Armstead v. State

Citations: 978 So. 2d 642; 2008 WL 879977Docket: 2007-KA-00238-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; April 3, 2008; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

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Perry Armstead was convicted in the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court on charges of sale and possession of cocaine. The court sentenced him to fourteen years for the sale and three years for possession, with the sentences running consecutively. The case stemmed from a controlled buy where a confidential informant, Cynthia Hamilton, purchased crack cocaine from Armstead, facilitated by agents from the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics and local police. Hamilton, equipped with surveillance devices, identified Armstead's voice during the interaction. 

Following the sale, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for Armstead's residence, where they found him and seized cash matching the serial numbers from the buy, along with additional cocaine. Armstead admitted ownership of the drugs during the investigation. Initially indicted on nine counts, the State chose to proceed with only two counts related to the sale and possession of cocaine, while a motion to sever these counts was denied. The jury convicted him on both counts, leading to his sentences. Armstead's subsequent motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied by the trial court.

Armstead's appeal raises two main issues: (I) whether he was informed of his Miranda rights and whether he waived them knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and (II) whether his conviction for cocaine sale in count A should be reversed due to prejudice from the admission of his confession in count B. 

In determining the admissibility of a confession, the State must establish all prerequisite facts beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge must first confirm if Armstead was advised of his Miranda rights, then evaluate whether his statement was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion. If the confession is admitted, the appellate court will not reverse the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and appropriate legal principles.

Armstead filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his statement about the drugs in the house, leading to a hearing where officers provided conflicting testimonies. Agent Hawkins stated he read Armstead his rights, to which Armstead responded that he understood and had no questions. After a general statement about drugs found in the house, Armstead claimed everything belonged to him. Officer Johnson corroborated that he heard Hawkins advise Armstead of his rights and that Armstead's admission came spontaneously without coercion. Conversely, Officer Moore, who could not recall whether rights were read, noted that Armstead initially denied ownership before admitting the drugs were his. Agent Anderson could not recall any relevant conversations.

The trial court deemed Armstead's statement admissible, concluding it was not obtained through custodial interrogation but was voluntarily given in response to an on-scene question after he had been read his Miranda rights. The court found no evidence of intimidation or threats by Officer Johnson that would necessitate suppression of the statement. Armstead's argument for a heightened review standard due to the alleged lack of specific findings of fact was rejected, as the trial court did provide relevant findings, indicating that Armstead was fully aware of his rights when responding to the officer's inquiry.

Armstead also contended that he had not been properly advised of his Miranda rights before questioning. He claimed Officer Johnson did not personally witness Agent Hawkins reading the rights. However, Agent Hawkins testified to having read Armstead his rights and confirmed that Armstead understood them. Officer Johnson corroborated this, despite not recalling the specific moment. The case was compared to McCarty v. State, where the defendant did not receive Miranda warnings during a subsequent interrogation, but the current case involved only one questioning session shortly after rights were read, distinguishing it from McCarty and supporting the trial court's finding of adequate advisement.

Lastly, Armstead argued that the State failed to prove he voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination, claiming his statements were coerced by threats to arrest his wife. The court noted that threats to arrest family members do not inherently render a confession involuntary, provided there is probable cause for such arrests, referencing legal precedent that emphasizes the necessity of good faith in using such tactics.

Probable cause for the arrest of Armstead's wife was established due to the presence of cocaine in a common area of their home where she lived and was a leaseholder, invoking a presumption of constructive possession. Officer Johnson's statements did not render Armstead's subsequent statement involuntary. The trial court correctly ruled that Armstead was read his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them, despite the lack of a written waiver. 

Armstead claimed that his conviction for sale of cocaine (count A) should be reversed due to prejudicial effects from his confession related to possession of cocaine (count B). He cited Bennett v. State, but the court clarified that Bennett predates Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-7-2, which allows for multiple charges to be tried together if they are connected. The court found no legal basis for limiting this statute based on potential inadmissibility of evidence between counts. The jury was properly instructed to consider each count separately, and substantial evidence supported Armstead's conviction on count A. 

Consequently, the trial court's admission of the confession was upheld, and the court affirmed Armstead's convictions for both counts, with a fourteen-year sentence for count A and a three-year sentence for count B, to run consecutively. The judgment was supported by the concurrence of multiple justices.

Hamilton and Anderson had differing accounts of the money given during a transaction, with Hamilton believing she received a twenty, two fives, and ten ones, while Anderson thought it was a twenty, a ten, a five, and five ones. Hamilton lived a ten to fifteen-minute walk from Armstead's home, which was equipped with an audio and video surveillance system, though it was unclear if the video functioned during the sale. Officer Johnson identified Miller as a "runner," a role commonly used by drug dealers to evade surveillance. Following a search of Armstead's home, a total of $1,163 was discovered, including $132 on Armstead himself, with seven individuals present at the time of the search. A nolle prosequi was entered for Armstead's possession of marijuana charge due to his guilty plea.

The excerpt references the Miranda ruling, which mandates that individuals must be informed of their rights against self-incrimination before custodial interrogation. The trial court implied that Miranda warnings were unnecessary because Armstead was questioned on-site during an ongoing investigation rather than in a custodial setting. The determination of whether a person is in custody depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the interrogation's setting, the presence of law enforcement, and the nature of the questioning. Armstead was handcuffed and questioned outside, with multiple officers present and a copy of the search warrant provided to him. Despite concluding that Miranda warnings should have been applied, the trial court found that Armstead had been informed of his rights.

Additionally, it was noted that in trials involving multiple charges, evidence relevant to one charge may often be challenged under Rule 404(b) concerning other charges, regardless of the temporal or circumstantial proximity of the alleged crimes.