in a place for a significant duration. The definition of "household" encompasses individuals living together as a family under one roof.

Previous case law indicates that determining "resident of the same household" is not solely about physical presence but involves the intention and relationship of the individuals. Although there is no specific Louisiana case addressing coverage for a foster child under the parents' homeowner's insurance, other jurisdictions have explored similar issues. A Wisconsin case identified three factors for determining coverage for a foster child: living under the same roof, the nature of the relationship, and the expected duration of that relationship.

The court determined that Henry, a foster child living in the Darden household under a one-year dispositional order, was a resident of that household. The term "residents of the named insured's household" was deemed unambiguous in this context. Henry had lived with the Dardens for several months, intended to continue living there indefinitely, and was placed in their home to foster a parental relationship. The policy's exclusion regarding bodily injury to an insured was found clear and unambiguous. Even if any ambiguity existed, it would typically be resolved in favor of coverage. However, since Henry was considered an insured under the policy, his bodily injury was excluded from coverage, leading to the denial of recovery under State Farm's homeowner policy.

Dissenting opinions argued that the term "residents of the same household" can be ambiguous. Citing previous cases, dissenting judges noted that residency involves intent and group membership, not just physical location. They contended that the exclusion should not deny coverage because Henry was in foster care under a state contract, receiving support from the state, which indicated he was not a permanent resident of the Darden household. The dissent emphasized that due to the nature of his temporary care, Henry should not be classified as a resident insured under the policy exclusion.

An Illinois case, *Country Mutual Insurance Company v. Watson*, determined that a foster child placed indefinitely in a home as a 'temporary care facility' was not considered a 'resident' of that household under a similar insurance policy exclusion. The court emphasized that a key factor of residency—intent to establish a permanent home—was absent, as the placement was not intended to be permanent and the foster parent received state funding for the care. The author finds the *Watson* case persuasive, concluding that the policy exclusion does not apply in their situation. They distinguish this from *United States Fidelity and Guar. v. Richardson*, where a 14-year-old girl living in the home of the named insured was deemed an 'insured' because she was under the care of the insured, despite not being a legal ward. In contrast, the current case involves a foster child placed temporarily under a fee contract with the State. Therefore, the author argues that the policy should cover the case and dissent from the majority opinion.