Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; May 8, 2003; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Dexter Tramayne Wells was convicted of aggravated assault and murder in Jackson County, Mississippi, receiving concurrent sentences of twenty years for aggravated assault and life imprisonment for murder. Wells appeals on several grounds:
1. Alleged error in admitting testimony from Chris Wells under specific hearsay rules (M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(b), 803(1), and 803(2)).
2. Claimed missteps in granting jury instructions S-7 and S-11.
3. Assertion that the trial court wrongly ruled against recross-examination.
4. Argument that the verdicts were contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence.
5. Challenge to the constitutionality of Miss. Code Ann. 47-5-139(1)(a).
The case arose from the 1996 murder of Willie Sampson McCorvey, who borrowed a truck and was later found dead. During the incident, Cynthia Williams was shot by an assailant identified as Victor McCoy, who was later implicated alongside Wells. Williams identified Wells as an accomplice during the altercation. McCoy pleaded guilty to charges related to the incident before Wells' trial, where he was convicted on December 4, 2001. The trial court denied Wells's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a new trial, prompting this appeal.
Regarding the admissibility of Chris Wells's testimony, Wells contends that the state did not comply with hearsay exception requirements, citing issues with cross-examination and inconsistencies with McCoy's statements.
Wells argues that there was no testimony regarding the time interval between the murder and McCoy's entry into the vehicle with Chris and Byron Wells, asserting that the spontaneity requirement has not been satisfied. He further claims that McCoy did not describe or explain the murder event. A pre-trial motion in limine was made to exclude McCoy's statements to Chris Wells, who testified that McCoy was excited when he entered the car and expressed a desire to go to Gautier, stating, "Me and Train done killed Frank." Chris Wells noted that McCoy was calm when he later reiterated that he and Wells had killed Frank. The judge, after considering the arguments and earlier testimony from McCoy, ruled that the statements were admissible under hearsay exceptions 801(d)(1)(b), 803(1), and 803(2), asserting that McCoy's statements were made shortly after the incident and were reliable as they were made without time for reflection. Consequently, the motion to exclude the testimony was denied, allowing Chris Wells to testify for the State.
M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(b) outlines that a statement is not considered hearsay if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination, provided the statement is consistent with their testimony and intended to counter claims of recent fabrication or improper influence. McCoy's prior consistent statement was admitted, where he affirmed to police that he and Wells were together during McCorvey's murder and both fired the weapon. However, during trial, McCoy testified inconsistently, claiming he acted alone and frequently expressed a lack of memory regarding the events.
Chris Wells's statement corroborated McCoy’s written account, specifically asserting that both were involved in the murder, which was relevant to counter McCoy's assertion of acting alone. The court found this admissible to prevent an “unwilling witness” from evading responsibility through memory lapses. Additionally, McCoy's statement to Wells was admissible under hearsay exceptions for Present Sense Impression and Excited Utterance, as it was made spontaneously immediately after the incident. Testimony revealed that McCoy, after committing the murder, relayed details of the crime to Wells shortly thereafter, indicating a spontaneous reaction. The trial judge's discretion in determining the spontaneity of the statement was upheld.
The trial court determined that McCoy's statement, "Me and Train done killed Frank," was admissible as it occurred shortly after entering the car, making it contemporaneous under M.R.E. 803(1). Additionally, McCoy's statement to Chris Wells was deemed an excited utterance under M.R.E. 803(2), as McCoy remained under the stress of the events surrounding the murder when he made the statement. Testimony indicated McCoy was visibly upset and excited at the time he was picked up, reinforcing the reliability of his utterance.
Regarding jury instructions, Wells contended that instructions S-7 and S-11, which pertain to aiding and abetting, were improperly based on a precedent that had been disapproved in a prior Supreme Court case. Instruction S-7 instructed the jury that anyone present and encouraging a crime is as culpable as the principal offender, specifically relating to the murder of Willie Sampson McCorvey. Instruction S-11 similarly instructed the jury about the aggravated assault of Cynthia Williams, emphasizing the same principles of complicity.
Wells objected to jury instructions S-7 and S-11, arguing they were duplicative of S-5, which provided a general statement on aiding and abetting. His attorney stated that the only difference in S-11 was a minor addition intended to reiterate the same principle to the jury multiple times. The State countered that Wells failed to preserve his objection for appeal, as a specific objection must be made at trial outlining the grounds for the objection. In the absence of such specific objections to S-7 and S-11, the issue was deemed waived.
Regarding recross-examination, after the redirect of Officer Robert Mabens, Wells' attorney attempted to ask follow-up questions, which the court denied, stating that recross-examination was not permitted. Wells contended the denial was an error, as he wanted to address spoliation of evidence, citing Hubbard v. State to support his claim. However, while recross-examination is permissible under Mississippi law, it is at the trial judge's discretion and can be limited if there is no oversight or rationale provided for not addressing the matter during the initial cross-examination. Wells did not demonstrate any oversight in his objection or provide a reason for not raising the issue earlier.
The trial judge permitted full cross-examination, and any failure by counsel to utilize this opportunity cannot be attributed to the judge, rendering Wells' claims meritless. Wells contends that the jury's conviction for aggravated assault and murder lacks sufficient evidence, arguing there is no testimony linking him to the crimes. He highlights that the sole witness, McCoy, claimed he was alone during the murder of McCorvey.
In assessing evidence sufficiency, all supporting evidence and inferences must be accepted as true, while evidence favoring the defendant is disregarded. A jury's verdict can only be overturned if no reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Participation in a crime, even as an accomplice, holds the individual equally responsible.
Mississippi law defines aggravated assault and murder with specific criteria, including intent to cause serious bodily harm or acting with extreme indifference to human life. McCoy, who pleaded guilty to murder, acknowledged Wells’ involvement in the crime, stating that Wells shot at McCorvey and sought assistance during a confrontation at Vaxter’s home. Additional testimony from witnesses corroborated that Wells was present and attempted to enter the trailer during the incident.
The evidence indicates that Wells acted in concert with McCoy in the aggravated assault and murder. The jury, as the factfinder, assessed witness credibility and demeanor, ultimately convicting Wells. The evidence presented was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find Wells guilty, thus no reversible error occurred.
Wells challenges the constitutionality of Miss. Code Ann. 47-5-139(1)(a), which prohibits inmates sentenced to life imprisonment from being eligible for earned time allowances based on age distinctions. Specifically, the statute allows inmates aged 65 or older who have served at least 15 years to petition for conditional release, except for those sentenced for capital murder. Wells argues that sentencing should not be harsher based solely on the offender's age. However, he did not raise this argument during the trial or in his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or for a new trial. The court maintains that constitutional issues not presented at the trial level cannot be addressed on appeal, as established in Colburn v. State, 431 So.2d 1111 (Miss. 1983). Consequently, Wells' argument is deemed waived and procedurally barred. The court affirms the trial court's judgment, upholding the convictions for aggravated assault (20 years) and murder (life imprisonment), with sentences running concurrently.
