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United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan
Citations: 28 L. Ed. 2d 339; 91 S. Ct. 1076; 401 U.S. 576; 1971 U.S. LEXIS 131; 76 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2881Docket: 434
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; April 5, 1971; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Mr. Justice Black's opinion addresses an action initiated by the Michigan State Bar in January 1959, seeking to prohibit the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen from assisting workers, their families, and widows in protecting against excessive legal fees by incompetent attorneys under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). The Union was accused of recommending specific attorneys, securing agreements to cap fees at 25% of recoveries, and promoting Chicago lawyers to Michigan claimants. The State Bar's complaint suggested a desire to protect unlimited legal fees. The Union admitted to practices aimed at safeguarding members from high fees and poor legal representation since 1930, including recommending designated "Legal Counsel" and providing transportation for injured members to these attorneys. Evidence presented included testimony indicating that from 1953 to 1960, many Michigan FELA claimants were represented by the Union's chosen Chicago lawyers. In 1962, the state trial court issued an injunction against the Union, citing violations of a state law against soliciting damage suits. The Union appealed, but the Michigan Supreme Court, after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar (1964), recognized the First Amendment rights of railroad workers to collectively seek legal representation. Acknowledging this ruling, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case for potential amendments to the complaint consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision. Following the remand, the State Bar chose not to amend its complaint, and the case remained unresolved until a motion for judgment was heard in May 1968. The trial court subsequently adopted the Virginia injunction verbatim, and the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed this decision, narrowly interpreting the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling to focus solely on the specific injunction language rather than the broader protections of union activities under the First Amendment. The Michigan Supreme Court incorrectly limited the ruling in United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn. by focusing solely on a specific part of the Illinois decree that forbids financial ties between the attorney and the Union. This interpretation disregards previous rulings that affirm the First Amendment right for groups to collaborate effectively in asserting their legal rights. The injunction in question imposes several restrictions on the Union that violate these principles: 1. The decree prevents the Union from providing legal advice to its members, which could broadly prohibit assistance to injured workers regarding their Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) claims. This contradicts the First Amendment protections upheld in Trainmen, which recognizes such activities as permissible. 2. The injunction also bars the Union from sharing information about injured members with attorneys, which contradicts established practices upheld in Trainmen for gathering evidence to support FELA claims. 3. A provision prohibits Union members from receiving any compensation for helping solicit legal employment for lawyers, despite historical practices where Union representatives were compensated for their time and expenses in facilitating access to legal counsel. This restriction undermines the First Amendment right to assist one another in obtaining legal representation. 4. There is a misinterpretation by some justices that the compensation prohibition refers to payments from attorneys rather than the Union, which adds further limitations inconsistent with prior rulings. Overall, the injunction, due to its vagueness and broad application, infringes upon constitutionally protected freedoms and should be invalidated. No basis exists for the restraint mentioned in the decree, as the complaint does not suggest any related activity, and there is no evidence in the current record to support it. Any references to such practices arise from other cases involving different parties, which the court wrongly relies on. The provisions in the decree stem from the Michigan court's adoption of a Virginia injunction unrelated to the current facts. The dissenting opinion highlights that the State Bar failed to prove the Union has engaged, is engaging, or plans to engage in sharing legal fees, and argues that an injunction based on potential 'temptation' is unwarranted and outside the scope of equity jurisdiction. In the precedent set by Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, the court emphasized that injunctions require evidence of threatened illegal conduct; the State Bar has not demonstrated any such threat regarding the sharing of legal fees. Moreover, the decree unjustly restricts the Union from controlling attorney fees. The Union has historically worked to protect its members from excessive legal fees by negotiating agreements that cap fees at 25% of recoveries, including associated costs. This practice was upheld in United Mine Workers, which recognized the right of workers to collectively seek affordable legal representation. The court's denial of the Union's efforts to protect its members from excessive fees is seen as contrary to justice and the principles established in prior decisions regarding collective legal action and worker rights. Collective activity aimed at ensuring access to the courts is recognized as a fundamental First Amendment right, as established in previous cases including NAACP v. Button, Trainmen, and United Mine Workers. The ability of associations to help members bear legal costs is essential for this right to have real meaning. The current case’s injunction, which restricts the union's ability to provide legal advice and support to its members, contradicts these precedents and has been reversed. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen merged into the United Transportation Union post-decree and is the petitioner here. The Michigan trial court's injunction prohibited the Union from various actions, including soliciting legal representation for injured members, communicating with lawyers about accidents, controlling legal fees, and sharing in legal recoveries. The previous injunction in United Mine Workers, which also restricted the union's legal support, is noted as similar. The dissenting opinion suggested that restrictions on communication between the Union and an injured member’s attorney were overly broad. The injunction’s provisions that prevent the Union from suggesting that a recommended lawyer would cover expenses or make advances were found invalid, aligning with the invalidation of the fee limitations.