State v. Goode

Citations: 956 S.W.2d 521; 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 785; 1997 WL 467035Docket: 02C01-9611-CR-00428

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; August 15, 1997; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Johnny R. Goode appeals a jury conviction for voluntary manslaughter, resulting in a four-year sentence and a $10,000 fine. The appeal raises three issues: the denial of a motion to suppress the defendant's statement, the sufficiency of evidence for the conviction, and the denial of probation. 

On June 10, 1995, Goode, a crack cocaine user, shot Jerome "Bud" Walker, who had been selling drugs to him. After a failed drug transaction, Walker suggested they drive to another location for better drugs. Following a purchase from a supplier named Rooney, Walker requested a ride home. The defendant claimed Walker threatened him with a knife, although no knife was found—only keys in Walker's hands. Alleging that Walker lunged at him, Goode shot Walker in the neck, leading to his death.

After the shooting, Goode did not report the incident and later received threatening calls from individuals claiming to be connected to Walker. Fearing for his life, he armed himself and went to a car wash where he was approached by police officers who had been tipped about the shooting. Upon arrest, Goode indicated which weapon he used and later claimed he had not been read his rights; however, the officer clarified he was not being questioned at that moment. Goode consented to a search of his home to retrieve evidence related to the shooting. The trial court's judgment was affirmed.

Officers visited the defendant's residence, collected evidence including notes and a shell casing, and later informed him of his rights at the police station. The defendant provided a written confession to the shooting of Walker. Although charged with second-degree murder, he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. 

The defendant filed a motion to suppress his statements, arguing they were obtained during custodial interrogation without prior constitutional warnings. He claimed he was "in custody" during initial questioning by the police, asserting that subsequent statements and evidence were tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Under Miranda v. Arizona, statements made during custodial interrogation require warnings to safeguard against self-incrimination. "Custodial interrogation" occurs when law enforcement questions an individual after they have been deprived of their freedom in a significant manner. 

The Tennessee Supreme Court established that the determination of whether a person is "in custody" is based on the totality of circumstances, specifically whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel deprived of their freedom akin to a formal arrest. Factors include the time and location of questioning, its duration, the officer's demeanor, the suspect's transportation method, the number of officers present, any restrictions on movement, and the suspect's awareness of their right to refrain from answering questions.

At the suppression hearing, evidence indicated three instances where the defendant provided incriminating information: he affirmed which gun was used in the shooting, incriminating notes and a matching shell casing were found during a consent search, and he signed a written admission at the police station. The defendant’s engagement with police began following an anonymous tip that identified him as the shooter, leading officers to locate him outside a nearby building where he was approached for questioning.

The defendant was approached by officers who drew their weapons during an initial encounter. While being searched, the defendant admitted to using a smaller gun to shoot a victim named Bud. Following this admission, he was formally arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a squad car. Although he stated he had not been advised of his rights, Capt. Houston informed him he would not be questioned at that moment but did provide Miranda rights. While awaiting backup, the defendant volunteered information about notes at his house and the location of a shell casing. The officers obtained his consent to search for these items. Later, at the police station, after being read his rights again, the defendant provided a detailed written confession regarding the killing of Walker.

The analysis of the initial statement concluded that the defendant was in custody when he made the first admission, which was improperly admitted but deemed harmless due to the subsequent written confession. The defendant argued that the items seized and his admissions were "fruit of the poisonous tree," referencing the legal principle that an illegally obtained confession taints subsequent evidence. The prosecution must demonstrate that any later confession was made freely and voluntarily, without coercive influence from the initial illegal conduct. Factors for determining the admissibility of the subsequent confession include the use of coercive tactics, the timing between confessions, and the conditions of detention leading to the later confession. These factors aim to assess whether the defendant's constitutional rights to self-incrimination were compromised.

The conversation that led to the defendant's confession was initiated by the defendant, and factors such as sobriety, education, intelligence, and legal experience were examined to determine the defendant's understanding of Miranda rights. The court concluded that the consent to search and the confession were valid as they followed proper Miranda warnings, thus overcoming any presumption of taint from an earlier question. The evidence from the consent search and confession was appropriately admitted.

Regarding the sufficiency of evidence for the voluntary manslaughter conviction, the defendant argued for acquittal based on self-defense. The appellate court's review, based on Tennessee law, focused on whether a rational jury could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found that the unarmed victim posed no immediate threat, as no weapon was found, and only car keys were in the victim's hands. The court noted that the jury could rationally determine that the defendant's response was excessive, allowing them to reject the self-defense claim. Thus, the evidence supported the jury's conviction of voluntary manslaughter.

On the denial of probation, the defendant contended that the trial court's decision was improper. Under Tennessee law, a defendant sentenced to eight years or less is generally eligible for probation unless specific exclusions apply. The court must consider the offender's status and any evidence against the presumption of probation eligibility. Although defendants may be presumed suitable for alternative sentencing, the burden to establish this suitability lies with the defendant.

In State v. Goode, the defendant, convicted of voluntary manslaughter (a Class C felony) and sentenced to four years as a standard offender, sought probation. While probation consideration is mandatory, it is not guaranteed. The trial court must assess various factors, including the offense's circumstances, the defendant's criminal history, social background, rehabilitation potential, and public safety needs. The court found Goode unsuitable for probation due to his prior conviction for marijuana possession, addiction to crack cocaine and alcohol, and concerning behavior, which indicated a lack of credibility and poor chance of rehabilitation. Consequently, the trial court's judgment was upheld, affirming that there were no reversible errors. The case was remanded for execution of the judgment, with an option for the appellant to post additional bail if seeking further appeal. Costs of appeal were assigned to Goode.