State v. Charles Edward Overby

Docket: E1999-00253-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; November 30, 2010; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Charles Edward Overby was convicted of several offenses: possession of marijuana, theft (both under $500 and over $1,000), aggravated assault, and second-degree murder, while being acquitted of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced him to a total of 35 years, with specific sentences for each offense: eleven months and twenty-nine days for both marijuana possession and theft under $500, eight years for theft over $1,000, ten years for aggravated assault, and twenty-five years for second-degree murder. The sentences for aggravated assault and second-degree murder were ordered to be served consecutively, while the other sentences were concurrent.

In his appeal, Overby contended that the trial court erred by allowing an expert witness to testify on the ultimate issue of insanity; however, the court found no error and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

The incident leading to the charges occurred on June 3, 1997, when Thomas Kevin Swinford observed a man, later identified as Overby, driving his father's state-assigned vehicle, which was valued at $7,500. The vehicle contained firearms and ammunition. After the theft, law enforcement discovered the vehicle at a residence in Bradley County, with some items missing. A witness, Roy Grant Breedlove, encountered Overby at his home, where Overby asked to use a phone and offered him marijuana, which Breedlove declined.

Irene Breedlove was at her home in Bradley County when the defendant arrived. Approximately 15 minutes after the defendant left, her husband, Mr. Breedlove, returned home. At 4:15 PM, the Breedloves saw the defendant driving a Georgia state vehicle, prompting Mr. Breedlove to stop him and inquire about his visit. Mr. Breedlove warned the defendant not to return to their property, after which they recorded the vehicle's license plate and reported it to the sheriff's department.

Tana King, who knew the defendant and his son, testified that she had never observed any signs of mental illness or drug abuse in the defendant. Jamie Fowler, a friend of the victim, Roy Allen Hampton, was at the victim’s residence when the defendant approached in a state vehicle. The defendant, shirtless and armed, demanded to know the whereabouts of his children, despite being told they were not present. He then shot the victim in the head, leading to the victim's death, with Fowler identifying the defendant as the shooter.

After the shooting, the defendant directed Fowler to the back of the house, but Fowler managed to escape and call 911. He informed the victim's grandfather of the incident and prepared for the possibility of the defendant entering the home. There was no prior interaction between the victim and the defendant that led to the shooting.

Robbie Steward, a neighbor, described the defendant as sweaty and out of breath when he visited her looking for his sons. She suggested he check at her mother's house across the street. George Howard, another neighbor, saw the defendant walking through weeds and noted he appeared calm and coherent. Lastly, Billy McBryar, returning home with his family, found the defendant inside his granddaughter's van. The defendant claimed he was waiting for someone to take him across town and exhibited a quiet demeanor.

The defendant was observed by McBryar, who noted his heavy perspiration and damp clothing, and advised him to leave the area. Following this, Lieutenant Mike Boggess was dispatched to investigate a suspicious person and encountered the defendant walking along Bromley Drive with several dogs. Boggess conducted a pat-down but found no weapon, describing the defendant as hot and sweaty, wearing a gray shirt and muddy blue jeans. After checking the defendant's ID, Boggess received instructions to arrest him. The defendant, who had cuts and scratches, did not resist arrest. A subsequent gunshot residue test indicated he had recently fired a weapon. Months later, the murder weapon was discovered nearby, containing several bullets.

Detective Clint Denny identified evidence from a stolen vehicle, including a small bag of marijuana and a note from Charles Overby, Jr., indicating he was with someone else and would return soon. Denny also collected a shirt worn by the defendant at the time of arrest. 

Dr. Charles Harlan, who performed the victim's autopsy, testified that the victim was likely unconscious immediately after being shot and died hours later. Under direct examination, Harlan addressed the impact of methamphetamine on a person's ability to discern right from wrong, stating it would not affect this capacity, though the defense objected based on Tennessee's insanity defense criteria. 

Dr. William C. Greer, a psychiatrist for the defendant, initially diagnosed him with major depression, later revising it to include psychosis and substance dependence. Greer could not confirm whether the defendant was experiencing a non-drug-induced psychosis at the time of the crimes or if he understood the wrongfulness of his actions.

The defendant's sister, Violet Little, testified about his introverted and nervous childhood, his claims of hearing his deceased father, and violent tendencies. She also mentioned a head injury he sustained as a child. Their mother, Barbara Sullivan, described him as quiet during his early years.

Ms. Sullivan reported her treatment for schizophrenia, anxiety, and depression, and noted that her son had previously sustained a head injury. She observed bizarre behavior from the defendant after his bail release, despite not having seen him for a month before the shooting. Dr. Patrick Craven from Mocassin Bend Mental Health Institute diagnosed the defendant with schizo-affective disorder, depressed type, noting the defendant heard voices urging him to commit suicide. Dr. David A. Rose conducted psychological tests, finding evidence of chronic depression and cognitive difficulties, and identified the defendant as relatively paranoid and unrealistic in his thinking. Dr. Samuel Craddock, a psychologist at Middle Tennessee Mental Health Institute, assessed the defendant as a danger to himself due to suicidal threats and diagnosed him with major depression with psychotic features. He claimed the defendant's mental state impaired his ability to comprehend the seriousness of his murder charge and assist in his defense preparation. Dr. Craddock treated the defendant approximately ten months post-crime and attributed his severe mental illness to voluntary amphetamine use, while affirming that the defendant understood the wrongfulness of his actions. He clarified that although amphetamine intoxication can be classified as a mental illness, it was self-induced. Dr. Craddock pointed out that behavioral indicators, such as attempts to evade capture or conceal evidence, suggested the defendant was aware of the wrongful nature of his actions. He concluded that despite the defendant's irrational behavior, he retained an understanding of the wrongfulness of the shooting. Dr. Jerry DeVane, the emergency room medical director, could not determine if the defendant had a mental disease or defect at the time of the shooting.

Dr. Angelina A. Supan diagnosed the defendant with paranoid schizophrenia but did not determine if he had a severe mental disease at the time of the murder. The defendant reported a childhood car accident that caused memory issues and auditory hallucinations for 14 to 15 years. He used earphones to mask the voices and was on medication, expressing a desire to no longer live. He admitted to using "crank" for eighteen days prior to the victim's shooting. 

Until 1995, Tennessee's insanity statute defined insanity as lacking substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's conduct due to mental disease or defect, which did not include antisocial behavior. In 1995, the statute was amended to require defendants to prove inability to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of their actions due to severe mental disease or defect. The burden of proof shifted to the defendant, requiring clear and convincing evidence, and expert witnesses were prohibited from testifying on the ultimate issue of insanity.

The 1996 Advisory Commission Comments acknowledged the restriction on expert testimony regarding insanity, reinforcing that specific provisions take precedence over general rules. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld a state's right to require defendants to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt without infringing on due process, implying that a lesser standard, such as clear and convincing evidence, is permissible. The jury ultimately rejected the defendant's claim of insanity based on the evidence presented at trial.

The defendant contends that the trial court undermined his insanity defense by initially barring expert testimony on his sanity but later permitting limited inquiries about his mental illness and its impact on his understanding of his actions. The court maintained that it properly restricted expert testimony in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. 39-11-501, which prohibits experts from directly stating whether a defendant was legally insane but allows them to discuss the presence of a severe mental disease or defect and its effect on the defendant's ability to comprehend the nature or wrongfulness of his conduct. The court referenced State v. Jeffery L. Perry, affirming that while experts could describe the defendant's mental state, they could not conclude that his mental condition prevented him from recognizing the wrongfulness of his actions. The jury is tasked with determining the influence of mental illness on the defendant's understanding at the time of the offense. The trial court ensured that expert witnesses could provide relevant opinions without transgressing legal boundaries, and none testified that the defendant met the statutory criteria for insanity. Ultimately, the defendant failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of his insanity defense, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's judgment, confirming that he was afforded a proper opportunity to present his case.