The case involves Willie Ed Mays, who was convicted by a jury for selling over .5 grams of cocaine and subsequently pled guilty to two additional similar charges, receiving concurrent sentences totaling ten years. Mays later sought post-conviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his lawyers failed to take several critical actions, including filing a motion to inspect the alleged cocaine, submitting a Brady motion, and objecting to jurisdiction issues. After a hearing, the trial court denied his petition.
On appeal, the court emphasized that Mays bore the burden of proof to show his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. The appellate court reaffirmed that trial court factual findings are conclusive unless contradicted by evidence. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mays needed to demonstrate that his attorneys’ performance was below reasonable standards and that this adversely affected the trial outcome, specifically that he would have opted for trial had counsel acted differently. The court noted that tactical decisions by counsel should not be second-guessed unless made without proper preparation. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision denying post-conviction relief.
The petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a pretrial motion to inspect cocaine evidence and a Brady motion, based on the State's late disclosure that the cocaine was lost or destroyed before trial. Defense counsel testified that this information came to light on the trial date. The court found that since the State was unaware of the missing evidence until then, the petitioner’s counsel would not have been in a better position for dismissal had they filed pretrial motions. The trial court allowed the defense to argue the missing evidence's impact during the trial, and found no merit in the petitioner’s claims.
Regarding the petitioner's assertion of prejudice from a delay in prosecution, the trial court acknowledged a delay of about four years from the offense in January 1991 to the indictment in May 1995. Although the petitioner demonstrated one of the three prongs required to claim due process violation under State v. Dykes—specifically, that there was a delay—the trial court determined that the delay was not intended to gain a tactical advantage but was to gather further intelligence. Consequently, the trial court's findings were upheld, and the appeal was deemed without merit.
The petitioner did not demonstrate that the State caused delays for tactical advantage or harassment, and his claims of prejudice due to these delays were unconvincing, failing to satisfy the Dykes test. A change of venue motion filed by defense counsel was withdrawn by agreement with the petitioner, which was deemed a tactical decision since there was no damaging publicity. The petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for not filing a motion to suppress evidence; however, defense counsel stated there was no basis for such a motion, and the petitioner provided no contrary evidence. The petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of officers in an undercover drug operation, but the court confirmed that the operation was conducted by officers with statewide jurisdiction, rendering this concern meritless. Lastly, the petitioner claimed he was coerced into pleading guilty due to ineffective assistance of counsel related to a jury trial conviction. The court determined that the petitioner entered his pleas knowingly to avoid consecutive sentences and understood the rights and concessions involved. Consequently, his claims of coercion and ineffective assistance were found meritless, leading to the affirmation of the lower court's judgment.
