Sedley Alley appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief, raising several issues for review, including claims of judicial impartiality, improper juror dismissal, ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of expert services, and errors by the prosecutor and trial court. Alley was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, kidnapping, and aggravated rape, receiving a death sentence based on the jury's findings of aggravating circumstances related to the crime's heinous nature and its connection to the other offenses. His convictions were previously affirmed by the Tennessee Supreme Court. Following a prior appeal that led to the recusal of the original trial judge, a new evidentiary hearing was held, during which a mental health evaluation team examined the petitioner. The team, including Deborah Richardson, concluded that there was no need to review Alley’s birth records for his mental health assessment. Ultimately, the replacement judge denied the post-conviction relief request, which was affirmed by the appellate court.
The petitioner did not disclose significant medical history when questioned by the evaluation team. During the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Richardson testified that she reviewed records indicating the petitioner's mother had edema during pregnancy and noted the petitioner's declining Apgar scores, as well as his birth defects, including a collapsed lung and spina bifida. Despite several medical issues, including congenital kidney problems and a history of urethral surgeries, these conditions were not explored by the evaluation team before trial. Ms. Richardson confirmed no consultations with a urologist or geneticist occurred regarding the petitioner’s conditions. The team found no link between the petitioner’s physical ailments and his alleged multiple personality disorder, concluding further investigation was unnecessary. Diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and substance abuse issues, the petitioner was also labeled a malingerer. Ms. Richardson noted that new medical records would not have altered her diagnosis. While the petitioner exhibited some symptoms during evaluations, he behaved normally around the general population and did not display signs of nightmares, contradicting his claims. The trial attorneys showed exceptional interest in the case, frequently consulting with the evaluation team, who provided them with all findings. Dr. Samuel Craddock, a clinical psychologist, affirmed the thoroughness of the trial attorneys' efforts and stated they could not have influenced the petitioner's diagnosis.
Dr. Craddock testified that the evaluation team ruled out multiple personality syndrome for the petitioner, stating it was not standard practice to review birth records when assessing competency or sanity. Instead, they focused on traumatic life events influencing the petitioner's mental state during the offense. He opined that neither the urethral surgery nor a diving injury impacted the diagnosis, noting the petitioner did not describe these events as traumatic, although he acknowledged that the surgery's post-operative hemorrhaging could qualify as trauma. Dr. Craddock observed the petitioner appeared more impaired in team meetings than with other patients and reported no unusual behavior despite complaints of sleep problems and nightmares. He attributed the petitioner's personality disorder symptoms to malingering.
Dr. Zillur Athar, another psychiatrist, discussed the potential for genetic syndromes to influence behavior but admitted the team did not consult a geneticist. He linked multiple personality disorders to early sexual abuse trauma, suggesting that the petitioner’s surgery and dilation could be traumatic if not properly explained. However, he could not verify if the petitioner was adequately informed prior to these procedures. Dr. Athar described the term "neurosis" as outdated and significant if previously diagnosed but noted no follow-up on such information by the team. He indicated that the specifics of any brain hemorrhaging would be necessary for assessing its impact on mental evaluation. He did not connect the petitioner’s violent actions to his childhood surgery and maintained that the petitioner was sane and malingering, despite new information presented at the hearing. Athar had no evidence of childhood sexual abuse and acknowledged extensive interactions with defense attorneys, stating he spent more time on this case than usual, observing the petitioner behaving normally with other patients but excessively complaining in evaluation meetings.
The testimony indicated that the petitioner's trial attorneys could not have influenced the evaluation results. Dr. Athar found no symptoms of mental illness justifying genetic investigation. Dr. Lynne Donna Zager, a psychologist, conducted a preliminary evaluation and did not recall any childhood mental health treatment for the petitioner, although she recognized prior neurosis as potentially relevant. She noted the petitioner's traumatic urology operation and acknowledged considering its relevance in the evaluation. The evaluation team, which included interviews with the petitioner and his family, ruled out genetic investigation at the time. Dr. Zager assessed the petitioner's competency for trial and mental condition during the offense but did not prepare to testify on mitigating circumstances. She praised the trial attorneys' efforts, ruled out multiple personality disorder, and confirmed issues of substance abuse and borderline personality traits. Dr. Zager also suggested possible malingering.
Dr. Allen Overton Battle, hired by the defense, conducted hypnosis to uncover suppressed memories, with all sessions videotaped and no medication used during them. He noted the petitioner’s trial attorneys provided substantial information for his defense. Dr. Battle concluded the petitioner had multiple personality disorder but could not assert legal insanity at the time of the crime. He expressed a desire for further testing, including a taped confession that was not available, and highlighted the importance of medical records related to the petitioner’s surgery as potentially informative regarding his mental state. He hypothesized that a female alter ego emerged to cope with trauma, suggesting this alter ego committed the crime while the host personality managed the aftermath. Despite testifying about the disorder's formation at trial, Dr. Battle was not asked about his hypothesis linking multiple personalities to the crime.
The petitioner’s trial attorneys did not ask Dr. Battle to testify about potential mitigating circumstances, despite his acknowledgment of their excellent performance throughout his forty years of experience. Dr. Battle relied heavily on the trial attorneys for information regarding the petitioner’s history, including medical reports, and emphasized that his testimony on the multiple personality disorder was vital for the defense. He stated he was not consulted about the sanity issue, as other professionals were available, and his focus was solely on investigating the multiple personality disorder. Dr. Battle admitted that his limited interaction with the petitioner hindered his ability to evaluate malingering or insanity effectively, declaring it "totally impossible" to make an informed assessment. Although he did not specifically testify on mitigating circumstances, he did communicate the petitioner’s childhood pain to the jury during the guilt phase.
Mark Ward, the petitioner’s direct appeal counsel, asserted he managed the case post-appeal notice and raised all pertinent issues based on his expertise, confirming a sufficient appellate record. He indicated he would have sought a rehearing if the supreme court had misrepresented a witness's testimony, but recalled no such inaccuracies.
Dr. Wyatt Lee Nichols, a clinical psychologist, was asked by the trial attorneys to evaluate the petitioner’s competency and sanity. After the petitioner claimed memory loss regarding the crime, Dr. Nichols deemed further evaluation inadequate and did not explore mitigating circumstances. At the evidentiary hearing, he acknowledged that examining the petitioner's past experiences and urinary tract issues could have been beneficial for mitigation.
Attorney Robert Jones, with extensive experience in the Public Defender’s Office and the capital defense team, along with Ed Thompson as lead counsel, conducted investigations. They spoke with the petitioner’s family, gathering information about significant medical issues, including surgery and a head injury, that impacted the petitioner’s life.
The defense team lacked experience in multiple personality disorders, and the decision to pursue an insanity defense was made collaboratively among attorneys, the petitioner, and various experts. The trial attorneys did not inform the petitioner of any potential multiple personality disorder based on medical advice. Mr. Jones, a member of the defense team, stated he was unaware of the trial judge's Rule 121 report or that he was asked for input on it. Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 12 mandates that trial judges complete a report for first-degree murder cases, detailing mitigating evidence and submitting it for counsel's comments. Mr. Jones disagreed with the trial judge's claim that no mitigating evidence was presented, arguing that the petitioner’s mental state and intoxication should have been noted.
The defense team first considered possible mental defects when the petitioner reported memory loss and sought expert evaluations from Dr. Nichols and later Dr. Battle, who specialized in hypnosis. The petitioner underwent extensive evaluations at an institute, where a team, including Dr. Marshall, examined him. As the possibility of multiple personalities emerged, the defense engaged Dr. Battle due to his expertise in criminal cases. Mr. Jones maintained regular communication with the evaluation team and participated in several sessions. Both Drs. Battle and Marshall initially supported the multiple personality theory, attributing it to the petitioner's medical issues. However, Dr. Battle’s stance became uncertain before trial regarding control during the offense. Mr. Jones relied on Dr. Battle’s earlier support for the defense until he provided adverse testimony at trial, leading to Jones's decision to not use Dr. Battle as an expert in the future. Dr. Marshall, however, supported the insanity defense during the trial, and both experts had testified to the petitioner’s multiple personalities in pre-trial competency hearings.
Attorney Jones filed motions to continue the trial, supported by the county public defender, leading to a three-day delay in jury selection. He maintained that he did not waive any significant issues during the trial, despite the trial being closely scheduled after another case. Jones acknowledged he was prepared for the trial, having worked on it for over a year, though he noted tensions arose, including threats of contempt from the judge and challenges to the defense attorneys' credibility.
Jones was unaware of a letter from the victim's parents to the trial judge, which raised concerns about the judge's contact with them; the prosecution had access to this letter, but the defense did not. He admitted not filing a recusal motion. Additionally, he delayed objecting to the state displaying a photograph of the victim to avoid alienating the jury.
Jones confirmed that all prior medical records of the petitioner were shared with experts, although he had no recollection of medical issues at birth and stated that examining doctors did not suggest obtaining the birth records. He acknowledged knowledge of the petitioner’s urinary tract surgery and head injury but reported that a neurological evaluation revealed no organic issues.
While he did not present the actual surgical instrument used in the petitioner’s procedures to the jury, he attempted to convey the associated pain through Dr. Battle’s testimony, which linked the surgery to the development of multiple personality disorder. Jones chose not to call Dr. Zager during the penalty phase due to concerns about the credibility of some experts.
The defense team introduced mitigation evidence during the guilt phase, believing it credible and compelling, as exemplified by Dr. Battle’s testimony regarding the petitioner’s troubled childhood behavior. This strategy aimed to potentially influence the jury toward a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict while simultaneously presenting mitigating circumstances. Jones decided against using a psychologist in the sentencing phase to avoid potentially damaging cross-examination, noting that the trial court had approved requests for expert assistance and funding for a geneticist.
Mr. Jones testified that an insanity defense notice was filed over a year before the trial, but the state did not offer a plea agreement. Multiple pretrial motions were submitted, including one to suppress the petitioner’s statement, which led to extensive hearings. Throughout the trial, Mr. Jones maintained regular communication with the petitioner regarding the insanity defense and took responsibility for preparing the appellate record for Mr. Ward's representation. Ms. Glen assisted in gathering background information on the petitioner and helped with jury selection and witness coordination during sentencing. Mr. Nally conducted most of the crime investigation and performed a background check. Edward Thompson, who had extensive experience in criminal law and previously served as the Shelby County Public Defender, faced fatigue from a prior trial and requested to withdraw from the upcoming trial, which led to a three-day extension being granted. During the trial, Mr. Thompson was unaware of a letter from the victim's family to the judge, but he noted that the jury heard significant mitigating circumstances, which he felt were omitted from the trial judge's Rule 12 report. Dr. Battle was expected to evaluate the petitioner’s competency and sanity but ultimately provided only supportive testimony without testifying as anticipated. The defense relied on the petitioner’s family for information about any potential issues, which did not include any concerns related to his birth. Mr. Thompson indicated he would have sought medical records had he been informed of any issues. He also stated that the petitioner appeared lucid when confessing to the crime, and no evidence supported intoxication, leading the defense to forgo expert testimony during the suppression hearing.
In the analysis, it is noted that trial courts' findings in post-conviction suits hold the weight of jury verdicts, and the petitioner bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court's findings are upheld on appeal unless contrary evidence is found. The petitioner argues that he was denied a fair trial due to the trial judge's conduct, claiming bias and a lack of neutrality, which was evident in the judge's comments during the post-conviction proceedings regarding motions for stay of execution and appointment of counsel.
The petitioner argues that comments made during the post-conviction proceedings reveal a personal bias from the trial judge stemming from the original trial. Although these misconduct claims were reviewed in the initial post-conviction appeal, the court determined that the appearance of partiality warranted recusal of the trial judge and a remand for a hearing before a different judge. Despite acknowledging the challenges faced by trial judges, the court emphasized the importance of maintaining public confidence in judicial impartiality. However, the petitioner is not eligible for relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act since the alleged misconduct occurred during the post-conviction hearing, and he did not provide sufficient evidence for post-conviction relief.
The petitioner cites specific instances of misconduct, including inaccuracies in a Rule 12 report, expedited psychological evaluations, and inappropriate contact between the judge and the victim's family. The state argues these claims were waived as they were not presented during the direct appeal. The court agrees, stating that all but one claim regarding the victim's family were waived and lack merit. The petitioner also contends that the trial judge's Rule 12 report contained inaccuracies regarding mitigating evidence and that his defense attorneys were denied access to the report prior to its submission. However, these complaints do not rise to constitutional violations, as the rules governing such reports are legally established to assist the supreme court in its review process. The court affirmed that its comprehensive review included more information than the Rule 12 report alone.
The petitioner asserts that the judge pressured the staff of Middle Tennessee Health Institute for a swift evaluation of Mr. Alley, but the record does not support this claim. Mr. Alley underwent evaluations by multiple experts over four months, and although some doctors desired more time, the Institute's experts testified that additional information would not have altered their diagnosis. The petitioner also claims that interactions involving the trial judge, his wife, and the victim's family indicate bias. This assertion is based on a letter from the victim's family requesting expedited proceedings, the trial judge's wife sitting near the victim's family, and the victim's father approaching the judge's chambers during a recess. The petitioner discovered the letter only during the hearing, and it is noted that sharing such correspondence with both parties is advisable to prevent any appearance of impropriety, per the Code of Judicial Conduct. After an evidentiary hearing, a replacement judge found no evidence of prejudice from the letter, noting the trial judge neither responded to the family nor granted them special concessions. The timing of notifying the defense attorney about the case schedule does not indicate bias. The jurors likely did not know the trial judge's wife, and there is no evidence of improper contact between the trial judge and the victim's father during the trial. The petitioner failed to demonstrate that the evidence contradicted the trial court's findings, rendering this claim without merit.
Additionally, the petitioner argues that the trial court wrongfully excused a juror for cause and did not allow defense counsel to rehabilitate the juror. However, this issue was previously resolved in favor of the state during direct appeal, making it a non-issue. The trial court also determined that the defense attorneys were effective. For a claim of ineffective counsel to succeed, the petitioner must prove that the counsel's performance fell below the standard of competence for criminal attorneys and that such deficiency likely affected the trial's outcome. The court does not re-evaluate tactical decisions made by trial counsel unless they stem from inadequate preparation. Simply differing in strategy does not establish ineffectiveness.
Reviewing courts maintain a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the bounds of reasonable professional assistance, placing the burden on the petitioner to prove claims of ineffective assistance by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial judge's factual findings are conclusive unless contradicted by the evidence. The petitioner alleges ineffective counsel, highlighting that his defense attorneys failed to present evidence of his mental condition during his police statement, which he argues was critical due to his insanity defense. Testimony from Deborah Richardson, a Mental Health Program Specialist, indicated that the petitioner was not impaired at the time of his statement, as it was logical and coherent. Attorney Thompson noted that the audio confession seemed lucid, leading them to forgo calling experts to avoid potential cross-examination risks that might weaken their defense.
The post-conviction court found no unfair trial deprivation due to this strategy, asserting it was a well-informed decision. The petitioner further claims his attorneys did not adequately investigate his medical history or present significant mitigating evidence during sentencing. He argued that medical records related to his urinary tract issues were not obtained or shown to experts, undermining his insanity defense. Additionally, he contends that miscommunication with Dr. Battle led to an inadequate psychological evaluation. The petitioner criticized his appellate counsel for not filing a motion to reconsider a misstatement in the supreme court opinion regarding Dr. Marshall's testimony. During evidentiary hearings, the petitioner presented medical records about his birth and urinary condition. Although defense attorneys were aware of certain medical issues, they did not know about additional complications. Experts who evaluated the petitioner before trial maintained consistent opinions despite the newly introduced records. Dr. Zager, consulted for competency and insanity evaluations, found the petitioner competent but recommended further evaluation at an institution; she was not called to testify regarding mitigating circumstances.
During the post-conviction hearing, testimony revealed the expert's suspicions regarding the petitioner's possible malingering and the subsequent decision to transfer him for further evaluation, which became the responsibility of the doctors at the Institute. Dr. Zager factored in the petitioner's urinary tract deformity during her assessment and noted her extensive communication with his defense attorneys. The record indicates significant effort from defense counsel in trial preparation, having consulted 25 medical professionals. When pursuing an insanity defense based on a multiple personality theory, the attorneys sought out leading experts, ultimately relying on Dr. Battle and Dr. Marshall, both of whom diagnosed the petitioner with multiple personalities. However, Dr. Battle did not definitively assert that an alternate personality was in control during the offense, leading to some uncertainty noted by Mr. Jones, the attorney. Despite this ambiguity, Dr. Battle's testimony still provided critical mitigation evidence.
Dr. Marshall's testimony was consistent with the defense, though there was confusion regarding Dr. Battle's role, with Attorney Jones asserting he expected a comprehensive evaluation. The trial court favored Jones' account of the expert's function. The defense's extensive use of various evaluation techniques aimed to assess the petitioner's state of mind at the time of the crime, supporting the defense's reliance on expert opinions. The record does not suggest ineffective assistance of counsel due to an expert altering his opinion. The petitioner also claimed ineffectiveness for not presenting the device used during medical procedures, but the defense's decision to rely on Dr. Battle's verbal description was determined to be a reasonable strategy. Lastly, the petitioner argued that the attorneys should have sought a rehearing after the supreme court misrepresented Dr. Marshall's testimony in its direct appeal ruling, which stated the state's expert testimony was compelling and established the petitioner's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
The jury accepted the testimony of the state's expert witnesses. The petitioner did not demonstrate any factual misstatement or how a rehearing petition could have altered the outcome of the direct appeal. He alleged that his defense attorneys were unprepared for trial, referencing their motion for a continuance. However, the trial judge granted only a three-day extension, and both attorneys testified at the evidentiary hearing that they were prepared, a claim the post-conviction court affirmed.
The petitioner argued his trial counsel was ineffective for not including the transcript of the closing arguments in the appeal record, where the prosecutor referenced victim impact evidence. Despite this, the supreme court ruled that the introduction of such testimony was an error but deemed it harmless. The petitioner speculated that the court's opinion could have differed had it known the specifics of the closing argument, but this was rejected because the inappropriate comments did not occur during sentencing.
In another claim, the petitioner criticized defense counsel for delaying objections to a large photograph of the victim displayed during the trial. The supreme court found no merit in this objection due to insufficient evidence on how the photo was presented. The post-conviction court concluded that the petitioner did not prove that the delayed objection or any other alleged ineffectiveness of counsel prejudiced the jury's decision on guilt or the death penalty.
Additionally, the petitioner cited several other instances where his counsel failed to object to prosecutorial questioning and arguments, including issues related to the victim's background and the husband's privilege. Each of these claims was presented without adequate explanation or support, leading to the conclusion that the petitioner failed to substantiate his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The post-conviction court found that trial counsel was not ineffective regarding the allegations presented by the petitioner. The petitioner argued that trial counsel failed to raise specific issues on direct appeal, but since no error was determined, this claim was rejected. Furthermore, the petitioner sought expert witness expenses for complex medical and psychological issues, arguing these experts were necessary to assess trial counsel's effectiveness. However, the trial court denied this motion based on the precedent set in *Teague v. State*, which stated that rules governing expert services in capital cases applied only at trial, not in post-conviction contexts. Although *Owens v. State* later overruled *Teague*, affirming that such rules do apply in post-conviction cases, it emphasized that mere allegations were insufficient; petitioners must provide specific factual proof of the necessity for experts to support their claims. The court concluded that the petitioner's motion did not meet these requirements, thus the post-conviction court correctly determined that the record was adequate to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, the petitioner claimed the trial court denied him the opportunity to present evidence through Dr. Lynn Zager, which he argued would have supported his assertion of inadequate preparation for his insanity defense. Dr. Zager indicated she had opinions on relevant issues but was not asked to provide them during the trial.
Testimony from Dr. Zager indicated that she had never been tasked with investigating a case in Shelby County for potential mitigating circumstances, as her facility, the Midtown Mental Health Center, typically conducts evaluations under court orders without focusing on mitigation. Dr. Zager's team first assessed the petitioner’s competency for trial and subsequently evaluated his sanity at the time of the offense, concluding he was competent but recommending further evaluation in Nashville. During post-conviction proceedings, when asked about the relevance of the information for mitigation, Dr. Zager stated that mitigation was not her focus, and she was unprepared to form an opinion on the matter. The post-conviction judge allowed the petitioner’s counsel to present an offer of proof regarding any mitigating evidence Dr. Zager could provide, but she was not prepared to do so.
The petitioner raised several claims against the prosecutors, including inappropriate questioning of a witness, improper arguments during sentencing, failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, and not providing a letter from the victim's family to the trial judge. The claim regarding the prosecutor's questioning was previously addressed by the supreme court, which deemed the conduct unprofessional but ultimately harmless. The argument about the prosecutor diminishing the jury's responsibility was considered waived since it was not raised on direct appeal. The trial court had informed the jury that they could consider sympathy in their verdict, countering the petitioner's claim of improper argument by the prosecutor. Additionally, the petitioner alleged that the prosecutor commented on his rights to counsel and silence without support from the record, leading to waiver of that issue. Lastly, the claim that the prosecutor withheld evidence regarding Dr. Zager's theory of the crime was deemed without merit, as Dr. Zager stated she had discussed her theory with both sides, contradicting the petitioner’s assertion.
Dr. Zager reported her findings to both parties as mandated by a court order. Attorney Jones's inability to recall receiving this information does not indicate that the state withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense; it merely highlights discrepancies in witness recollections. The petitioner claims that the prosecutor erred by not providing the defense with a copy of a letter from the victim's family, but this failure, while improper, was deemed inadvertent and not prejudicial to the petitioner's right to a fair trial.
The petitioner alleges judicial misconduct, claiming the trial judge wrongly denied the jury access to videotapes of the petitioner’s hypnotic and sodium amytal sessions. However, this issue was previously resolved by the state supreme court, which found the trial judge's actions appropriate. The petitioner also contests the trial court's allowance of victim impact evidence, which the supreme court found irrelevant but deemed harmless error.
Additionally, the petitioner argues that the trial court improperly limited the defense's ability to present mitigating circumstances. This claim lacks support in the record and is therefore considered waived. Lastly, the petitioner asserts that certain jury instructions during both the guilt and penalty phases were unconstitutional. Specifically, claims include the definitions of premeditation, malice, reasonable doubt, and confession. The court clarified that the prior ruling in State v. Brown did not render the premeditation instruction unconstitutional and noted that Brown's application is not retroactive. The assertion regarding the malice instruction shifting the burden of proof is also contested.
The trial court instructed the jury on the distinction between express and implied malice, clarifying that malice cannot be inferred solely from deadly intent and that the state holds the burden of proof for all crime elements, with no burden placed on the defendant by inference. The court found these instructions appropriate within the overall context. The petitioner challenged the reasonable doubt instruction involving "moral certainty," but the state's supreme court has upheld this wording in the past. Regarding jury instructions on confessions, the petitioner argued that the jury's ability to assess confession reliability was restricted, but failed to provide additional arguments or support, thereby waiving the claim. The trial court instructed the jury to evaluate the truth of the confession while considering all related evidence, which the court deemed constitutional and without merit.
The petitioner also contended that jury instructions during the sentencing phase unconstitutionally shifted the burden to him to prove mitigating evidence, a claim previously rejected by the supreme court. He argued that the instructions did not adequately narrow the class of death penalty-eligible defendants and limited jury consideration of mitigating factors like sympathy, both claims having been dismissed in prior rulings. Additionally, he asserted the instructions diminished the jury's role in the death penalty process without substantive argument, although the death penalty statute has repeatedly survived constitutional scrutiny.
The petitioner claimed that the instruction regarding the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance was vague, a contention deemed meritless by the court. He also asserted that the aggravating circumstances instruction duplicated an element of the crime, but this was dismissed as irrelevant since he was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder, thus eliminating any Middlebrooks issue. Lastly, he argued that allowing multiple aggravating circumstances based on the same set of facts was unconstitutional, but this claim was not substantiated.
The petitioner alleges 37 instances of improper "double counting" without providing supporting arguments or legal citations, rendering the claim meritless. Additionally, the petitioner contests the constitutionality of the reasonable doubt instruction, specifically the term "moral certainty," used during sentencing, but this claim is rejected based on established precedent from the state supreme court. The petitioner further argues that the Tennessee death penalty statute is unconstitutional; however, this issue was previously addressed and ruled upon in a direct appeal, making it a settled matter. Various court decisions reinforce the lack of merit in the petitioner's broad claims. Ultimately, the post-conviction court's findings and conclusions are fully supported by the record, and the petitioner has not met the burden of proof, leading to the affirmation of the denial of post-conviction relief.
