Cofer v. Ensor

Citations: 473 So. 2d 984; 54 A.L.R. 4th 325Docket: 83-898

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; April 11, 1985; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Alabama addressed whether the minority status of a parent of a deceased minor child tolls the two-year statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim under Code of 1975, § 6-5-391. The court analyzed whether the limitations period in § 6-2-38(a) applies to § 6-5-391, determining it to be a "statute of creation" rather than a statute of limitations, thus not subject to tolling provisions. 

Robin Cofer, who was 16 at the time of her child's birth and subsequent death on February 10, 1980, brought a lawsuit on December 22, 1982, just before turning 19. Her claims included medical malpractice and wrongful death. The Cullman Circuit Court dismissed the wrongful death claim as time-barred since it was filed two years and ten and a half months after the child's death. The dismissal was certified as final, allowing for an appeal. Relevant state laws indicated that a married woman under 19 retains certain legal disabilities, impacting her ability to file claims. Ultimately, the court upheld the dismissal, ruling the wrongful death action was barred by the statute of limitations.

When a minor child's death results from the wrongful act, omission, or negligence of another, the father or mother has the right to initiate legal action for damages, as outlined in section 6-5-391. If both parents are deceased, or if they do not commence an action within six months of the child's death, the personal representative may file the lawsuit. Only one action can be initiated for the wrongful death of the minor, which will bar any subsequent actions under this section or section 6-5-410. 

In cases where the parents are lawfully living together, they have equal rights to sue for injuries to their minor child. If the parents are not living together or if legal custody has been granted to one party or a third party, the party with custody has the exclusive right to file the action, as per section 6-5-390.

Furthermore, actions for wrongful death must be initiated within two years of the death, as specified in section 6-2-38(a) and section 6-5-410(a). The personal representative can seek damages in a competent court in Alabama, provided the deceased could have pursued legal action had they survived.

The document also differentiates between statutes of limitations and statutes of creation, noting that the latter is integrated with the right being established, while the former strictly relates to the enforcement timeframe of a claim and does not extinguish the underlying right. This distinction was clarified in a referenced case, emphasizing that unless stated otherwise, statutes of limitations are generally interpreted as affecting only the remedy.

A prescriptive period included in the statutory grant of a cause of action is characterized as a statute of creation, making it a substantive right that cannot be tolled. Conversely, a prescriptive period derived from sources outside the statute is regarded as a statute of limitations, which may be tolled. The classification of an enactment as either a conditional statute or a statute of limitations is determined by analyzing its terms. If the limitation appears within the same statute as the liability creation, it suggests an intention for it to serve as a condition of the newly established right.

Cofer argues that the two-year prescriptive period in Code of 1975, 6-2-38(a) should be classified as a statute of limitations, making it eligible for tolling due to a parent's minority under 6-2-8(a). Cofer cites the legislative history of 6-5-391 to support this view. The initial act from 1871-72 allowed parents to sue for a minor's wrongful death and imposed a one-year limitations period, which was later deemed unconstitutional. Subsequent legislation in 1885 authorized parents to sue but did not restate the one-year limit; instead, it was later codified in the Codes of 1887 and 1897. The relevant sections of these Codes clarify that a parent or personal representative may seek damages for wrongful acts leading to a minor's death, further establishing the context of the statute's limitations.

The 1887 Code codified provisions from January 23, 1885, regarding limitations on actions for wrongful death and personal injury. Specifically, Section 2800 establishes a two-year limitation for representatives to recover damages from wrongful acts or negligence resulting in death, while Section 2801 sets a one-year limitation for actions involving personal injury or death of a minor. Section 26 outlines that parents or the personal representative of a deceased minor may sue for damages due to wrongful death, with a suit by a parent barring a subsequent suit by a representative. Section 27 permits a personal representative to maintain an action for wrongful death if the deceased could have pursued a claim had they survived, emphasizing that such actions survive the defendant's death and do not affect the decedent's debts. A 1907 amendment confirmed a two-year limitation for wrongful death claims, applicable regardless of who files the suit. Additionally, Section 2485 provides that if both parents are deceased or fail to act within six months, the minor's personal representative may sue, with any suit barring others under the same provision.

A personal representative can initiate a lawsuit and seek damages for wrongful acts, omissions, or negligence that led to the death of a testator or intestate, provided the deceased could have filed a similar action had they survived. This legal action persists even if the defendant dies, allowing it to be revived against their personal representative. The action does not require prior prosecution or conviction of the defendant for the wrongful act, and the damages awarded are not liable for the deceased's debts, instead being distributed according to the statute of distributions. The lawsuit must be filed within two years of the death. Historical context indicates that the statute has undergone several modifications since its inception in 1872, with specific legislative intentions aimed at giving parents the right to sue for the wrongful death of an infant without conflicting with the personal representative's rights. Confusion exists regarding the interplay between different sections of the law concerning damages—whether they are compensatory or punitive—and how damages are treated post-recovery, particularly regarding their distribution among the deceased’s heirs.

The statute creates ambiguity regarding the relationship between actions initiated by parents and personal representatives. While a parent's action is a bar to a suit by the personal representative, the reverse is not specified, leaving uncertainty whether a judgment from a personal representative's action under section 26 would preclude a parent's action under section 27. The amendment aimed to clarify, not change the statute's meaning. Damages under section 27 are deemed punitive, while those under section 26 are compensatory; however, damages should align since their language is consistent. In parental actions, contributory negligence may be a defense. Recoverable damages under section 27 are limited to pecuniary compensation for the parent, benefiting only them. Historical context shows that earlier statutes provided for compensatory damages, later altered to punitive damages, with distribution rules resembling personal property, exempt from the deceased's debts. The Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as punitive, leading to confusion about whether actions under this statute preclude actions under section 26.

The excerpt addresses the legal distinction between compensatory and punitive damages under different statutes regarding wrongful death actions. It notes that damages assessed under one statute (referred to as §26) are compensatory, while those under another (§27) are punitive, creating ambiguity on whether actions under these statutes can bar one another. The case L. N.R.R. Co. v. Robinson illustrates the amendment of a complaint concerning the cause of action for a child's wrongful death. It emphasizes that the limitations period in §6-5-410(d) is a statute of creation, meaning it is a fundamental aspect of the cause of action that does not allow for tolling. The excerpt further explains that the two-year period for bringing a wrongful death action is critical and must be adhered to, distinguishing it from a statute of limitations. This time frame is viewed as a condition precedent for the right to pursue the action, rather than merely a procedural limitation. The excerpt concludes that statutes creating new rights of action must explicitly state the time constraints within which those actions must be initiated, fundamentally linking the time requirement to the existence of the right itself.

The statute establishes a critical condition for liability in wrongful death actions, stipulating that such actions must be initiated within a specified timeframe to be valid. If the action is not commenced within this period, both the action and the right to pursue it are extinguished. The statute governing wrongful death claims of minors, specifically § 6-5-391, does not include its own limitation period but derives it from the original wrongful death statute created in 1852, which applied to all persons, including minors, and set a two-year limitation. The 1876 amendment that vested the right in parents did not create a new cause of action but merely allowed parents to sue for their child's wrongful death. Thus, the limitation period remains rooted in the original statute rather than being a tollable statute of limitations. The inclusion of this limitation period in § 6-2-38(a) does not indicate it as a new source but rather as part of a comprehensive compilation of limitation periods for various actions. Consequently, the two-year limitation established by § 6-5-410 applies universally to wrongful death actions, regardless of the age of the deceased or the status of the plaintiff. The court's reasoning aligns with a precedent, emphasizing that tolling statutes, such as § 6-2-8, do not apply to these actions, as the limitation period is integral to the right created by the statute. Furthermore, arguments suggesting that minors should have an extension of time post-disability are flawed, as they overlook that the statute itself defines the timing for bringing the action without exceptions for disabilities.

In wrongful death claims, the minority status of a plaintiff does not toll the applicable two-year statute of limitations unless a saving clause is explicitly included in the wrongful death act. Courts consistently view the time limits in wrongful death actions as essential to the claim itself, affecting liability rather than just the remedy. Defendants argue for applying the two-year limitation from § 6-5-410 to cases under § 6-5-391, supported by precedent in Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, where the court determined that the minority of a deceased employee's dependent children did not toll the limitation period for wrongful death claims. The court emphasized that wrongful death actions must arise under the wrongful death statute, asserting a singular action for such claims. 

Additionally, § 25-5-11 permits dependents of a deceased employee to sue for wrongful death while also allowing claims against the employer for compensation. This statute was designed to give dependents the right to bring actions under specific circumstances, replacing the previous requirement that only a deceased's estate administrator could file such claims. The interpretation holds that if an employee who is covered by Workmen's Compensation dies due to a third party's negligence, the dependents—not the personal representative—must initiate the wrongful death action. This linkage between the statutes ensures that dependents retain the right to sue while recognizing the employer’s subrogation rights.

The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed that Code 1975, § 25-5-11(a) allows dependents of an employee killed due to a third party's liability to initiate a wrongful death action against that third party. While both § 25-5-11(a) and § 6-5-410 establish separate causes of action, there can only be one wrongful death action in Alabama, governed by § 6-5-410. The court held that the limitations period defined in § 6-5-410 applies to actions under § 6-5-391, despite the distinctions between the two sections regarding who can sue and the distribution of recoveries.

The trial court's judgment, which barred the action, was upheld. A dissenting opinion expressed that the majority misapplied statutory construction principles, arguing that the limitations period in § 6-5-410 should not govern actions under § 6-5-391 since § 391 did not create a wrongful death cause of action but merely allowed parents to sue for a child's wrongful death. The dissent emphasized the importance of legislative intent in interpreting whether a statute is one of creation or limitation.

The majority's conclusion regarding the source of the limitations period for section 391 is flawed. They argue that section 410 is the source because, prior to the enactment of section 391, personal representatives could bring wrongful death actions under section 410. However, this reasoning overlooks significant factors. Notably, the 1876 statute that granted parents the right to sue reduced the limitations period from two years to one year, a change that was later reversed. Importantly, while personal representatives had a cause of action before section 391 was enacted, parents did not.

The majority erroneously substitutes its interpretation of legislative intent for the actual legislative history reflected in the statutes. The original act from 1872 included a one-year limitations period for parents' actions, which was later codified in such a way that separated the limitations period from the cause of action. This separation indicates that the legislature intended for the parents' cause of action to be distinct from that of the personal representative. The codification process, which relocated the limitations period to a different chapter of the Code, further supports this distinction.

Moreover, the legislative history shows that just 19 days before the original act was passed, the legislature enacted a new wrongful death statute for personal representatives, further emphasizing the separation of these causes of action. Overall, the evidence strongly suggests that the legislature intended for the parents' cause of action to have its own separate limitations period, contrary to the majority's assertion that section 410 serves as the source for section 391.

The General Assembly of Alabama enacted a law allowing the personal representative of a deceased individual, whose death was caused by another's wrongful act or omission, to file a lawsuit within two years of the death. This right exists only if the deceased could have pursued a similar claim had they survived. The damages awarded are determined by a jury and distributed as personal property of an intestate, exempt from the deceased's debts. The law specifies that the right of action survives against the personal representative of the party responsible for the death. Additionally, any conflicting laws are repealed.

In 1876, when these death acts were incorporated into the Code, the legislature established different limitation periods for each action. Specifically, the two-year limitation remained for one statute, while another statute omitted its limitation period entirely, instead placing it under a general limitations section. This discrepancy indicates a legislative intent to treat the two statutes differently regarding their limitations. Nine years after an earlier version was deemed unconstitutional, a new statute was enacted in 1885, allowing parents or representatives to sue for wrongful acts causing injury or death to a minor. This new act did not specify a limitation period, which was also not included in the subsequent Code of 1886.

When a minor's death is caused by wrongful acts, omissions, or negligence, the father, mother, or personal representative may file a lawsuit for damages, but if the parents sue, the personal representative cannot. The statute of limitations for these actions has evolved over time. Initially, the Code of 1886 amended the limitations statute to clarify that wrongful death and personal injury claims for minors had different statutes of limitations: one year for personal injury and two years for wrongful death. This distinction was carried into the Code of 1896, where the legislature explicitly established separate limitation periods for these actions. 

In 1907, the legislature harmonized the limitations period for both types of actions to two years but did not alter the fundamental nature of the claims. The current statute, 6-2-38, applies specifically to actions by representatives and suggests that the same two-year period should apply by analogy to actions brought by parents. The majority's failure to justify their conclusions regarding legislative intent despite the historical context and separate limitations periods undermines their position. The lack of legislative amendments indicating a change in the character of the limitations periods for these actions indicates that the original distinctions remain significant.

Section 410 establishes a two-year statute of limitations specifically applicable to wrongful death claims, while Section 391 does not set a fixed time for initiating such actions; instead, it is governed by the limitations period in Section 6-2-38(a), which allows for tolling under Section 6-2-8. There is no legislative or case law indicating that the limitations period from Section 410 applies to the wrongful death claims of parents under Section 391. The distinction between these two causes of action is crucial: wrongful death claims under Section 410 are filed by a personal representative who is not subject to the same disabilities that could toll the statute, while parents may face such disabilities when their claims under Section 391 arise. The majority's assertion that the two-year period in Section 410 applies universally to all wrongful death claims fails to recognize the distinct nature of the causes of action and the different parties authorized to sue, as well as the varying distributions of any recovery. Furthermore, the Court in Nicholson did not consider the applicability of Section 410's limitations to actions under Section 391, focusing instead on the relationship between Section 410 and the provisions of Section 25-5-11(a), which allows employees or their dependents to pursue claims against employers and third parties in cases of employment-related deaths.

The Court determined that the minority status of the dependents did not extend the two-year limitations period for wrongful death claims, which are governed by the wrongful death statute (Section 123, Title 7, Code of Alabama 1940). It is established that only one wrongful death action exists, and claims brought by dependents must arise under section 25-5-11, although this conclusion does not apply to section 391 under the current case facts. Historical precedent, including Benson v. Robinson, clarifies that when a minor child dies and has a living parent, the action for damages is exclusively for the benefit of that parent. If the parent dies afterward, the claim transfers to the parent's estate. The administrator of the minor acts as a quasi-trustee for the parent unless no parent is living at the time of the minor's injury, in which case the administrator’s action is governed by section 5696 for the benefit of the minor’s distributees. The Court noted that different statutes exist for wrongful death claims, and misinterpretation could undermine established legal principles. Furthermore, the purpose of section 25-5-11, as interpreted by the Court, allows dependents of a deceased employee to pursue wrongful death claims only if the death occurred due to an accident while employed, whereas historically, only the estate's administrator could initiate such claims. The statutory framework ensures that wrongful death actions against negligent third parties must be brought by dependents under section 25-5-11 in cases involving employees covered by workmen's compensation.

Section 312, Title 26, Code of Alabama 1940, allows dependents of an employee killed in incidents that create third-party liability to file a lawsuit against that third party. The case Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc. establishes that Alabama recognizes a single cause of action for wrongful death under Code 1975, § 6-5-410. While § 25-5-11(a) grants dependents the right to initiate an action against third parties, such actions are considered to arise under § 6-5-410. This distinction is crucial as § 25-5-11(a) does not create a new cause of action but refers to existing legal liabilities for damages, implying a connection to § 6-5-410, which governs wrongful death claims in Alabama. In contrast, § 391 creates an independent cause of action for parents seeking damages for the wrongful death of a minor child, distinct from the provisions of § 410. Although both statutes share similarities, they confer separate causes of action. Historical context is provided through cases like Smith v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., which originally established a cause of action for parents of minor children due to wrongful death, highlighting the evolution of these legal statutes. The initial statute was later revised to address constitutional issues, reinforcing the separate legal frameworks for wrongful death claims involving adults and minors.

The Court interprets the 1885 Act, later codified in the 1896 Code, emphasizing that the right to recover damages for the wrongful death of a child is statutory, as there was no common law right for such an action. The statute grants the right to sue exclusively to the parents of the deceased child, and while originally the administrator could not sue unless the parents were deceased, amendments now allow the administrator to sue for damages that solely benefit the parents. A suit by either parents or the administrator bars further actions by the other party, indicating that the administrator acts as a quasi-trustee for the parents. Unlike wrongful death cases involving adults, where the personal representative holds the right to sue and damages are distributed according to statutory guidelines, cases involving minor children require the action to be brought under the specific statutory framework of section 391, ensuring that damages remain the property of the parents. The Court reinforces that if a minor child dies leaving a parent, the administrator acts on behalf of the parent, and recovery is not part of the child's estate. The administrator cannot choose between applicable statutes to bring the action; both sections 391 and 410 cannot apply simultaneously in this context.

In cases of wrongful death of a minor, if a qualified parent survives, that parent is the sole beneficiary of damages, able to sue in their own name or as an administrator. Previously, courts applied section 123 when an administrator was present, despite a surviving parent; however, current interpretations exclusively invoke section 119 when a qualified parent survives. The right to sue for wrongful death is statutory, not common law, as established in Adkison v. Adkison, which confirmed that damages belong to the father of the deceased minor. Courts have acknowledged that while there are differences between the death statutes, there are also similarities. Section 2588 confers the right of action to the father even if death occurs, allowing recovery for circumstances where he could have claimed damages if the injury had not resulted in death. The right under section 2589 is for personal representatives when the deceased could have sued before death. It is crucial for an action for wrongful death to be based on conduct that would have supported a claim by the deceased had they survived. If there was no underlying cause of action for the deceased, then none arises under the wrongful death statute.

In Owens v. Auto Mutual Indemnity Co., the Alabama Supreme Court clarified that a parent can sue for the wrongful death of an unborn child based on the rights the child would have had if born and injured. The right to sue for wrongful death is contingent on the child's ability to maintain an action for personal injury had they survived. The court referenced earlier cases to emphasize that the basis of the action lies in the wrong done to the injured party. 

Additionally, it was noted that two statutes, while distinct, are related and share similar language, indicating legislative intent for both to allow punitive damages rather than compensatory damages. Amendments to the original complaint (Counts 5, 7, and 8) were found to not fall under the Employers' Liability Act but under a code section granting a right of action for the unlawful killing of a minor child. The analysis indicated that both statutes confer unique causes of action and that the legislature intended to treat them separately, despite their similarities. The absence of a limitations period in one statute (391) as opposed to another (410) was highlighted as a deliberate legislative choice.

The omission by the legislature has resulted in the right of action under § 391 being subject to a technical statute of limitations (§ 6-2-38(a)), rather than a statute of creation. The court in Nicholson correctly differentiated between these two types of statutes and ruled that the tolling statute (§ 6-2-8) does not apply to actions under § 410, but only to those under § 391. Appellants argue that minors should be allowed additional time to file after reaching adulthood, citing § 36, Title 7, Code of Alabama 1940. However, this argument fails because § 36 pertains to statutes of limitations, not to actions like those under § 6-5-410, where the time limit is essential to the right itself. There is no saving clause in either § 123, Title 7, or § 312, Title 26 that would suspend the two-year limitation for wrongful death claims, even for claimants under a disability at the time the cause of action arises. Courts in other states share the view that minority does not toll the time limit in wrongful death actions, as the deadline is a fundamental aspect of the claim. The Nicholson ruling emphasized the distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of creation regarding tolling, a distinction overlooked by the majority in this case. The court also cited Whitson v. Baker, reaffirming that tolling statutes apply only to statutes of limitations, not to actions where the limitation period is integral to the right. In Mewburn v. Bass, the court similarly ruled that a statutory redemption right was not subject to tolling. Federal courts adhere to state law for limitations and apply tolling statutes relevant to state statutes of limitations. Since the limitation for § 1983 actions is found in Chapter 2, the requirements for tolling in that context appear to be met.

Section 6-2-38 is identified as a general statute of limitations, which can be tolled due to the plaintiff's minority, in line with precedents such as Nicholson. However, because Section 410 contains an explicit two-year limitations period, it is characterized as a statute of creation and not subject to tolling. The legislature has not amended Section 391 since its enactment to include a similar express proviso. The prevailing rule is that the latest expression of legislative intent prevails, indicating that actions under Section 391 should be governed by the general statute of limitations in Section 6-2-38(a), rather than being subject to an untollable statute of creation. This conclusion is supported by the legislature's historical decisions to delete earlier limitations and amend Section 6-2-38(a) to apply it to Section 391. Therefore, the plaintiff's action is deemed timely filed, leading to the determination that the summary judgment was improperly granted, warranting a reversal and remand for further proceedings. Additionally, the legislature's compilation of limitations periods does not imply an intent to establish Section 410 as the source for wrongful death actions, as limitations for Section 391 have consistently been sourced from the "Limitation of Actions" chapter.

The excerpt addresses the legal standing of a personal representative to maintain an action under section 119, Title 7, Code of 1940, particularly concerning wrongful death claims. There is skepticism regarding the applicability of section 119, given that section 123, which predates section 119, explicitly grants personal representatives the right to sue for wrongful deaths of both minors and adults. This skepticism is supported by references to prior case law, including dicta from Justice McClellan in Lovell v. De Bardelaben Coal & Iron Co., which underscores the necessity of recognizing the personal representative's rights to avoid conflicting interpretations that could undermine their ability to sue under section 123. The excerpt also mentions that while the issue of the personal representative's rights under these sections is significant, a definitive ruling on this matter is not required at this juncture. Finally, it notes that the Court in Peoples v. Seamon resolved the previously reserved question from Taylor v. City of Clanton, specifically when a deceased minor child is survived by parents.