Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 5, 1979; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
The Massachusetts veterans’ preference statute, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31. 23, is challenged for being unconstitutional due to its discriminatory impact against women, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under this statute, veterans are prioritized for state civil service positions over nonveterans, disproportionately benefiting males. Helen B. Feeney, a non-veteran, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the statute's preference formula excludes women from top civil service jobs. The three-judge District Court ruled in Feeney's favor, acknowledging the statute's legitimate goals but determining that its exclusion of women was severe enough to necessitate a more limited preference. This ruling was appealed by the Massachusetts Attorney General, leading to a vacated judgment for further consideration based on the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, which established that a neutral law does not violate equal protection solely due to its disproportionate impact unless it is shown to have a discriminatory purpose.
Upon remand, the District Court reaffirmed its original ruling, asserting that the veterans’ hiring preference is inherently nonneutral as it favors a traditionally male class. The court found the exclusionary consequences for women to be too significant to be considered unintended. The Attorney General appealed again, with the case having probable jurisdiction, highlighting that while many states provide hiring preferences for veterans, Massachusetts's absolute lifetime preference is particularly generous, applying to around 60% of public jobs and available to any honorably discharged veteran, regardless of gender.
Civil service positions in Massachusetts are classified as either labor or official. For official service positions, applicants must take competitive examinations, with scores determined by a combination of test results and relevant experience. Disabled veterans, veterans, and surviving spouses and parents of veterans are given ranking preference over all other candidates, as stipulated by Chapter 31.23. When a vacancy arises, public agencies request a list of 'certified eligibles' from the state personnel division, from which a few top candidates are selected for consideration. While this veterans’ preference does not guarantee appointment, it significantly advantages veterans who achieve passing scores.
Ms. Feeney, a long-term Massachusetts resident, began her public service career in 1963 and held various positions until her agency was disbanded in 1975. Despite her high scores on civil service exams, she consistently ranked below veterans due to the preference system, ultimately leading her to perceive further competition as futile. She initiated litigation shortly after losing her job. The justification for veterans' hiring preference has historical roots, aimed at rewarding military service and easing veterans' transitions to civilian life, dating back to 1884. Initially providing a tie-breaking advantage, the law evolved into a stronger preference by 1895, exempting veterans from merit-based selection requirements. However, this statute faced legal challenges for violating constitutional principles regarding government service.
Veterans’ preference law in Massachusetts originated from an 1896 statute aimed at complying with constitutional standards set in Brown v. Russell, initially granting absolute preference only to qualified veterans. A Supreme Judicial Court advisory opinion in 1896 validated this preference. The law was broadened in 1919 to include World War I veterans, changing the preference from absolute to priority in eligibility. This statute has faced numerous amendments to include veterans from later conflicts and has consistently been challenged legally and criticized by civil service reform advocates, although it was reaffirmed by a referendum in 1926.
The current challenge to the veterans’ preference law is based on claims of sex discrimination. Historically, the law has defined "veterans" in gender-neutral terms, and women serving in official military units have always qualified for the preference, with additional provisions made in 1943 to include women from auxiliary units. Despite these efforts, the law predominantly benefits men due to federal restrictions on women's military enlistment and the absence of a military draft for women. As of the initiation of this litigation, over 98% of veterans in Massachusetts were male, with only 1.8% being female.
Data from 1963 to 1973 indicated that, out of 47,005 permanent appointments, 43% of hires were women, yet only 1.8% of these women were veterans compared to 54% of men. Many female appointees occupied lower-paying positions, and on sample eligibility lists, veterans with lower test scores displaced women who would have otherwise been certified. The appellants acknowledged that the preference law has significantly limited the public employment opportunities for women, forming the basis of the appellee’s federal constitutional claim.
The appeal centers on whether Massachusetts' lifetime preference for veterans constitutes discrimination against women under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment allows for classification in laws, provided such classifications are rationally based; thus, uneven effects on specific groups are not inherently unconstitutional. Courts primarily assess the validity of legislative classifications, presuming that any unjust outcomes will be corrected through the democratic process unless there's evidence of discriminatory intent.
Racial classifications, however, are presumptively invalid and require extraordinary justification due to their historical context of discrimination. Similarly, gender classifications face scrutiny; they must demonstrate a close relationship to significant governmental objectives and are often deemed unconstitutional if they favor one gender over another in public employment without compelling justification.
While public employment isn't a constitutional right, any law favoring males over females must withstand a high level of scrutiny. Precedents indicate that a neutral law can still have unconstitutional implications if it disproportionately impacts historically marginalized groups, provided there is evidence of discriminatory intent. In assessing gender discrimination claims, a two-part analysis is necessary: first, whether the law is genuinely gender-neutral, and second, whether any adverse effects are rooted in gender-based discrimination. This framework will guide the evaluation of the current case.
Ch. 31. 23 has been examined to determine if it creates a gender-based classification. The appellee conceded that the statute is neutral on its surface and acknowledged that state preferences for veterans are generally valid, limiting her challenge to the absolute lifetime preference for veterans in Massachusetts. The District Court found that the statute serves legitimate purposes and was not created to discriminate against women. The appellee and the District Court agreed that the distinction between veterans and nonveterans does not serve as a pretext for gender discrimination.
The definition of 'veterans' has been gender-neutral, and Massachusetts includes women veterans in its definition. While fewer women benefit from the preference, the nonveteran class consists of both men and women, indicating that the statute does not exclusively disadvantage women. The District Court noted that the purposes of the statute clarify its impact and that it distinguishes between veterans and nonveterans rather than between genders.
The key issue is whether there is evidence of a gender-based discriminatory intent in the veterans' preference legislation. The appellee argues that the preference is inherently gender-biased due to federal military policies favoring men and claims that the preference's impact on women's employment opportunities is significant and likely unintended. She believes these factors, along with the preference's minimal relevance to job performance, demonstrate the discriminatory intent necessary to establish a constitutional violation. This argument suggests that the state intentionally adopted policies reflective of federal laws that have historically limited women's military participation.
Two significant issues undermine the argument presented. First, it contradicts the District Court’s key finding that Massachusetts did not implement a veterans' preference to discriminate against women. Second, both the appellee and the District Court assumed that a limited veterans' hiring preference could be legally justified. These points render the argument unsustainable. Since the veteran status is predominantly held by men, any preference for veterans is inherently biased against women. If Massachusetts’ preference is seen as incorporating historically discriminatory military practices, the extent of that preference does not alter its constitutional implications. Discriminatory intent does not vary with the degree of preference; it is either present or absent. The District Court concluded that the veterans' preference was not enacted to advantage men specifically, indicating no intent to exclude women from public jobs. Describing the preference as 'inherently nonneutral' merely highlights its impact without addressing intent. Although the law explicitly favors veterans, the District Court found this preference legitimate and not gender-based, which aligns with the law's analysis as neutral despite its greater burden on women. While the military's enlistment policies may have discriminated against women, that history is irrelevant to this case. The appellee argues that the legislature must have foreseen the adverse effects on women resulting from their preference for veterans, suggesting that such outcomes were not unintended. Thus, while the preference for veterans was intentional, its negative impact on women, given the male-dominated veteran population, cannot be dismissed as unforeseen or unintended.
'Discriminatory purpose' requires that a decision be made, at least in part, because of its adverse effects on a specific group, rather than merely accepting those effects. The evidence does not support that the Massachusetts veterans' preference was established to reinforce gender stereotypes within the Civil Service. Instead, the preference has historically been available to all veterans, including women, under a broad definition. Initially aimed at assisting older Civil War veterans, the preference has been continuously reaffirmed for newer veterans. The law is characterized as a preference for veterans over nonveterans, regardless of gender, rather than favoring men over women. Although veterans' hiring preferences may be seen as undemocratic and unfair, particularly during peacetime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide grounds to challenge policies perceived as unwise. The appellee failed to show any intent to discriminate based on sex, leading to a reversal of the judgment and remand for further proceedings. The excerpt also notes that the Massachusetts Civil Service law was recodified in 1979 and mentions the legal context surrounding a related case involving Carol A. Anthony, which was rendered moot by legislative changes. An interim statute replaced the veterans' preference pending final judgment. The Attorney General's appeal against the judgment was made despite objections from other state officials.
Massachusetts law allows for veterans' hiring preferences, as affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court in Feeney v. Commonwealth. The federal Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 established the first comprehensive statute for veterans, although preferential hiring practices date back to the Civil War. Many state laws, including those from the late 19th century, also provide such preferences.
Veterans typically receive a point advantage on civil service exams, with disabled veterans receiving 10 points and non-disabled veterans receiving 5 points. Some states, like Massachusetts, offer absolute hiring preferences, while others have varying forms of preference, including tie-breaking preferences.
The definition of a "veteran" under Massachusetts law includes individuals with honorable discharges who served at least 90 days of active duty, with specific recognition for those awarded the Purple Heart or other notable honors. The term "wartime service" encompasses specific conflicts defined in the law, covering service from September 16, 1940, to May 7, 1975.
Previously, Massachusetts law required residency for eligibility, but this was deemed unconstitutional due to equal protection violations in Stevens v. Campbell.
Nondurational residency requirements are upheld in New York's veterans' preference statute, as affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court. The statute outlines the order of placement for names on eligible lists for civil service appointments: 1) disabled veterans, 2) veterans, 3) widows or widowed mothers of veterans who died in service, and 4) other applicants. Disabled veterans are prioritized for retention over all other candidates. Amendments in 1977 expanded the preference to surviving spouses and parents, while a 1978 amendment mandated written justification from appointing authorities for selecting candidates not at the top of the list. Historical context shows a long-standing rationale for veterans' preference laws, with various legal challenges leading to standardized support for such statutes. The preference structure has evolved, eliminating previous exemptions for women and ensuring absolute retention preference for disabled veterans, which was challenged but ultimately upheld in various state and federal cases.
The legal document outlines various historical and legal points regarding women's military service and preferences in civil service. It references multiple court cases from the 1970s that upheld point preference laws for veterans in Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Wisconsin. The document notes that such provisions were enacted after the establishment of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC), which defined "wartime service" and recognized women who served in auxiliary roles as veterans. Historical context is provided, highlighting that women have participated in combat roles unofficially throughout U.S. history, with notable figures like Molly Pitcher and Lucy Brewer serving disguised as men.
The text discusses the challenges faced by civil service veterans' preference laws, particularly regarding enforcement and the age of applicants. It mentions the 1896 statute that instituted an absolute preference for Civil War veterans, detailing applicant demographics and outcomes. The Army Nurse Corps, created in 1901, is noted as the first official military unit for women, although they did not receive full military rank until 1944. During World War I, proposals for women's enlistment in various roles were largely rejected, whereas the Navy successfully enlisted women as Yeoman F’s and Marine F's, marking a significant development in women's military roles. The establishment of official military corps for women during World War II is highlighted, with approximately 350,000 women serving across different branches, including the WAAC, WAVES, and others.
Most individuals served in health care, administration, and communications during World War II, with others working as airplane mechanics, parachute riggers, gunnery instructors, and air traffic controllers. The Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 established women's military services permanently, granting them regular military status but imposing quotas limiting enlistment to no more than 2% of total strength, with stricter eligibility requirements than for men and limited career opportunities. During the 1950s and 1960s, women made up just over 1% of the military force. The 2% quota was lifted in 1967, and many restrictive policies regarding women's military participation were modified or eliminated in the 1970s. By 1972, women constituted less than 2% of enlisted personnel, but this percentage rose to 4.6% by 1975, the year this litigation began. Although the provision for "women’s requisitions" may have historically protected certain jobs from preferences favoring male veterans, the statutory history reveals no intent to prevent single-sex hiring practices. The veterans’ preference law from 1896, which originally applied to an all-male class, did not endorse such practices but may have inadvertently encouraged the hiring of women in previously inaccessible positions. Discriminatory intent can typically be inferred from objective factors, and the effectiveness or impact of a more modest preference does not alter its constitutional neutrality. Legislative intent can often be discerned from the outcomes of its actions, and the foreseeability of consequences may inform the assessment of intent.
When adverse effects of a law, such as chapter 31.23's gender-based consequences, are inevitable for a specific group, it can lead to a strong inference that these effects were intended. However, this inference serves as a tool in constitutional analysis rather than definitive proof. In this case, the adverse impact arises from a legitimate legislative policy, and the statutory history and evidence do not support the inference as proof of intent. The appellee argues that former statutes regarding women's requisitions indicate Massachusetts believed women should not compete with men and that provisions for female dependents of veterans reflect outdated gender roles. However, these claims are contradicted by the statutory history and overlook the recognized contributions of women in military service, as detailed in congressional hearings and reports from 1977.
