Laura Coffey v. Cherokee Aviation, Inc.

Docket: E1999-01037-COA-R3-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee; July 13, 1995; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Laura Coffey and Peter Cowan appealed a jury verdict that found Cherokee Aviation, Inc. not liable for the deaths of their spouses, Steven Coffey and Peggy Cowan, in a plane crash. The crash occurred on July 13, 1995, after the aircraft, inspected by Cherokee Aviation, reportedly experienced an in-flight fire due to ruptured fuel lines, which the plaintiffs alleged was the result of Cherokee's negligence. Cherokee countered that the crash was due to pilot error and claimed there was no fire.

After a mistrial in April 1998, a second trial in early February 1999 concluded with a jury verdict in favor of Cherokee. The plaintiffs' motion for a new trial was denied, prompting the appeal. They raised several issues regarding evidentiary rulings by the trial court, including the admission of testimony from an NTSB investigator, the inclusion of reports from medical experts that were not timely disclosed, and the exclusion of a statement from a medical expert suggesting the possibility of an in-flight fire.

The appellate court found no errors in the trial court's decisions and affirmed the judgment, noting that the record on appeal was incomplete, which limited their review to the testimonies included. Relevant witness testimonies were discussed, including observations made by Justin Patterson and Joshua Ryan before the crash.

The plane appeared to be in a low final approach to runway three when it unexpectedly turned right and vanished from view behind trees, with witnesses reporting smoke rising shortly after its disappearance. J. Reid Garrison, a pilot at Hilton Head Airport, heard Mr. Coffey's calm approach report but did not see the plane, only smoke later. William and Barbara Newton, nearby in their car, heard a loud noise, saw an electric wire fall, and then flames crossing the road, culminating in dark smoke and the tail section of a plane behind trees. Mr. Newton notified authorities after the fire. 

Don Lykins, an accident reconstruction expert, concluded an in-flight fire had occurred based on witness accounts and wreckage analysis. Conversely, Dr. Joe Wilkerson, an aeronautical expert, determined Mr. Coffey failed to adequately inspect the aircraft for water in the fuel, which led to a partial engine power loss. Norman Alvares, a fire expert, found no evidence of an in-flight fire, attributing the cockpit burns to post-crash conditions. Dr. Cleland Blake, a medical expert for the plaintiffs, identified signs of an in-flight fire through an analysis of victims’ tissues and autopsy reports, confirming that consulting specialized doctors is standard practice.

The appellate court's standard of review for jury verdicts, as established by Tennessee law, requires finding material evidence supporting the verdict without weighing the evidence or determining preponderance. The court must view evidence favorably for the verdict and affirm it if material evidence exists. Additionally, the trial court has broad discretion regarding the admissibility of evidence, reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

Timothy Monville, an investigator for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), conducted an investigation into an airplane crash relevant to this case and prepared a factual accident report. During his deposition, he referenced this report, which was included as an exhibit, and parts of his deposition were read to the jury. The Plaintiffs objected to the reading of a specific sentence from the report stating, "Examination of the engine compartment area revealed no evidence of an in-flight fire." They raised concerns regarding the application of federal regulations governing NTSB testimony, which allow an investigator to use their factual report as a testimonial aid but prohibit using the Board's accident report, which includes findings on probable cause, in litigation.

The Plaintiffs also claimed that reading Monville's deposition violated Tennessee’s hearsay rule, arguing the report did not meet the hearsay exception for public records. Although Monville's report was filed as a deposition exhibit, it was not entered into evidence in full, and only portions were admitted through his deposition readings. Monville detailed the crash site, wreckage, tests performed, and included eyewitness accounts, concluding the plane struck trees, then power lines, before landing on the roadway. Importantly, Monville's statement about the absence of evidence for an in-flight fire was part of his observational findings regarding the engine compartment rather than an expert opinion on the fire's occurrence.

The Plaintiffs reference the Advisory Commission Comments to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(8), noting that the Commission explicitly rejected the federal subsection regarding factual findings from investigations. These Comments serve as persuasive authority but cannot alter the rule's meaning, and courts need not reference them when the rule's text is clear. Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(8) allows for a hearsay exception for reports that detail observations made under a legal duty, excluding those made by law enforcement personnel. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has a legal obligation to investigate and report on plane crashes, making Mr. Monville’s factual accident report admissible as a hearsay exception. 

In contrast, Tennessee law prohibits the admission of certain reports filed by drivers after accidents resulting in injury or property damage over $400, making those reports inadmissible in any related trials. The exclusion of these reports is partly due to their determination of fault, which is not present in Mr. Monville’s report. The unreliability of the excluded reports further distinguishes them from Mr. Monville’s testimony, which was considered reliable due to his first-hand preparation and the opportunity for cross-examination.

Dr. Charles Berry, an aerospace and preventive medicine expert, opined that there was no in-flight fire after reviewing lung tissue slides from Mr. Coffey and Ms. Cowan. He consulted with Dr. Weilbaecher, a board-certified pathologist, and Dr. Cagle, the director of a pulmonary pathology center, both of whom corroborated his conclusion. Although Dr. Berry relied on their reports, he did not present them to the jury, only summarizing their conclusions in his testimony. The trial court correctly permitted the reading of Mr. Monville's deposition and report sections to the jury.

Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Berry’s testimony regarding the reports from Dr. Weilbaecher and Dr. Cagle should be excluded because they could not depose these doctors due to the Trial Court quashing deposition notices, which were set too close to the trial date. They reference *Ammons v. Bonilla*, where the court excluded expert testimony due to the plaintiff's failure to disclose witnesses. However, Cherokee had supplemented its interrogatory responses to inform Plaintiffs of the two doctors, though the Trial Court did not permit them to testify. Plaintiffs received the doctors’ reports before the trial, and under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 703, experts can rely on inadmissible evidence if it is standard practice. Dr. Berry and Dr. Blake, a Plaintiff's medical expert, affirmed that consulting specialized doctors for their opinions is common practice. The court found no error in allowing Dr. Berry to testify about the relied-upon reports, citing precedent that permits reliance on inadmissible hearsay.

Regarding Dr. Warren Lovell, designated as a potential expert witness, Cherokee had stated he would not testify. Although Dr. Lovell’s deposition was partially included in the record, he expressed uncertainty about an in-flight fire due to insufficient material for review. Cherokee filed a Motion in Limine to prevent the Plaintiffs from referencing Dr. Lovell’s deposition or his termination as a witness, but there is no record that the Trial Court ruled on this motion, nor did the Plaintiffs provide an offer of proof concerning Dr. Lovell. During Dr. Berry’s cross-examination, there was an inquiry about the number of pathologists who had reviewed the case for the defendant, leading to objections based on prior proceedings.

A witness acknowledged reviewing a deposition from a pathologist related to the case, though he was uncertain about its relevance to the defendant. The only reference to Dr. Lovell in the record was vague, and the trial court did not prohibit questioning about him. The plaintiffs did not provide proof regarding Dr. Lovell’s opinions or his previous designation as a potential expert witness, which the trial court addressed by noting that without an offer of proof, it would not overturn the trial judge’s decision. The plaintiffs argued for cross-examination on bias and for admitting Dr. Lovell’s statements, but these arguments were not considered due to the lack of a formal offer of proof. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed a missing witness jury instruction should have been provided, yet there was no record of such a request. After reviewing the evidence, the jury ruled in favor of Cherokee, a decision endorsed by the trial court. The judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed, with costs of appeal assigned to Laura S. Coffey, Peter R. Cowan, and their sureties.