State v. Robert Dunlap

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02C01-9801-CC-00009

Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee; September 21, 1998; Tennessee; State Appellate Court

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Robert Emmet Dunlap, Jr. was convicted of three counts of selling cocaine in Henry County and received concurrent ten-year sentences for each count. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, Dunlap appealed on three grounds: 

1. Challenging the trial court's refusal to allow him to subpoena jurors to investigate whether extrajudicial information influenced their verdict.
2. Arguing that the court erred in not compelling the state to disclose the criminal record of the confidential informant who testified against him.
3. Contending that the court wrongly denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal on count five of the indictment.

The evidence against Dunlap included recordings of the cocaine transactions made with a confidential informant, Dan Grooms, who was cooperating with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) due to his own legal troubles. Grooms had a criminal history and was compensated for his cooperation. The trial court expressed concern over the integrity of the jury's verdict amidst Dunlap's claims regarding potential juror misconduct, but ultimately maintained the jury's decision.

The trial court denied the appellant's request to subpoena jurors, emphasizing that an affidavit from a juror alleging misconduct is necessary before issuing a subpoena. Tennessee case law indicates varying perspectives on the admissibility of juror affidavits or testimony concerning juror misconduct and its sufficiency for a new trial. Tennessee Rule of Evidence 606(b) restricts juror testimony about deliberations but allows testimony regarding extraneous prejudicial information or outside influences. Information about a juror’s prior knowledge of an accused's criminal record is considered extraneous and can be prejudicial if it affects the verdict.

The appellant's case was complicated by Ms. McMackin's hearsay statements about discussions among jurors, which were deemed insufficient to warrant further investigation. The acknowledgment by two jurors of discussing extraneous information did not lead to any juror being willing to provide an affidavit. This reluctance creates a challenge for the defense, as jurors may fear repercussions from their peers or the community, leading to a difficult position where the lack of an affidavit hinders the ability to question jurors about misconduct. The trial court's discretion and the sanctity of jury verdicts are also highlighted as critical considerations.

The trial judge must investigate the potential impact of extraneous prejudicial information on the jury to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial. If a jury is exposed to extra-record evidence that could be substantially prejudicial, it is the trial judge's responsibility to assess whether this exposure has influenced the verdict and to determine the appropriate course of action. The judge has broad discretion in conducting such inquiries but cannot initiate them based solely on unverified speculation. In this case, the judge is tasked with investigating whether jurors received information regarding the appellant's past criminal history and if that information affected their verdict. If both inquiries yield affirmative answers, a new trial must be ordered.

The appellant also asserts that the trial court erred by not requiring the state to disclose the criminal record of confidential informant Grooms, claiming this omission violated due process under the precedent established in Brady v. Maryland. The case law indicates that while the state is not obligated to disclose the criminal records of its witnesses, failure to disclose evidence that could impeach a witness may violate due process if it is material to the case's outcome. Materiality is defined as having a reasonable probability of changing the trial's result if disclosed. The relevant case law emphasizes that the prosecution's suppression of favorable evidence can undermine confidence in the trial's outcome.

In the case of Copeland, the Court found no merit in the appellant’s claims regarding the confidential informant's criminal record, determining it was not material to the trial's outcome. The informant was identified as a compensated "snitch," and his testimony was corroborated by the accompanying officer. The appellants could not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the trial's results would differ if the informant's criminal record had been disclosed. Similarly, Grooms' criminal history was deemed non-material; he admitted to having prior felony convictions and cooperating with law enforcement to avoid a life sentence. The evidence, including microcassette tapes and Agent Azbill's testimony, supported the transactions in question.

The appellant also challenged the trial court's denial of his motion for acquittal on count three of the indictment, concerning a cocaine sale on May 16, 1995. However, the appellant's argument incorrectly addressed count five, relating to May 25, 1995. The court upheld the sufficiency of evidence for both counts. The trial court's assessment of evidence focused on legal sufficiency rather than weight, affirming that Grooms' purchase of cocaine from the appellant was sufficiently evidenced by Agent Azbill’s testimony and the audio recording. Despite the tape's unclear nature, the testimonies provided adequate support for the conviction. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment in all respects, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.