Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; February 10, 2004; Florida; State Appellate Court
Jeffrey I. Jacobs appeals a court order modifying his child support obligation following his divorce from Jill E. Jacobs. The couple was married in 1989 and divorced in 1998, with a marital settlement agreement stipulating $1,500 monthly child support and the obligation to pay private school tuition if his income exceeded certain thresholds. In 1999, the former wife sought relief from the judgment, claiming she was misled about her ex-husband's financial status, and filed for a modification of child support due to his increased income.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the former wife had access to accurate financial information during the negotiation of the settlement. The court dismissed her fraud claims but allowed for modification of child support based on a perceived error in guideline calculations, referencing the Wilkes v. Wilkes decision, which permits relief from judgment even without fraud. The court ordered that certain child-related expenses be paid proportionately based on their incomes, deviating from the marital settlement agreement that placed these expenses primarily on the former wife.
However, the appellate court determined that the Wilkes precedent was superseded by the Florida Supreme Court's ruling in Macar v. Macar, which asserts that relief from judgment should not be granted if the requesting party had access to relevant financial information. As the former wife was deemed to have such access, the appellate court reversed the trial court's order modifying the 1998 judgment, affirming that the original marital settlement agreement remains in effect for the period before the modification.
Modification of child support was affirmed, effective August 16, 1999, based on Florida Statutes 61.30(1)(b), which allows for modification upon demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances, defined as a difference of at least 15% or $50 in monthly obligations. This statute applies to both agreed and court-ordered child support. The trial court found that the 15% threshold was met, justifying the modification.
The former husband contested the trial court's refusal to allow credits against his child support obligations, particularly arguing that a mandatory $25,000 stock purchase should be treated as a business expense. The court determined that this expense resulted in acquiring an asset and was not deductible under the guidelines.
Additionally, the former husband sought credit for early prepayment of Florida college prepaid tuition contracts. The court ruled that since he was required to pay these expenses regardless, early payment did not warrant a credit against his child support obligations.
The modification order included a provision for the former wife to receive attorney's fees for the modification proceedings, with jurisdiction reserved for setting the amount. The former husband argued against the award of fees, but the court deemed the issue premature until the amount was determined. Subsequently, the trial court set the attorney's fee amount after the appeal briefs were filed, and the ruling on this matter was not addressed in the current appeal. The overall judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
