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Oregon v. Mathiason

Citations: 50 L. Ed. 2d 714; 97 S. Ct. 711; 429 U.S. 492; 1977 U.S. LEXIS 38Docket: 76-201

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; January 25, 1977; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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Respondent Carl Mathiason was convicted of first-degree burglary, with his confession being pivotal to the State’s case. He sought to suppress the confession, arguing it was obtained without the Miranda warnings, but the trial court denied this motion, determining he was not in custody at the time. The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, but the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed it by a divided vote, asserting that the interrogation occurred in a "coercive environment" despite Mathiason not being formally detained. This ruling conflicted with decisions from other jurisdictions, notably referencing People v. Yukl. The State of Oregon has since petitioned for certiorari to challenge the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment.

The Supreme Court of Oregon detailed the circumstances leading to the confession: a police officer investigating a burglary reached out to Mathiason, who was a parolee and a suspect identified by the victim. After several unsuccessful attempts to contact him, the officer arranged a meeting at the state patrol office, assuring Mathiason he was not under arrest. During the interrogation, which took place in a closed office, Mathiason was informed of the police’s belief in his involvement and falsely told that his fingerprints were found at the crime scene. Within five minutes, he confessed, after which he was advised of his Miranda rights and recorded the confession. The officer reiterated that Mathiason was not being arrested and was free to leave. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the interrogation’s setting and circumstances constituted a coercive environment, which the Supreme Court now believes was an overextension of the Miranda ruling, leading to a reversal of the Oregon Supreme Court's decision.

The decision in Miranda established rules for police procedures during 'custodial interrogation,' defined as questioning by law enforcement after a person is taken into custody or significantly deprived of freedom. The Miranda principle has been applied in settings such as prisons and suspects' homes post-arrest. However, in this case, the respondent voluntarily went to the police station, was informed he was not under arrest, and left freely after an hour-long interview. Therefore, he was not in custody or deprived of freedom in a significant way. The court emphasized that a noncustodial situation does not become custodial merely due to perceived coercion; police are not required to provide Miranda warnings unless there is a substantial restriction on freedom. The Supreme Court of Oregon's finding regarding a police officer's false statement contributing to a coercive environment is irrelevant to determining custody under Miranda. The petition for certiorari was granted, the Oregon Supreme Court's judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Justice Brennan dissented, advocating for oral argument instead of summary disposition.