Charles K. Newsom, the plaintiff, appeals a summary judgment from the Davidson Chancery Court in a case involving claims against his employer, Textron Aerostructures, Inc., and Gary L. Smith. Newsom asserts that his demotion and subsequent termination violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), and he also alleges slander and outrageous conduct by the employer.
Newsom, born on February 14, 1933, worked at Textron for 34 years, beginning on September 23, 1957. He held a management position as Senior Compliance Analyst (SCA) from April 1988, responsible for ensuring compliance with federal regulations in government contracts. Following a poor internal audit (pre-CPSR) in April 1989, which revealed deficiencies in 70% of procurement packages, Newsom was suspended for one week. On August 10, 1989, he was demoted to Buyer II, with Sherry Ritchie, a younger female, taking over his previous role. An annual evaluation on August 30, 1989, cited his unsatisfactory performance as the reason for the demotion, specifically referencing the pre-CPSR results. Newsom contends that age discrimination motivated his demotion. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.
Newsom appealed his performance appraisal and demotion through Textron's internal process, which was reviewed by a supervisor and another manager. In January 1990, the managers upheld the demotion, and Newsom did not regain his prior position. On June 21, 1990, he filed an age discrimination charge with the EEOC, citing his demotion to Buyer II and other discriminatory actions, noting that the most recent discriminatory act occurred on August 10, 1989. He later amended his charge to indicate that the discrimination was ongoing. The EEOC found his claim without merit in July 1991, and Newsom subsequently filed a lawsuit against Textron in August 1991, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). During the litigation, he remained employed as a Buyer II, where he was evaluated as "meeting the standards" in August 1990 and August 1991.
In late 1991 and early 1992, Textron sought to open a bidding process for cutting tools, during which concerns arose regarding Tool Group Network's rapid acquisition of Textron contracts. Following these concerns, Textron's legal department initiated an internal audit, as mandated by the Anti-Kickback Enforcement Act. During this investigation, irregularities were discovered in the awarding of contracts to Tool Group, including instances of non-competitive pricing and altered documentation. Newsom and another employee, Martha Martin, were questioned regarding their roles in awarding contracts to Tool Group, which was not the lowest bidder for several contracts. Textron investigators suspected that Newsom had shown favoritism towards Tool Group, engaged in undisclosed meetings, accepted entertainment from them, and awarded contracts without proper authorization. As a result of these findings, Newsom was terminated on March 27, 1992.
Textron terminated Newsom's employment, citing violations of company policies and job performance issues. Following his discharge, Newsom amended his complaint on July 21, 1992, claiming retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA) for filing an age discrimination suit related to his demotion. He further alleged that Textron’s actions constituted slander and outrageous conduct. For a summary judgment to be granted, the moving party must prove there are no genuine material fact issues and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must evaluate the evidence favorably towards the nonmoving party and only grant summary judgment when legal issues alone can resolve the case without material fact disputes.
Newsom also asserted a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging that his demotion and the circumstances surrounding it were due to age discrimination. Textron countered that Newsom's ADEA claim was barred because he failed to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the 300-day limit after the alleged discrimination, noting that he filed the charge 307 days after his demotion. Newsom argued that his charge was timely since it was filed within 300 days of both his internal appeal ruling in January 1990 and his performance evaluation on August 30, 1989.
Newsom contends that Textron repeatedly violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by not reversing his demotion through internal procedures, suggesting that the 300-day limit for filing an EEOC charge did not start until the internal appeals were exhausted. However, the analysis concludes that Newsom's ADEA claims are barred by the 300-day filing requirement because he did not submit his charge until 307 days after being informed of his demotion on August 10, 1989. Timely filing is a prerequisite for an ADEA lawsuit, and while the 300-day period is not jurisdictional and may be tolled for equitable reasons, there is no indication of such grounds in this case. The limitations period begins when the plaintiff's cause of action accrues.
Referencing **Vaught v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co.**, the court noted that the plaintiff's awareness of potential discrimination triggers the filing deadline. In Vaught, the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff’s ADEA lawsuit was time-barred because he filed his charge more than 180 days after becoming aware of facts supporting discrimination. Similarly, Newsom was knowledgeable of sufficient facts by August 10, 1989, including his age, prior favorable evaluations, and his demotion, which indicates that his claim should have been filed at that time. The determination is further supported by federal court precedents, reinforcing that claims must be filed promptly once the basis for them is apparent.
Plaintiffs contended that their EEOC charges were timely filed within 300 days of learning they were replaced by younger employees. The court rejected their argument for equitable tolling of the 300-day period until confirmation of age discrimination, ruling that the limitation began when they received notice of termination. The court noted that plaintiffs provided no substantial facts to justify their late discovery of discriminatory practices, emphasizing the need for due diligence in equitable tolling claims. It stated that Newsom should have known enough by August 10, 1989, to file a charge, and any claims arising from that date were barred if not filed promptly. The court dismissed the argument that the charge was timely based on subsequent events, asserting that Textron's actions were not separate acts of discrimination but reaffirmations of the initial demotion decision. Consequently, Newsom's EEOC filing on June 21, 1990, was deemed untimely. Additionally, Newsom claimed retaliation under T.C.A. 4-21-301(1) for his discharge on March 27, 1992, following his EEOC charge and lawsuit against Textron, asserting that his termination violated the statute prohibiting retaliation against individuals who oppose discriminatory practices or participate in related proceedings.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA), a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) engagement in a protected activity, 2) that the defendant was aware of this activity, 3) an adverse employment action taken by the defendant against the plaintiff, and 4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. In this case, Textron concedes the first three elements, leaving only the causal connection in dispute regarding Newsom’s discharge in March 1992 following his age discrimination suit filed in August 1991 and his EEOC charge from June 1990.
Newsom claims a causal link exists due to the seven-month gap between his suit and termination, asserting Textron's stated reason for his dismissal—receiving meals from vendors during bidding—was pretextual. He argues that other employees engaged in similar conduct without facing discipline. Additionally, he points to Textron's Business Conduct Guidelines, which he interprets as permitting reasonable business entertainment.
However, Textron contends that Newsom was terminated not for accepting meals but for favoring Tool Group in contract awards despite them not being the lowest bidders, awarding contracts without proper supervisor approval, and holding unauthorized meetings with Tool Group during the bidding process. Textron's evidence indicates these actions, rather than the receipt of meals, justified the termination. Newsom has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Textron's reasons for his dismissal were pretextual. His affidavit and references to other employees’ conduct do not adequately counter Textron’s justification for his termination.
Newsom's claims against Textron were dismissed due to insufficient evidence supporting his termination's alleged motive. He argued that he was fired for receiving business meals, but only cited his belief that the real reason was his prior age discrimination lawsuit, which the court deemed inadequate to raise a genuine factual dispute. The court found that Textron's stated reasons for termination—violating company policies and failing to perform job duties—were not pretextual.
In his claim of outrageous conduct, Newsom contended that Textron's actions during his termination, including reporting him to federal authorities and requiring him to collect his belongings in a garbage bag while being observed by colleagues, were extreme and humiliating. However, the court ruled that these actions did not meet the legal threshold for outrageous conduct, which requires behavior that is utterly intolerable in a civilized society.
Regarding his defamation claim, Newsom alleged that Textron's report to the federal government about his bidding conduct was unfounded and caused him emotional distress. The court found that he failed to identify any specific defamatory statements or prove they were false, which is necessary for a defamation claim. Consequently, the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Textron was affirmed, with costs assessed against Newsom.
