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Hoover Inc. v. Metro Board of Zoning Appeals
Citation: Not availableDocket: 01A01-9506-CH-00277
Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; January 4, 1995; Tennessee; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Hoover, Inc. is appealing a chancery court order that affirmed the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals' denial of its application for a conditional use permit to build a stone processing plant at 6682 Nolensville Road. Hoover submitted the application on April 23, 1992, and the Board held a public hearing on May 28, 1992, where evidence was presented both in favor of and against the application. The Board, comprising seven members, required four concurring votes for approval; however, the vote resulted in 2 against, 0 in favor, 3 abstentions, and 1 absence due to a prior resignation. Hoover's president, a Board member, did not attend the hearing due to a conflict of interest, while members Spann and Karr abstained, believing their participation was inappropriate unless Hoover resigned. They had communicated their position to Hoover both in writing and in a meeting prior to the hearing. The appellate court, led by Judge Samuel L. Lewis, reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case. Both board members attended the meeting to ensure a quorum for discussing an application, ultimately leading to the Board's denial of the application under section 17.16.060 of the Zoning Regulations of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. This regulation stipulates that a quorum consists of four members, requiring at least four concurring votes to grant or deny an application. Karr and Spann were aware that their abstention would prevent the applicant, Hoover, from obtaining the necessary votes due to a vacancy and a conflict involving another board member. Hoover appealed the Board's decision to the Davidson County Chancery Court, which later allowed several private parties to join the case as respondents. The chancellor ruled that the Board improperly permitted Karr and Spann to vote despite their disqualifications and noted the absence of findings of fact, which hindered judicial review. Consequently, the case was remanded for a new hearing. All respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Middle Section, which assessed whether the Board made a legally effective decision on Hoover’s application. The court reversed the chancellor's ruling, determining that Karr and Spann's participation was appropriate and that the Board was not required to make factual findings since it did not secure a concurring vote. Citing precedent cases, the court affirmed the Board's decision and sent the case back to the chancery court for a merits review. On February 22, 1995, the chancellor concluded that Hoover failed to demonstrate compliance with general requirements and deemed its reclamation plan inappropriate, ultimately affirming the Board's decision. Hoover filed a notice of appeal on March 22, 1995, with the Citizens and Stop the Quarry submitting a joint brief, alongside a brief from the Board and the Metropolitan Government. The 'general requirements' for granting a conditional use permit, as outlined in section 17.124.040 of the Zoning Regulations, include criteria to ensure public health, safety, and welfare; no adverse impact on surrounding properties; adherence to 'conditional uses' defined in the title; and conformity to relevant district provisions for public convenience. The 'specific requirements' relevant to the case are established in section 17.124.330, which mandates that activities such as sawmill, mining, or quarrying must be located in sparsely developed areas, with no new sites permitted within a one-mile radius of existing quarries. Additionally, site plans must detail the final site contours post-operation, ensuring compatibility with local topography and adequate drainage, along with the use of non-toxic, non-flammable, and non-combustible fill materials. The legal proceedings involve multiple parties joining a brief against a quarry project, primarily focusing on whether the Board acted beyond its jurisdiction or in an illegal, arbitrary, or fraudulent manner. The court clarified that it does not weigh evidence in common law certiorari cases. Confusion arose regarding which court had addressed the issue, as the chancery court determined it could not review the Board's decision due to a lack of findings of fact, while the Western Section later reversed this, affirming the Board's decision as legally effective and subject to review. However, neither court resolved whether the Board's decision was illegal or arbitrary. The chancery court's ruling, dated February 22, 1995, ultimately affirmed the Board’s decision based on the finding of material evidence supporting the conclusion that Hoover's plan failed to meet the general requirements, lacked evidence of a sparsely developed area, and did not provide an adequate reclamation plan. The chancery court's decision is flawed because it did not reflect the Board's stated reasons for denying the permit, which was done by operation of law rather than on the basis of Hoover meeting specific or general requirements. A reviewing court must have the administrative body’s factual findings to assess whether its decision was supported by material evidence. The court does not take a stance on the Western Section's conclusion regarding the necessity of findings absent four concurring votes. However, it affirms that a reviewing court cannot evaluate the material evidence supporting a decision without knowing the basis of that decision. The law's applicability was misapplied in this case. An administrative body's actions can be deemed illegal, arbitrary, or fraudulent based on several factors, including failure to adhere to due process, misapplication of legal standards, decisions made for ulterior motives, or constitutional violations. If a zoning permit applicant meets all requirements and is denied based on reasons unrelated to compliance, that denial is arbitrary and unreasonable. Case law supports that a board member cannot vote against an application if they believe the applicant meets zoning requirements. In this instance, four of the five board members acknowledged that Hoover met the legal conditions for the permit. Notably, board member Emamalie, while expressing that he believed Hoover met the requirements, ultimately voted to deny the permit due to personal obligations to neighboring residents, indicating his decision was based on factors outside the established legal criteria. A decision made by the board is considered arbitrary under Tennessee law. Board members Spann, Karr, and Price abstained from voting on Hoover's application, even though they believed Hoover met the zoning requirements. Price expressed sympathy for local residents but acknowledged that, based on the current law, Hoover was likely entitled to a conditional use permit due to meeting specific requirements. He suggested that the law should clarify what additional considerations could be taken into account. Spann concurred, stating that Hoover could meet the legal requirements for a permit with appropriate conditions. The court views these abstentions as equivalent to votes against the application. According to Section 17.16.060 of the Zoning Regulations, there are no explicit rules regarding abstentions, which are instead addressed by Robert's Rules of Order. This source indicates that abstaining is effectively akin to voting on the prevailing side, even if a member chooses not to record their decision publicly. The court concludes that such abstentions should be treated as votes against the application when assessing if the administrative body acted unlawfully or arbitrarily. In this case, there was no clear prevailing side, but a regulation permitted the Board to deny Hoover's application automatically. Board members Karr, Spann, and Price were aware that their abstentions would effectively deny the permit. Despite believing Hoover met zoning requirements, their abstentions were treated as denials, leading to the conclusion that they acted illegally and arbitrarily. Their actions appeared influenced by public opposition to the quarry and personal dissatisfaction with the Zoning Regulations. The court emphasizes the problematic nature of board members abstaining for any reason, asserting that such abstentions can lead to an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. Karr, Spann, and Price's ability to deny the permit while recognizing Hoover's compliance with the law indicates a circumvention of regulatory mandates. Furthermore, abstaining to avoid responsibility undermines the administrative function of the Board. The court also addressed the coercive behavior of Spann and Karr towards Hoover regarding potential conflicts of interest, referencing Zoning Regulations that stipulate disqualification from participation if a board member has an interest in the matter. There is no requirement for a board member to resign due to conflict, and Hoover did not violate any regulations. Consequently, the court found Spann and Karr's actions in asking Hoover to resign in exchange for abstaining to be illegal. The court reversed the chancery court's decision and remanded for further proceedings, with costs on appeal assigned to the respondents.