Linda RS v. Richard D.

Citations: 35 L. Ed. 2d 536; 93 S. Ct. 1146; 410 U.S. 614; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 99Docket: 71-6078

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; March 4, 1973; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

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Linda R.S., the mother of an illegitimate child, initiated a class action to challenge the discriminatory enforcement of Article 602 of the Texas Penal Code, which penalizes parents for failing to support their children but, through state judicial interpretation, applies only to married parents. She sought to compel the local district attorney to prosecute the father of her child, Richard D., for neglecting to provide support. The three-judge District Court dismissed her case due to a lack of standing, concluding that while she had an interest in her child's support, the application of Article 602 would not secure support but would only lead to the father's incarceration. The court emphasized that a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution decisions of another. 

Article 602 states that any parent neglecting their child under eighteen years may face misdemeanor charges and up to two years in jail. Texas courts have interpreted this statute to apply exclusively to parents of legitimate children, thereby exempting parents of illegitimate children from such obligations. Linda R.S. argued that this interpretation unfairly discriminates against illegitimate children, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Despite her claims, the court first required her to demonstrate that she had standing to invoke the judicial process and that her case presented a constitutional "case or controversy." The judgment of the lower court was affirmed.

The determination of standing hinges on whether the appellant has demonstrated a personal stake in the outcome, ensuring concrete adverseness necessary for the court's consideration of constitutional issues, as established in Baker v. Carr. Recent rulings have broadened the categories of injuries that confer standing, yet the requirement for the plaintiff to show actual or threatened injury remains intact, particularly in the absence of explicit statutory standing. In this case, the appellant has not established a sufficient connection between her alleged injury—stemming from her child's father's failure to provide support—and the government action she challenges. Although she has experienced injury, merely asserting an abstract injury does not meet the standing criteria. The appellant must show that her injury is directly caused by the enforcement of the statute in question. The Texas statute creates a completed offense with fixed penalties upon failure to support, rather than allowing for civil contempt that could directly lead to her desired outcome of obtaining support payments. Consequently, the relationship between the appellant's injury and her claim is deemed too speculative, failing to satisfy the prerequisites for judicial intervention.

A citizen lacks standing to challenge prosecutorial policies unless they face prosecution themselves. This principle is supported by precedents such as *Younger v. Harris*, *Bailey v. Patterson*, and *Poe v. Ullman*, which emphasize that private citizens do not have a judicially recognized interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of others. Although the appellant, Linda R.S., has an interest in her child's support, she has not established a sufficient connection between her interest and the enforcement of the State's criminal laws. Consequently, the District Court's dismissal of the action for lack of standing is upheld. 

Linda R.S. claims to represent herself and others seeking support for illegitimate children, challenging the constitutionality of Art. 602, which applies only to fathers of legitimate children. While there are significant issues regarding the relief she seeks (potentially requiring prosecution of Richard D. for child support), these do not impede her right to initiate a class action. It is noted that a father facing prosecution under Art. 602 could argue its discriminatory nature as a defense and would have standing to challenge the statute's enforcement.

The dissenting opinion argues that Linda R.S. and her class have a legitimate interest in contesting a law that excludes them from protection, unlike the general public. The dissent critiques the majority's view that the coercive effect of criminal sanctions is merely speculative, asserting that the threat of penalties undeniably influences behavior and should be taken seriously, reflecting a broader societal assumption about the impact of criminal law.

Criminal sanctions are viewed as a means to compel fathers to meet support obligations for their legitimate children, with Texas actively prosecuting these cases based on the mothers' complaints. However, Texas does not entertain similar complaints from mothers of illegitimate children, raising questions about the standing of these mothers to challenge the discrimination they face. Drawing an analogy to a hypothetical law that criminalizes only the murder of white individuals, it is argued that mothers of illegitimate children have a valid interest in contesting their exclusion from protections under the state's child-support laws. The dissenting opinion emphasizes that the appellant's challenge highlights the exemption of fathers of illegitimate children from both civil and criminal liability. The decision in Gomez v. Perez has significant implications for the civil liability of fathers concerning illegitimate children, suggesting that the appellant may not need to rely on criminal law for support. The standing issue is complex and should be reconsidered in light of ongoing developments, including the impact of Gomez on the case's precedents. The District Court previously addressed a challenge to a Texas statute imposing civil liability for child support, which was found not to be properly before them. The case is recommended for remand to clarify its status, given the evolving legal context and the potential for a lack of a live controversy. An affidavit indicated that the State could not prosecute under existing law as it did not apply to fathers of illegitimate children. The text also notes that federal courts cannot issue advisory opinions, emphasizing the necessity of concrete legal disputes.

Congress has the authority to create legal rights through statutes, which can establish standing even if no injury would exist without such statutes, as illustrated in cases like Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. and Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co. A notable commentary on standing emphasizes that individuals without a personal stake lack standing. Furthermore, it has been acknowledged that requiring a party to demonstrate they are adversely affected does not prevent judicial review of executive actions or the protection of public interests. In this context, the appropriate party to challenge the constitutionality of Article 602 would be a parent of a legitimate child prosecuted under the statute, arguing that the law discriminates against them compared to parents of illegitimate children. The case is decided on the basis of lack of standing, without addressing the merits of the appellant's claim.