Forbes v. Chapin

Citations: 917 So. 2d 948; 2005 WL 3478555Docket: 4D05-371

Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida; December 20, 2005; Florida; State Appellate Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Jason Forbes, the natural father, appeals two non-final orders from the trial court regarding visitation rights of Mona Chapin, the maternal grandmother of his minor child. The first order denies Forbes' exceptions to a general master's report affirming the validity of a 1998 court order that granted Chapin visitation rights. The second order finds Forbes in contempt for failing to notify Chapin of a stepmother's adoption petition, which the court deemed a violation of the visitation order. The visitation rights were established following Forbes' divorce from the child's mother in 1997, with a 1998 order allowing Chapin one week of summer visitation and five weekends annually. Although visitation occurred without incident until 1999, disputes arose post-2002, culminating in Chapin being denied notice of the 2003 adoption proceedings after the mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights. The general master ruled that Chapin had a right to enforce visitation under the original order and that Forbes’ failure to notify her constituted contempt, based on a 'best interest of the child' standard. Forbes contended that the visitation order infringed upon his constitutional right to privacy, claiming he had not waived this right by signing the 1998 agreement. The trial court's orders included findings of fact regarding the enforcement of the visitation agreement. The appellate court reversed and remanded for the orders to be vacated.

The court addressed the grandparent visitation rights under Florida law, specifically noting that despite the initial hearing being conducted under Chapter 61, it found alignment with Section 752.07, which maintains grandparental rights even after a stepparent's adoption. The court emphasized that any termination of visitation rights must be in the child's best interest and that the grandmother had a strong bond with the child, making termination inappropriate. Although the court suggested that the adoptive mother had knowledge of the visitation agreement, it did not explicitly declare a waiver of rights. The court reaffirmed the validity of the visitation order, entered prior to the father's remarriage, and acknowledged the father's reliance on relevant case law while applying Section 752.07. 

The court ruled that a parent's agreement to grandparent visitation does not waive their constitutional right to privacy in child-rearing, as established by the Florida Constitution. It highlighted that parental decision-making should not be interfered with unless there is significant harm to the child. The trial court found a knowing waiver of constitutional rights, which is generally presumed against, meaning an intentional abandonment of a known right must be clearly established. In this case, the court concluded there was insufficient evidence that the father waived his rights, resolving any doubts in favor of maintaining those rights.

Florida courts have determined that statutory provisions granting grandparents visitation rights violate a parent's constitutional right to privacy in child-rearing unless there is a compelling state interest showing demonstrable harm to the child. The court in Von Eiff ruled section 752.01(1)(a) unconstitutional for lacking a requirement to establish such harm before infringing upon parental rights. The court found that while maintaining a relationship with the grandmother was in the child's best interest, there was no substantiated claim of harm. 

In Sullivan v. Sapp, the Florida Supreme Court upheld this position, declaring section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c) unconstitutional for not requiring proof of harm before granting grandparent visitation rights based solely on the child's best interest. This ruling reinforced previous cases (Beagle, Von Eiff, and Brunetti) affirming that parents possess a constitutional right to raise their children free from government interference unless a compelling interest is demonstrated.

The trial court's failure to cite Spence v. Stewart, which previously upheld grandparent visitation under section 61.13(2)(b)(2)(c), is noted, as Spence has since been labeled an anomaly by the Supreme Court in Sullivan. In Spence, the court had concluded that the act of bringing a grandparent visitation dispute to court constituted a waiver of familial privacy. However, Sullivan clarified that a father's right to privacy remains intact regardless of court involvement. The Supreme Court also referenced Lonon v. Ferrell, which opposed the Spence ruling and found section 752.01(1)(b) unconstitutional, aligning with other cases that rejected the idea that privacy rights are forfeited by seeking judicial intervention. Ultimately, the Supreme Court emphasized that all statutes related to grandparent visitation that do not include a harm requirement have been deemed unconstitutional, reiterating that a best interest standard alone is insufficient.

The court determined that subsections (b) and (c) of section 752.01(1) have not been explicitly declared unconstitutional, yet subsection (b) was found to infringe on a mother's constitutional right to privacy regarding child-rearing. Following the remand in Belair v. Drew, the Fifth District ruled that subsection (b) is facially unconstitutional as it does not meet the compelling state interest test and violates privacy rights under Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution. The trial court's reliance on section 752.07 to uphold visitation rights against a parent's objections was deemed unconstitutional. The court concluded that equitable principles do not override this unconstitutionality and that contempt cannot be enforced for non-compliance with unconstitutional notice provisions. Visitation rights for non-parents are solely statutory, and a court lacks inherent authority to grant such rights without a constitutional basis. Consequently, the grandmother's designation as an interested party was incorrect, negating her right to notice in adoption proceedings. The court asserted that the father did not waive his privacy rights by agreeing to the original visitation order, which did not survive the stepparent's adoption. Therefore, the contempt order is vacated, and the visitation order is reversed and remanded.