Tom and Karen Moore appealed the granting of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Lloyd A. Walwyn, following their claim of negligence related to Mr. Moore's medical treatment after a fall on May 1, 1993. After examining Mr. Moore at Tennessee Christian Medical Center, Dr. Walwyn diagnosed him with fractures and performed surgeries. Mr. Moore later missed a scheduled procedure for further treatment, which resulted in an infection requiring nine additional surgeries by other medical professionals. The Moores filed a complaint on May 2, 1994, alleging that Dr. Walwyn's failure to prescribe antibiotics was negligent and caused the subsequent injuries.
Dr. Walwyn filed a motion for summary judgment on October 19, 1994, supported by his affidavit. The Moores opposed this with a counter-affidavit from Dr. Bruce Schlafly. On January 11, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Dr. Walwyn, finding no genuine issues of material fact regarding the standard of care or causation. The Moores' motion to reconsider, submitted on February 7, 1995, which included a second affidavit from Dr. Schlafly, was denied on March 14, 1995. The Moores filed notices of appeal following these rulings. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not err in its decisions.
In Tennessee, the motion for summary judgment requires the moving party to demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact, as established in Byrd v. Hall. The moving party cannot rely solely on conclusory statements and must provide a properly supported motion. Once this burden is met, the nonmoving party must show that a genuine issue exists or that further discovery is required, using evidence beyond mere allegations. This evidence must come from affidavits or other discovery materials per Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03, and while it must be admissible at trial, it need not be in admissible form at this stage.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must view the evidence favorably for the nonmoving party. If the judge finds no genuine issues of material fact and the law supports the moving party's claim, the motion must be granted. Medical malpractice claims specifically require expert testimony on negligence and proximate cause unless the malpractice is within common knowledge. Affidavits from medical professionals that clearly counter the plaintiff's claims can justify dismissal if the plaintiff fails to provide adequate rebuttal evidence.
Affidavits must be written statements made under oath, based on personal knowledge, and must detail facts admissible in evidence. The affiant must be competent to testify on the matters presented. In medical malpractice cases, witnesses must be licensed in the relevant field and have practiced in the applicable state within the year preceding the alleged incident. Failure to meet any affidavit requirement invalidates it for summary judgment purposes.
An affidavit based on information and belief, lacking personal knowledge, is insufficient unless specified by statute, as established in State Dep't of Human Servs. v. Neilson. In Moncrief v. Fuqua, affidavits were deemed inadequate due to the affiants' incompetence in a medical malpractice case. The appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting no genuine issues of material fact, supported by his notarized affidavit claiming familiarity with the standard of care in orthopedic surgery and stating that his actions did not deviate from this standard, nor caused any harm to Mr. Moore.
This shifted the burden to the appellants to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, but their submitted letter and report failed to do so, as they were not admissible evidence under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 and did not meet the competency requirements outlined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(b). The documents did not establish the relevance of Dr. Schlafly’s testimony or his practice qualifications. Additionally, the letter was improperly authenticated, lacking a notarized signature, while only the report was duly sworn. Even if the report was deemed appropriate for summary judgment, it did not create a genuine factual dispute regarding the standard of care or causation necessary to prove medical malpractice, as required by Tennessee Code Ann. 29-26-115(a)(1, 2).
Appellants needed expert testimony to demonstrate that the alleged malpractice exceeded common knowledge, but they did not meet this burden. Dr. Schlafly's report indicated that intravenous antibiotics should have been administered during two surgical procedures on specific dates, asserting that failing to do so fell below the standard of care. However, his statement lacked specificity regarding the standard of care in Nashville or similar communities, failing to define a clear "standard of acceptable professional practice" as required by Tennessee law. Dr. Schlafly referred to several articles advocating the use of prophylactic antibiotics, but these did not establish a definitive standard or relate to local practices, merely presenting alternatives.
In addition to establishing the standard of care, a medical malpractice claim also requires proof of causation, encompassing both cause in fact and proximate cause. The report did not adequately demonstrate that the lack of antibiotics was a probable cause of Mr. Moore's injuries. Although Dr. Schlafly suggested that the absence of antibiotics might have contributed to a bone infection, he did not affirm this conclusion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty. His reliance on limited medical records and the phrasing of his conclusions further weakened the case, as he failed to meet the evidentiary standards necessary to support the malpractice claim.
Dr. Schlafly's report reveals that he did not review Mr. Moore's x-rays or the records of drugs used during his treatment, including an antibiotic injection administered on May 2, 1993, the date of one of appellee's operations. Despite this lack of information, Dr. Schlafly concluded that the appellee's failure to administer prophylactic antibiotics caused Mr. Moore's infection and subsequent surgeries. However, his conclusions were deemed insufficient to counter the appellee's motion for summary judgment, as the report and letter did not meet the requirements set by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03, lacking necessary affidavits or admissible testimony to establish Dr. Schlafly's competence under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-115(b). Consequently, the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment was upheld, as the record failed to demonstrate a material dispute regarding the standard of care and causation.
Regarding the motion to reconsider, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion, asserting that they relied on the same affidavit from Dr. Schlafly, which had already been presented in opposition to the summary judgment. The court found no valid reason for the plaintiffs to submit this testimony again at this stage. Although Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure do not formally recognize a "motion to reconsider," such motions can be assessed based on their substance. In this case, the court treated the motion as one to alter or amend under Rule 59.04. The appellants cited a precedent, Schaefer v. Larsen, claiming it supported their position. However, the court distinguished this case from Schaefer, noting that the prior judge had considered late-filed affidavits, whereas the current judge did not, and emphasized that while motions to alter must be viewed favorably, they are not guaranteed to be granted.
Appellants cited Richland City Country Club v. CRC Equities, Inc. to support their argument; however, the case did not favor their position. The court in Richland City noted that affidavits submitted after a hearing should not necessarily be disregarded solely based on their late filing. The trial court retains discretion to exclude affidavits if the rationale extends beyond mere tardiness. In Braswell v. Carothers, a subsequent case clarified that evidence presented post-summary judgment must be genuinely new to warrant reconsideration. The court found that the plaintiffs' evidence was not newly discovered, as it could have been available prior to the original hearing, and upheld the trial court's decision not to vacate the judgment. The appellants' reliance on a letter, report, and affidavit was deemed inadequate, as the affidavit did not introduce new evidence, merely reiterating previously available information. Consequently, the trial judge did not abuse discretion in rejecting the affidavit and sustaining the summary judgment. The trial court's judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings, with costs of appeal charged to the appellants.
