State of Tennessee v. Ceasar Johnson

Citation: Not availableDocket: W2008-00111-CCA-R3-CD

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; November 30, 2010; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Ceasar Johnson was convicted by a Shelby County jury on two counts of voluntary manslaughter and one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, resulting from a shooting on January 9, 2006, that killed Mark Collins and Cedric Stanley and injured Edward Stanley, Jr. Johnson received a total sentence of twelve years, serving four and a half years for each manslaughter conviction and three years for the attempted manslaughter, all to be served consecutively. On appeal, Johnson challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing options, and the imposition of consecutive sentences. The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the record and affirmed the trial court's judgments. Key witness testimony included that of Rosalee Stanley, who confirmed her son Edward owned the vehicle involved, and Susan Collins Quarterman, who recounted the circumstances of her son’s death. Witness Susan Williams described observing Johnson shoot into the car occupied by the victims while she was driving nearby. The appellate court's opinion was delivered by Judge Alan E. Glenn, with Judges Norma McGee Ogle and Camille R. McMullen concurring.

A witness identified as Williams observed a gunman fleeing the scene of a shooting while holding a gun but did not see a baseball cap in his hand. After calling 911, Williams and her husband parked their car close to the scene without exiting or opening any doors. She estimated her attention was diverted from the shooting for about one to two minutes. Another witness, Jessica Griffin, was in Memphis for a funeral when she heard gunshots. While driving, she saw two men flee from a red car where the shooting occurred. Upon reaching the scene, Griffin noted a young man in the backseat leaning over and another in the front passenger seat struggling to breathe, while the driver was responsive. She did not observe any weapons and was unsure if the driver’s side window was shattered. Memphis Police Officer Timothy Steele arrived to find a maroon Cadillac with broken windows and three unresponsive passengers, while the driver could provide information. He reported that all car doors were closed upon arrival and noted the presence of witnesses who did not interact with the vehicle. Lieutenant Gregory Quinn later arrived, found the driver still inside the car, and had to secure the vehicle before removing him. He ensured the perimeter was secured and collected shell casings, confirming that no one other than emergency personnel touched the car.

Edward Stanley, Jr. testified about the events of January 9, 2006, while visiting his parents' house. His brother, Cedric, left briefly but later called to inform Edward that he had been robbed. Edward, accompanied by Mark Collins, drove to pick up Cedric, who indicated that the assailants were nearby. Upon encountering the defendant, who was with another individual, an argument erupted regarding the robbery of marijuana from Cedric. During the confrontation, Edward noted that he and Collins did not intervene, but they observed the defendant denying involvement while holding a bag of marijuana. 

Edward acknowledged inconsistencies in his statements to the police about what was stolen, initially uncertain if it was drugs or money, but later clarified that the robbery involved marijuana. Following a prolonged argument, the defendant's companion approached him and he began shooting. Edward witnessed Collins injured and called for Cedric to contact the police. However, Cedric collapsed in the car shortly thereafter. After the gunfire, Edward saw both the defendant and his companion flee the scene. He was hospitalized for approximately two and a half months and learned of the deaths of Cedric and Collins days later. Edward confirmed that neither he, Cedric, nor Collins had weapons that day and identified the defendant in a lineup shortly after the incident.

Agent Steve Scott of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) testified as an expert in firearms identification regarding evidence examined from a shooting incident. He received a Beretta nine-millimeter firearm, various cartridges, and projectiles retrieved from victims and the shooting scene. Scott determined that none of the projectiles or cartridge cases had been fired from the Beretta. While he noted that two projectiles could have been fired from the same weapon, he couldn't conclusively state that they originated from a single gun due to differences in metal composition affecting ballistic markings.

Agent Oakley McKinney, a fingerprint specialist with the TBI, examined the Beretta and found no latent fingerprints, attributing this to the firearm’s matte finish, which reduces fingerprint retention. He stated that the absence of prints does not indicate the gun was not handled and noted that he did not compare Cedric Stanley's known fingerprint impression due to the lack of developed latent prints.

Agent James Russell Davis II, an expert in gunshot residue analysis, analyzed a residue kit taken from Cedric Stanley's hands, yielding inconclusive results that did not rule out the possibility of his involvement with a firearm. Davis explained that inconclusive results are common for shooting victims due to the nature of gunshot residue distribution. He also analyzed a SEM tab from an item described as a jacket shoulder but could not confirm the presence of gunshot primer residue or the specifics of the sample, as details regarding the jacket's ownership and its proximity to the discharge were unclear.

Dr. Kenneth Snell, an expert in forensic pathology, conducted autopsies on Cedric Stanley and Mark Collins. He determined that Cedric sustained a gunshot wound to the back of his right upper arm, with the bullet entering and exiting the arm before penetrating the chest cavity, damaging the right lung and severing blood vessels. The bullet was recovered from the left shoulder area. The absence of soot or stippling around the external wound suggested the gun was fired from at least six inches away. Mark Collins suffered a head wound that exited on the opposite side at a slight downward angle, also lacking soot or powder, indicating an indeterminable firing range.

Officer Hope Smith, a crime scene investigator, responded to the shooting at 3425 South Mendenhall Road on January 9, 2006. She documented the scene, identifying evidence including marijuana, a small silver scale, spent bullet casings, and live nine-millimeter rounds, noting that the Cadillac involved blocked pedestrian traffic. The driver’s side window was completely shattered, but she did not report any other broken windows. A secondary crime scene yielded additional plastic baggies containing tobacco near an apartment complex.

Sergeant Anthony Mullins also responded to the scene, describing a secured perimeter with emergency vehicles present, and a body outside the Cadillac. He confirmed that the Cadillac was taken for further examination, revealing bullet trajectories indicating shots originated from outside the right rear door. No weapons were found in the vehicle. The investigation did not identify the defendant as a suspect until two to three days later, at which point officers analyzed Cedric's cell phone records to establish potential persons of interest.

Officers identified the defendant as the gunman through Edward's identification after finding the defendant’s number in Cedric’s call log. On January 12, 2006, they arrested the defendant at his residence and conducted a consensual search, uncovering a nine-millimeter Beretta handgun belonging to the husband of the defendant’s sister, as indicated by him. The defendant was taken into custody around 7:30 p.m., with questioning starting three hours later and lasting two hours, followed by an additional two hours for typing his statement.

In his confession, the defendant admitted to killing Cedric and Collins with a black and silver nine-millimeter handgun, stating he fired five shots and no one else was involved. He claimed not to know the gun's location, suggesting it was lost while fleeing. The defendant recounted a series of events leading up to the shooting, including a conversation with Cedric about marijuana, and described a confrontation where Cedric and two others reached for their guns, prompting him to shoot in fear for his life. He stated he ran to a gas station afterward and returned home, asserting he had no prior contact with Cedric that day, except for a previous marijuana sale.

Initially, the defendant claimed self-defense, stating the victims were armed, but this terminology was absent from his typed statement. Sergeant Mullins noted that he may have mentioned cell phones during the interrogation but did not recall offering the defendant an excuse related to that. He also confirmed that the defendant was hesitant to implicate Cook during the interview. Earline Fitzgerald, a witness, testified to seeing two young men running near her home around 4:00 p.m. on January 6, 2006.

A witness, Fitzgerald, observed a scared young man wearing khaki pants, a red shirt, and a cap, who claimed he was being shot at. Concerned, she called 911 and heard three gunshots during the call. Afterward, she saw a young man on a stretcher who resembled the one who spoke to her, but she only noted he was dressed in red. Ceasar Johnson, II, the defendant’s father, testified about the arrest of his son on January 12, 2006. He described the police's rough treatment despite the defendant's surrender and recounted their lengthy stay at the police station, during which they signed a rights advisement. Johnson expressed concerns about the interrogation process, stating that the officers appeared to control the narrative and did not accurately document the defendant's responses. He did not object out of fear. Marco Parrot, a witness familiar with the victim, identified Cedric and Collins as acquaintances from school and the neighborhood. He recounted a drug transaction with Collins on January 9, 2006, where Collins mentioned having plans to "pop cone," indicating potential criminal intentions. Parrot corrected his earlier police statement, clarifying that Collins requested two ounces of marijuana, not two pounds.

The defendant acknowledged signing a statement that he considered true but admitted to not reading it fully due to being late for work. He is currently incarcerated for missing a court subpoena and has prior convictions for theft and aggravated assault. Sergeant Caroline Mason from the Memphis Police Department testified about the defendant's questioning on January 13, 2006, noting that she did not engage in substantial conversation before he signed the advice of rights form. She explained that statements are recorded in the squad room, with Sergeant Mullins asking questions and her typing responses. She stated that all relevant statements would be included upon the defendant's request. Although the defendant's statement took two hours, she clarified that this was due to the necessity of discussing Miranda rights, which had been addressed prior to the interview.

The defendant testified about his activities in January 2006, stating he was living with his sister and selling marijuana. He recounted a call from Cedric Stanley on January 6, asking to buy marijuana, which he initially declined due to job searching. After calling Cedric back, he planned to sell an ounce of marijuana for $75 while carrying a quarter pound. While walking with a friend, they were confronted by Cedric and others in a car, who attempted to rob them at gunpoint. The defendant described a tense encounter, during which he felt threatened and attempted to escape but was blocked by the assailants' vehicle. Fearing for his life, he handed over the drugs when ordered, but during the confrontation, he grabbed a gun from Cedric and fired in self-defense, claiming he had no intention to kill anyone. He fired five shots without any return fire from the armed individuals.

The defendant disposed of a firearm, sought refuge at a gas station, then returned home, where he asked his sister to call the police. He remained at home until his arrest on January 12, 2006, only stepping outside once due to threats he perceived from passersby. On the day of his arrest, he was at home with family when police arrived around 7:00 p.m. He was then taken to an interrogation room, where he was shackled to a table for a couple of hours with Sergeants Mullins and Mason, and his father present. During the interrogation, Sergeant Mullins illustrated potential penalties on a blackboard, suggesting the defendant's actions were not in self-defense, despite the defendant asserting that the shooting was a self-defense reaction to being threatened by the victims. 

The defendant wanted to cooperate with police in hopes of leniency but felt his statement was misrepresented, as key details of previous encounters with the victims were omitted. He was not allowed to review the statement before signing it and noted the officers took minimal breaks during the interrogation. Ultimately, the jury convicted him of two counts of voluntary manslaughter and one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter.

The defendant contested the sufficiency of the evidence for these convictions, claiming his actions were justified as self-defense. The appeal process evaluates whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the elements of the crime were proven, as established in case law. The credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are determined by the trier of fact, with precedents affirming that insufficient evidence can lead to the reversal of a conviction.

A jury's guilty verdict, confirmed by the trial judge, validates the testimonies of the State's witnesses and favors the State's narrative in resolving evidentiary conflicts, as established in State v. Grace. The trial judge and jury assess witness credibility based on their direct observations, which cannot be fully replicated in a written record during appeals. Upon conviction, the presumption of innocence is replaced by a presumption of guilt, imposing the burden on the defendant to prove insufficient evidence for their conviction.

The defendant, charged with second degree murder and attempted second degree murder, was instead convicted of lesser charges: voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter involves an intentional killing under provocation. Criminal attempt exists when a person, with required culpability, takes a substantial step toward committing an offense.

The defendant contends that the evidence did not support his convictions, arguing he acted in self-defense due to a reasonable fear of death or serious harm when he shot the victims. Under Tennessee law, a person may use force in self-defense if there is a reasonable belief of imminent danger. When self-defense is raised, the State must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the determination of whether the defendant acted in self-defense is ultimately a factual question for the jury.

Evidence was evaluated in favor of the State, supporting the defendant’s convictions for voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter. The defendant admitted to firing into a car, resulting in the deaths of Mark Collins and Cedric Stanley, and injuring Edward Stanley. He claimed self-defense, asserting that he was approached by the victims, who attempted to rob him while armed. The defendant testified that he fled, was chased, and shot after Cedric allegedly exited the vehicle with a gun. He presented testimony from Earline Fitzgerald, who mentioned seeing a young man claiming he was being shot at, but she could not identify him.

Contrary to the self-defense claim, evidence from Edward Stanley indicated the victims were unarmed and that no weapons were found in their vehicle. Eyewitnesses, including Jessica Griffin and Susan Williams, confirmed the absence of weapons and noted that all car doors were closed when they arrived at the scene. The jury evaluated the evidence and, despite the self-defense argument, concluded that the defendant acted out of passion provoked by adequate circumstances rather than a legitimate fear for his life.

During sentencing in October 2007, Edward Stanley described the traumatic impact of the incident on his life, opposing probation for the defendant. Rosalee Stanley, the victims' mother, expressed that granting probation would be an insult and unjust. The defendant’s father spoke positively about him, noting his academic performance and mentioning the death of the defendant's mother in December 2004, which prompted his move to Memphis to live with a sister.

The defendant did not attend school in Memphis, citing a break to prepare for Job Corp after his mother's death, which significantly impacted his ability to focus. He left school in Mississippi after completing the eleventh grade, achieving mostly B's and C's. The defendant claimed self-defense in the shooting of the victims, asserting he was not a bad person and had been raised in a religious environment. He acknowledged involvement with drugs and a negative peer group after moving to Memphis but had since earned improvement certificates and engaged in religious activities while incarcerated, aspiring to obtain a ministry license upon release. 

Victim impact statements were presented by the State, while the defendant provided letters of support from his community. The trial court enhanced the defendant’s sentence due to prior criminal behavior, drug dealing, use of a firearm during the offense, and lack of hesitation in committing the crime despite high risks to human life. The court found no mitigating factors and sentenced the defendant to four and a half years for each of the two voluntary manslaughter convictions and three years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, ordering sentences to be served consecutively for a total of twelve years, denying probation or alternative sentencing.

In reviewing the sentence, the court conducts a de novo review with a presumption of correctness regarding the trial court's determinations, conditional on evidence showing that the trial court considered relevant facts and principles. This presumption does not extend to legal conclusions or determinations based on uncontested facts. The reviewing court must weigh various factors, including evidence from the trial, the presentence report, sentencing principles, and the defendant's statements and potential for rehabilitation.

In **State v. Taylor**, the burden lies with the party challenging the trial court's sentence to prove its erroneous nature, as established by **Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401**. The defendant must demonstrate that the trial court's sentence is incorrect. If the trial court adhered to the statutory sentencing guidelines and adequately considered the relevant factors, the appellate court will not alter the sentence even if it prefers a different outcome.

The defendant contended that the trial court wrongly denied judicial diversion, probation, or alternative sentencing, arguing he was a suitable candidate for such options due to his status as a Range I offender convicted of Class C and D felonies, along with his youth, lack of a criminal record, and the circumstances of the crime. However, the State maintained that the trial court's decision to deny alternative sentencing was justified, and the appellate court agreed.

Regarding judicial diversion, **Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-313** allows a trial court to defer proceedings and place a qualified defendant on probation after a guilty plea or verdict, provided certain criteria are met, such as no prior felony convictions. Successful completion of probation leads to dismissal of the proceedings and potential record expungement. The trial court's discretion in granting or denying diversion is significant and will not be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion, which requires a lack of substantial evidence supporting the trial court's decision. In assessing diversion eligibility, factors considered include the defendant's amenability to correction, the offense's circumstances, criminal history, social background, mental and physical health, deterrence value, and public interest. The trial court must justify its denial of diversion by addressing these factors and explaining how those supporting denial outweigh those favoring diversion.

The trial court denied the defendant's request for diversion, expressing concerns about his amenability to correction due to his lack of employment, school dropout status, and admission of drug dealing. The court highlighted his good physical and mental health but noted a "horrible social history." It characterized the offense as extremely aggravated, citing the defendant's actions in killing two teenagers and partially paralyzing a third with minimal provocation. The court concluded that judicial diversion for such a "purposeful killing" would undermine public interest, especially given the case's extensive community publicity.

Regarding alternative sentencing and probation, the defendant, classified as a standard offender for Class C and D felonies, was presumed eligible for alternative sentencing due to his sentence being ten years or less. However, this presumption did not guarantee probation; the defendant bore the burden of proving his suitability for probation. The trial court's decision-making involved a case-by-case analysis of multiple factors, including the offense's circumstances, the defendant's criminal record, social history, present condition, deterrence needs, and the interests of both the defendant and the public. Credibility and potential for rehabilitation were also considered, as was the risk that probation might diminish the offense's seriousness. The presumption for alternative sentencing could be rebutted by evidence from the presentence report, State testimony, or other records. The court could deny alternative sentencing based on considerations such as the necessity of confinement to protect society from a defendant with a significant criminal history.

Confinement was deemed necessary to maintain the seriousness of the offense and deter similar future crimes, as outlined in Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-103(1). In sentencing the defendant to confinement instead of probation, the trial court referenced the defendant's troubled social history involving drugs and firearms, his failure to engage in productive activities like school or work, and the extremely aggravated nature of the crime. Despite the absence of prior convictions, the court expressed skepticism about the defendant's potential for rehabilitation and credibility, especially regarding his claims of religious transformation.

The trial court found that a probationary sentence would diminish the gravity of the offenses, which involved the defendant firing five shots into a car during a failed drug deal, resulting in two deaths and one serious injury. The court emphasized the societal need for protection from such violent acts and concluded that no less restrictive measures had been attempted. The defendant's argument that the court overlooked mitigating factors was rejected; the court had considered these factors but did not interpret them favorably for the defendant. The trial court’s conclusions are supported by a presumption of correctness, indicating careful consideration of the relevant facts and sentencing principles.

A court can deny alternative sentencing based on the seriousness of the offense, requiring that the offense be especially violent or shocking, and that its nature outweighs any factors favoring alternative sentences. This is supported by State v. Hartley, which emphasizes the need for particularly egregious circumstances. The case in question was highly publicized, with significant media coverage and community concern due to the prevalence of homicides, as noted in the presentence report indicating that the defendants were recent homicide victims in Memphis. 

The Tennessee Supreme Court in Hooper provided a list of factors to assess whether deterrence is needed and if incarceration is suitable, including the frequency of similar offenses in the community, the defendant's intent and motivations, the level of publicity surrounding the crime, involvement in criminal enterprises, and previous criminal conduct. 

The defendant's social history revealed a lack of education and work experience, with the court finding the defendant's rehabilitation potential not credible. This led to the affirmation of the trial court's denial of probation or alternative sentencing. 

Regarding consecutive sentencing, the defendant claimed the trial court merely recited the Wilkerson factors in labeling him a dangerous offender. However, the State contended that the trial court made the necessary findings. Under Tennessee law, consecutive sentencing is at the trial court's discretion if it finds by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant is a dangerous offender with a disregard for human life and a willingness to commit high-risk crimes.

A trial court imposing consecutive sentences on a defendant classified as a dangerous offender must demonstrate that the total sentence length is proportional to the severity of the offenses and necessary for public protection. In this case, the trial court cited factors such as the serious nature of the offenses, the defendant's lack of ambition or productive lifestyle, and the aggravating circumstances surrounding the crimes, which involved shooting into a car and resulting in two deaths and one partial paralysis. The court emphasized the necessity of extended confinement to safeguard society from the defendant’s criminal tendencies and disregard for life. The trial court concluded that consecutive sentences were justified, affirming the defendant's status as a dangerous offender due to his willingness to engage in violent and anti-social behavior. The appellate review confirmed that the trial court's findings met the requirements established in prior cases and supported the decision for consecutive sentencing. The judgments of the trial court were thus affirmed.