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Stack v. State
Citations: 860 So. 2d 687; 2003 WL 22351418Docket: 2001-KA-01905-SCT
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; October 16, 2003; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Joseph Dreher Stack was convicted of the murders of James Thomas and Larry Albert Chopones in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, resulting in consecutive life sentences imposed by Judge Stephen B. Simpson. Stack's conviction arose from events on October 24, 1998, after he and Gene Livingston consumed alcohol and encountered Chopones in a vacant lot. Following a confrontation where Stack believed Chopones intended to harm Livingston, Stack fatally attacked Chopones, stabbing him approximately thirty times and slashing his throat. When Thomas and Daisy Jones intervened, Stack turned on Thomas, stabbing him twice before fleeing the scene with Livingston. Both victims ultimately died from their injuries. Stack, arrested later that evening for public drunkenness, confessed to the murders in a recorded statement given three hours post-arrest. He filed a pro se motion for a speedy trial while awaiting grand jury action and was indicted on May 13, 1999. Stack's defense underwent several changes with multiple motions for continuance, primarily for obtaining necessary records and psychiatric evaluations. The trial commenced on June 14, 2001, after several delays, resulting in his conviction. Stack's appeal challenges the conviction and sentences, which the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, finding no reversible error in the proceedings. The trial judge's denial of Stack's motion for continuance is reviewed under the standard that such a denial will not be reversed unless it leads to manifest injustice. Mississippi law requires that any application for a continuance must include an affidavit detailing the expected evidence from absent witnesses or documents, along with a demonstration of due diligence in procuring them. The court retains discretion to grant or deny a continuance and can cross-examine the party making the affidavit. A denial of a continuance is not grounds for reversal unless it is shown that injustice resulted, with the burden on the defendant to provide concrete evidence of prejudice rather than mere assertions. Stack's motion was ore tenus, meaning he did not follow the procedural guidelines set out in the relevant statute. Courts have consistently upheld that a judge does not abuse discretion in denying a continuance when the defendant fails to comply with these requirements. Stack was given an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice during a hearing on a motion for a new trial but did not succeed. Stack's counsel was assigned six weeks prior to trial, which does not constitute grounds for a continuance based on precedents where less preparation time was deemed acceptable. The court noted multiple cases supporting this, including instances where defense counsel had only days to prepare for serious charges. There was no evidence indicating that Stack's counsel would have changed their defense strategy if granted a continuance, and the record lacked any indication of an insanity plea. The court could only speculate on whether the lack of a mental evaluation was due to negligence, a tactical choice, or an attempt to delay proceedings. During a motion hearing shortly before trial, Stack's counsel argued inadequate preparation time and the necessity of psychological testing. However, the trial judge highlighted existing continuance orders and a previous order for a mental evaluation that had not been acted upon. The judge found no substantial evidence of Stack's mental deficiencies that would impede his understanding or participation in the trial and denied the motion for a continuance, deciding to keep the case on the trial docket. The trial court expressed concern over the delay in obtaining defense records, noting that significant time had passed without their acquisition. The court decided to proceed with the case due to a lack of evidence indicating the defendant's inability to assist counsel. A local psychological evaluation of the defendant, Stack, was proposed, with the possibility of reconsidering a motion for continuance if the evaluation indicated incompetence or necessity for missing records. Stack declined the local evaluation and relied on the existing record, which included a previously overlooked mental evaluation order. During a post-trial hearing, Stack's counsel claimed that the denial of the continuance hindered effective assistance of counsel. The court questioned the absence of testimony from Mr. Cox, the defense counsel, regarding the alleged ineffective assistance. Both the court and the assistant district attorney noted that without evidence or testimony from Mr. Cox about the failure to pursue the records, speculation about their potential impact was unfounded. The State argued that the delay in obtaining records from the Veterans Administration suggested they were unlikely to benefit the defense, reinforcing the notion that the defense’s arguments lacked a factual basis. The court had previously allowed a recess for a psychological evaluation, but the defense chose not to pursue that option, leading the State to assert that the focus on psychological records was merely a tactic for delay. The case involving Stack was scheduled for evaluation by a local mental health professional on June 14, 2001, but defense counsel repeatedly declined the trial judge's suggestion to pursue this evaluation, insisting on relying solely on the existing record. The trial judge perceived this refusal as a tactical maneuver and exercised sound discretion in denying Stack's motion for a continuance, noting this was the fifth such request. Stack himself had filed letters requesting a speedy trial, yet no affidavit was submitted to support the motion, nor was there a valid reason provided for not completing the court-ordered psychological evaluation. Defense counsel Smith was appointed shortly before the trial date, while Dawson, who had limited experience with murder cases, inherited the case along with a heavy caseload. Smith, however, had significant trial experience, having tried numerous murder cases. The court concluded that the defense's delay tactics, particularly the failure to conduct the mental evaluation, hindered the judicial process and negatively affected the prosecution's ability to present the case, the victims, and witnesses. Furthermore, Stack claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing that his attorneys failed to prepare adequately for trial, did not pursue a mental health evaluation, and neglected to argue self-defense. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's denial of the continuance and upheld the proceedings. The standard for evaluating effective assistance of counsel requires demonstrating that a lawyer's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense, as established in Strickland v. Washington. The inquiry focuses on whether the counsel's assistance was reasonable under the circumstances, with a strong presumption favoring the competence of defense counsel. Judicial scrutiny is highly deferential, aiming to eliminate hindsight bias and evaluate the conduct from the perspective of counsel at the time. A defendant must show a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the outcome would have been different, sufficient to undermine confidence in the result. Stack's claim hinges on the assertion that better preparation, evaluation by a psychiatrist, and a self-defense argument would have altered the trial's outcome. However, Stack fails to substantiate this claim. Previous cases cited by Stack did not find counsel ineffective. The court concluded that there is no singular method for defending a client, and it found no evidence of deficient or prejudicial performance by defense counsel in this instance. Stack did not demonstrate any likelihood that the trial outcome would differ, relying instead on unsupported assertions. The court found no evidence suggesting that the actions of Stack's counsel deviated from trial strategy, rendering this issue without merit. Regarding the request for a "heat of passion" jury instruction related to the charge involving Larry Albert Chopones, Stack argued he lacked the intent to kill, necessitating a manslaughter instruction. He invoked the Weathersby principle, which states that a defendant's uncontradicted testimony should be accepted if reasonable. Mississippi law stipulates that jury instructions are to be evaluated collectively, and a trial judge may refuse instructions deemed incorrect, redundant, or lacking evidentiary support. Stack's proposed instruction was refused by the trial court, as it was deemed a misapplication of the Weathersby rule, which serves as guidance for directed verdicts rather than a jury instruction itself. Hence, Stack's appeal on this matter was also deemed without merit. Stack claims he acted in self-defense while trying to protect his friend, Gene Livingston, during a stabbing incident. He argues that the circumstances created a Weathersby scenario, emphasizing that Livingston was the only other person present and did not testify at trial. In a recorded statement, Stack described how he intervened when Chopones reached for Livingston, leading to him stabbing Chopones with his own knife. He recounted the chaotic situation, mentioning his aggressive reaction when confronted by a group of individuals. The State countered Stack's Weathersby argument by presenting forensic evidence that highlighted the severity of Chopones' injuries, which included numerous stab and slicing wounds, suggesting Stack's actions may have been malicious. The jury was instructed on the relevant legal standards, and there was no evidence to support a lesser charge of heat of passion manslaughter. Consequently, Stack's claims were deemed without merit. Additionally, Stack argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict or a new trial, asserting that no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellate court's review will assess the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, adhering to established legal standards regarding such motions. In Esparaza v. State and related cases, the court established that credible evidence supporting the defendant's guilt must be accepted as true, and the prosecution is entitled to favorable inferences from the evidence. The jury is responsible for determining the weight and credibility of the evidence. A reversal of conviction is warranted only if reasonable jurors could only find the defendant not guilty. In the case at hand, the State argued against Stack's claims of procedural deficiencies, pointing out that Stack's argument lacked detail and failed to demonstrate reversible error. The presumption of correctness applies to the trial court's judgment, placing the burden on the appellant. The evidence presented included Stack's apprehension at the crime scene with blood on him and the murder weapon, alongside a confession and eyewitness accounts of his actions during the killings, leading the court to find the issue of guilt without merit. Regarding Stack's claim that his due process rights were violated due to a nine-month delay in indictment, the State contended that this issue was procedurally barred as it was not raised at trial. The court referenced precedent indicating that issues not presented to the trial judge cannot be raised on appeal. Furthermore, even if considered, the court found the claim meritless, noting that prior cases upheld that significant pre-indictment delays do not automatically constitute due process violations unless actual prejudice and intentional government delay are proven, which Stack failed to demonstrate. Stack's failure to demonstrate actual prejudice from delays in the proceedings or any tactical advantage gained by the State renders his claims meritless. He also argues that the cumulative effect of various errors warrants reversal of his convictions. However, since all previously identified errors lack merit, there is no cumulative prejudicial impact. After reviewing the case, the Circuit Court's decisions are upheld, affirming Stack's convictions for the murders of James Thomas and Larry Albert Chopones, with consecutive life sentences confirmed. In dissent, Justice McRae highlights significant neglect in Stack's case, arguing that the motion for a continuance filed by defense counsel was justified due to their late appointment and insufficient preparation time. McRae contends that a mental evaluation, essential for Stack's defense, was not completed, and therefore, Stack's convictions should be reversed and remanded for a new trial after the evaluation. Additionally, there is uncertainty regarding the timing of the appointment of Stack's counsel, with evidence suggesting that they had only four to six weeks to prepare before the trial commenced. Dawson, appointed as Stack's counsel, was also handling 124 other cases and had no prior experience with murder cases. A motion for a continuance filed in June 2001 was deemed a "defense strategy" by some, yet it was made in good faith and based on reasonable grounds. At the time of the alleged murders, Stack was undergoing mental treatment at the V.A. Hospital, but relevant records were never provided to the court. Stack experienced multiple changes in attorneys; his first two appointed counsel, Ellis and Cox, did little to advance his case. Cox did request a mental evaluation, which led to a court order for Stack’s transfer to the State Hospital, but this order was never executed, and Cox continued to seek Stack's medical records. As trial approached in June 2001, Dawson and Smith, the last assigned attorneys, filed for a continuance upon discovering the lack of V.A. Hospital records and the unexecuted mental evaluation order. Their request was denied by the trial judge. They emphasized that they were appointed only six weeks before the trial and that Dawson had no murder trial experience, while also presenting evidence of Stack's mental health history. The excerpt references prior case law, highlighting that a motion for continuance due to lack of preparation must be substantiated and is subject to the trial judge's discretion. However, if the trial court’s actions indicate a lack of a fair trial, it is the duty of the appellate court to ensure fairness by possibly granting a new trial. The document cites several cases to support the principle that a fair trial includes adequate preparation time, and it concludes that, similar to the Barnes case, a new trial may be warranted if doubts about the fairness of the original trial persist. The circuit court denied Stack's motion for a continuance, determining that Stack's defense attorneys had sufficient notice to prepare for trial and that Stack's prior requests for a speedy trial undermined the need for additional time. Stack waived his pro se claims regarding the speedy trial to pursue the continuance. Smith and Dawson, Stack's attorneys, acquired his case file only six weeks before trial amid a heavy workload of 124 other files, which hindered their preparation. Despite pleading to the court for more time, their requests were denied, with the court noting previous continuances granted before they joined the case. The court expressed concern about the three-year delay affecting all parties involved, including victims and witnesses, but acknowledged that denying the continuance severely prejudiced Stack’s defense. Evidence suggested that the attorneys could not adequately prepare, as they had not even reviewed Stack's file. The court found Stack to be "lucid" and asserted that he could have gathered necessary medical records for a psychological evaluation if he had intended to use it in his defense. However, Dawson and Smith were diligent in their efforts to secure these records. The denial of the continuance effectively deprived Stack of a comprehensive defense, particularly regarding the critical mental evaluation. The majority opinion argued that the defense's inability to prove that the trial outcome would differ if granted more time indicated a lack of merit in their claims. However, it was noted that the denial of the continuance caused actual prejudice to the defense, preventing them from presenting a full case. The dissenting opinion contended that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the continuance, advocating for the reversal of Stack's convictions and remanding the case with instructions to conduct the mental evaluation before a new trial. Notably, a rule (URCCC 9.07) requires defendants to timely notify the prosecution of intentions to assert an insanity defense.