Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; January 12, 1989; Alabama; State Supreme Court
Employers National Insurance Company petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Julius S. Swann, Jr. of the Etowah Circuit Court to vacate his January 28, 1987, order requiring Employers to answer interrogatories from plaintiffs Jessie B. Stephens and Cornelia Stephens. The plaintiffs alleged willful misrepresentations by Employers regarding an automobile insurance policy, claiming these misrepresentations were part of a broader scheme to defraud policyholders.
The plaintiffs filed discovery requests on September 25, 1986, to which Employers objected. Following a motion to compel filed by the Stephenses, the trial court ordered Employers to respond to the interrogatories within 15 days. Employers later sought to set aside this ruling, citing undue hardship, but the trial court granted only a limited protective order regarding the time frame for discovery without vacating its previous order.
The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the discovery sought by the Stephenses, emphasizing that the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure support broad discovery to expedite trials and achieve justice. The court noted the trial judge's discretion in these matters and that challenges in producing discoverable information do not justify denying the discovery itself. The writ was ultimately denied.
In Ex parte Dorsey Trailers, Inc., the standard of review for a writ of mandamus is established, emphasizing that mandamus is appropriate to assess whether a trial judge has abused discretion in restricting discovery rights. The use of mandamus for discovery issues is limited due to the discretionary nature of discovery orders; a clear and certain right must be shown, with no reasonable basis for dispute, for the writ to issue. Rule 26(c), A.R.Civ.P. allows a party to seek relief from discovery for good cause, permitting the court to issue protective orders against undue burden or expense. If a protective order is denied, the court may require compliance under just terms. The burden of seeking protection falls on the party requesting it, who must file a motion in the appropriate court. The law regarding discovery reviews, summarized in Ex parte McTier, states that appellate courts will not overturn trial court decisions unless there is clear evidence of an abuse of discretion. While discovery rules are intended to be broadly construed, they are not limitless, and trial courts have significant authority to prevent abuse. The appellate review focuses on whether the trial court abused its discretion. Employers national insurance company objected to interrogatories but failed to provide sufficient evidence that a motion objecting to them was filed before the trial court's January 28, 1987 order compelling responses. The only motion available was an objection to a subpoena related to documents that an employee of the insurance company did not possess personally, raising further questions about the appropriateness of the discovery request.
Records in question are deemed to belong to the Defendant, and the method of their production was not compliant with procedural rules. An oral objection to the Subpoena Duces Tecum was raised by the Defendant's attorney, even though the response time had not yet expired under Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. The Plaintiffs' Motion to Produce is improper under these rules; it does not align with a Request for Production of Documents as defined in Rule 34. The Defendant objects to the document request on several grounds: it is vague, overly broad, burdensome, irrelevant to the litigation, and seeks documents prepared in anticipation of litigation, which are privileged and not discoverable without a showing of good cause, which the Plaintiffs have failed to provide.
The Defendant has not objected to the interrogatories themselves and has not demonstrated any prior motion for a protective order before the trial court's ruling on January 28, 1987. The trial court’s review was limited to what was presented at the time of its decision, and while a protective order could have been granted, the court was not obligated to assess the relevancy of interrogatories in the absence of such a motion. Consequently, the trial court's actions are not seen as abusive discretion. The legal standard requires clear evidence of error for any claim of abuse of discretion, which is not found here. Additionally, the trial court's decision to grant the Stephenses' request for document production is scrutinized, with specific documents requested that relate to policyholder rights regarding uninsured motorist coverage from January 1972 to the present.
All correspondence, memorandums, and written documents related to the Plaintiffs' claim, including the Employer's first notice of claim and loss reports from the claims department, are outlined in the request for production. Additionally, the claims manual pertaining to the Uninsured Motorist Section and related procedures for handling such claims are specified. Employers contends that the second and third requests are moot—the second having been provided and the third not existing. The focus is on the first request, which Employers argues is vague and overly broad, violating Rule 34, A.R.Civ. P. The court disagrees, asserting that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a response, especially as the time frame was limited to two years instead of starting from 1972. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied. The original complaint included a bad faith claim against Employers, which was dismissed after summary judgment was granted in favor of Employers. Furthermore, Employers' motion to set aside the ruling and request for a protective order was filed over a year after the initial order, with an explanation that the delay was due to the trial judge's previous indication of reconsideration.
