Court: Supreme Court of the United States; January 14, 1971; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
39 U.S.C. § 4006 allows the Postmaster General to mark letters as 'Unlawful' and return them to the sender if he determines, based on satisfactory evidence, that the recipient is seeking money for obscene materials or distributing related information. The statute includes provisions for a hearing conducted by a Judicial Officer after a complaint, with the possibility of administrative appeal. Section 4007 permits district courts to order the detention of a defendant's incoming mail if there is probable cause to believe a violation of § 4006 has occurred.
In the case involving Tony Rizzi, a magazine distributor, the District Court found § 4006 unconstitutional, citing the precedent set in Freedman v. Maryland, which mandates that: (1) the censor must initiate judicial review and demonstrate that the material in question is unprotected, (2) prompt judicial review is essential, and (3) any pre-judicial restraint must be minimal and fixed in duration. The court also ruled § 4007 insufficient since it does not guarantee prompt review and permits discretionary action by the Postmaster General.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the administrative censorship scheme under §§ 4006 and 4007 violates the First Amendment due to inadequate protections against the suppression of protected expression. Key deficiencies included a lack of governmental judicial involvement in mail restriction processes, insufficient standards for prompt review, and failure to limit pre-judicial restraints to the shortest necessary duration. The rulings from both cases, No. 55 and No. 58, were upheld.
39 U.S.C. 4006 allows the Postmaster General to take action against individuals attempting to obtain or disseminate obscene material through the mail. Upon satisfactory evidence, the Postmaster General may instruct postmasters to return mail to the sender marked 'Unlawful' and prohibit the payment of money orders or postal notes to the individual involved, with procedures governed by departmental regulations. These proceedings begin with a written complaint from the General Counsel, followed by a trial-like hearing held by the Judicial Officer, who issues a decision including findings of fact and reasons, with a provision for administrative appeal. An order under 4006 cannot be issued until these proceedings conclude. However, if the Postmaster General seeks to detain the defendant's incoming mail before the proceedings finish, he can request a temporary restraining order from the U.S. District Court, demonstrating probable cause of statutory violation. The court may allow examination of detained mail unrelated to the alleged unlawful activity, but its action does not impact the ongoing statutory proceedings.
In the case of Mail Box, administrative proceedings were initiated on November 1, 1968, with the hearing concluding on December 5, 1968, and a decision issued on December 31, 1968, deeming the magazines obscene. Mail Box subsequently filed a lawsuit claiming 4006's unconstitutionality, which resulted in a three-judge court ruling the statute unconstitutional for failing to meet standards set in Freedman v. Maryland, vacating the administrative order, and mandating the immediate delivery of all Mail Box's mail.
In Book Bin, the Postmaster General sought a 4007 order to detain mail while 4006 proceedings were pending. Book Bin counterclaimed, asserting that both 4006 and 4007 were unconstitutional, leading to another three-judge court ruling both statutes unconstitutional.
The court affirmed that the procedures outlined in 4006 are constitutionally inadequate under Freedman v. Maryland, as they fail to provide sufficient standards for temporary mail detentions based solely on a finding of 'probable cause' for obscenity. The court emphasized the necessity of procedural safeguards to protect free expression as outlined in previous cases, noting that government procedures regulating obscenity must not undermine constitutionally protected speech. The judgment highlighted that the lack of essential procedural protections—such as the burden on the censor to prove unprotected expression, requirements for prompt judicial review, and limitations on pre-emptive restraints—renders the administrative censorship scheme created by 4006 and 4007 unconstitutional. Unlike the Maryland scheme in Freedman, where prior restraint was absolute, the 4006 process allows for administrative determinations before any mail restrictions are placed, yet still lacks the necessary judicial oversight.
The procedure outlined fails to require the Postmaster General to seek a swift judicial ruling on the obscenity of materials, placing the onus on distributors to initiate legal action to prove their magazines are protected expression. The First Amendment mandates that the government bear this burden. Judicial determination in adversarial proceedings is essential to safeguard freedom of expression, and only such a process can validly impose final restraint. Once an administrative order is issued against a distributor, there is no provision for judicial review, allowing the Postmaster to label orders as 'Unlawful' and return them without recourse, which poses risks to constitutionally protected speech. The inherent censorship role of the Postmaster may lead to less sensitivity to free expression than an independent court. The appellants' suggestion to render the administrative order ineffective during judicial review does not compel the government to seek prompt judicial determination, and it is not the court's role to amend statutes. The Postmaster General's authority to request detention of mail under section 4007 does not remedy the lack of prompt judicial adjudication required by the First Amendment, as it remains discretionary for the Attorney General to act. Additionally, relief from the district court based on 'probable cause' does not satisfy the need for a thorough judicial review of obscenity. The court aligns with prior rulings emphasizing the necessity for prompt judicial review before imposing severe restrictions under sections 4006 and 4007. The statute also fails to ensure that any initial restraints are temporary and aligned with judicial resolution, undermining the requirement for a final determination on the obscenity of the materials.
Appellees lack access to prompt judicial review regarding obscenity, only able to seek full review after prolonged administrative processes, which they must initiate themselves. This delay poses a significant threat to their First Amendment rights without a definitive judicial ruling on obscenity. The judgments of the three-judge courts in cases Nos. 55 and 58 are affirmed, with Mr. Justice BLACK concurring. The excerpt discusses the legislative history of Sections 4006 and 4007, with Section 4006 enacted in 1950 allowing the Postmaster General to impound mail for 20 days pending review. In 1959, the Post Office sought to extend this period and modify the necessity standard to 'public interest,' but Congress instead enacted Section 4007, limiting the Postmaster General's authority to issue interim orders and requiring court involvement. Senate reports expressed concerns about potential overreach and lack of due process, noting that the Post Office justified the need for these powers to address fraudulent operators. Section 4007 additionally permits the Postmaster General to seek impounding orders during ongoing proceedings under 39 U.S.C. 4005, which has been upheld against First Amendment challenges. The Government asserts that Section 4006 complies with constitutional standards, akin to the fraud statute upheld in Donaldson v. Read Magazine, although it does not argue that Donaldson definitively validates Section 4006.
The Government expressed concerns during oral arguments that affirming the case could threaten the legitimacy of 4005 and the precedent set by Donaldson, but provided no supporting arguments for this claim. The current consideration is limited to a single magazine issue, and the court does not address the appellees' assertion regarding the constitutional right to receive materials via mail as discussed in Stanley v. Georgia. Historical context is provided with a reference to a 1962 opinion suggesting Congress could implement noncriminal judicial processes with specific procedural safeguards. However, doubts arise about Congress's authority to permit processes that lack full judicial involvement, as emphasized by Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day. The Judicial Officer, appointed by the Postmaster General, has quasi-judicial roles, yet the Constitution mandates a fully participatory judicial process in noncriminal censorship, which 4006 does not satisfy. Freedman v. Maryland and Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown are cited as models for judicial procedures aimed at regulating obscene materials. A provision added to prevent judicial review during administrative proceedings was influenced by Postmaster General Summerfield's concerns about obscenity in the mail. Additionally, while orders under 4006 and 4007 allow recipients to access certain mail at post offices, questions arise about whether such actions infringe on First Amendment rights, referencing Lamont v. Postmaster General.
