Poole v. Lessee of Fleeger

Citations: 36 U.S. 185; 9 L. Ed. 680; 11 Pet. 185; 1837 U.S. LEXIS 174

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; February 11, 1837; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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The case involves a writ of error to the judgment of the U.S. Circuit Court for West Tennessee concerning a land dispute over a 2,727-acre tract in Montgomery County, Tennessee. Plaintiffs in error, Burgess Poole and others, are contesting a judgment favoring defendants in error, John Fleeger and others, who sought to recover the land through an ejectment action. The plaintiffs claimed title as devisees of Frederick Rohrer, who obtained a grant from Kentucky in 1796, based on a Virginia military land warrant. The defendants asserted their title through various grants from North Carolina (1786, 1792, 1797) and Tennessee (1809-1814), demonstrating continuous possession of the land.

The trial revealed that the defendants occupied portions of land not covered by any grants predating Rohrer’s grant. They presented evidence attempting to establish that Walker's line had been recognized as the boundary between North Carolina and Virginia before Kentucky and Tennessee's separation and that Tennessee had exercised jurisdiction up to this line with Kentucky's acquiescence until the compact of 1820.

The 1820 compact established Walker's line as the boundary between Kentucky and Tennessee, with provisions ensuring that claims to land derived from Virginia military services would not be prejudiced by the new boundary. Claimants could assert their rights in court without being affected by statutes of limitations concerning the period before the boundary was settled, but conflicting claims could still be challenged. The Court's opinion will focus on aspects of the case that do not hinge on the validity of the evidence presented.

The 4th article of the compact between Kentucky and Tennessee stipulates that all currently vacant and unappropriated lands east of the Tennessee River and north of 36 degrees 30 minutes north latitude shall belong to Kentucky. The court determined that the boundary established by this compact is several miles south of Walker's line and the disputed land, meaning that the defendants' titles rely on this compact. Tennessee's acceptance of the compact signifies that the disputed lands were not under its or North Carolina's jurisdiction at the time of the grant, making the titles contingent on the compact’s terms. The court's instruction, which the defendants contested, was upheld, establishing that sovereign states can fix territorial boundaries through compacts, which are binding on citizens. The U.S. Constitution permits such agreements with congressional consent, which was granted here, validating the compact and its obligations for both states. Furthermore, while Walker's line is designated as the future boundary, the compact acknowledges that the legitimate boundary is the latitude of 36 degrees 30 minutes north, as affirmed by historical documents, and does not prejudice Virginia's claims north of this boundary. Thus, the compact implicitly recognizes this latitude as the true boundary while allowing Walker's line to govern future jurisdiction.

Grants made by North Carolina and Tennessee were deemed invalid as they were beyond the states' territorial boundaries, while the grant from Virginia was valid as it fell within its territory. The court's instruction was deemed correct, negating arguments that states cannot divest citizens of land titles granted under their authority or violate the constitutional prohibition against impairing contract obligations. The invalidity of the North Carolina and Tennessee grants stems from a defect in title rather than a contract violation. 

The court addressed objections to the will of Frederick Rohrer, which the plaintiffs claimed as devisees. Defendants argued the will was not properly registered in Tennessee; however, the court overruled this objection, and no exceptions were noted during the trial. Typically, failure to take exception implies waiver. The absence of the will or its probate in the record complicates any assessment of the objection's validity. The court concluded that registration, if proper, relates back in time, rendering the timing irrelevant. 

Additionally, defendants contested the evidence of title from the plaintiffs, asserting that a tenancy in common could not support a joint demise. This objection was overruled, and since no exception was taken, it was considered waived, particularly as the motion for a new trial was subsequently denied.

In Tennessee, tenants in common have a uniform practice of declaring a joint demise in ejectment cases, allowing them to recover part or all of the premises based on the evidence presented regarding title. This was confirmed in Barrow's Lessee v. Nave, where the court noted that this practice had not been contested and was likely mandated by the act of 1801, which eliminated exceptions to the declaration's form or substance once an issue is joined in an ejectment case focused solely on title. The judgment from the circuit court is affirmed, with costs awarded. The case was heard on the record from the U.S. District Court for West Tennessee and was argued by counsel before the decision was rendered.