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Lemon v. Kurtzman
Citations: 29 L. Ed. 2d 745; 91 S. Ct. 2105; 403 U.S. 602; 1971 U.S. LEXIS 19Docket: 89
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; October 12, 1971; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Chief Justice Burger delivered the Court's opinion on two appeals regarding the constitutionality of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes that provide state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools. Both statutes are challenged under the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Pennsylvania statute offers financial support through reimbursement for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects at nonpublic schools. The Rhode Island statute, enacted in 1969, provides a salary supplement of up to 15% of annual salaries for teachers in nonpublic elementary schools, contingent upon various conditions: the salary must not exceed that of public school teachers, recipients must be state-certified, and eligible schools must have lower average per-pupil expenditures on secular education compared to public schools. Additionally, the Rhode Island statute mandates that eligible teachers must only instruct subjects taught in public schools, utilize approved teaching materials, and agree not to teach religion while receiving state supplements. Citizens and taxpayers of Rhode Island, who are the appellees, challenged the statute's constitutionality, while the appellants include state officials, eligible teachers, and parents of students in church-related schools. A three-judge federal court established under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284, noted that about 25% of Rhode Island's pupils attend nonpublic schools, predominantly Roman Catholic institutions. The court examined extensive evidence on the secular instruction provided at these schools and acknowledged that while religious values do not necessarily impact secular content, the parochial system is considered integral to the Catholic Church's mission. Ultimately, the Court ruled both statutes unconstitutional. The District Court found that the Act infringed the Establishment Clause by creating excessive government-religion entanglement and providing significant aid to a religious enterprise, with a majority affirming this conclusion. The Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, enacted in 1968, aimed to support nonpublic schools facing financial crises, allowing the state to purchase secular educational services from these institutions. The Act mandates that reimbursements to nonpublic schools are strictly for actual expenses related to secular subjects, with rigorous accounting and auditing requirements in place. Funding originated from a tax on horse racing, now sourced from cigarette taxes, totaling approximately $5 million annually. The program serves about 636,215 students across 1,181 nonpublic schools, predominantly church-affiliated, especially Roman Catholic schools. The case was initiated by associations and individuals advocating for church-state separation, including citizen taxpayer Lemon, who also claimed direct financial involvement through tax contributions. The District Court confirmed the individual plaintiffs' standing but denied standing to the organizational plaintiffs. Ultimately, the court dismissed the complaint regarding the Act's constitutionality, asserting it did not breach the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses, with Chief Judge Hastie dissenting. The appellate court reversed this decision. In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court upheld a state law reimbursing parents of parochial school students for bus transportation costs, with Justice Black indicating that this ruling approached the limits of the Religion Clauses. He acknowledged the ambiguity in interpreting the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, which prohibit not only the establishment of a state religion but also any law that could be seen as promoting it. The Court identified three main concerns of the Establishment Clause: sponsorship, financial support, and government involvement in religious activities. It established three tests for evaluating relevant statutes: they must have a secular purpose, their primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and they must not lead to excessive government entanglement with religion. The analysis of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes revealed no intent to advance religion, as they aimed to enhance secular education in all schools under compulsory attendance laws. The Court noted that states have a legitimate interest in maintaining educational standards. It also acknowledged that secular and religious teachings can be distinct and separable. However, the statutes recognized the religious missions of church-related schools and attempted to ensure that state aid only supported secular functions. Despite these precautions, the Court concluded that the overall relationship created by the statutes resulted in excessive entanglement between government and religion, necessitating a finding of violation of the Religion Clauses. In Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court affirmed state tax exemptions for religious organizations' real property used for worship, emphasizing a need for careful examination of state-religion entanglement. The ruling indicates that while total separation of church and state is impractical, certain interactions, such as fire inspections and zoning regulations, are permissible. The Court underscored the necessity of scrutinizing government aid to religious institutions to avoid excessive entanglement. In the case of the Rhode Island Salary Supplement Act, the District Court found significant entanglement risks associated with the Roman Catholic elementary schools benefiting from the program. These schools, closely tied to parish churches, incorporate religious symbols and instruction within their educational framework. Approximately two-thirds of the teaching staff are nuns, fostering an environment that naturally integrates religious teachings into daily school life. The Court concluded that these schools serve as vital instruments for transmitting the Catholic faith, particularly to impressionable young students, highlighting their substantial religious involvement and purpose. The religious nature of church-related schools raises significant church-state entanglement concerns, contrary to the intent of the Religion Clauses. Although the District Court observed that religious values do not inherently interfere with secular subject content, the extensive religious activities necessitate careful governmental oversight to ensure state aid is restricted to secular education. The Rhode Island Act's specific form of aid exacerbates these entanglements. Legal precedents allow states to provide secular services to church-related schools, such as transportation and textbooks, without violating the Establishment Clause. However, the dissenting opinion in the Allen case highlighted concerns about ensuring genuinely secular content in state-provided textbooks. In contrast, the role of teachers poses a greater risk to maintaining secular education as their approach to subjects is less predictable than textbook content. The Rhode Island Roman Catholic elementary schools operate under the Bishop's supervision, with financial responsibility resting on individual parishes, where priests control fund allocation. While lay teachers now comprise over a third of the teaching staff, their hiring and contracts remain under religious authority, which deeply permeates the school system. The governing “Handbook of School Regulations” reinforces religious influence, stating that religious formation is integral to education beyond formal classes and encourages teachers to promote religious vocations. Despite some teachers claiming to keep religion out of secular instruction, the structure and mission of these schools present potential hazards for state aid contributing to religious education. The employment of teachers by a religious organization underlines the challenge of separating religious influence from secular education, especially given that most lay teachers share the Catholic faith. Teacher responsibilities in parochial schools often blur the line between secular and religious education, making it challenging for dedicated religious educators to maintain a neutral stance. While there is no assumption of bad faith among these teachers, their commitment to their faith may lead to unintentional religious instruction, complicating the separation between secular teaching and religious doctrine. The Rhode Island Legislature cannot rely solely on the assumption that such teachers can effectively segregate their religious beliefs from their educational duties; hence, state aid is carefully conditioned with strict restrictions. Eligible teachers must instruct only in courses offered in public schools and refrain from teaching religion, necessitating ongoing state oversight to ensure compliance with the First Amendment. This oversight raises concerns of excessive state-church entanglement, particularly in determining the allocation of funds between secular and religious education in schools that exceed public school expenditure norms. The Pennsylvania program mirrors Rhode Island's structure, providing state aid to church-related schools, which are controlled by religious organizations aimed at promoting their faith. Allegations regarding Pennsylvania schools have been accepted as true following the dismissal of a related complaint for failure to state a claim. The Pennsylvania statute, similar to Rhode Island's, creates a relationship between church and state through its restrictions and surveillance designed to ensure teachers remain nonideological. It limits reimbursements to public school courses and approved materials, explicitly excluding religious teachings or practices. Schools must implement accounting procedures that allow the state to differentiate between secular and religious instruction costs. A major concern is that the statute provides state financial aid directly to church-related schools, contrasting with previous cases like Everson and Allen, where aid was directed to students and parents. The Court in Walz v. Tax Commission highlighted the risks of direct payments to religious organizations, suggesting such subsidies imply significant government involvement, which historically leads to control and surveillance measures. Furthermore, the potential for political divisiveness arising from state assistance to parochial schools is significant. Given the number of students in church-related schools, state aid will likely provoke political activism from proponents and opponents alike, leading to campaigns that could align voting behavior with religious beliefs. This polarization threatens the democratic process, as issues of church-state relations could overshadow other critical matters facing society. The framers of the Constitution aimed to shield religious practices from government influence, and historical precedents warn against the dangers of intertwining religion with political power. Adherents of various faiths often take strong public stances due to the pervasive influence of religious values in national life. The Court's previous ruling in Walz addressed the status of religious groups under state tax laws, emphasizing that it provided benefits to all religious organizations. In contrast, the current situation involves ongoing and potentially increasing annual appropriations that favor only a few religious groups, which could intensify political fragmentation and divisiveness along religious lines. The Rhode Island District Court highlighted a significant financial crisis within the parochial school system that would necessitate larger state subsidies for lay teachers' salaries. Although the Pennsylvania case lacks developed facts, expanding aid pressures have already influenced state revenue allocations, such as cigarette taxes. While the Walz case argued against tax exemptions for places of worship leading to state-supported religion, the current context suggests a more compelling risk of establishing state aid for church-affiliated educational institutions, which is historically novel compared to the longstanding practice of tax exemptions for churches. Modern government programs often create self-perpetuating demands, particularly when they support institutions with political backing and growing needs. The evolution of constitutional interpretation can lead to unforeseen consequences, raising concerns about government entanglement with religion, which the Religion Clauses aim to prevent. The contributions of church-related schools to society are acknowledged, as are their financial struggles. However, the core issue is whether state aid to these institutions aligns with the Religion Clauses, which mandate that government should refrain from involvement in religious education and keep churches separate from governmental affairs. The Constitution maintains that religion is a private matter, and while some interaction is natural, clear boundaries must be established. The Rhode Island District Court's judgments in cases No. 569 and No. 570 are affirmed, while the Pennsylvania District Court's judgment in case No. 89 is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Mr. Justice Marshall did not participate in the consideration of case No. 89. The District Court identified only one instance requiring a breakdown between religious and secular expenses, noting that the school involved was not affiliated with the Catholic church. The court expressed skepticism regarding the necessity for such determinations in Catholic schools due to their reliance on nuns, which significantly lowers wage costs compared to public schools. Plaintiffs claimed the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing state assistance to private institutions with discriminatory admissions and hiring policies. However, the court unanimously ruled that no plaintiff had standing to raise this claim, as the complaint did not demonstrate that any plaintiff's child was denied admission to a nonpublic school based on racial or religious discrimination. The court's ruling rendered further discussion on this issue unnecessary.