Lantier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.

Citations: 614 So. 2d 1346; 1993 La. App. LEXIS 899; 1993 WL 57763Docket: 92-335

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; March 2, 1993; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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In the case of Edna G. Lantier v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, the Court of Appeal of Louisiana addressed an airboat accident resulting in the drownings of Eddie Cormier and Freddie Lantier. The plaintiffs, Sue and Sarah Cormier, along with Edna Lantier, filed lawsuits against Glenn Webb, the airboat's owner and operator, and his insurer, Aetna, under general maritime law, which were later consolidated for trial. Aetna denied coverage based on a watercraft exclusion in Webb's homeowner's policy. 

During the trial, the jury found that Webb was not negligent and that the airboat was not defective, but it did not address the insurance coverage issue. As a result, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' actions. Upon appeal, the court determined that the jury's conclusion regarding Webb's lack of negligence was manifestly erroneous and reversed the dismissal.

The incident occurred on February 27, 1987, during a frogging expedition. After navigating from Bayou Long to the Gulf Canal, Webb's airboat began taking on water and sank while he attempted to maneuver close to the small flat-bottomed boat. Webb, the only survivor, testified about the construction of the airboat and the conditions of the waterways. He acknowledged the absence of flotation material in the hull and the lack of life jackets worn by the men, despite the airboat being equipped with them.

Webb testified that while maneuvering the airboat to the right in Bayou Long, it began taking on water and sank within seconds, leaving him and one other man, Stutes, to swim to safety. They attempted to locate two others, Cormier and Lantier, but were unsuccessful. Following the incident, Webb contacted the St. Martin Parish Sheriff's Department, which later recovered the bodies of Cormier and Lantier. 

In the procedural history, Aetna filed a motion for summary judgment, citing a watercraft exclusion in the insurance policy that it claimed exempted coverage for the incident. The trial court denied Aetna's motion, and the plaintiffs subsequently sought a declaratory judgment to establish Aetna's liability at $100,000 per deceased individual, which the court granted, determining there were two occurrences under the policy. 

The plaintiffs also filed a motion in limine to prevent Aetna from questioning Webb about his intentions regarding coverage for the airboat and his attempts to secure separate insurance. The court granted this motion but allowed Aetna to present evidence regarding intent. 

During the trial, the Cormiers' attorney sought to exclude evidence about the decedents' life jackets, but the court denied this request. After the jury was sworn and two witnesses testified, Webb filed a motion to strike the jury trial, which the court found meritorious but denied as untimely. 

At trial's end, the plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict was denied, and the jury found Webb not at fault. The plaintiffs appealed, claiming errors related to the denial of the motion to strike the jury trial, the jury's verdict being clearly erroneous, improper jury instructions on comparative fault, and issues regarding insurance coverage and damage awards.

Appellants contend that the trial court improperly denied defendant Webb's motion to strike the jury trial. They argue that since a jury trial was not available in federal court on the trial date, it should also be unavailable in this state court action under the "saving to suitors" clause. The trial court denied Webb's motion due to its untimeliness. The Cormiers filed their suit on November 16, 1987, and Lantier on June 14, 1988, both before the September 9, 1988, effective date of La. C.C.P. art. 1732(6), which restricts jury trials for admiralty claims designated as such in state court. This amendment, mirroring Federal Rule 9(h), was designed to give plaintiffs control over the jury trial decision. It has been determined to be substantive law and not retroactive, thus not affecting suits filed before its enactment. At the time these suits were filed, neither party had the right to a jury trial due to a lack of complete diversity. Since the outcome remains unchanged regardless of the applicability of La. C.C.P. art. 1732(6), the trial court's denial of the motion to strike was justified. Aetna had timely requested a jury trial on July 29, 1988, and no opposition was raised until Webb's late motion to strike, which the court properly denied as it was filed past the allowed period. The precedent set in Callahan v. Town of Bunkie supports the notion that a party can waive statutory protections against jury trials through consent, which was not objected to until the appeal stage.

The plaintiffs waived their right to contest the lack of complete diversity and the application of La. C.C.P. art. 1732(6) by not objecting before trial and not joining in Webb's motion to strike during trial. Thus, they cannot raise objections post-trial regarding issues they acquiesced to during the proceedings. The trial court's decision concerning Webb's motion to strike is upheld. 

The jury found Webb not negligent and determined the airboat was not defective, which the plaintiffs claim is manifestly erroneous. Appellate courts generally defer to jury findings unless there is manifest error. The plaintiffs allege that Webb's negligent operation and supervision of the airboat caused it to sink, leading to the drowning of two passengers. They argue for the application of res ipsa loquitur, which allows for an inference of negligence under specific circumstances where the defendant had exclusive control over the situation and no other probable explanations exist. 

The court agrees with the applicability of res ipsa loquitur and reverses the jury's finding of no negligence. To establish liability for negligence, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that Webb's actions caused the harm, he owed a duty to them, he breached that duty, and the risk of harm was within the scope of that duty. Evidence suggests that Webb's actions—making a turn while the airboat already contained rainwater—led to the sinking. Expert testimony indicates that the accident resulted from a combination of steering issues, pre-existing rainwater, and navigating into deeper water. Webb could not provide an explanation for the water entering the boat or for not allowing the passengers to walk to safety.

Sargent indicated that turning an airboat, regardless of throttle speed, causes an airblast from the propeller to push the boat to the left, with the effect magnified if water is present in the hull. Investigating officer August Dupuis noted that at the time of the accident, the water level in Bayou Long was lower than in the Gulf Canal, creating a dip where they met. When Webb entered this dip and moved into deeper water, the airboat sank. Citing Holman v. Reliance Insurance Companies, the court recognized that the trial court erred by not applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, as the accident was atypical absent negligence. The evidence indicated that Webb's negligence in operating the airboat led to it taking on water and sinking. Consequently, Webb was found liable for the accident due to his breach of duty. Since negligence was established, the court did not need to consider strict liability concerning the airboat's construction and operation.

Regarding comparative fault, the jury did not assess the fault of Cormier and Lantier, despite the trial judge instructing them on this issue. The plaintiffs argued that there was insufficient evidence to assign fault to the decedents. They also contended that their failure to wear life jackets should not be interpreted as comparative fault, similar to provisions in La. R.S. 32:295.1 concerning safety belt use. However, the court upheld the trial court's decision, stating that the failure to wear life jackets provided a factual basis for the jury's consideration of comparative fault.

The jury did not assess whether Cormier and Lantier's failure to wear life jackets contributed to their deaths. An evaluation under the Watson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co. framework requires consideration of several factors: the nature of the conduct (inadvertent or aware of danger), the level of risk created, the significance of the conduct's goals, the capacities of the actors, and any extenuating circumstances. Initially, both Cormier and Lantier wore life jackets but removed them upon entering the shallower Gulf Canal. Louisiana law mandates that at least one life preserver be available per person on vessels and requires children under 12 to wear life jackets; there is no similar requirement for those over 12. Drawing a parallel to seat belt laws, the absence of a legal requirement for life jacket use suggests that their failure to wear them should not imply comparative negligence. Citing previous case law, it was concluded that Cormier and Lantier were not at fault for their deaths regarding life jacket use.

Regarding coverage under the Aetna homeowner's policy issued to Webb, the jury did not determine if the policy covered the incident. Aetna argues that the policy excludes coverage for inboard motor powered watercraft, while plaintiffs and Webb contend that airboats are not included in this exclusion, asserting that the policy language is ambiguous and should favor coverage. Legal principles dictate that insurance contracts are to be enforced as written if clear. Courts must interpret policies as a whole, and any ambiguity should benefit the insured. However, unambiguous provisions limiting liability in insurance contracts must be upheld, allowing insurers to set conditions within legal bounds.

Ambiguity in insurance policy language necessitates the application of interpretations favoring coverage. The case revolves around whether an airboat qualifies as an "inboard motor powered" watercraft, thus potentially excluding it from coverage under Aetna's policy. Aetna argues the airboat's motor, viewed from above, fits within the hull's spatial boundaries, supporting its classification as inboard. In contrast, plaintiffs contend that from other angles, the motor is outside these boundaries, disqualifying it as inboard.

Expert testimonies presented conflicting views: Aetna's marine surveyor, George A. Blann, defined an inboard motor based on its foundation within the hull, despite acknowledging the motor's external position. Louis Bell, an airboat industry expert, agreed on the inboard classification but conceded the motor's external placement. Plaintiffs’ expert Arthur Sargent argued that the airboat engine's location above the hull excludes it from the inboard category, citing Coast Guard regulations that classify airboats separately. Rudy Vorenkamp, another plaintiffs’ expert, supported this distinction, emphasizing the unique classification of airboats by the Coast Guard. Additionally, Kenneth Laperouse of Louisiana’s wildlife agency classified airboats as "other vessels," not fitting within inboard or outboard categories.

The divergent expert opinions indicate the exclusion's ambiguity, allowing for two reasonable interpretations regarding coverage. Consequently, the ambiguity is interpreted against Aetna, leading to the conclusion that Webb's homeowner's policy provides coverage for the incident involving the airboat.

The judge granted the plaintiff's motion in limine, ruling that evidence regarding Webb's intent during the purchase of the homeowner's policy and his attempts to obtain separate coverage for an airboat was irrelevant and inadmissible. Aetna was permitted to present this evidence to preserve it for appeal. Aetna argued that the trial court erred, citing Louisiana Code of Evidence article 401, which defines relevant evidence as having the tendency to affect the probability of a consequential fact. Webb's testimony indicated he sought separate airboat coverage unsuccessfully from multiple agents but did not inform Aetna of his airboat ownership and did not negotiate the policy directly with them, as the bank managed the policy acquisition process. The court found that even if the evidence was relevant, its exclusion was harmless since there was no mutual intent established regarding the watercraft exclusion.

Regarding Aetna's liability, the plaintiffs sought a summary and/or declaratory judgment on Aetna's potential exposure, asserting that the $100,000 coverage limit applied to each claim. The trial judge ruled there were two occurrences, thereby declaring Aetna's potential exposure to be $200,000. Aetna did not contest this ruling. The judgment was categorized as a declaratory judgment under La. C.C.P. art. 1871, which allows courts to declare rights and legal relations without requiring further claims or remedies to be considered.

The declaration issued in this case serves as a final judgment or decree, but exceptions arise when the judgment only establishes limits of liability, rendering it interlocutory. This principle is supported by case law, specifically Lantz v. Campbell, which clarified that judgments addressing only liability limits do not constitute final judgments. Similarly, the decision in Henson v. Safeco Insurance Companies reinforces this interpretation. In contrast, the Fulton v. Blue Cross of Louisiana case found a declaratory judgment to be final when it determined substantive issues of the case. 

In the current case, the judgment clarified only the liability limit under the Aetna policy, categorizing it as an incidental matter and thus an interlocutory judgment. Despite Aetna not appealing the interlocutory judgment, its correctness remains reviewable. The trial court ultimately ruled in favor of Aetna, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit entirely. 

The policy in question specifies a liability coverage limit of $100,000 per occurrence, defined as an accident resulting in bodily injury or property damage. The trial court erroneously interpreted the incident as two occurrences, leading to a $200,000 liability limit. However, the court found that there was only one occurrence—the airboat accident—resulting in two claims. Therefore, Aetna’s total liability is confirmed at $100,000.

The excerpt also discusses survival damages, which may include compensation for pain and suffering, loss of earnings, and other damages incurred by the victim until their death, as illustrated by the case Mathieu v. State, Department of Transportation and Development. Damages for pre-death pain are valid if evidence supports their existence.

Cormier and Lantier were conscious for a brief period after their airboat sank and attempted to swim to safety, suffering pain and distress before drowning. An award of $10,000 each for their pain and suffering was deemed appropriate. Wrongful death damages include compensation for loss of love and affection, services, support, medical, and funeral expenses. Edna Lantier testified about her marriage to Fred since 1943, highlighting their strong family bond and shared activities, including travel, fishing, and community involvement. She expressed deep grief over Fred's death, with no evidence of economic loss presented. A $125,000 award for loss of love and affection was deemed appropriate for Edna, along with $4,857.26 for funeral expenses. Eddie Cormier, 35, had a life expectancy of 38.9 years and earned $33,000 annually as a partner in Cajun Custom Cabinets. An award of $125,000 to his wife Sue Cormier and $50,000 to their daughter Sarah was deemed reasonable for loss of services and support, with Sue describing their excellent relationship and her subsequent withdrawal from shared activities following his death.

Ruth Durlacher testified about her daughter, Sue Cormier's emotional distress following Eddie's death, highlighting Sue's ongoing expressions of grief for both Eddie and his daughter, Sarah. The court awarded $100,000 for loss of love and affection to Sue and $50,000 to Sarah, in addition to $3,835.90 for funeral expenses. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that Aetna's liability should exceed its policy limits due to a failure to settle within those limits. The court held that under Louisiana law, only the insured can claim damages against Aetna for bad faith in settlement negotiations. Consequently, the plaintiffs lack a cause of action against Aetna, and its liability remains confined to the policy limits. The trial court's judgment was reversed, and a new judgment was issued in favor of Edna Lantier against Glenn Webb and Aetna for $139,857.26, with judicial interest, while Aetna’s liability is limited to its policy limits. Glenn Webb and Aetna were ordered to cover all legal costs incurred during the trial and appeal.