RIVERSIDE TRANSPORTATION INC. v. Burke

Citation: 978 So. 2d 1261Docket: 2007 CA 1370

Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal; March 26, 2008; Louisiana; State Appellate Court

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In the case of Riverside Transportation, Inc. v. David Edwin Burke and the State of Louisiana, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana addressed an appeal regarding damages awarded to Riverside Transportation and intervening parties following an altercation involving undercover State Trooper David Edwin Burke. The incident occurred on March 5, 2000, during Mardi Gras when Maria Montalvo, who had reserved a restaurant for a party, hired a limousine from Riverside to transport her and her guests. After encountering traffic, some guests exited the limousine to use portable toilets and were followed by Trooper Burke, who claimed he was assisting one of the women. However, the limousine occupants perceived him as a potential threat since he did not identify himself as law enforcement. A physical confrontation ensued, resulting in injuries and an arrest for felony assault against Roy Hill.

Riverside filed a lawsuit against Burke and the State of Louisiana, alleging unlawful trespass, battery, and wrongful detention by Burke. Several occupants intervened to seek damages for injuries incurred during the altercation. After a non-jury trial, the court awarded Riverside $38,000 in compensatory damages, $500 in punitive damages, and $5,000 in attorney fees, along with costs and interest. The appellate court later amended the judgment but affirmed it as amended.

The trial court issued a judgment against the defendants, ordering them to pay damages to the intervenors totaling $70,500, with specific amounts awarded to each individual: Maria Montalvo ($12,000), April Hill ($8,500), Pam Kindel ($6,500), Helga Pope ($5,000), Bianca Cheng ($5,000), Angel Hebert ($5,000), Lisa Lambert ($5,000), Kristen Miley ($5,000), Roy Hill ($2,500), and Ronald Cheng ($2,500). Additionally, the intervenors were awarded attorney's fees at a rate of $150 per hour for 234 hours, with further fees applicable for time incurred after January 24, 2007.

On appeal, the defendants raised several issues, claiming the trial court erred in: 1) finding the plaintiffs met their burden of proof regarding the defendants' liability due to actions by David Burke; 2) excluding Trooper Murphy Paul's testimony; 3) ordering defendants' attorney to provide law enforcement witnesses for depositions shortly before trial; 4) ruling that any witness not deposed would be barred from testifying; and 5) preventing the use of depositions of plaintiffs/intervenors for cross-examination while allowing the reverse.

The trial court justified its judgment by stating that the petitioners, including Helga Pope, had established liability against David Burke, who entered a limousine without consent, causing a disturbance. The court awarded compensatory damages to Riverside Transportation, Inc. of $3,800 and punitive damages of $1,500, along with $5,000 in attorney fees. Specific awards were based on individual testimonies of injuries and trauma suffered, particularly highlighting Montalvo’s severe facial injury, Hill's physical assault, and Kindel's permanent facial scar. The damage awards were subsequently amended to include Bianca Cheng's $5,000. The defendants contended that the plaintiffs did not prove liability and argued that the damage amounts were excessive.

Plaintiffs assert that Trooper Burke's actions constituted a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows for civil action against individuals acting under state law who deprive others of constitutional rights. To succeed, plaintiffs must demonstrate two key elements: first, that Burke's conduct occurred under color of state law, and second, that it deprived them of a constitutional right. Generally, government officials are granted qualified immunity unless their actions violate clearly established rights known to a reasonable person. Acting under color of state law typically requires the exercise of power granted by state law, which can be satisfied by showing that the conduct qualifies as "state action." State employment usually suffices to classify an individual as a state actor, particularly when acting within official duties. However, not all actions by public employees are state actions; personal pursuits unconnected to their governmental role do not qualify. Trooper Burke claimed his actions were part of his duty to ensure public safety during a drug bust, asserting that he assisted a civilian who fell while engaging in traffic control.

Trooper Burke was acting within his duties as a State Trooper during the incident but acknowledged that the women entering the limousine were not interfering with a drug bust and he had no reason to suspect illegal activity. The trial court correctly found that Trooper Burke lacked probable cause for an investigative stop of the plaintiffs. It accepted the plaintiffs' testimony over that of law enforcement, determining that Burke did not identify himself as a State Trooper and entered the vehicle without probable cause or consent. While a trespass by law enforcement does not inherently constitute a constitutional violation, it often breaches legitimate privacy expectations, particularly when the trespass is intrusive. Courts analyze the nature of the trespass and the privacy interest in the area involved; individuals have greater privacy rights in their homes than in vehicles. However, the Fourth Amendment continues to provide protection against unwarranted government intrusion in all constitutionally protected areas, including automobiles. The Supreme Court clarifies that an individual is not considered "seized" under the Fourth Amendment until they submit to police authority or are physically contacted by law enforcement.

An individual is considered "seized" under the Louisiana Constitution if they are "actually stopped" or if an imminent stop is certain. In *State v. Tucker*, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that a seizure can occur when law enforcement approaches with such force that escape is virtually impossible. Officers can approach individuals in public and ask questions without violating the Fourth Amendment, and a person's refusal to answer does not provide grounds for detention. If there is no seizure, no constitutional rights are violated.

In the case at hand, Trooper Burke approached the plaintiffs' vehicle but did not identify himself as a law enforcement officer, subsequently entering the vehicle and assaulting several occupants. Although Burke claimed he identified himself, he acknowledged that not all occupants may have heard him. He stated he did not cross the vehicle's threshold but could see inside from the doorframe. The encounter escalated when one occupant, Roy Hill, kicked Burke, prompting other officers to assist him. 

The trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs, determining that Burke acted under color of state law and that his actions led to an unlawful seizure and infringement of the intervenors' constitutional rights, resulting in physical and emotional injuries. While Burke's initial approach was lawful, his failure to leave after being asked, and his physical intrusion into the vehicle, constituted a violation of the plaintiffs' civil rights.

A thorough review of the case record reveals no manifest error in the trial court's factual findings. An appellate court cannot overturn these findings unless it identifies a lack of reasonable factual basis or determines that the findings are clearly wrong. The standard for reviewing factfinder determinations involves confirming that the factfinder's conclusions were reasonable, particularly when credibility assessments are involved, which require substantial deference. In this case, the trial court found the testimony of the plaintiffs more credible than that of the law enforcement witnesses, a determination that cannot be deemed manifestly erroneous. The court rejected the defendants' argument to differentiate between the actions of Trooper Burke and those of his fellow officers, emphasizing that the officers acted as a team and their illegal actions should not be evaluated separately. Consequently, the appellate court affirms the trial court's imposition of liability on the defendants.

Regarding damages, the discretion of the judge or jury is significant, and appellate courts rarely disturb general damage awards unless there is an abuse of discretion. The appellate court found no abuse concerning the damages awarded to several plaintiffs but identified an abuse of discretion in the damages awarded to Riverside Transportation, Inc., whose owner testified about the limousine leased to one of the plaintiffs at the time of the incident.

Mr. Randolph testified that after the limousine incident, one captain's chair was damaged, requiring $150.00 in repairs and resulting in three to four days of downtime during the busy Mardi Gras season, where he typically earned $1,000 per run. He expressed frustration over the incident's impact on his small business, noting that he had to cope with court proceedings, a negative media portrayal, and customer concerns about his business's reputation. Randolph stated he was sued by Trooper Burke and had not received further business from the limousine's occupants, despite his business relying heavily on repeat customers.

The court concluded that Riverside's damages amounted to a maximum of $4,150.00—comprising the repair cost and lost earnings during the repair period. Although the trial court awarded more, the appellate review found insufficient evidence to support claims of economic loss or damage to Riverside's reputation, as no financial records substantiated these claims. Consequently, the appellate court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding damages exceeding $4,150.00. Additionally, it ruled that Riverside did not meet the burden of proof necessary for punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as the deprivation did not demonstrate the requisite reckless or callous disregard for rights.

Riverside experienced deprivation due to its limousine being immobilized while the passengers were detained and interviewed by law enforcement, causing them emotional and physical distress. The court found an error in awarding $500.00 in punitive damages to Riverside, especially since the passengers were not awarded punitive damages despite their suffering. 

In the subsequent issues raised, defendants challenged a trial court ruling requiring them to produce certain law enforcement witnesses for deposition before trial. The court had set a deadline for depositions to be completed by September 22, 2006, with trial scheduled for September 25, 2006. Although no formal record of this order was documented, defendants acknowledged its existence at trial. The pre-trial order from September 25, 2003, listed multiple law enforcement officers as witnesses for plaintiffs, and defendants sought to amend their witness list to include additional officers shortly before trial. The trial court did not allow this amendment and required the production of witnesses who had previously failed to appear for depositions.

The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, noting that there was no abuse of discretion in requiring the defendants to produce the witnesses, given the proximity to trial and the history of the witness list. The court emphasized that the State had the ability to compel attendance of its employees for depositions. Additionally, since the defendants did not present the excluded testimony at trial, they could not claim error based on the exclusion. The ruling affirmed the trial court's broad discretion in discovery matters.

The party claiming improper exclusion of evidence must make a proffer; failure to do so precludes arguing the exclusion was erroneous, as established in several Louisiana cases. In the case at hand, defendants argued that the trial court improperly excluded Trooper Murphy Paul’s testimony during a hearing for a motion for new trial. However, there is no transcript from that hearing, and the minute entry notes that documentary evidence was presented, followed by a denial of the motion. Defendants indicated that two witnesses were unavailable for deposition prior to trial, which they claimed undermined their case. The court found no error in refusing to allow the proffer of Trooper Paul’s testimony since it should have been available during the trial and was not properly proffered then.

Additionally, defendants contended that the trial court denied them the use of deposition testimony to impeach plaintiffs' witnesses, while allowing plaintiffs to use deposition testimony. Louisiana law permits the use of deposition testimony for impeachment, provided a proper foundation is laid. This foundation requires that the witness acknowledges or denies making prior inconsistent statements. The court found that defendants failed to establish this foundation during their attempts to use prior deposition testimony, which contributed to the trial court's rulings against them.

The trial court's decision to uphold plaintiffs' objections to the defendants' use of deposition testimony for witness impeachment was found to be correct. The judgment was amended to reduce the compensatory damages awarded to Riverside Transportation, Inc. from $38,000.00 to $4,150.00 and to vacate the $500.00 punitive damages award. The trial court's judgment was affirmed in all other respects. The defendants, David Edwin Burke and the State of Louisiana, will bear the appeal costs amounting to $4,237.82. 

Notable details include that April Stevens, referred to as April Hill during the trial, and the issue of the intervenors’ attorney fees being under a separate appeal. There was a discrepancy in the trial court's oral reasons regarding damages, but this was not raised as an error on appeal. Additionally, the defendants failed to specially plead the defense of qualified immunity. It was noted that corporations are recognized as persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Riverside's request to increase attorney fees was acknowledged, though no formal answer was found in the record. The plaintiffs highlighted difficulties in securing witness depositions during the protracted litigation, and provisions from the Code of Evidence regarding prior inconsistent statements were deemed applicable to deposition forms.