Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 7, 1972; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the Court's judgment, joined by The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist. The Court referenced its prior rulings in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California, establishing that a post-indictment pretrial lineup is a critical stage in criminal prosecution. It affirmed that conducting such a lineup without the accused's counsel present violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, potentially rendering in-court identifications inadmissible if derived from a lineup conducted in violation of this right. The Court noted that a per se exclusionary rule is necessary to ensure law enforcement respects the accused's right to counsel during lineups.
The current case examines whether to extend this exclusionary rule to identification testimony from a police station showup conducted before formal charges were filed. The incident involved Willie Shard, who reported a robbery on February 20, 1968. On February 22, police stopped the petitioner and Ralph Bean, discovering items belonging to Shard. After their arrest, Shard was brought to the station where he identified the petitioner and Bean without the presence of legal counsel. Their pretrial motion to suppress this identification was denied, and Shard testified against them at trial, leading to their conviction, which was affirmed by the Illinois appellate court. The court ruled that the Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rule did not apply to pre-indictment confrontations. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address this specific question, clarifying that the privilege against self-incrimination was not relevant in this context.
The Court determined that the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination does not apply to the lineup process in Wade, asserting that no violation occurred regarding Wade's privilege. The privilege protects against being compelled to provide testimonial evidence, but requiring an accused to display physical characteristics does not constitute such compulsion. The doctrine established in Miranda v. Arizona, which is focused on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation, does not pertain to this case. Instead, the relevant constitutional guarantee here is the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, which attaches only after adversarial judicial proceedings have begun. This principle is supported by a series of cases that affirm the right to counsel arises at various points, including arraignment and preliminary hearings. The Court noted that while there have been disagreements regarding the right to counsel, all relevant cases involve situations post-initiation of judicial proceedings. The ruling in Escobedo v. Illinois is distinguished as it primarily aimed to protect the privilege against self-incrimination rather than the right to counsel, and its application is limited to its specific facts. The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings marks a critical point in the justice system, as it signifies the government's commitment to prosecute and the establishment of adversarial positions between the government and the defendant.
The commencement of "criminal prosecutions," to which the Sixth Amendment guarantees apply, is defined as starting with formal prosecutorial proceedings. The court declines to extend these constitutional protections to routine police investigations, emphasizing that rights to counsel arise only at "critical stages of the prosecution," such as post-indictment lineups, as established in relevant case law. While acknowledging the potential for police abuses during identification procedures, the court asserts that the Due Process Clause prohibits only those lineups that are overly suggestive and lead to mistaken identifications. The Stovall case illustrates the necessary balance between protecting suspects and allowing effective crime investigations before formal charges are made.
The narrative transitions to a specific incident involving the identification of two defendants by a witness who confirmed seeing and recognizing them during a robbery. The witness was brought to the police station by officers, and he positively identified the defendants without any suggestion from the police. Ultimately, the conviction of one defendant, Bean, was reversed, highlighting ongoing divisiveness among courts regarding the application of Wade and Gilbert to confrontations that occur before indictment.
The excerpt compares various legal precedents related to the right to counsel during critical stages of criminal proceedings, specifically from arraignment to trial. It highlights that defendants did not receive adequate legal assistance during this crucial period, despite having a constitutional right to counsel as affirmed in Powell v. Alabama. The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to a speedy and public trial, an impartial jury, notification of charges, confrontation of witnesses, compulsory process for witness procurement, and legal counsel. The text notes that the court, due to a limited grant of certiorari, will not address the potential due process violations in this case, leaving that issue open for future examination in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
