Mitchell v. Moore

Citation: 406 So. 2d 347Docket: 79-517

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama; September 18, 1981; Alabama; State Supreme Court

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The case concerns a slip and fall incident involving Mrs. Ethel V. Moore, who sought damages for personal injuries due to alleged negligence and wanton misconduct by Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. and the M. L Realty partners. The incident occurred on March 1, 1978, when Mrs. Moore tripped over a jagged crack between the ramp and sidewalk outside a Winn-Dixie store in Mobile, Alabama. Evidence indicated prior incidents of falls at the same location, and the landlord failed to address the hazardous condition despite having notice.

Mrs. Moore sustained significant injuries, including a fractured left hip requiring surgery, resulting in a permanent impairment. The jury awarded her $75,000 in damages. The appellants, representing M. L Realty, raised several issues on appeal, including:

1. Alleged error in allowing witness Inez Sykes to testify, claiming violation of discovery rules.
2. Denial of a requested continuance due to a missing witness.
3. Admissibility of Medicare payment evidence as not being a collateral source.
4. Claims of misdirection in jury instructions regarding the duty of care owed by landlords to business invitees.
5. Assertion that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.
6. Claims of excessive damages.
7. Improper judgment entry in favor of Winn-Dixie on its cross-claim.

The trial court's decisions regarding these issues will be examined in the appellate review.

A judge may require a party to disclose intended trial witnesses if justified, but a party cannot demand the same from an opposing party. In this case, the trial court determined that the plaintiff did not conceal the identity of Ms. Sykes, and it had discretion regarding her testimony, which was not abused. The appellants claimed reversible error due to the trial court's denial of a continuance for the absent Deputy Sheriff Ronald Emrich, but the court's discretion in granting continuances is limited. Guidelines state that the expected evidence must be material, that there is a likelihood of obtaining it later, and that due diligence must be shown. The court found Emrich's testimony would be cumulative and noted that simply exhausting compulsory process does not equate to due diligence. Additionally, the court ruled that Medicare payments fall under the collateral source rule, meaning they should not reduce recoverable damages, aligning with existing case law. The appellants' challenge regarding the jury instructions on a landowner's duty to a business invitee was also raised, but specifics were not provided.

Appellants argue that the trial court imposed a stricter standard of care on them compared to defendant Winn-Dixie. They claim that their lease agreement with Winn-Dixie granted them control over the parking lot, thereby placing them in the same position as Winn-Dixie regarding their duty to Mrs. Moore, who was a business invitee. Appellants contend that the court improperly distinguished the duties owed by them and Winn-Dixie based on the lease, leading to a higher duty of care than the common law requirement to maintain a safe environment for invitees. However, the lease merely reiterated the common law duty of a landlord to keep premises safe. 

Referencing the case of Mudd v. Gray, the court noted that landlords have a duty to maintain common areas in good condition and can be held liable for injuries to invitees if they fail to do so. The trial judge correctly instructed the jury about the shared duty of care among defendants. Although the lease imposed a duty to repair common areas, it did not exceed the common law duty owed to a business invitee. 

Appellants also questioned the sufficiency of evidence supporting the jury's verdict, which involved negligence and wanton conduct. The lease specified that the landlord (M. L) was responsible for maintaining the common areas, and while appellants claimed they were not liable for repairs due to a lack of written notice from Winn-Dixie, evidence showed that Mitchell, M. L's management company, conducted routine inspections. These inspections could identify disrepair, allowing repairs to be ordered without prior written notice. Thus, the court concluded that the written notice requirement was intended to inform the landlord of existing repair needs rather than absolve them of liability for neglect.

The trial court correctly ruled that written notice was unnecessary for the landlord if they were aware or should have been aware of the hazardous condition through periodic inspections. The jury favored Winn-Dixie on this matter, with sufficient evidence supporting the verdict against the appellants based on negligence. Although the appellants claim a lack of evidence for wanton misconduct by the M. L defendants, the court found evidence of prior incidents at the same location and noted the appellants' failure to investigate or address the issue, qualifying the case for a wanton conduct verdict. The appellants' request for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial due to an unclear basis for the jury's general verdict was rejected, affirming the jury's role in assessing evidence sufficiency. 

Regarding damages, the jury awarded $75,000, which, despite Mrs. Moore's proven special damages of around $5,000, was justified as punitive damages due to wantonness. The appellants' challenge to the excessiveness of the damages was deemed meritless. Lastly, the appellants contested the indemnity judgment in favor of Winn-Dixie, which was based on the lease obligations of M. L to maintain the common areas of the shopping center. M. L argued that their duty to repair was contingent upon receiving written notice from the tenant, but this contention was not upheld in the judgment.

The court affirmed the trial court's ruling on the written notice requirement and addressed M. L's claim regarding the enforceability of the indemnity provision. Citing Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Sumter Plywood Corp., the court recognized an exception to the general rule against contracting against one's own negligence, particularly in cases involving leases or easements. The court referenced Industrial Tile v. Stewart, establishing that indemnity contracts are enforceable if they clearly express an intention to indemnify against the indemnitee's negligence, provided both parties have equal bargaining power and understand the agreement.

In this case, the indemnity provision was in a landlord-drafted lease agreement, clearly indicating the landlord's responsibility for maintaining common areas. Therefore, the court upheld Winn-Dixie's entitlement to judgment on its cross-claim, affirming the trial court's decision.

Chief Justice Torbert dissented, arguing that the evidence presented did not sufficiently allow the jury to determine issues of wanton misconduct and negligence, citing Alabama law that states these cannot coexist in the same act. Wanton conduct is defined as reckless indifference to the consequences of one’s actions, while negligence lacks the mental intent associated with wantonness. The dissent emphasized that punitive damages are not recoverable for simple negligence, only compensatory damages.

In negligence actions, three essential elements must be established for a plaintiff to recover: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) an injury proximately resulting from that breach. The defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, which varied depending on the plaintiff's status as either a licensee or invitee. In this case, the plaintiff was an invitee, requiring the defendant to maintain safe premises and exercise reasonable care, but the defendant is not an insurer of safety. The majority decision affirming a verdict on wantonness relied on prior notice of an earlier fall in the same location, but this incident occurred nearly two years prior and did not indicate a defective condition. Testimony from the store manager acknowledged a dangerous crack but indicated no notification of this condition. This prior notice should suggest negligence rather than wantonness. Comparisons were made with similar cases, such as City of Birmingham v. Wright, which found insufficient evidence for wantonness. The court concluded that evidence of prior incidents and conditions did not support a claim of wanton misconduct. Therefore, the claim based on wanton misconduct should be reversed.