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Elkins v. Moreno
Citations: 55 L. Ed. 2d 614; 98 S. Ct. 1338; 435 U.S. 647; 1978 U.S. LEXIS 82Docket: 77-154
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; April 19, 1978; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion regarding a lawsuit brought by nonimmigrant alien residents of Maryland against the University of Maryland and its President, Elkins. The respondents contended that the University’s refusal to grant them "in-state" status for tuition purposes contravened federal laws, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supremacy Clause. The District Court ruled in favor of the respondents, citing violations of principles from Vlandis v. Kline, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to ascertain whether this ruling conflicted with previous decisions, specifically Weinberger v. Salfi. The Court concluded that resolving the constitutional issues necessitated addressing an important state law question for which no controlling precedent existed in Maryland's Court of Appeals. Consequently, the Court decided to first address preliminary federal law issues before certifying the state law question to Maryland's Court of Appeals. In 1973, the University of Maryland enacted a policy governing "In-State Status for Admission, Tuition, and Charge-Differential Purposes," which delineated eligibility criteria primarily for U.S. citizens and lawful immigrant aliens. The policy required financial dependency or independent financial status for at least six or twelve months, respectively, and defined "domicile" as a permanent residence with the intent to live indefinitely in Maryland. The policy included eight factors for determining domicile, one of which involved paying Maryland income tax. In 1974, respondents Moreno and Otero applied for in-state status. Moreno, dependent on a parent with a G-4 visa, was denied because neither he nor his father were considered Maryland domiciliaries. Otero was denied due to his non-citizen status and lack of permanent residence. Respondents filed a consolidated appeal to the IRC for in-state status at the University of Maryland, which was denied on the grounds that in-state tuition is reserved for individuals subject to the full scope of Maryland tax liability. The University asserted that neither the respondents nor their parents paid Maryland income tax, which is a criterion for establishing domicile necessary for in-state classification. The University maintains a policy that grants in-state status only to U.S. citizens and lawful immigrant aliens, emphasizing that holders of a G-4 visa cannot demonstrate the requisite intent to establish permanent residence in Maryland. This position was reiterated in a final appeal to President Elkins, who concurred with the classification policy and noted that the parents of the respondents did not pay Maryland income tax, further complicating their claims for in-state status. Clare B. Hogg's application faced similar rejection, with emphasis placed on her and her dependent's G-4 visa status and the absence of Maryland income tax contributions as significant factors against her request for reclassification. The IRC, in its review, affirmed that individuals on non-immigrant visas, including G-4, cannot establish the intent necessary for domicile. Respondents, unable to secure in-state status through the University, initiated a class action against the University and petitioner Elkins. They sought a declaration for in-state status and a permanent injunction against the University for denying such status based on G-4 visa holder status, lack of Maryland state income tax payment for salaries from international organizations, or non-domicile in Maryland due to these factors. The District Court, upon reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, granted limited relief by issuing a declaration and injunction preventing Elkins from denying respondents the opportunity to establish in-state status based on an "irrebuttable presumption of non-domicile." However, the court did not grant in-state status outright, noting that the eligibility of respondents' fathers, who provided financial support, was disputed. The court also refrained from determining if the University could deny status based on the fathers' state tax payments. The District Court determined that while respondents could present their domicile claims, there was no individualized hearing due to the University's predetermined view that G-4 visa holders lack the intent to establish domicile. It concluded that under Maryland common law, G-4 aliens could establish domicile if legally permitted by federal law. Analysis of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 confirmed G-4 aliens’ capacity to change domicile, contradicting the University's presumption. Consequently, the court found the University's policy violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment due to the availability of reasonable alternative means for determining domicile. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld these findings. Petitioner contends that the University’s policy should be evaluated under standards from Weinberger v. Salfi, arguing these cases have superseded Vlandis. Alternatively, petitioner claims the District Court's conclusions on Maryland and federal law were incorrect, asserting that G-4 visa holders universally cannot establish Maryland domicile. Respondents counter that Vlandis was distinguished, not overruled, by Salfi, and maintain that the District Court’s interpretation of the law was accurate. The University’s policy is challenged for allegedly discriminating against G-4 aliens who could become domiciled in Maryland, raising equal protection concerns despite arguments framed within due process. The core issue is whether G-4 aliens can form the intent necessary for Maryland domicile under federal and state law. The University asserts that its primary concern is domicile as defined by Maryland courts, rejecting any intent to exclude nonimmigrant classes. The case aligns with the principles established in Vlandis, which states a state cannot deny an individual the opportunity to demonstrate domicile if its policies suggest otherwise. There is a reluctance to revisit or limit Vlandis unless absolutely necessary, as indicated by past precedent on avoiding constitutional decisions. The University is open to revising its policy if Maryland courts determine G-4 aliens can establish domicile. Thus, the critical question of G-4 aliens' capacity to acquire domicile is key to the case's outcome. Given the absence of clear precedents on federal statutory law and Maryland common law regarding this issue, the case will be certified to the Court of Appeals of Maryland to clarify these state-law aspects. Petitioner contends, with respondents seemingly in agreement, that if federal law mandates a nonimmigrant alien to maintain a permanent residence abroad or to declare an intention to leave the U.S. by a specific date, then such an alien's subjective desire to reside permanently in a state does not constitute the requisite intent to establish domicile. It remains unclear whether this argument is grounded in Maryland's common law definition of intent or posits that federal law imposes a "legal disability," which states must acknowledge under the Supremacy Clause. However, the determination of the impact of such federal law is unnecessary because Congress did not impose requirements on G-4 aliens regarding permanent residence abroad or a pledge to leave on a fixed date. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended in 1976, serves as a comprehensive framework for the admission of aliens, establishing two classes: immigrant and nonimmigrant aliens. Immigrant aliens are subject to quotas unless they fall under specific exemptions, and while they typically seek permanent residence, the Act does not mandate that they must intend to remain permanently. Nonimmigrant aliens, defined under section 101(a)(15), are categorized into 12 subcategories allowing entry without quota restrictions, catering to needs in diplomacy, tourism, and commerce. Nonimmigrants are generally regarded as temporary visitors, but certain classifications explicitly require an intention to maintain a foreign residence, such as visitors and nonimmigrant students, who must not intend to abandon their foreign homes. Restrictions on intent were intentionally included in the definition of certain nonimmigrant classes to prevent aliens from entering the U.S. with the real purpose of immigrating permanently. Nonimmigrant aliens who fail to comply with their status can be deported under 241(a)(9) of the 1952 Act. However, Congress did not impose such restrictions on the G-4 nonimmigrant class, indicating a deliberate allowance for these aliens to establish domicile in the U.S. G-4 aliens are admitted indefinitely as long as they are recognized as employees or family members of employees of international treaty organizations. If a G-4 alien develops a subjective intent to stay indefinitely, it does not violate the Act or regulations. Termination of G-4 employment results in loss of status, but does not automatically lead to deportation or require re-entry for immigrant status. The 1952 Act established an adjustment of status mechanism for aliens to apply for permanent residency without leaving the U.S., a process subject to administrative discretion. Favorable factors for adjustment include family ties and hardship, while adverse factors could hinder approval. However, there is no indication that the named respondents face adverse factors, suggesting they could successfully adjust their status to permanent residency. The case revolves around whether G-4 visa holders and their dependents can become domiciliaries of Maryland, a question of state law. The Court of Appeals of Maryland is asked to clarify if individuals residing in Maryland under 8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(15)(G)(iv) can establish domicile. The certified class includes current University of Maryland students, prospective students deterred by current policies, and high school students in Maryland who hold or are dependent on G-4 visas. The University of Maryland was dismissed from the case based on precedent from Monroe v. Pape. The complaint alleged violations of multiple federal statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, among others), with jurisdiction established under 28 U.S.C. 1343. The District Court accepted this basis for jurisdiction without dispute. The term 'immigrant' excludes certain nonimmigrants, including G-4 visa holders and their immediate families, who are identified as respondents in the case. Respondents Moreno, Otero, and Hogg have resided in Maryland for 15, 10, and 5 years, respectively. The District Court did not provide a basis for denying the requested relief, suggesting it believed the University wouldn't exclude these individuals from in-state status if they qualified for domicile. The University has denied allegations that it excludes students based on the tax status of their parents, specifically claiming no intention to penalize students for their parents’ non-payment of Maryland taxes due to international organization employment. The University clarified that it does not intend to exclude respondents based on their failure to pay state income taxes. In response to requests for admission, the University denied the relevance of tax exemptions for G-4 visa holders and the implications of tax payments (including those on less than 50% of earned income or solely on unearned income) for in-state tuition eligibility. The University acknowledged that an immigrant student financially dependent on a parent with lawful permanent residency may qualify for in-state status regardless of the parent's Maryland income tax obligations, provided other domicile criteria are met. This indicates that tax status does not influence in-state eligibility for any group of aliens. The court, aligning with the District Court, refrained from deciding whether the University would be restricted by the Supremacy Clause from denying in-state status on tax grounds and did not address the equal protection argument. The respondents also claimed the University’s policy is invalid under the Supremacy Clause, given that federal authority governs alien control and foreign relations, but this argument was not considered at this time. Petitioner’s interpretation of the University’s policy delineates between domiciliaries and non-domiciliaries, reflecting a policy decision by the Board of Regents, which is codified in the University’s rules. The policy initially denies in-state status to non-immigrant aliens, based on the interpretation that such individuals lack the intent to permanently reside in Maryland, as per state domicile law. The University’s distinctions between immigrant and non-immigrant aliens derive from an assessment of domicile law in conjunction with the conditions of various non-immigrant visas. The legal foundation for the University’s domicile policies and the distinctions made between different classes of aliens is well established. Respondents argued against abstention, asserting that the Maryland common law of domicile is not relevant to the case, and no clarification is needed. The University of Maryland's tuition policy reflects its interpretation of Maryland common law, which does not exclude nonimmigrant aliens based solely on their immigration status. The petitioner clarified that the University has not denied in-state status to students without U.S. citizenship or immigrant visas, indicating that alienage does not affect domicile determinations. Respondents’ equal protection claim hinges on whether G-4 aliens can be considered domiciliaries in Maryland; a negative ruling would alter their constitutional arguments, while an affirmative ruling would necessitate policy changes by the University’s Board of Regents. There is no recent Maryland case law addressing this issue, and the petitioner did not seek certification of the domicile question to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The District Court's choice not to abstain remains unchallenged, as noted in precedent. The equitable practice of abstention is constrained by the potential delays and expenses it may cause, though utilizing an adequate certification procedure can ultimately save resources and enhance cooperative judicial federalism. Certification simplifies the analysis of Pullman abstention. Typically, deference is given to state law interpretations by district courts and affirmed by appellate courts, but this case diverges due to two primary factors: the significant state interest in domicile definitions, which affect voting rights, public office eligibility, divorce eligibility, and tax obligations; and the importance of foreign nationals' status in Maryland, influencing the state's relations with federal, state, and foreign entities. The court asserts that such local and impactful legal questions should be initially resolved by state courts when efficient methods for obtaining state rulings exist. There is no implication that the district court's interpretation of Maryland law was erroneous. Additionally, prior to the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, nonimmigrant aliens from the Western Hemisphere could not adjust their status; this restriction was lifted by the amendments. Relevant administrative decisions are binding on immigration service officials. G-4 aliens as a class are not deemed less qualified for adjustment of status than the class representatives, despite being part of a class action. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to answer legal questions certified by the Supreme Court of the United States, provided the questions involve determinative legal issues lacking controlling precedent within the state. Such certification can be initiated by a court or any party involved. Certification orders must clearly outline the legal question and relevant facts pertaining to the controversy. The prevailing view is that domicile rules are uniform within a state. If Maryland diverges from this view, it is anticipated that the Court of Appeals will focus on domicile issues for this case. The Maryland Court of Appeals subsequently responded to the certified question, resulting in a supplemental decision in Toll v. Moreno, 441 U.S. 458 (1979).