William J. Denning v. CSX Transportation, Inc.

Citation: Not availableDocket: M2012-01077-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; October 9, 2013; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The case involves an appeal by CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT) following a jury verdict in favor of William J. Denning under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). CSXT contested the trial court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the court's ruling on post-judgment interest, asserting it should be calculated under federal law. Denning cross-appealed regarding the exclusion of certain evidence and the calculation date for post-judgment interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of CSXT's motion and the trial court's evidentiary decisions, as well as the award of post-judgment interest under Tennessee law. However, it reversed the trial court's determination that interest accrues based on federal law, concluding that state law governs the calculation of post-judgment interest in FELA cases tried in state court.

Denning, who worked for CSXT from 1963 to 2001, filed his action in September 2004, alleging injuries from exposure to harmful substances, including asbestos and diesel exhaust. His amended complaint included claims of intentional conduct and various negligent acts, seeking over $25,000 in damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Pre-trial proceedings, including a McDaniel hearing, addressed most of his claims. The trial court allowed certain claims to proceed, including one involving chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), which was later retried due to a mistrial. The case reflects the complexities of FELA litigation and the interplay between state and federal law regarding damages and interest calculations.

On November 18, 2011, a jury ruled in favor of Mr. Denning, finding CSXT in violation of the Locomotive Inspection Act and awarding Mr. Denning $250,000 in damages while attributing 90% of the fault for his injuries to him. The trial court accepted the jury's decision, determining that fault allocation principles did not apply, and awarded Mr. Denning post-judgment interest at a rate of 10% per annum, effective from the date of the jury verdict. 

CSXT subsequently filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial and sought to amend the judgment to apply a lower federal post-judgment interest rate, effective from December 2, 2011. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial but deferred the decision on the amendment while requesting supporting law from CSXT. On May 1, 2012, the court partially granted CSXT's motion, establishing that interest would be calculated from December 12, 2011, the date of the judgment, but upheld the state post-judgment interest rate of 10% due to CSXT's failure to substantiate its claims regarding federal law applicability.

CSXT subsequently appealed, raising two issues: the entitlement to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the adequacy of Mr. Denning's causation evidence and the trial court's decision to apply Tennessee law for post-judgment interest instead of federal law. Mr. Denning cross-appealed on two points: the trial court's failure to award interest per Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-14-122 and the exclusion of evidence linking diesel exhaust to esophageal cancer.

A Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 50.02 motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is reviewed similarly to a Rule 50.01 motion for directed verdict, allowing for granting only when evidence supports a single conclusion. Appeals are assessed de novo, favoring the non-moving party in evidence evaluation. The applicability of federal or state law is also a legal question reviewed de novo without deference to the trial court. In the case of Mr. Denning under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), the jury found that CSXT violated the Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), which mandates that locomotives must be safe and properly inspected. The LIA does not create a separate cause of action but establishes unlawful conduct when violated, serving to supplement FELA by imposing an absolute duty on railroads for safe equipment. Violations of the LIA standards constitute negligence per se. FELA provides a federal remedy for railroad worker injuries due to employer negligence and aims to eliminate traditional defenses to liability while facilitating recovery in valid cases. FELA's broad coverage does not allow carriers to limit liability through contracts or regulations. To establish a claim under FELA, an employee must demonstrate that they were injured while employed in furtherance of interstate transportation, that the railroad was negligent, and that this negligence contributed to the injury.

Actual work and acts incidental to it fall within the scope of employment under FELA actions. In this appeal, CSXT challenged the denial of its Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, which must be assessed using the same standard as a directed verdict. A directed verdict in a FELA case should not be granted if there is any reasonable proof of employer negligence contributing to the injury or death in question. CSXT does not contest the jury's finding of negligence but argues that Mr. Denning failed to prove causation, primarily relying on the admission of Dr. Jonathan Evans' testimony. Dr. Evans claimed that diesel exhaust exposure caused Mr. Denning's COPD, but CSXT contends this testimony was inadmissible and insufficient for establishing causation because it relied on a study indicating only an association and not a direct causal link. CSXT also claims that Dr. Evans did not specify the level of diesel exposure necessary to cause COPD, which they argue undermines his testimony based on toxic tort principles. However, the FELA causation standard is notably broader than the common law proximate cause standard, making CSXT's arguments based on toxic tort principles inappropriate. The trial court's evidentiary decisions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, which limits the ability of appellate courts to overturn such decisions unless there is a clear error in legal standards or reasoning.

The trial court serves as a 'gatekeeper' regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, ensuring that experts apply the same intellectual rigor in court as in their professional practice. The court must verify that the expert's opinions are grounded in relevant scientific methods and data, rather than mere speculation. The reliability of such testimony involves four components: qualifications assessment, analytical cohesion, methodological reliability, and foundational reliability. The court must examine whether the expert's conclusions are adequately supported by their data to avoid significant analytical gaps. It should also evaluate the expert's methodology and the reliability of the underlying data. 

In this case, CSXT contends that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Evans' testimony, arguing it was scientifically unreliable since it relied on an NIH study that did not establish a direct causal link between diesel exhaust exposure and COPD. They point out that the study indicated only an association. However, the court found no abuse of discretion in permitting Dr. Evans' testimony that exposure to diesel exhaust caused Mr. Denning’s COPD, noting Dr. Evans' qualifications as a board-certified internist and pulmonologist with over 18 years of experience, as well as his clinical history with Mr. Denning, who was not a cigarette smoker.

Dr. Evans provided extensive testimony on Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD), highlighting his research background and a significant NIH study on railroad workers' exposure to diesel exhaust. This study indicated a correlation between diesel exposure and increased COPD mortality, specifying that engineers and brakemen were notably affected. Dr. Evans noted that the study found exposure to diesel exhaust increased the likelihood of developing COPD by 2.5 percent annually, even more than smoking, and was supported by prominent medical institutions. While Dr. Evans asserted that over 90 percent of Mr. Denning's condition was related to diesel exhaust, he acknowledged during cross-examination that the NIH study did not explicitly state that diesel exhaust causes COPD, but rather established an association with COPD mortality. CSXT argued the study's reliability was undermined by this lack of definitive causation, and by Dr. Evans' reliance on it to support his opinion. However, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s evidentiary decisions, affirming the jury's verdict. 

Additionally, Mr. Denning contested the exclusion of evidence linking diesel exhaust to esophageal cancer, claiming the trial court deemed his evidence unreliable. CSXT countered that Mr. Denning waived this argument by not filing for a new trial. Mr. Denning maintained that the jury verdict should stand without requesting a new trial, leading the court to pretermit this issue, as it found no error warranting relief on appeal.

The trial court determined that post-judgment interest in a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) action should accrue from the date of judgment, December 12, 2011, at a rate of ten percent per annum, as dictated by state law. Mr. Denning contends that interest should start accruing from the jury's verdict date, citing Tennessee statutes for both the commencement date and interest rate. Conversely, CSXT argues that federal law governs the accrual date, asserting that post-judgment interest is part of the actual damages awarded. The court acknowledges that while state courts must apply federal substantive law for FELA claims, post-judgment interest is not explicitly addressed in existing case law. Previous rulings, including Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, indicate that prejudgment interest is governed by federal law, but the issue of post-judgment interest remains unresolved. The prevailing view among jurisdictions is that post-judgment interest should align with state law, which is supported by the historical context provided by the Supreme Court in both Monessen and Louisville, N.R. Co. v. Stewart. The court concludes that post-judgment interest in FELA actions in state court can be justifiably awarded under state law provisions, contrary to CSXT's position.

The Supreme Court's decision in Stewart upheld Kentucky state law allowing a jury verdict by nine or more jurors and affirmed a ten percent post-judgment interest award. The Court clarified that states are not required to suspend judgments and can impose costs in cases where the judgment is upheld. Post-judgment interest compensates plaintiffs for the time between the verdict and payment, reflecting their right to use the awarded funds. In contrast, the Monessen Court ruled that prejudgment interest is not permitted under FELA as it is considered part of actual damages aimed at making plaintiffs whole, and noted that Congress has not amended FELA to include prejudgment interest despite multiple changes since its enactment. Post-judgment interest in federal civil actions is governed by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1961, which specifies a calculation method but does not affect judgments not specified in the section. The distinction between procedural and substantive law is highlighted, emphasizing that post-judgment interest can significantly increase the amount a defendant must pay if the plaintiff prevails.

Post-judgment interest serves to compensate a successful plaintiff for the delayed use of awarded funds after a favorable judgment. A party retaining funds that should have been paid must also pay interest on those funds. Once payment is made in full satisfaction of the judgment, interest ceases to accrue. If a defendant wins on appeal, the issue of interest becomes moot. In FELA actions adjudicated in state courts, the accrual and amount of post-judgment interest are governed by state law, specifically Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 47-14-121 and 122, applicable as of the jury's verdict in November 2011. The trial court's evidentiary rulings and denial of CSXT's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are affirmed, as is the award of post-judgment interest at ten percent per annum. However, the trial court's decision to calculate interest from the judgment date is reversed; interest should instead be calculated from the jury's verdict date. The case is remanded for modification of the interest award, execution of the judgment, and collection of costs, with costs on appeal charged to CSX Transportation, Inc. and its surety.