Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama; March 11, 1985; Alabama; State Appellate Court
Judith Ann Neelley was indicted for the capital murder of thirteen-year-old Lisa Ann Millican, following her abduction, brutalization, and eventual killing on September 28, 1982. After a jury found her guilty and recommended life imprisonment without parole, the trial judge sentenced her to death by electrocution, overriding the jury's recommendation. A key issue on appeal was whether Neelley's statements to law enforcement were inadmissible due to a violation of her right to counsel. Neelley had been arrested in Tennessee on unrelated charges prior to being interviewed by FBI Agent Bill Burns, during which she indicated a desire to consult her attorney, Bill Burton. Although she initially refused to talk without her lawyer present, she later consented to answer questions after being told they were routine. However, she did not sign a waiver of rights form. The court heard evidence regarding the voluntariness of her statements during the trial and a subsequent new trial motion. The appeal examined whether Neelley's lack of proper legal counsel during interrogation impacted the admissibility of her statements.
Mrs. Neelley voluntarily engaged in an interview where she discussed various topics, including money orders. During the interview on October 14th, Agent Burns informed her five times that she could terminate the discussion and return to her jail cell if she wished. Despite these offers at 6:25, 6:49, 7:32, 8:10, and 11:05, Mrs. Neelley opted to continue, expressing a desire to understand the agents' intentions. She requested that Agent Burns refrain from repeatedly asking if she wanted to stop the interview.
At some point, after her Miranda rights were waived, Agent Burns was notified that Attorney Burton was present and wanted to speak with Mrs. Neelley. However, she was not informed of Burton's presence and was not permitted to see him. Attorney Burton had been called by Alvin Neelley to assist them during the investigation. Upon arriving at the jail, he discovered that both Mr. and Mrs. Neelley were being interviewed by law enforcement. While Alvin was allowed to meet with Burton, Mrs. Neelley was not, as the FBI agents stated they were investigating a homicide, not the forgeries Burton was representing her for.
Investigator Danny Smith denied Burton access to Mrs. Neelley, clarifying that they were not discussing forgeries but rather a homicide investigation. Burton, unaware of the murder inquiry, came to advise Mrs. Neelley against speaking with detectives. He expressed concerns to the officers about potentially compromising their case by denying him access. During the hearing for a new trial, Mrs. Neelley's uncle testified that tensions escalated when Burton insisted on being present during her questioning, but access was refused.
Mrs. Neelley waived extradition from Tennessee and was transferred to Fort Payne, Alabama, where she was charged with murder on October 15, 1982, and arrested at 2:18 AM. She provided a second statement to Investigator Danny Smith later that day, after being informed of the charges and having counsel appointed. The trial judge confirmed that Mrs. Neelley was properly advised of her Miranda rights and made voluntary waivers of those rights, including the right to counsel. The judge ruled that the refusal to allow Attorney Bill Burton to attend the interview did not interfere with the attorney-client relationship regarding the murder charge, as Mrs. Neelley did not request his presence during the interview. However, any portions of her statement related to charges from Murfreesboro, Tennessee, were deemed inadmissible because Mr. Burton represented her in those matters.
The admissibility of Mrs. Neelley's confessions hinged on two issues: whether the denial of Attorney Burton's access violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel and whether she was adequately informed of his presence, affecting her Fifth Amendment waiver of rights. Case law, including *Escobedo v. Illinois* and *Miranda v. Arizona*, suggests that preventing an attorney from seeing a client can violate the Sixth Amendment, potentially excluding any statements made thereafter.
Confusion surrounds the interpretation of a footnote's dicta regarding the rights of suspects in police custody. Some argue it grants an automatic right for an attorney retained by third parties to see the suspect, while others, like Professor Kamisar, assert that such a reading undermines the suspect's ability to waive their rights. Courts have generally ruled that failing to inform a suspect about an attorney seeking access negates a valid waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, as established in Burbine v. Moran.
In the case at hand, the court does not need to determine if Mrs. Neelley's rights were violated, as any potential error is deemed harmless. Even if her confessions were inadmissible, they were overshadowed by her own trial testimony. The court acknowledges the reluctance to apply harmless error in capital cases but finds the unique circumstances warrant it. For a constitutional error to be considered harmless, it must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict. The distinction is made between coerced confessions, which do not fall under harmless error principles, and voluntary statements obtained through inadequate Miranda warnings.
The court employs two tests to assess harmless error: the ‘overwhelming evidence’ test and the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ test. In this case, both tests indicate harmless error due to substantial circumstantial evidence linking Mrs. Neelley to the crime, including her presence at the Riverbend Mall around the time of the victim's last sighting.
On Tuesday, Mrs. Neelley contacted the Rome, Georgia police, indicating that Lisa's body could be found 'where she left it.' The following day, she repeated this information to the DeKalb County Sheriff's Office. On October 3, 1982, she unsuccessfully attempted to pick up Diane Bobo, but later that day, she successfully enticed John Hancock and Janice Morrow Chapman to accompany her and Alvin. Hancock testified that Mrs. Neelley threatened him with a pistol, stating she would take care of his girlfriend too before shooting him in the back. Chapman subsequently disappeared. On October 4, Mrs. Neelley approached Deborah Smith using similar tactics. Evidence linked Mrs. Neelley to the murder of Lisa Millican, including hair samples matching hers found on the victim's shirt and a towel at the scene, as well as human seminal fluid consistent with Alvin's blood type found in Millican's body. Despite the circumstantial evidence being deemed overwhelming, the court determined that Mrs. Neelley's confessions did not significantly impact the verdict and were therefore harmless. The defense strategy admitted Mrs. Neelley's involvement in the kidnapping and murder but contested her mental responsibility due to past abuse from her husband. This approach paralleled the Hall v. United States case, where the defendant also did not deny the crime but claimed insanity. The court noted that Mrs. Neelley's strategy to exonerate her husband indicated she had been manipulated by him, and thus, any introduction of her confession to the jury did not unfairly prejudice her case.
In State v. Gatcomb, the defense strategy focused on establishing a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, rather than contesting the act of violence itself. The court found any error related to the admission of Dr. Cloutier's testimony to be harmless, as the defendant did not dispute the acts committed but rather his mental state at the time, indicating that the error did not impact the conviction. In a separate case involving Judith Ann Neelley, the defense portrayed her actions as being under the coercive control of her husband, Alvin Neelley, asserting that she lacked the intent to kill. Defense counsel detailed her troubled background and abusive relationship, emphasizing that she was manipulated and forced into committing the crimes. Despite acknowledging her involvement in the murder, the defense aimed to demonstrate her lack of intent through arguments involving duress, the battered woman syndrome, and coercive persuasion, suggesting she was not fully culpable for her actions.
Alvin Neelley's defense strategy during the trial involved portraying his wife, Mrs. Neelley, as a victim of severe mental, emotional, and physical abuse, likening her to "The Bride of Frankenstein" under his control. The defense argued that this conditioning rendered her incapable of independent thought or intent, framing her actions as those of an animal or puppet. Testimony included explicit descriptions of degrading sexual acts, with Mrs. Neelley claiming she felt dehumanized and acted solely under her husband's direction. The trial judge allowed extensive evidence from the defense, leading to objections from the prosecution regarding leniency. Although Alvin did not testify, the defense effectively used statements he had made to support their claims, including details about Mrs. Neelley's actions that were previously ruled inadmissible. Throughout the trial, Mrs. Neelley asserted her culpability for the murders while attempting to exonerate Alvin, stating that her confessions were made to protect him. She admitted to killing two individuals and attempting to kill another, but maintained that her actions were dictated by Alvin, emphasizing that her cooperation with authorities was intended to prevent him from facing charges.
Mrs. Neelley testified at trial that she acted under coercion from Alvin, who compelled her to commit the crimes. As part of her defense, she submitted a letter, dated October 15, 1982, to Alvin, claiming sole responsibility for the murder of Lisa Millican while attempting to exonerate him. Although the letter was initially ruled inadmissible, it was presented to the jury, revealing her intent to mislead law enforcement and her own attorneys regarding Alvin's involvement. Throughout her testimony, she admitted to various crimes, including murder, and acknowledged that she deliberately misled authorities about Alvin's participation. Her extensive admissions during the four days of direct examination overshadowed any potential prejudicial impact from the earlier confession. The court concluded that even if admitting her confessions was erroneous, it was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence against her, including her own corroborating testimony, affirming that the jury would have reached the same verdict without the confessions. The document references a precedent highlighting the caution required in applying the harmless error rule, yet maintains that the overall evidence left no reasonable doubt regarding her conviction.
The court revisited its harmless error analysis, recognizing that the defendant in Smith v. Estelle may have felt compelled to testify to counter the impact of his earlier unlawful confession, similar to the precedent set in Harrison v. United States. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that if a defendant's testimony is influenced by illegally obtained confessions, it cannot be deemed independent evidence of guilt. However, it concluded that the rationale for not finding harmless error in Smith and Harrison does not apply here, as the record indicates Mrs. Neelley's decision to testify was a strategic defense choice, unrelated to her confession's admission. The trial judge found no significant prejudice from juror misconduct claims, noting that juror responses during voir dire did not warrant a new trial. Furthermore, the trial court correctly admitted evidence of the defendant's subsequent violent acts, which were relevant to establishing intent, motive, and identity related to the murder charge.
In Garner v. State, the jury sentenced the defendant to life without parole. The precedent set in Witherspoon v. Illinois does not apply when the jury recommends a sentence less than death. The offense occurred after Alabama's 1981 capital punishment statute took effect and is governed by Alabama Code 1975. 13A-5-40 et seq. The court reviewed the entire record for errors affecting the defendant's rights and found none. The trial court identified two aggravating circumstances: the crime was committed during kidnapping and was deemed "especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel." The trial judge's findings were supported by evidence, and the only statutory mitigating circumstance recognized was the defendant's age at the time of the crime. Two nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were found: influence from her husband and her voluntary actions leading to her and her husband's arrest. The judge's assessment of mitigating circumstances was also backed by evidence. The court noted that despite the nature of the crimes, the death sentence was not influenced by passion or prejudice, and the trial was conducted fairly without sensationalism. The defense provided effective representation, exceeding constitutional standards. Ultimately, the court concluded that when weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the death sentence was appropriate. Testimony from a clinical psychologist indicated that the defendant exhibited severe battered women's syndrome, suggesting a diminished capacity for independent intent.
The Court acknowledges Mrs. Neelley's defense but emphasizes the trial psychiatrist's opinion that her actions were those of a "demented person" rather than someone classified as "crazy." It asserts that if Mrs. Neelley had suffered the extensive abuse she claimed, she would likely be incapacitated or deceased. Four legal issues related to her alleged abuse were considered: duress, insanity, diminished capacity, and mitigation of punishment.
Duress is not a viable defense under Alabama law for murder, as stated in Code 13A-3-30. Insanity has been used as a defense in similar cases, but there was no evidence to support Mrs. Neelley’s assertion of legal insanity per Code 13A-3-1. For a successful insanity defense, a mental disease or defect must be proven, which was not established in this case. Diminished capacity is also not recognized as a defense under Alabama law.
Some scholars have proposed a "brainwashing" defense for victims of severe abuse, equating the psychological effects of Battered Spouse Syndrome to brainwashing; however, this defense has not gained legal acceptance. Ultimately, the only relevant legal theory considered by the jury was mitigation of punishment, where the evidence of Mrs. Neelley's abuse was evaluated as a possible mitigating factor under Code 13A-5-51, particularly regarding her mental or emotional state during the crime.
The defendant's ability to understand the criminality of her actions was significantly diminished. The case involves the brutal murder of thirteen-year-old Lisa Ann Millican, contrasting sharply with the defendant Mrs. Neelley's claims of her own abuse and mental health issues. The trial court acknowledged mitigating factors, including the jury's recommendation for life without parole, but concluded that they were outweighed by the severity of the crime. The court found the death sentence appropriate and consistent with similar cases, despite the absence of prosecution against Alvin Neelley for his role in the murder. Mrs. Neelley's actions were described as grotesque and horrifying, earning her the label of "Bride of Frankenstein" from her defense counsel. After thorough review, the court affirmed that Mrs. Neelley received a fair trial and that the death penalty was justified under Alabama and U.S. law. Additionally, the court addressed a motion to suppress statements made by Mrs. Neelley, finding that she had been properly informed of her rights, voluntarily waived her right to counsel, and that her statements were made with rational intellect and free will, although parts of her statement related to other charges were deemed inadmissible. The circuit court's judgment was affirmed unanimously.
The Court found that the defendant's statement to Investigator Danny Smith on October 15, 1981, was admissible based on several key findings:
1. The defendant was properly advised of her Miranda rights before making the statement.
2. She voluntarily and knowingly waived those rights.
3. A remark by Investigator Smith regarding the information being shared with the Judge for bail consideration did not serve as a promise or inducement for her statement.
4. Another remark from Investigator Smith about potentially facilitating a meeting with her husband was vague and did not constitute a promise or inducement.
5. The defendant's statement resulted from rational thought and free will, with the Court finding sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of involuntariness typically associated with confessions.
Consequently, the motion to suppress the statement was denied, allowing the State to present the statements as evidence, except for aspects related to the offense charged in Murfreesboro, Tennessee.
Additionally, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, with hearings conducted on June 21 and July 1, 1983. The primary issue was whether the Court erred in admitting two out-of-court confessions made by the defendant while in custody, particularly the first confession made on October 14, 1982, in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The defendant argued that her waiver of counsel was involuntary because she was not informed of her attorney’s presence and was denied his entry into the interview room. The Court's findings specifically affirmed that the defendant was properly advised of her rights prior to the confession.
The defendant voluntarily waived her constitutional rights, including the right to counsel, during the interview, which she chose to continue after being informed multiple times that she could terminate it. Her statements were deemed to stem from a rational intellect and free will. Attorney Bill Burton did not represent her in the murder case, and his exclusion from the interview did not affect her attorney-client rights. The defendant did not request his presence, and there were no threats or coercion from law enforcement during the interview. The confession was determined to be voluntary based on the totality of circumstances.
An additional statement made by the defendant on October 15, 1982, after being charged, reiterated much from the earlier interview but included new details. This second statement was also given after proper advisement of her rights, and no coercion was present. The defendant later admitted to killing Lisa Millican during her trial, with her testimony aligning with her confessions, except for differing motivations. The court ruled that if a defendant admits to facts similar to those in a confession on the stand, they cannot contest the legality of that confession. Therefore, even if the confessions were involuntary, their admission was deemed harmless due to her trial testimony. Additionally, the court found that juror Eileen Hargis was not biased and did not engage in misconduct against the defendant.
The court determined that a juror did not inappropriately signal "object, object" during a cross-examination, but was instead attempting to gain the bailiff's attention. The defense raised the misconduct allegation at the end of the testimony on the day of the incident, requesting the juror's replacement with an alternate. The court allowed the defense an opportunity to present supporting evidence, which was declined. Observations during the trial indicated no misconduct by the juror, prompting the court to deny the replacement request before submitting the case to the jury. The court noted the juror's attentiveness and detected no inappropriate communication with the prosecution or spectators. Claims regarding the juror usurping the foreman's role were found to be baseless and insufficient to suggest bias or influence on the verdict. Furthermore, the court reiterated that juror conduct during deliberations cannot be used to challenge a verdict. The defense also alleged that the juror improperly responded to voir dire questions, specifically noting that juror Hargis did not respond to a question regarding personal or familial involvement in criminal acts.
At the motion for a new trial hearing, it was revealed that Mrs. Hargis faced five pending charges for worthless checks in the District Court of DeKalb County. She testified that she believed her actions were not criminal due to her attorney's advice regarding the absence of criminal intent. Her attorney confirmed that he had negotiated a potential dismissal of these charges, contingent on Mrs. Hargis paying restitution and court costs, which were still pending at the time of the Neelley trial.
The court determined that Mrs. Hargis was not required to disclose her pending charges during voir dire, as the context of the question implied it was directed at victims of unprosecuted crimes. This was supported by the exclusion of a venire member who had been a victim of a crime. Even if the question were interpreted differently, it only pertained to unprosecuted offenses, thus excluding Mrs. Hargis' situation.
Additionally, regarding a question about her knowledge of the prosecutors, Mrs. Hargis did not respond. The defendant argued that she should have known them due to the pending charges; however, her attorney testified that negotiations were conducted without her presence, and she had no prior acquaintance with the prosecutors. The court concluded that her lack of response was appropriate and that she was not acquainted with the prosecutors before the trial.
The court determined that juror Hargis's responses during voir dire did not likely prejudice the defendant's case. The defendant claimed that prosecutors improperly withheld information regarding Mrs. Hargis' pending cases; however, the court found no breach of duty since the information was not known to the prosecutors until after the jury had been selected. This conclusion was supported by Deputy District Attorney Michael O'Dell’s testimony.
The defendant challenged the admission of evidence concerning events after the murder of Lisa Ann Millican, specifically: the shooting of John Hancock, the murder of Janice Chapman, and attempts to lure other potential victims. The court noted that the evidence demonstrated a pattern of behavior linked to the abduction of Millican, as the defendant had been actively searching for girls to attract for her husband’s sexual gratification. Following Millican's death, the defendant shot Hancock and later killed Chapman. The court concluded that evidence of prior crimes is admissible if it shows a common plan or scheme related to the charged crime, affirming the relevance of the evidence presented.
Additionally, the defendant argued that emotional outbursts and spectator comments during the trial biased the jurors. Although there was an instance of applause from spectators during a suppression hearing, it occurred when jurors were not present, and the court found no prejudice resulted from this incident. Witnesses at a hearing for a new trial reported overhearing prejudicial remarks from spectators, but the court maintained that these did not impact the jurors’ impartiality.
The court determined that any remarks made by spectators during the trial were not heard by the jury, supported by juror testimony and the courtroom's physical layout, which favored media representatives over spectators. To maintain order and prevent interference from spectators, the court implemented specific procedures, including limited seating, security regulation at the entrance, prohibitions against talking during jury presence, and the removal of non-compliant spectators. The court monitored spectator behavior closely and reprimanded a spectator for inappropriate facial expressions, noting that this incident occurred outside the jury's view. The spectator section remained orderly, and the court concluded that the defendant was not prejudiced by spectator conduct.
In the context of the defendant's motion for a new trial, Dr. Margaret Nichols, a psychologist, testified that the defendant exhibited behavior consistent with battered woman syndrome and was under her husband’s control at the time of the incident. However, for the court to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant must meet five criteria. The court found that Dr. Nichols' testimony did not meet these criteria as it was unlikely to alter the trial's outcome, could have been discovered with due diligence prior to the trial, and did not present new, material evidence.
Dr. Nichols' testimony is deemed insufficient to warrant a new trial for the defendant, Judith Ann Neelley. The court reviewed all grounds for the motion and determined that none justified a new trial, concluding that the defendant had a fair trial without prejudicial error. Consequently, the court denied the amended motion for a new trial. The defendant had been convicted of the capital offense of murder during a kidnapping, with a jury verdict rendered on March 22, 1983. Following the verdict, a sentencing hearing recommended life without parole, despite the prosecution advocating for the death penalty.
The crime involved the abduction and murder of 13-year-old Lisa Ann Millican, who was taken by Neelley while on an outing with other girls. After separating from her group at a mall, Lisa was lured by Neelley under the pretense of going for a ride. Neelley shot Lisa on September 28, 1982, after attempting to force her into sexual submission to her husband. The abduction was part of a broader scheme to entice young women for sexual exploitation, which Neelley and her husband had been pursuing for days prior to the incident. Following the murder, Lisa's body was disposed of in a canyon.
The court order is dated September 6, 1983, and was signed by Circuit Judge Randall L. Cole, with copies sent to other honorable judges involved in the case.
On the day following a trip to Cleveland, Tennessee, where the defendant and Alvin picked up their twins from Alvin's mother, they traveled to Scottsboro, Alabama, and rented a motel room. There, the defendant attacked Lisa with a slapjack in an attempt to knock her unconscious but failed. Subsequently, Alvin sexually assaulted Lisa, who was left overnight handcuffed to the bed. The next day, Alvin assaulted her again despite her protests, while the defendant handcuffed Lisa to a bathroom fixture and interrogated her about a man she knew.
Later, the defendant took Lisa to Little River Canyon, handcuffed her to a tree, and injected her neck multiple times with liquid drain cleaner, waiting for her to die after each injection. Lisa was allowed bathroom breaks but was forced to return to her position each time. When the poison did not kill Lisa, the defendant attempted to shoot her at the canyon’s edge. After Lisa begged to be taken back, the defendant shot her in the back but the body fell toward her instead of into the canyon. The defendant then forcibly pushed Lisa's body into the canyon.
During her trial, the defendant claimed Alvin directed her actions at the canyon, contradicting her earlier out-of-court statement that Alvin was not present. Five days later, the defendant picked up Janice Chapman and her common-law husband, John Hancock. She shot Hancock but he survived and testified at trial. The defendant and Alvin then took Janice to a motel, where Alvin sexually assaulted her as well. The next day, the defendant killed Janice by shooting her multiple times. In trial testimony, the defendant maintained that Alvin was present for both shootings, though she had previously stated he was only there for Hancock’s shooting but not for Janice's murder.
On October 9, 1982, the defendant picked up a young woman in Nashville, who was later present with the defendant and Alvin in a Murfreesboro motel when the defendant was arrested for a bad check charge on October 10, 1982. This woman was released unharmed by Alvin, who himself was arrested on October 13, 1982, for a similar charge. While in custody, both the defendant and Alvin faced additional charges related to the murders of Lisa Ann Millican and Janice Chapman, as well as the shooting of John Hancock.
The court made specific findings regarding aggravating circumstances as required by law. It found that two aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the capital offense occurred during the commission of a kidnapping, as established by the jury's verdict; (2) the offense was deemed especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, supported by evidence including the victim's age (13), instances of sexual abuse, physical abuse inflicted by the defendant, and the method of the child's murder, which included being shot after being restrained and tortured. The court determined that the crime's severity exceeded that typical of capital offenses.
Regarding mitigating circumstances, the court found none existed, specifically noting the defendant's significant prior criminal history, including a gunpoint robbery at age 16.
The defendant was committed to the Georgia Youth Development Center for her involvement in a robbery, while her husband, Alvin, received a prison sentence. After their releases, Alvin became fixated on the belief that the defendant was sexually abused in the Youth Development Center, prompting them to plan violent retaliatory actions against its employees, including shooting at one and attempting to firebomb another's car. The defendant also attempted to lure YDC employees to a motel for potential harm, but was unsuccessful in any attacks.
The defendant's criminal activity extended to writing bad checks, altering money orders, stealing checks, and theft from convenience stores. During her arraignment, her counsel sought psychiatric evaluation due to claims of extreme emotional disturbance, but a psychiatrist concluded that the defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect and acted with deliberation.
The court evaluated several mitigating circumstances. It found no evidence supporting the claim that the victim, Lisa Ann Millican, consented to her abduction and abuse, as she was under 16 and legally in the custody of Harpst Home. The court also determined that the defendant's role in the crime was not minor, as she was directly responsible for Lisa's abduction and murder. Lastly, the defendant's argument of acting under extreme duress due to Alvin's influence was considered unconvincing.
Key evidence in support of the defendant's influence by her husband includes: testimony from Alvin's former wife indicating his domineering behavior, photographic evidence of the defendant's bruising from frequent beatings, letters revealing Alvin's abusive nature, and the absence of any prior criminal record for the defendant before her relationship with Alvin Neelley. The court concluded that while the defendant was significantly influenced by her husband, this did not equate to extreme duress or substantial domination, as she was deemed capable of independent decision-making. She had multiple opportunities to separate from Alvin but chose instead to commit the murder of Lisa Ann Millican. The court found no evidence of her being brainwashed and confirmed her retained capacity for independent choices.
Regarding her plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, the jury concluded that the evidence did not support this defense, indicating the defendant possessed substantial capacity to understand the criminality of her conduct. While acknowledging mitigating circumstances, such as the defendant's age of 18 at the time of the crime, the court noted that her lifestyle choices since age 15 indicated more maturity than typical for her age. The court did recognize her husband's influence as a mitigating circumstance, despite earlier conclusions regarding its extent.
The defendant initiated her own arrest and that of her husband, thereby ceasing a multi-state crime spree. While at her mother's home in Murfreesboro, she directed her mother to inform the police of her whereabouts due to outstanding bad check charges, although she could not explain her motivations for this action, suggesting a possible moral impetus. The court evaluated both aggravating and mitigating factors in the case, ultimately determining that the severity of the crime overshadowed the jury's recommendation for a life sentence without parole. Consequently, the court sentenced the defendant to death, with a formal order to follow.
In a related matter, Mrs. Neelley challenged the legality of a warrantless search of her mother’s home by Tennessee authorities on October 14, 1982, arguing that her mother did not consent to the search. However, the court questioned Mrs. Neelley's standing to contest the search and noted that the evidence suggested it was consensual. Mrs. Adams (the defendant’s mother) testified that several police officers requested to search her home, and despite feeling scared, she allowed them entry. She clarified that the officers were polite, did not threaten her, and returned items to their original places after searching. The testimony also indicated that one of the officers, David Grissom, was known to her, and she did not fear him.
Evidence supports the conclusion that Mrs. Adams's consent to search her home was given freely and voluntarily. The court referenced a precedent in Phillips v. State, where consent from an owner was deemed valid. Mrs. Neelley claims juror Eileen Hargis's alleged misconduct warrants a new trial, citing Hargis's inattentiveness, inappropriate behavior towards defense counsel, and usurpation of the jury foreperson role. After a thorough hearing, the trial court found no evidence of misconduct or bias from Hargis that would justify her replacement. Additionally, Neelley argues that Hargis failed to disclose pending criminal charges related to issuing worthless checks during voir dire. Testimony revealed that Hargis had five such charges and was in negotiations for their dismissal based on restitution. Hargis did not acknowledge her charges during voir dire, believing she lacked criminal intent due to her attorney's advice and the circumstances surrounding the checks.
Mrs. Hargis had no prior acquaintance with Deputy District Attorney Michael O'Dell, who stated he was unaware of her connection to ongoing cases during the voir dire examination for the Neelley trial. O'Dell testified that he did not remember negotiating an agreement regarding worthless check charges with Mrs. Hargis's attorney at that time but later recognized her charges were pending and were dismissed shortly after the Neelley trial concluded. He believed the cases were effectively resolved before the Neelley trial, with the cases remaining open for 90 days solely for payment purposes. Mrs. Neelley argued that the State's failure to disclose Mrs. Hargis's pending charges constituted suppression of information that could prejudice her defense. However, it was noted that even if O'Dell had recalled the charges, he had no legal obligation to disclose them without evidence of prejudice to the defense. O'Dell expressed concern about Mrs. Hargis serving on the jury and indicated he would have used a peremptory strike had he been aware of her charges. The court concluded that the lack of disclosure did not equate to reversible error, as Mrs. Hargis's situation could potentially benefit either party. The court also deemed it speculative to assume a juror with pending charges would be biased against the prosecution. Ultimately, the trial court found no probable prejudice to Mrs. Neelley from Mrs. Hargis's non-disclosure during voir dire, leading to the rejection of the application for rehearing, with all judges in agreement.
